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Foreword
IN ORDER TO WRITE a book about the development of leg-
islatures in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, it was first
essential to determine how to identify a legislature. Obviously,
reliance could not be placed upon names, as evidenced by the
Olbiil era Kelulau, the body which functioned in the Palau dis-
trict between the years 1955 and 1963: translated into English,
this would be “meeting place of whispers!” Looking at functions
proved equally ineffective. Belying the etymology, early in their
histories institutions now referred to as legislatures “had little or
no concern with legislation.”1 Even today, if it be accepted that
law-making is the measure of a legislature, how can we reconcile
the facts that in quantity of output, legislatures are eclipsed by the
sheer bulk of quasi-legislation issued by administrative agencies
and that the drama of their impact is overshadowed by judicial de-
cisions setting impersonal precedents as binding as statutes for all
to observe?
Viewing the same problem from another perspective, at the
1234th meeting of the United Nations Trusteeship Council in
1964, Mr. Shakov, the representative of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, declared “no representative legislative body as yet
existed in the [American Administered Trust] Territory [of the Pa-
cific Islands] … since the Council of Micronesia had turned out to
be a purely consultative body” and that the then proposed Terri-
tory-wide, bicameral Congress of Micronesia “would be only a
consultative body, like the body that already existed … [because]
no legislation could enter into force until it had been approved
by the High Commissioner….”2 There can be no quarrel with the
1 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn
and Co., 1950), p. 268. See also Charles A. Beard and John D. Lewis, “Represen-
tative Government in Evolution,” American Political Science Review, 26:2 (April,
1932), 231–235; A. F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament (2d ed.; London: Long-
mans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926), pp. 44–60; George L. Haskins, The Growth
of English Representative Government (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1948), passim.
2 Trusteeship Council Official Records, 31st Sess., 1234th meeting, June 8,
1964, pars. 14, 15. In future references, these reports will be referred to as
TCOR.
contention of the Soviet position if it implied that the exercise of
law-making is insufficient per se to identify a legislature. However,
the further constraining of the definion of a “legislature” to those
bodies in which “the last word about what the law is to be rests”3
or whose “decision is both necessary and sufficient for the final
enactment of a law”4 ignores the integral involvement of the exec-
utive and fails to face the reality of the initiative, referendum, and
recall. Such attempts to define a legislature by assigning it a quota
of functions or residual powers reawaken the unfruitful attempts
by political philosophers of yesteryear to identify the locus of sov-
ereignty. Clearly, the classifier “legislature” carries no undisputed
meaning nor necessarily describes any single institution common
to various systems of government.
None of the foregoing denies that it is principally through the
enactment of statutes that the modern legislature has derived its
saliency. A comparable inquiry into primacy put during Cromwell’s
Long Parliament would probably have prompted a reply referring
to the redress of grievances and the subordination of the king. In-
deed, there is a strong probability that there are no functional de-
limitations to the activity of a legislature, be it granting divorces,
conducting wars, choosing chief executives, or molding a nation’s
opinion. Rather, in any political system the legislature performs
functions appropriate to that system as they have evolved by
virtue of the legislature’s representative nature and its character-
istic group process.
Of all political institutions, the legislature as a corporate body
is most aptly designed to bring the element of representation to
political decision-making. Even when the legislature is no more
than the agent of a particular stratified level of society, with the
legislators bespeaking themselves as well as their class in accor-
dance with its mandate, to that extent their action is bindingly
representational. Similarly, the skewing of the legislature’s com-
position through selection of its members by a narrowly restricted
suffrage does not prevent it through political fiction from func-
tioning as the representative of the entire constituency. So long
as the represented endorse, accept, tolerate, or at least do not
openly reject the conduct of deliberations in their name, the deci-
3 K. C. Wheare, Legislatures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963),
p. 3.
4 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliaments (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd.,
1961), p. 116.
vii
sions of the legislature psychologically are theirs and this in turn
legitimizes the legislature’s actions. The King’s Curia becomes
a nascent legislature when to its membership are added those
who are recognized spokesmen for the views of others beside the
King. Even in the absence of all powers of initiation, a pro forma
concurrence with an executive-determined program in no way pre-
cludes a legislative body possessed of representative character
from sanctioning the proposed course of action.
Representation is not confined to the legislative institution. In
view of the manner in which constituencies are geographically con-
torted, fields of candidates partisanly narrowed, and the psycholog-
ical processes of identification cultivated by modern mass media
techniques, on the American scene many constituents may consider
the elected chief executive to mirror the views they hold more aptly
than do the members of the legislature. However, this constitutes
more a dissatisfaction with the style and product of representation
than a transference of the basic acceptance of the legislature as
the prime representative institution. Not even in the new American
state constitutions does the elected chief executive participate in
the most fundamental of law-making functions performed by the
legislature, the enactment of constituent legislation; and in the case
of the United States constitution itself, there has not been any effort
to modify the sharing in the task by legislatures on two levels of gov-
ernment, to the exclusion of the executive.
The other distinguishing characteristic of the legislative institu-
tion is its collegial nature and the attendant processes it observes.
The legislature’s structuring reflects its group character by the
minimizing of formal hierarchy and the wide internal dispersal
of power. In the parliamentary system of government, legislative
direction rests in a committee, while Mr. Speaker ought more fit-
tingly be referred to as umpire than as the spokesman his title
implies. But whether adopting the British or the American pat-
tern of leadership, the legislature meets collectively and moves to
collective decision, be this by simple majority, extraordinary ma-
jority, or through consensus to unanimity. When not acting as a
body, the legislature typically utilizes smaller groups rather than
individuals to further its functions. Committees screen and refine
legislative proposals, or at least the latter; when it becomes nec-
essary to reconcile policy differences between the two houses of a
bicameral legislature, a conference committee serves the purpose.
Duties associated with the administration of the legislature are as-
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signed to accounts committees, rules committees, and a host of
other sub-collegial bodies. Delegation is to groups, specialization
is formalized through groups, and the individual legislator shapes
his conduct accordingly. The member unobservant or defiant of
legislative norms soon finds himself subjected to group sanctions
and, if the degree of his flaunting warrants, formal censure and
expulsion expressed through vote of the legislature. In short, to
the extent that all institutional effort embodies both individual and
collective aspects, the legislature in its process emphasizes the
collegial.
It is against this backdrop of the universal nature of the legisla-
tive institution5 that the legislatures of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands may be identified and the development of the leg-
islative process delineated.
5 For a more complete treatment, see Norman Meller, “The Identification and
Classification of Legislatures,” Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 10:4
(Oct., 1966), 308.
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Preface
THIS BOOK COVERS a ten-year period of research. During
the course of its preparation, I received the confidences of numer-
ous Micronesians and American administrative personnel in the
field. In order to respect their wishes, I have left many sources
unidentified and have modified references sufficiently to prevent
attribution to specific individuals. Their authors know that I value
their contributions as highly as those from people of whom men-
tion could be, and has been, made.
The reader will immediately note that the quotations from ma-
terials written in English by Micronesians frequently read a little
“quaintly.” This but reflects the fact that the people of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands are still becoming familiar with the
grammar and idiom of the English language. Rather than rewrite
these statements correctly, or liberally pepper them with inser-
tions of “sic,” I have included them in haec verba so that this
dimension of Micronesian life may be literally depicted.
There are many limitations to the research upon which this
work is based. For one thing, it is of Micronesia as viewed through
the eyes of a Westerner. Little systematic inquiry has been at-
tempted by Micronesians themselves since the pioneer effort of
Sakuma in 1946 to distribute in Palau what in effect was a public
opinion questionnaire, and this attempt was cut short by the ob-
jections of the high chiefs. Throughout my decade of study, there
has been the continuing risk of influencing findings by the mere
playing of the participant-observer. This was borne home in 1956
when, watching the Marshallese congress in session, my probing
queries about the authority enjoyed by the Marshallese Holdover
Committee unintentionally instigated an effort to limit its scope.
At times, however, I have deliberately sought to shape the course
of the legislative process in the Trust Territory, as when I trained
Micronesian legislators and legislative staff for their tasks, but a
conscious effort has been made to prevent this involvement from
coloring my analyses.
The account of my indebtedness can never be fully recorded. At
various times, financial assistance has been received from the Tri-
Institutional Pacific Program, the Legislative Reference Bureau,
the University Research Council, the Social Science Research
Institute, and the Institute for Technical Interchange of the East-
West Center, all either part of or participated in by the University
of Hawaii. The Hawaiian and Pacific Collection of the Univer-
sity’s Sinclair Library, and its staff, have proven invaluable. The
Administration of the Trust Territory has spared no effort in its
cooperation. Marion G. Saunders, Dr. Allan F. Saunders and Dr.
Robert B. Stauffer greatly facilitated the collection of background
data. The New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National
University kindly undertook the duplication of the final draft while
I was in that Australian trusteeship studying its “national” leg-
islature. The manuscript itself has been reviewed in whole or in
part by Dr. William Alkire, Dr. Ron Crocombe, Fran Defngin, Tom
Dinell, Dr. Daniel Hughes, Kurt Ludwig, Dr. Leonard Mason, Dr.
Robert R. Robbins, Dr. John L. Taylor, Luke Tman, Kaleb Udui,
Raymond Ulochong, Strik Yoma, and John de Young, and the value
of their comments and criticisms can here only be cumulatively ac-
knowledged, although I of course stand responsible for any error
yet remaining. And finally, how can one number the many courte-
sies extended to me and my wife by countless people throughout
the Trust Territory?
On July 9, 1965, the workshop which preceded the convening
of the Congress of Micronesia drew to a close. When I would
next see all thirty-three members-elect assembled, they would be
congressmen. Many of them were former students at the Univer-
sity of Hawaii, a few even members of my class on legislatures.
That memorable Friday afternoon was the eve of their receipt of
the power to determine the destiny of the Trust Territory. I held
then no reservation about their competence to assume that awe-
some responsibility—nor do I now.
NORMAN MELLER
Honolulu, 1968
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CHAPTER 1
Micronesia—Past and Present
NORTH OF THE EQUATOR and west of the dateline, spread
across an expanse of the western Pacific larger than the whole of
the continental United States, lies the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. Its thousands of small islands, separated by hundreds of
miles of open ocean, prompted Domeny de Rienzi to propose the
name of “Micronesia” for this region1 to the Société de Géogra-
phie of Paris.
At that time—1831—it was believed that racial, linguistic, and
ethnological factors sharply distinguished the inhabitants of these
“micro” islands from the Melanesians (Lemanesia) to the south
and from the peoples of the Polynesian Triangle. Later research
has revealed Micronesians share few things in common such as
the reversible sailing canoe, which set them apart from other
inhabitants of Oceania. Rather, basic cultural commonalities with
the other Pacific Island peoples negate this three-fold divisional
concept of Oceania.2 Although mutual intelligibility is lacking, all
of the indigenous languages have a Malayo-Polynesian root. In
short, the Marshalls, Carolines, and Mariana Islands, the three
major archipelagoes in the Trust Territory, today are collectively
identified primarily as components of a geographic expression
1 To be completely accurate, “Micronesia” also encompasses the Gilbert Is-
lands, now part of the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony administered by Great
Britain, and Nauru, formerly a trusteeship under joint Australian, British, and
New Zealand responsibility but now an independent nation. Both are south of the
equator. Guam, an unincorporated territory of the United States, lies at the west-
ern edge of Micronesia as part of the Mariana Islands but outside the boundaries
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Recognizing the near concordance
of geographic “Micronesia” with the political Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands, the new legislature for the Trust Territory has been named the “Congress
of Micronesia.” “Someday in the future the terms Trust Territory or Territory may
cease to be used because of a change in the political status of the area. Regard-
less of change, this area will always remain Micronesia.” Recommendation on
naming the congress, made by the Working Committee to the Territorial Legisla-
tive Committee of the Council of Micronesia, Jan. 9, 1963.
2 For example, see extensive treatment of Micronesian, Melanesian, and Poly-
nesian material culture in Saul H. Riesenberg, “The Cultural Position of Ponape
in Oceania” (Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley: 1950).
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which historical happenstance has artificially welded together into
a political unit. First under the Spanish, next the Germans, then
administered by the Japanese pursuant to a League of Nations
mandate, and now governed by the United States in accordance
with the Trusteeship Agreement, these Micronesians have been a
subject people under alien rule, until recently outside the stream
of the modern world.
Despite having 2,100 islands, the Territory aggregates but 687
square miles of land, an area smaller than the state of Rhode Is-
land, scattered over three million miles of ocean.3 The low coral
islands, frequently strung out in an irregular ribbon around a
large lagoon to form an atoll, are sometimes barely awash above
the level of the ocean. The volcanic islands, more massive in area,
rise to greater elevations, but the tallest, Agrihan in the North-
ern Marianas, only reaches a height of a little over 3,000 feet. For
the most part, the Marshalls are atolls, the Marianas high islands,
and the Carolines composed of both. The two largest of the high
islands, Babelthuap in the Palaus and Ponape in the Eastern Car-
olines, together account for two-fifths of the Territory’s total land
mass. All of this area might be fitted within the single Truk lagoon.
Most of the islands are of either coral or igneous composition
and the sedimentary deposits which are the product of the islands’
weathering. Some metamorphic rock of continental origin occurs
in Yap and Palau, evidencing these islands to be but the tops of
great wrinkles in the Asian continental shelf. The soils of the high
islands are generally more fertile, while the coral origins of the
low islands limit their productive capacities. Nevertheless, the is-
lands with the densest populations tend to be the atolls, a fact
which bespeaks a heavy reliance upon fishing for the primary
source of protein. The islands’ geological formation has set narrow
bounds to their mineral resources. With World War II terminating
the mining of manganese in the Marianas and of low grade baux-
ite deposits on Babelthuap, and the cessation of the exploitation
of Angaur’s phosphate beds a few years ago, the Trust Territory’s
mainstay is its agriculture, supplemented by its oceanic resources.
All of Micronesia, except for two small, uninhabited islands in
the Northern Marianas, falls within the tropics. Here are to be
3 The limited land available for Micronesian use is further indicated by
the fact that over three-fifths of the total area is owned or controlled by the
Trust Territory Administration. Title to some of this public domain is dis-
puted.
found the South Sea Islands of Hollywood scenarios and romantic
novels, with windblown palm trees, azure seas, and wave-lapped,
dazzling beaches. Vegetation everywhere is lush and verdant, save
on the drier atolls of the northern Marshalls. Temperature re-
mains remarkably equable and the humidity uncomfortably high
throughout the year; the winds and rain are the most variable of
the climatic elements. The northeast tradewind belt covers the
eastern-most part of the Territory, and the remainder falls within
the fringe of the monsoon zone of east Asia. Precipitation varies
with seasonal shifts of the wind. Rainfall averages eight to four-
teen feet a year in the southern-most half, while in the northern
islands, which have marked wet and dry seasons, it may not reach
half that amount. Micronesia is the spawning ground for Pacific
typhoons, and every few years some part of the Territory is dev-
astated or narrowly misses destruction by tropical storm. Relying
mainly upon a subsistence economy tied to the products of farm
and sea, every untoward climatic variation disrupts the islanders’
nicely attuned dependence upon their natural environment, and
prolonged drought or heavy storm has proven disastrous to the
populations of whole islands.
The origin of the Micronesians remains a matter of conjec-
ture. Voyages into Western Micronesia may have originated from
the Moluccas in the East Indies and the Bismarcks northeast
of New Guinea several thousand years before the beginning of the
Christian era. More likely, the Philippines were the source of hardy
travelers who deliberately set sail easterly or, blown off their course,
drifted to the islands of Micronesia, some returning to acquaint
others of their discoveries. Into the islands these peoples intro-
duced pigs and chickens and brought the roots, seed crops, and
trees which had sustained them in their former homes. Adapt-
ing these to both high island and low island environments, they
also evolved new subsistence patterns which utilized the limited
indigenous flora and rich marine resources of their new abode. Al-
though most Micronesians are of medium stature, brown skin, and
have straight to wavy black hair, their many sources are revealed
by the Mongoloid, Negroid, and Polynesian features encountered.
Attesting to the people’s manifold origins, the multiplicity of
adaptive processes, and to the degrees of spatial dispersion
which kept groups isolated, diversities in physical character-
istics, languages, and cultural systems today set Marshallese,
Ponapeans, Kusaiens, Trukese, Ulithians, Yapese, Palauans, and
3
Chamorros apart from one another, as well as from the Polynesians
who occupy the outliers of Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro.
“Any attempt to reduce the great variety of institutional systems
which prevail throughout Micronesia to common denominators
would convert them into relatively meaningless categories.”4
However, it is safe to generalize that the Micronesians’ political,
social, and economic systems were built around kinship ties and,
in some places, attendant complex class cleavages, and that these
lineage (extended family) relationships continue to play an im-
portant role. In the Carolines and the Marshalls, the basic unit
of the political-social organization consists of a number of matri-
lineages, with the members living in small hamlets or dispersed,
close to the lands they farm. In the Marianas, the long contact of
the Chamorros with the Spanish resulted in the disappearance of
traditional lineages and class structure and in their replacement
by the Hispanicized, Western-style, nuclear family and amorphous
social distinctions depending on wealth.
A hereditary class system in the Marshalls separates the com-
moner (kajur) from those of royal status (iroij), and the para-
mount chiefs (iroij laplap) exercise residual feudal authority over
their liege subjects.5 Ponape in the Eastern Carolines was for-
merly divided into independent kingdoms, each with two parallel
lines of nobility, and even to this day most adult males on the is-
land hold titles either within these noble or in commoner lines,
which provide them status and a degree of authority in local so-
cial life. Notwithstanding missionary contact, the modification of
traditional Kusaiean patterns due to depopulation, and that is-
land’s complex system of titles’ falling into disuse, the former
kingship relationship still exerts a degree of influence in socio-
political decisions. In the central Carolines, neither Truk nor the
atolls lying between the Truk lagoon and Yap, farther west, know
the class strata of the other areas. Here the community chief or-
dinarily is the senior male of the lineage which reputedly first
settled on a particular island or attained ascendancy through
war. This chief receives a degree of homage in the form of gifts and
first fruits from the other lineages but enjoys relatively minimal en-
hanced prestige and authority. “A similar level of social organization,
4 John Useem, “Institutions of Micronesia,” Far Eastern Survey, 17:2 (Jan. 28,
1948), 23.
5 The traditional chiefly structures of the Marshalls, Palau, and Ponape are de-
scribed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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except for matrilineal descent, exists on the two Polynesian islands
of Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro in the southeastern Carolines.”6
Stratification reached a peak in the Western Carolines with Yap’s7
nine social classes and sharply partitioned caste relationships.
Through Western contact these class cleavages have been some-
what moderated, but they still carry social prestige and leave an
imprint upon local political action. In Palau, at the western extreme
of the Carolines, the heads of the ten ranking clans of each village,
numbering the chief among them, traditionally formed a council
(klobak) and constituted the local bureaucracy. The villages were
loosely linked together into districts, which are today’s municipali-
ties, and they in turn had their klobak with its paramount chief. Con-
federations of these districts represented the most extensive form
of supra-local political integration found in Micronesia and have
been perpetuated in the person of the two high chiefs of the Koror
and Melekeok confederations. These chiefs have played prominent
parts in the legislature of the Palau district and remain potent forces
in matters involving Palauan custom. Reflective of Palauan linkage
with Western economy, the upper strata are the wealthy, bifurcated
into the meteet, who are senior-ranking title holders and their close
relatives, and the merau, who have amassed fortunes but come from
lower ranking clans.
Pre-contact native religious beliefs were promised on reverence
of ancestors. Serving as a counterfoil to autocratic abuses, spirit
worship and shamanistic practices also controlled over other
forms of deviant social behavior. Some of the Outer Islanders in
the Yap district continue to hold their pagan beliefs, and a seg-
ment of the people in Palau are members of the Modekngei, a
movement with dogma somewhat reminiscent of the cargo cult.8
The great majority of the Micronesians today are Christians, with
the Chamorros almost all Roman Catholic, the Marshallese pre-
dominantly Protestant, and the balance of the Micronesians di-
vided between these two religions. A strong undercurrent of su-
6 12th Annual Report [of the United States] to the United Nations on the Admin-
istration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1958, to June 30, 1959,
p. 77. In future references, these reports will be referred to as [no.] Annual Report of
the United States to the United Nations, [date].
7 The caste system of Yap and the nature of the former Yap empire are delineated
in Chapter 6.
8 For extended treatment, see Arthur J. Vidich, “The Political Impact of Colo-
nial Administration” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: 1952), Chap. 10; see also
Homer G. Barnett, Being a Palauan (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961),
pp. 83–85.
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perstition and taboo persists throughout the area, however, and
sorcery accompanied by the simple magic formulas of traditional
times is still practiced to some degree.
The colonial powers introduced Micronesia to a commercial
money economy in which personal self-advancement replaces the
communal values of the traditional society. The Micronesians re-
sponded by eclectically accepting the food supplements, minor
luxuries, and durable trade goods purchased from the sales of co-
pra, trochus, and handicraft but also retaining their customary
measures for living the good life. Subsistence economy, cash econ-
omy, and in some favored areas with regular surpluses (as Pon-
ape), prestige economy have all been fitted into a composite, and
“because the natives bent without breaking, the acculturation of
Micronesia proceeded without the social disintegration which so
often accompanies superimposed changes.”9
Typically in Micronesia, the individual is a member of many dif-
ferent groupings: his immediate household, his lineage, the clan
tracing descent from a traditional ancestor, and in the Western
Carolines, age-based groups and social clubs. Companies gath-
ered for fishing, farming, and community work projects may be
built upon any of these. During the Japanese period, age-graded
organizations were encouraged, and to a minor degree their im-
print is still felt in athletic activities and the performance of
community labor. For the satisfaction of normal wants, coopera-
tion through traditional island organization, with each person’s
rights and duties defined in relation to the common products and
projects, has sufficed. Essential everyday needs for the bulk of the
population continue to be met mainly by family effort. It has been
only as the Micronesian has adopted the individualism of the West
that he has turned to earning his own living and making his way
through personal competitive effort. Work for the government and
enterprises based on Western patterns have furthered this break
from tradition.
Commercial activity in the Trust Territory is chiefly made up
of modest family proprietorships and chartered trading companies
engaging in import and export business. Some of the latter have
grown into extensive operations, with their sales of trade goods
each year passing the million dollar mark. Manufacturing is
largely confined to cottage-type industries in the subsistence sec-
9 John Useem, “Governing the Occupied Areas of the South Pacific,” Human
Organization, 4:3 (Summer, 1945), 3.
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tor. Construction firms are just making their appearance, several
districts have small boat building and repair yards, and service-
type activities are springing up adjacent to district headquarters
throughout the Territory. All of these are Micronesian-owned and
fail to rival the large-scale enterprise supported by Japanese cap-
ital prior to World War II. The government continues to perform
numerous services which elsewhere may usually be found within
the private sector of the economy. The repair of equipment, stor-
age and refrigeration facilities, transportation, and electric power
are but a few examples. The Kennedy Administration in 1962
opened the Territory to the free entry of United States citizens
and American investment, but safeguards precluding exploitation
of the region’s cheap labor and requirements for Micronesian par-
ticipation and eventual management have slowed the advent of
American enterprise in the area. The most recent development
has been the formation by Micronesians of the United Micronesia
Development Association to market all of the Territory’s copra
and, in conjunction with American companies, to operate the Trust
Territory’s airlines and a chain of tourist hotels. This represents
the first effort by Micronesians to undertake an economic venture
blanketing the entire Trust Territory.
Territorial imports now total about $10 million annually, with
the United States as the country of origin for two-thirds of the
foods, machinery, and other products destined for Island consump-
tion. In view of the marketing of most of the Territory’s products
through Japan as well as the lower price of that country’s manu-
factures, Japan is the second largest supplier of Territorial im-
ports. Each year the value of the Territory’s products sold exter-
nally falls far short of that of the goods brought into the Islands,
and the deficit is offset by governmental expenditures derived
from appropriated United States funds. For fiscal year 1967, in
part due to the drop in copra sales, external trade failed to equal
even one-quarter of the value of imports. Copra constitutes by far
the largest component of the Territory’s exports, dwarfing the in-
come earned from scrap metal, trochus, cacao, and handicraft. A
commercial fishery under American operation has only recently
commenced exporting from Palau. It is a somewhat ironic com-
mentary on the state of the Territory’s economy that, despite the
extensive oceanic resources of the area, imports of canned fish for
food annually run more than quadruple the income from external
sales and are about equal the value of the total Territorial catch.
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The total income of the Trust Territory is unknown: in the words
of the high commissioner, “We do not have reliable information on
our territorial productivity.”10 Governmental expenditures from all
sources for the 1965–1967 period approximated $23.3 million an-
nually, the commercial sector’s value of goods and services, about
$5.4 million, and the subsistence sector added another $11 mil-
lion. Not all of this was devoted to providing goods and services
available for Micronesian use as, for example, the $1,400,000 in
salaries paid to Micronesians which was primarily for military pur-
poses on Kwajalein.11 But after making adjustments for these and
other comparable items, there was a statistical per person aver-
age of a little over $400 in goods and services annually available
for Micronesian consumption and investment. Given the Microne-
sian’s general access to local food resources and the ubiquity of
production and exchange outside of the money economy, these fig-
ures substantiate the conclusion reached from casual observation:
in the absence of natural disaster, the Territory’s inhabitants en-
joy a standard of living modestly above subsistence level. On the
other hand, they are assured only a fairly simple and monotonous
pattern of life, hardly sufficient to satisfy the rising expectations
of the educated, younger Micronesians.
Almost 23 per cent of the able-bodied “adult” population falling
within the 14 to 65 years of age brackets work for wages and
salaries (7,500). A little less than half of these (3,500) are directly
employed by the government, and this group includes most of the
educated and experienced people in the Territory.12 Their numbers
are swelled by those who share in the monetary economy through
full-time, private entrepreneurial effort and by part-time produc-
tion of copra for export, handicraft, and produce. Cumulatively,
though, at least half of the total adult population remains engaged
in customary economic pursuits. This hardly offers horizons of
opportunity sufficient to accommodate the rapidly expanding pop-
ulation of the Trust Territory or the yearly increasing crop of high
school graduates unwilling to support themselves in accordance
with traditional Micronesian life-ways.
The present Trust Territory population of close to 91,500 people
is growing at an overall rate of almost 4 per cent annually, one of
10 Saipan District Panorama, Oct. 30, 1964, p. 2.
11 All data are extrapolated from Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., “Eco-
nomic Development Plan for Micronesia” (Washington: 1966), Parts III. IV, pp.
495–507.
12 Ibid., p. 511.
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the fastest in the world. During the Japanese period, the drastic
depopulation which initially set in after Micronesian contact with
Westernized civilization was halted, and the destruction and priva-
tions suffered during World War II only temporarily slowed, but
did not reverse, the expansionary trend. The rate has quickened
with American emphasis upon health and sanitation, and even Yap,
the last of the areas to recover from the debilitating impact of
Western contact, now registers an increase of inhabitants. It is es-
timated that by 1970 the number of the Trust Territory’s people
will have doubled since the advent of the American administra-
tion, only a quarter of a century. Already some of the small islands
in the Truk and Ponape administrative districts have become so
overcrowded that a portion of their population has been resettled.
“Demographic imbalance is rapidly becoming the rule rather than
the exception in Micronesia.”13 With half the population now less
than 20 years of age, the ever-mounting pressure upon the Admin-
istering Authority for additional school facilities has been one of
the reasons for placing education in the vanguard of augmented
governmental operations.
Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, in 1494 the whole of the Pacific
Ocean nominally came under Spanish influence. This sphere of in-
fluence narrowed with the centuries, as Spanish attention focused
upon the island areas north of the equator, and in Micronesia the
Spanish looked to Guam as a port of call along the galleon route
from the Philippines to Mexico. Adjacency led to the inclusion of
all the Northern Marianas under Spanish rule, while Spain was
slow to exercise control over the Carolines and never did establish
ascendancy over the more distant Marshalls. Germany, in extend-
ing its empire into the Pacific, moved to fill the vacuum and in
1885 declared a protectorate over the Marshalls, took formal pos-
session of Yap, and raised its flag on a number of the other islands
of the Central and Eastern Carolines, including Truk, Ponape, and
Kusaie. This clash between Spanish and German interests was
referred to Pope Leo XIII for arbitration. His determination con-
firmed Spain’s claim to sovereignty over the Carolines on the
condition that it maintain an orderly government. German eco-
nomic access still continued, and with the Spanish-American War
and the ceding of Guam to the United States, Germany purchased
13 Roland W. Force and Maryanne Force, “Political Change in Micronesia,” in
Roland W. Force, ed., Induced Political Change in the Pacific (Honolulu: Bishop
Museum Press, 1965), p. 6.
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the balance of the Marianas and the Carolines from Spain for $4.5
million. The American delegates to the Paris peace conference
could not agree on the advisability of American possession of all of
Spain’s Micronesian holdings. There was insufficient American in-
terest in the area, despite the extension of the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions’ activities into the Marshalls
and Eastern Carolines as early as 1852 and the long contact of
American seamen with “American Polynesia,” as the central Pa-
cific had been called by many cartographers.14
Spanish colonial policy in the Marianas set only minimal objec-
tives: pacification and Christianization of the indigenes, mainten-
ance of a way station for Spanish ships, and preservation at the
lowest possible cost of orderly government by the Chamorros and
by the Carolinians who had first been allowed to settle on Saipan
early in the nineteenth century. In the Carolines, when after papal
arbitration Spain belatedly tried to counter Germany’s imperial-
istic ambitions by establishing a system of administration, even
less was achieved. Spanish efforts to exploit the area’s economic
resources never were more than half-hearted. Contrasting with
Spain, once its hegemony was assured, Germany pushed beyond
constructing a Western system of law and order and concentrated
upon economic development of Micronesia through copra produc-
tion and the encouragement of commerce. The inhabitants were
required to plant coconut trees under penalty of punishment by
forced labor. Through indirect rule and the exercise of autocratic
direction, efficient administration was maintained. Public schools
were erected, health measures imposed, and roads extended. Ger-
man efforts were just beginning to bear fruit when Japanese forces
occupied the area early in World War I.
During the initial period of Japanese rule, the naval military
government ministered to the needs of the region. At the end
of 1920, Japan became formally responsible for the government
of the future Trust Territory under a class C mandate from the
League of Nations. This designation denoted that the people were
not deemed capable of self-governance for the foreseeable future.
In 1922, following abandonment by the United States of its ad-
vocacy of Yap’s internationalization, originally to safeguard Amer-
14 See Pearle E. Quinn, “The Diplomatic Struggle for the Carolines,” Pacific
Historical Review, 14:3 (Sept., 1945), 290; Earl S. Pomeroy, “American Policy Re-
specting the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas, 1898–1941, “Pacific Historical
Review, 17:1 (Feb., 1948), 43.
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ican interests in the trans-Pacific cable station there, Japanese
civilian rule of Micronesia was instituted under the South Seas
Government (Nanyo Cho). The naval period turned its attention
mainly to the opening up of promising islands by working through
indigenous political institutions. With the advent of civilian admin-
istration, the Japanese embarked upon an ambitious program of
economic exploitation and rapid colonization. Particularly around
the district centers, the Japanese encouraged accelerated modern-
ization and deliberately endeavored to undermine many aspects of
the traditional political systems by inducing acceptance of Japan-
ese life-ways.
Over the years, the Japanese substituted direct for indirect rule,
and the Micronesians were relegated to unimportance in their
own governance, frequently holding titular roles with little effec-
tive power. Major Japanese attention was directed to converting
the economy exclusively to the interests of homeland Japan by tap-
ping the ocean resources and producing the fertilizers, sugar, and
industrial alcohol essential to Japan’s welfare. Commercial fishing
and plantation agriculture were encouraged in the Marianas and
Palaus, and the latter became a wintering spa for tourists. The Mi-
cronesians were regarded as culturally and socially inferior, and
if the movement of Japanese, Koreans, and Okinawans into Micro-
nesia had continued, the indigenes would probably not only have
been reduced to a peasant proletariat but also eclipsed in all but
the outlying islands. By World War II, Japanese resident civilians
outnumbered the natives and on some islands far exceeded them.
For example, the single town of Garapan on the island of Saipan
had 29,000 Asian residents, almost five times the number of Cha-
morro and Carolinian inhabitants in the entire Marianas.
The education provided Micronesians stressed Japanese lan-
guage and customs and was vocationally oriented. Few opportuni-
ties for advanced education were afforded. The Japanese honored
their obligation to care for the health of the people by introducing
free medical care, and they also furnished a number of community
services, such as electricity in the urbanized areas. Primarily,
the Micronesians profited indirectly from the Japanese presence
through improved transportation and communications, designed
for furthering colonization and economic growth, and the filtering
down of the benefits derived from Japanese commercial and indus-
trial activity. The emphasis placed upon cash cropping of copra
and tapioca (manioc) gradually moved many of the Micronesians
11
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to ever greater dependence upon a money economy, an apprecia-
tion of the efficiency of the machine age, and a reliance upon its
products.
In 1935 the Japanese withdrew from the League of Nations,
and military objectives became increasingly dominant. Parts of the
islands were fortified in violation of the mandate conditions, al-
though the Japanese conscientiously continued to observe other
requirements, such as providing free education, albeit of a limited
nature, and expanding health and sanitation. With World War II,
military defense supplanted economic expansion, and Japanese ef-
forts were concentrated on military security. As the war continued
and conditions deteriorated, the depletion of food supplies caused
the Japanese to adopt ever harsher measures, commandeering
local foodstuffs and other necessary supplies for their military
forces and their colonists. Many of the Micronesians were dis-
placed from their homes and farms and deprived of medical care
and access to trade sources, and some suffered extreme privation.
By the end of World War II, civilian government had been eclipsed.
In the parts of the Trust Territory where the military forces were
not in direct control, political direction began to be reasserted
through traditional institutions which had previously been under-
going drastic erosion through the Japanese reliance upon direct
police supervision.
In World War II, when the islands came under American juris-
diction, naval military government teams tended to civilian needs,
as had the Japanese military government during World War I. Over
6,000 Americans were killed wresting Micronesia from Japanese
control,15 and the temper of the American people hardly counte-
nanced surrendering the islands to any other nation; conversely,
the United States had early declared it sought no territorial gains
from World War II. The placing of the area under United Nations
trusteeship resolved the dilemma, and in 1947, with the Trustee-
ship Agreement, the islands technically came under civil admin-
istration. Actually, at the same time President Truman signed the
agreement, he delegated authority on an interim basis to the Sec-
retary of the Navy and commissioned the Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Pacific Fleet, as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, so
that naval personnel continued their administration of the area un-
til 1951.
15 See Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World
War II, Vols. VII, VIII (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1953).
14 Micronesia—Past and Present
Shortly after the end of World War II, the general policies to
be observed by the United States in Micronesia were announced
in a “Pacific Charter” issued by the Pacific fleet commander. This
directive provided for the physical restoration of damaged prop-
erties and facilities, continued improvement of health and sanita-
tion, encouragement of self-governing communities, institution of
a sound program of economic development, and establishment of
an educational program.16 These objectives were more generally
augmented by Articles 73 and 76 of the United Nation’s Char-
ter. The former declares that the interests of the inhabitants of
territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure
of self-government are paramount and that the members of the
United Nations “accept as a public trust the obligation to promote
to the utmost within the system of international peace and secu-
rity established by the … Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants
of these territories….” Article 76 applies specifically to trustee-
ships and in part binds the United States “to encourage respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage
recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world.”
Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese
Mandated Islands spells out the responsibilities of the United
States in great detail. In discharging its obligations, the United
States is committed to:
1. foster the development of such political institutions as are suited
to the trust territory and shall promote the development of the inhab-
itants of the trust territory towards self-government or independence
as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust ter-
ritory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned: and to this end shall give the inhabitants of the trust terri-
tory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in
the territory; shall develop their participation in government; shall give
due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system
of law for the territory; and shall take other appropriate measures to-
ward these ends;
2. promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the in-
habitants, and to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources;
encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture, and industries; pro-
tect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources; and
improve the means of transportation and communication;
3. promote the social advancement of the inhabitants and to this
16 Information on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Under Naval Ad-
ministration to 1 November 1950 [Honolulu: 1951], p. 5.
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end shall protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements
of the population without discrimination; protect the health of the in-
habitants; control the traffic in arms and ammunition, opium and other
dangerous drugs, and alcoholic and other spirituous beverages; and
institute such other regulations as may be necessary to protect the in-
habitants against social abuses; and
4. promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this
end shall take steps toward the establishment of a general system of ele-
mentary education; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of
the population; and shall encourage qualified students to pursue higher
education, including training on the professional level.
As the Administering Authority, the United States also agreed un-
der Article 7 of the agreement to “… guarantee to the inhabitants
of the trust territory freedom of conscience, and, subject only to
the requirements of public order and security, freedom of speech,
of the press, and of assembly; freedom of worship, and of religious
teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.”17
Felix Keesing identified three schools of thought in native pol-
icy: the “zoological park” idea, assimilation into the “superior”
society of the dominant group, and a mid-way which fosters the
growth of a modernized native society by encouraging only that
which is believed desirable in the native culture.18 In proceeding
under the letter of the Trusteeship Agreement, the United States
long considered itself to be following the last of these three ap-
proaches, not presuming “to determine in advance the ultimate
goals of cultural, social, economic and political evolution in Mi-
cronesia.”19 In retrospect, in the fields of economic and social
development its actions for many years more closely approximated
the zoological park policy. The theorem was unquestionably ac-
cepted that it was not to the indigenes’ interest to accustom them
to a standard of living which they would not be able to maintain
with their own limited resources. “It is not the intent of the Admin-
istration to propagate either a highly sophisticated or a mendicant
society in the Trust Territory.”20 As a result of granting aid in a
17 The United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement for the former
Japanese Mandated Islands are reproduced in U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of
United Nations Charter Collection of Documents, Senate Doc. No. 87, 83d Con-
gress, 2d Sess. (1954).
18 Felix M. Keesing, The South Seas in the Modern World (rev. ed.; New York:
John Day Co., 1945), pp. 81 ff.
19 G. P. Murdock, Social Organization and Government in Micronesia, CIMA
Final Report No. 19, Part 3 (Washington: Office of Naval Research, 1949), pp. 5,
6.
20 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report of
a Special Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs, 83d Congress, 2d Sess.
(1954), p. 26.
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form and at a rate which would encourage an integrated socio-eco-
nomic system and of restricting business activity to Micronesian
enterpreneurs, the infra-structure destroyed during World War II
remained for the most part unreconstructed, and a long period
of economic stagnation ensued. By virtue of the attempt to avoid
cultural demoralization and to protect the Micronesians against
external exploitation, the Territory never regained the level of eco-
nomic prosperity enjoyed under the Japanese.
Transference of responsibility from the Navy to the Department
of Interior in 1951 introduced some changes in the style of admin-
istration observed, but the basic “holding operation” policy re-
mained unaltered. Meanwhile, the “temporary” physical facilities
erected by the Navy during the war continued to deteriorate.
Much of the effort of the Administering Authority was directed to
their patchwork maintenance through stretching the inadequate
funds appropriated by Congress, and a large share of all im-
provements tended directly or indirectly to the needs of American
personnel. In the admission of the high commissioner, “possibly
the Interior Department erred in contending that it could operate
the Trust Territory more cheaply than the Navy and laid a poor ba-
sis for getting more money from Congress.”21
Only in matters pertaining to the national security of the United
States was the policy of frugality and non-disturbance of the indige-
nous inhabitants waived. Under the Trusteeship Agreement, the
United States reserved the right to close portions of the area for
security reasons and to direct their use to the purposes of the Ad-
ministering Authority. Whole island populations in the Marshalls
were resettled to enable the utilization of their lands for atomic
testing and the development of anti-missile defensive systems.
Some inhabitants who were not moved were accidentally dusted
by radioactive fallout. In the Marianas, the operation on Saipan of
a highly classified training ground for Nationalist Chinese gueril-
las was accompanied by the return of that island from Interior’s
to Navy’s jurisdiction. Rota remained under Interior, while Guam,
just outside the Trust Territory’s periphery, was granted a greater
degree of self-governance as befitting its half century as an Ameri-
can possession. Given the close cultural and family ties of the
Chamorro people, that the inhabitants of the Marianas “should
be divided into three [separate jurisdictions] seems almost incred-
21 Honolulu Advertiser, Oct. 24, 1965, p. A4.
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ible.”22 It was not until 1962, after the discontinuance of the C.I.A.
sponsored training activity, that the Northern Marianas were re-
united under the Interior Department’s administration, which also
supervised the Territory of Guam’s relationships with Washington.
Except for matters concerned with the national security of the
United States, all that has transpired under the trusteeship has
in good faith been intended to further the best interests of the
Micronesians.23 As a consequence, past American policy has not
redounded to the detriment of Micronesian-American relations. In
many respects the United States came to be viewed more favor-
ably than Japan. Although under Japan there had been a wider
variety of goods and services and greater opportunities to obtain
employment, ceilings had been placed on the modernized aspi-
rations of the Micronesians. Attendance at higher schools had
been denied the indigenes, and they were ineligible for other than
minor governmental positions. The Japanese attitude of inher-
ent superiority did not sit well, and their deliberate intervention
in indigenous affairs disturbed traditional superordinate-subordi-
nate relationships and upset the functioning of the customary
social and political organizations. The conscious endeavors by
Americans to preserve Micronesian traditional ways, their demon-
stration of respect for the indigenes as human beings, and the
adoption of indirect rule as a system of government collectively
served to reassure the Micronesians and to solidify working rela-
tionships with the American administrators.
New policy pronouncements from Washington bid well to ma-
terially modify this near two decades of American “protectionism.”
Early in the 1960’s, the decision was made to bring the inhabitants
of the island complex into the orbit of twentieth century living
as quickly as possible, while at the same time exercising precau-
tions to avoid the dangers inherent in such rapid advancement.
The means chosen was to accelerate the planned social, economic,
and political development of Micronesia, with the last to be un-
dertaken with a view toward the shape of future relationships be-
tween Micronesia and the United States. Seemingly, Washington
had concluded that it was to the advantage of American security
to recast the old policy.
22 Emil J. Sady, The United Nations and Dependent Peoples (Washington:
Brookings, 1956), p. 201.
23 This is not to deny the element of rationalization inherent in the policy fol-
lowed, for the policy was to the advantage of the national security of the United
States and at a relatively nominal cost.
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One of the results flowing from this new approach was the
placement of the schools in the forefront of deliberately fostered
cultural change, upon the premise that trained manpower is es-
sential for increased economic activity and the informed citizenry
necessary to assume powers of greater self-government. Under an
accelerated educational program inaugurated in May, 1963, dur-
ing a three-year period, over three hundred new classrooms were
added to the Territorial school system, high schools were opened
at the headquarters of each of the six administrative districts and
in two sub-centers, recruitment of qualified teachers from the
mainland United States was intensified, and a general upgrad-
ing of the system was begun. Major emphasis was placed upon
the teaching of English. Next scheduled for a similar crash pro-
gram has been the improvement of health services. Meanwhile, a
survey of the region’s resources by Robert R. Nathan Associates,
Inc., provided a long-range plan for the Territory’s total economic
development, and Hawaii Architects and Engineers, Inc., submit-
ted a twenty-year, $237 million physical development program. A
contract signed in 1968 calls for modernizing air travel through
the Territory with jet service, and as the initial stage, the build-
ing of tourist-style hotels in all six of the district headquarters.
The dispersal of Peace Corps Volunteers to all parts of the Trust
Territory promises to more than double the number of Americans
temporarily residing in the Territory and to influence significantly
Micronesian attitudes and aspirations. Contemplated is nothing
short of lifting the peoples of Micronesia out of their “zoo” into a
way of life more attuned to the modern world, and not so inciden-
tally, patterned in good part on the American model.
Much yet remains to be accomplished before the newly
rephrased objectives for the Trust Territory can be realized. The
education program even though expanded, has not been able to
keep pace with increased school enrollments. According to the
Interior Department’s own appraisals,24 “half of the classrooms
now occupied are far below an acceptable standard and many
are greatly overcrowded.” “Unless secondary school facilities are
greatly increased, by 1972 we will be able to accept in high school
24 This and all of the following quotations are official appraisals of the
Secretary of the Interior which have been extracted from his letter and its
accompanying attachment, requesting markedly expanded funds for the Trust
Territory, reproduced in full in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Report No. 2172, 89th Congress, 2d Sess. (Oct. 3, 1966),
pp. 18 ff.
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only one of every four eighth grade graduates.” “Fully 43 per cent
of all public school teachers have not graduated from high school,
and an additional 30 per cent have only high school diplomas.” De-
spite the attention now being given to improved health services,
“there is still a very high incidence of filariasis, amebic dysentery,
leprosy, and tuberculosis—illnesses which are almost unknown or
completely controlled in the United States, and which could be
controlled in the Trust Territory. There are almost no registered
nurses in the Trust Territory, and 90 per cent of the doctors are
not qualified by medical degrees. The district hospitals are all over-
crowded and three are wholly inadequate. Most of the 90 outlying
dispensaries are structurally unsound and staffed largely by insuf-
ficiently trained personnel.” “Throughout the area there is almost
no decent housing and communities are characterized by the large
number of dwellings constructed of leftover World War II corru-
gated iron. Because of the low-income level of the people, lack
of lending institutions, and lack of long-range community plan-
ning, there has been little success in launching well-developed
housing programs.” “Power, water, and sewage disposal facilities
are urgently needed throughout Micronesia…. At the present time,
less than 10 per cent of the total population has a protected wa-
ter supply. While sewage systems do exist on some islands, there is
no sanitary disposal system on any island.” “With few exceptions,
roads in the trust territory are generally deplorable….” “Airfields
which have been built must be surfaced and protected from ero-
sion; runway lights should be installed; the airport at Ponape must
be completed….25 Urgently needed communication facilities include
improved radio equipment at each district center and regional ser-
vice center….” “In addition, courthouses, administration buildings,
employee quarters, and legislative buildings are required. Through-
out the Trust Territory, public buildings are in a sorry state.”
To help overcome these and other deficiencies, the Secretary of
the Interior in 1966 requested a sum of $172 million for capital im-
provements over a five-year period and an additional $152 million
for expansion of essential services associated with the improve-
ment program. Combined, this represented an amount almost
three times the total of all appropriations made to the Department
of the Interior for the Trust Territory during the previous fifteen
years it had administered the area. The Congress responded by
25 The Ponape district still depends upon amphibian planes using a water land-
ing.
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raising the appropriation ceiling to $25 million for fiscal year 1967
(from $17.5 million) and for fiscal years 1968 and 1969 to $35
million, with the implication that the greater authorization would
continue if the Territory demonstrated it could manage the expen-
diture of the increased funds. However, the actual augmentation
of appropriations has not kept pace (e.g., only $24 million for fis-
cal year 1968), so the financial needs of the Territory continue.
By the end of World War II the islands of Micronesia had
been ravaged, their native economy based on copra destroyed,
communications were non-existent, and schooling had all but dis-
appeared. Reclamation of so many islands so widely dispersed
presented a colossal task. Under the Trusteeship Agreement, the
United States assumed an obligation not just for physical reha-
bilitation but also for promotion of the political, economic, social,
and educational advancement of Micronesia. “Advancement” is a
relative term at best, and by today’s standards, American past ef-
forts are now being found wanting. Viewed from the perspective
of the conditions the United States encountered when it wrested
the islands from Japan, these same activities may be judged ac-
complishments. But whatever the measure, against the backdrop
of the restricted self-government permitted the Micronesians by
earlier colonial powers and the total absence of any effort to pre-
pare them for determining their own political destiny, the United
States’ performance stands forth as a positive and significant con-
tribution to the welfare of the Trust Territory. Of all four areas of
development, it is in the political realm that the endeavors of the
United States have scored their greatest success. It is to political
advancement, and the use of the legislative institution as the cho-
sen vehicle for accomplishing this end, that the remainder of this
work now turns its attention.
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CHAPTER 2
Governmental Strata
IN ITS FIRST ACCOUNTING to the Trusteeship Council, the
United States laid before the United Nations its plans for the po-
litical advancement of the Trust Territory: initially would come
self-governing municipalities, then progressively the powers of
regional district bodies would be increased, and finally, Territory-
wide organs of self-government in which the indigenous popu-
lation would play a substantial if not major part.1 At that time
the municipal government structure had already taken shape, and
the precursors of today’s district legislative bodies were begin-
ning to function. The convening of the Congress of Micronesia on
July 12, 1965, represented the implementing of the third stage of
this political-development plan by which an ever-expanding scope
of self-governance has been transferred to the Micronesians. To
the annoyance of some members of the United Nations pressing
for ever faster political change, the American personnel still staff
the key administrative posts and retain the reins of power, with
veto rights over all indigenous political action. Much yet remains
to be accomplished before Micronesians assume full responsibil-
ity for their own governance. But throughout the two decades of
American administration, the United States adhered steadfastly
to the broad outline of development sketched before the United
Nations, and the ethnocentric horizons of the region’s nine major
cultures have been ever broadened as the Micronesians have been
prepared for participation first in district-wide and then Territory-
wide self-government.
Nowhere is the word “democratic,” as the measure of the new
political structure, written into the sources of authority for the
United States’ administration of the Trust Territory.2 They only
refer to the promotion of development toward self-government
or independence in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
Micronesians. Free elections and a share in political decision-
1 TCOR, 5th Sess., 19th meeting, July 13, 1949, p. 245.
2 See John Sandelmann, Some Observations on the Problem of “Self Govern-
ment” in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: 1953), p. 106.
making thus are subsumed; coincidentally, these constitute funda-
mental features of a democracy. Though the basic documents are
silent, the United States has entertained no doubts that the gov-
ernment of the Trust Territory should take shape in harmony with
the principles underlying its own system, and it has so disported
itself. In the fall of 1946 the commander of the Marianas restated
and amplified the military government’s policies already in effect:3
democratic processes of government are to be encouraged, but
not fostered arbitrarily. Before any move is made, local forms of
government must be studied and comprehended. Once the cus-
tomary governmental system is understood, the logical place to
infuse democratic principles is to be determined. After democratic
processes are inaugurated in a small way, they will be extended
gradually to larger groups and areas. None of this was necessarily
antithetical to the indigenous political systems of Micronesia, for
some practices traditionally followed had democratic overtones. In
addition, in a few cases the Americans had been preceded by the
Japanese in proposing the use of elections for choosing “chiefs.”4
What the American administrators have tended to lose sight
of is that “most cultural elements are transferred in terms of ob-
jective form stripped of the meaning which is an integral part of
them in their original context.”5 Emphasis has been placed upon
the implanting of structural changes, with less attention given to
ascertaining whether formal adoption has been accompanied by
any modification in basic Micronesian political patterns. Because
the changes were sponsored by the Administering Authority, the
Territory’s inhabitants complied in their observance, but to many
the new patterns were for long extraneous to the political relation-
ships governing their conduct. Five years after elected municipal
government was introduced to Palau, the district anthropologist
in Palau advised the district administrator (DistAd), “Until very
recently, older and more conservative Palauans have considered
participation in elections a kind of favor to the American Admin-
istration…. Having attended local elections in the past in both
3 Dorothy E. Richard, U.S. Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), II,
306–307.
4 Burt Tolerton and Jerome Rauch, Social Organization, Land Tenure,
and Subsistence Economy of Lukunor, Nomoi Islands, CIMA Final Report
No. 26 (Washington: National Research Council, Pacific Science Board,
1949), p. 48.
5 R. Linton, ed., Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes (New York: D.
Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1940), p. 486.
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Palau and Yap, I can personally testify that it is embarrassing to
watch magistrates and hereditary chiefs act unbidden to marshall
all persons to the polling places…. The motivation in most cases
has sprung from a desire to please and impress the visiting Ameri-
can dignitaries rather than from any deep-seated feeling of civic
responsibility.”6 Under these circumstances, it was to be expected
that in many districts the innovation of electing local magistrates
would return to leadership posts the incumbents who had previ-
ously held them by ascriptive right. Only as there developed a
sense of political consciousness and of local initiative in the West-
ern sense did these superimposed institutions become more than
empty forms.
In their initial zeal duly to recognize the customs of the Micro-
nesians and adapt democratic procedures to the values of the
islanders, the American administrators accepted as traditional
many of the political configurations they found upon the United
States’ entry into Micronesia. Municipal government as it was
evolved by the Americans in Palau, Yap, and Ponape was premised
upon the geographical jurisdiction of each local governmental
unit’s being coterminous with the districts of the ancien régime.
In truth, the “independent” divisions of Ponape Island, which the
Americans regarded as originating in antiquity, had been in-
creased to five only late during the Spanish and German times;
Sokehs was formerly part of Kiti, and Net originally included
within U.7 The ten districts of Yap were delineated by the Japanese
when they expanded the eight “traditional” divisions first set up
by the Germans.8 Similarly, the conversion of Palau’s “traditional”
sixteen districts into municipalities, and the recognition of the
Koror and Melekeok confederations, ignored the fact that these
groupings had been preceded by other confederations with dif-
ferent geographical delimitations.9 In fact, the Americans had far
greater leeway in identifying the physical boundaries of the new
units of municipal government they were sponsoring and need
6 Memo from District Anthropologist Palau to DistAd Palau, July 14, 1953.
7 William R. Bascom, Ponape: A Pacific Economy in Transition, USCC Eco-
nomic Survey No. 8 (Honolulu: 1946), p. 41.
8 Stanford University School of Naval Administration, Handbook of the
Trust Territory (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1948), p.
77.
9 See, for example, Arthur J. Vidich, “The Political Impact of Colonial Ad-
ministration” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: 1952), pp. 80–82. In addition
to the fourteen independent districts listed there, Tobi and Sonserol should
be added.
24 Governmental Strata
not have believed themselves so restricted. Part of this constraint
arose from the Americans’ being loath to disturb the customary and
hereditary leaders. They believed it would cause less confusion if
the present leaders were encouraged to retain their authority while
at the same time promoting the election of local officials, thus blend-
ing liberal and conservative elements of government.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A considerable measure of indirect rule was necessitated by
the smallness of the staff during the German regime, and much of
traditional local government was retained. The Japanese appeared
to follow the German system, but while continuing the form, they
eroded the substance. During the Japanese period, local officials
of two grades were appointed, village (or island) chiefs and village
headmen,10 the latter nominally supervised by the chiefs. These
functionaries submitted reports on local conditions, collected taxes,
notified their people of all applicable laws and regulations, and for-
warded to higher authority all communications originating in the
local area. These posts were normally given to lineage leaders,
but in time the Japanese appointed persons more for their ame-
nability to compliance with orders than for their possession of the
highest ascribed status. Village policemen and secretaries assisted
the officials in many localities. In actual practice, most of the ef-
fective authority over local affairs was exercised by the Japanese,
and Yanaihara could write that the “office of village chief or village
headman retains none of the traditional meaning of chieftain in the
gens society, but is merely a subordinate administrative position
under the government with purely territorial authority.”11 The struc-
ture of local government functioning under the Japanese furnished
the matrix for the municipalities founded by the American admin-
istration. To the municipalities was returned a greater degree of
autonomy, and most units were modified by the addition of a coun-
cil, a significant incorporation of the legislative function into formal
government at the local level.
In December of 1945, at the close of World War II, the naval
10 Reference to Japanese titles are omitted due to the different terminology
encountered: such as soncho (atoll magistrate) and buraku sodai (village head-
man) in the Marshalls; so-soncho (village chief) and soncho (village headman)
in the Palaus; and, soncho for the mayor and joyako for the Chamorro “akon-
seheros” (councilmen) on Saipan.
11 Tadao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands under Japanese Mandate (Shanghai: Kelly
and Walsh, Ltd., 1939), p. 265. Written about Palau, this statement also character-
ized most of the other areas of the Mandate.
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military government was directed to observe that “the inhabitants
of the occupied territories be … encouraged and assisted to as-
sume as much as possible of the management of their own affairs
and the conduct of their own government. Local governments, in-
sofar as practicable, should be patterned on the political-social
institutions which the inhabitants have evolved for themselves….
Legislation and enforcement machinery should be held to the min-
imum requisite to the preservation of peace and order, the mainte-
nance of property rights, the enforcement of measures for health
and sanitation, and those laws respecting trade, industry, and la-
bor, which are essential to economic well-being.”12 This policy
encouraged a resurgence of traditional leadership, but local units
continued mainly to coincide with the “traditional” geographic-po-
litical divisions drawn during the Japanese era. With the military
authorities avoiding as a matter of policy the setting up of a uni-
form system, the nature of the government which ensued varied
widely. “In some cases, the local political system was allowed
to continue in operation, with strong chieftains occupying their
posts by right of inheritance. In others, a type of local government
dating from Japanese or German times was encouraged as custom-
ary. In still others, a council form of government patterned along
American democratic lines was established.”13
By 1947 the need to regularize local government was manifest
if orderly political development was to be encouraged. “Munici-
palities” were normally recognized as coterminous with an island
or a locally recognized division of a larger island but sometimes
could be a combination of several small adjacent islands. Each
municipality was to have a magistrate,14 assisted by a council ei-
ther appointed or elected. A scribe, or secretary, and a treasurer
were to aid the magistrate in keeping records, maintaining vital
statistics, collecting taxes, and disbursing municipal funds. Local
revenues would be used to pay these officials, policemen in some
instances, and school teachers. Election of magistrates was en-
couraged, and each year the Trust Territory reported an ever
larger number of municipalities headed by popularly chosen mag-
istrates. As was to be expected, at first the people selected their
hereditary chiefs, but gradually they recognized the value of nam-
12 Directive of Admiral Spruance, quoted in Stanford University School of
Naval Administration, Handbook …, op. cit., p. 93.
13 U. S. Department of the Interior, Management Survey of the Government of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: 1951), I, 47.
14 In a few areas—Ponape, Saipan, Tinian—the name “mayor” is used.
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ing officers with qualifications other than just ranking hereditary
status.15 Sometimes councilmen were reported “elected” when in
fact senior family heads had automatically assumed these posts.16
These same reports show a slight shrinkage in the number of
municipalities as a few were consolidated for purposes of effi-
ciency and economy, until the number firmed around 102.
The indigenous leaders accepted this municipal organization, at first
“in many cases, without enthusiasm, for, when all was said and done,
they preferred their own system of government.”17 For a period of time
these municipalities “served mainly as ineffective one-way channels for
the transmission of district orders to the people,” with the officers lack-
ing enough personal authority or unwilling to exercise initiative to en-
force the orders.18 Although these local units were to bear the full sup-
port of the elementary schools, their resources proved inadequate, and
this responsibility was gradually shifted to the district legislatures and
finally to the Territorial government. Depending upon the population
size of the municipality and the extent of its urban character, the activ-
ities of some expanded substantially, with Saipan, the largest, perform-
ing functions comparable to those of a small city and listing approxi-
mately one hundred persons on its payroll.
Starting in April of 1957, the administration embarked upon
an ambitious program of “chartering” municipalities. A multi-pur-
pose objective underlay this effort, namely to delineate municipal
boundaries, define authority, specify taxing and legislative powers,
set up procedures for the election of municipal officers, and out-
line their duties. The model, which forms the basis of each local
unit’s fundamental law, was worked out after taking into account
the Micronesian district leaders’ comments on the original draft.
It presented “few if any new concepts …; essentially it follows
the basic ideas contained in the Interim Regulations [under the
Navy] and other earlier guides for the establishment of local
governments. It does broaden these ideas to meet more advanced
15 The Micronesians’ reluctance publicly to disgrace a traditional leader was
well illustrated by the Kusaiens’ in 1947 voting the “king” out of office but, to
mitigate his defeat, electing his son to the office of chief magistrate. James L.
Lewis, Kusaiean Acculturation, CIMA Final Report No. 17 (Washington: National
Research Council, Pacific Science Board, 1948), p. 61.
16 E.g., see Marc J. Swartz, “The Social Organization of Behavior: Relations
Among Kinsmen on Romonum, Truk” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: March,
1958), pp. 111–112.
17 TCOR, 8th Sess., 325th meeting, Feb. 16, 1951, par. 40.
18 Garth N. Jones, “Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands” (Ph.D.
thesis, University of Utah: 1954), p. 283.
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conditions and to some extent standardizes organizational patterns
and governmental procedures.”19 Aiming at introducing greater uni-
formity into the structure and functioning of municipalities, it con-
templates that each chartered unit will have an elected council
empowered to adopt local ordinances, which become effective upon
the concurrence of the district administrator, and to enact emer-
gency ordinances with the sole approval of the magistrate, the local
chief executive. The municipal tax levies and the annual budget plan
must similarly receive the district administrator’s assent. Originally
the program anticipated chartering twenty municipalities a year,
but the number was reduced to ten as a more realistic annual goal.
It was at first thought “highly probable” that all 102 municipalities
would be chartered by 1963.20 Something closer to half of this num-
ber have now been chartered, with every Palauan and all but one
Ponapean municipality so qualified.
The chartering project was partially undertaken upon the
Trusteeship Council’s urging that there be more immediate pro-
gress toward self-government. An objective appraisal of the pro-
gram attributes more importance to the understanding gained by
Micronesians regarding the processes of government incidental to
the effort expended in preparing a community for chartering than to
any greater enjoyment of municipal autonomy. Nor were significant
structural changes or even modification in day-to-day operations
made upon the recognition of the new status. Before a charter is
granted by the high commissioner, through an extended series of
meetings local leaders are familiarized with their tasks under the
charter and with the procedures necessary to be followed. In some
cases this has merely meant instructing these officials on operat-
ing the local government in the manner the Administering Authority
originally intended but which they have failed to observe. The re-
quirement of district administrator approval for local ordinances
and annual budgets constituted no innovation, but municipalities,
particularly those distant from district headquarters, had been lax
in their compliance with these “technicalities.”
Through the device of chartering, the personnel of the Admin-
istering Authority have been able to gain access to municipal
officials to train them in the procedures of Westernized local gov-
ernment. Chartering also gave the Administering Authority an
19 Memo of HiCom, April 11, 1957, quoted in Thorwald Esbensen, “A Report on
Political Education in Truk,” [Moen, Truk: circa 1959], pp. 5, 6.
20 TCOR, 22d Sess., 895th meeting, June 17, 1958, par. 26.
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opportunity to teach the officials the simple steps in parliamentary
maneuver necessary to conduct council meetings and a chance
to encourage local incentive by preparing them to play an active
role in place of waiting for instructions from above. Today the Ad-
ministering Authority views the chartering, as exemplified by the
new Kolonia Town Charter (Ponape), as responsible for the begin-
ning of a trend toward the increased awareness and involvement
of municipal governments in problems of urban development.
The magistrate of the typical municipality, whether or not char-
tered, continues to provide liaison between his community and the
district administration. As the local chief executive, he promul-
gates the laws of the Trust Territory and of the district and other
information addressed to his people, and is charged with seeing
that they abide by these laws and the local ordinances. He is ac-
countable for the work of the municipal officers and employees
and maintains or supervises the safe keeping of community prop-
erty and funds. The magistrate also oversees the preparation of
municipal tax rolls and the annual budget, the disbursement of
funds, and the holding of local elections. In outlying areas where
councils serve only as “advisors” to the magistrate, binding direc-
tives are normally issued by him after a consensus of the council
has been reached. Where elected councils function, as chairman
of the council he presides over their meetings, keeps a record of
their actions, and directly or indirectly participates in the adoption
of local ordinances.
In many of the smaller municipalities, most of the funds col-
lected from head taxes, boat taxes, coconut tree levies, license
fees, and other sources of local moneys go to pay the salaries of
the magistrate and other municipal officers, with little left over
for the funding of community projects. As traditional leaders for-
merly directed communal activities without need of any financing
through taxes and, under the Japanese, the local officials received
a small remuneration directly from the branch governments, a
degree of dissatisfaction exists over the levying of taxes merely
to pay the “keep” of officers of an “American-imposed” municipal
government. Non-compliance with local tax laws is widespread.
On the other hand, expanded municipal-type services are desired,
and there is little inclination to return to the traditional forms
and ways of tending to local matters. Today, most project-oriented
spending performed for local communities is financed with Trust
Territory funds or with grants-in-aid from district legislatures,
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which leads to frustration when it is not in accord with locally
expressed priorities. This is the stuff out of which political inter-
est springs, and it can be through the municipal councils that this
public opinion may be expressed and positive steps formulated to
take corrective action.
The municipality—whether the chartered variety observing
Western political ideas and processes or older ones retaining the
traditional political organization relatively unchanged—affords
the greatest degree of autonomy of any institution of self-gov-
ernment in which Micronesians play a part. At the district and
Territorial levels there are no indigenous executive organs of gov-
ernment. In contrast, at the local level all governmental affairs are
conducted by the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, and as a prac-
tical matter the district administration does not materially affect
the course of day-to-day community government. On islands other
than those on which the district headquarters are located, contact
with the municipalites becomes less frequent, and district admin-
istration knowledge of their operations is ofttimes incomplete.
There is even less supervision of those municipalities reached by
brief field-trip visits no more than several times a year. Three-sev-
enths of the Territory’s population lives off the islands where the
district administration is headquartered, and for them, local gov-
ernment is in good part synonymous with self-government.
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION
Given the vast distances within the Trust Territory, it was
essential for its government that an intermediate level of admin-
istration be interposed between the high commissioner (HiCom)
and his departments, on the one hand, and the municipalities
on the other. When the Germans and Japanese faced the same
problem, they utilized the geographical dispersal of the islands
into relatively contiguous clusters as the logic for district demar-
cation. The pattern set by the Japanese was later fairly closely
followed by the Americans. Although in Palau, Ponape, and Yap the
same sites have served as administrative centers for all three na-
tions,21 corresponding continuity has not characterized each new
21 In Truk and the Marshalls, the decision was made to locate the district
headquarters on different islands than those used by the Japanese, to avail the
Trust Territory of plants built by the American military forces; on Saipan, the
town of Garapan was completely leveled during the taking of the island, and the
district administrative center was placed close to the military government’s tem-
porary civilian camps.
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administration’s succession to the work of its predecessor. “Ex-
cept for meager official documents passed on by one government
to the next, the informal advice offered by retiring administrators,
and the reports of native informants to the incoming group on
their feelings toward the predecessors, each new set of rulers was
forced to rediscover the nature of native societies.”22
Originally the high commissioner named four officers as district
governors, with two districts, Truk and Ponape, under a single
governor for the Eastern Carolines. The Marshall Islands, also
under a single governor, were divided, with Kwajalein and the sur-
rounding area as one district and the rest of the Marshalls as the
other, with Majuro as its center. Yap was recognized as a subdis-
trict in the Western Carolines, which was under the jurisdiction
of a third district governor, and the fourth’s jurisidiction covered
the Mariana Islands. The Marshalls were eventually combined into
a single administrative district, Truk and Ponape were separated,
and Yap’s status was changed to that of a fully independent dis-
trict with its own administration. Later in the 1950’s, when the
Navy regained supervision of part of the Northern Marianas and
the Interior Department retained the balance of Micronesia, the
Trust Territory for a period was divided into seven districts. Now,
at least for the moment, the internal division of the Territory for
administrative purposes appears stabilized, with the number of
districts again fixed at six: Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, Yap, Palau,
and Marianas. How long this will continue remains problemati-
cal, for Kusaie in the Ponape district desires separate status as a
distinct administrative entity, as do Rota in the Marianas and the
Outer Islands in the Yap district.
Relatively little of the literature treating the governance of the
Trust Territory considers the exact nature of the district admin-
istrator and the agencies operating at the district level. The dis-
trict administrator occupies a perplexingly ambiguous role. As
appointee of the high commissioner,23 he is his principal’s field
representative, supervising all district government and responsi-
ble for overseeing the activities of the municipalities. Each district
is generally organized so as to coincide administratively with
22 John Useem, “Applied Anthropology in Micronesia” Human Organization,
6:4 (Fall, 1947), 1.
23 To be accurate, district administrators are appointees of the high com-
missioner with concurrence from Washington; the latter approval apparently
includes involvement of both the executive (Interior) and congressional (commit-
tee chairmen) branches.
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the functional structure of the Trust Territory’s Headquarters on
Saipan. This results in an anomalous dual supervision, with the
district health, education, and agriculture officers looking as
much, if not more, to their specialist supervisors on Saipan as to
their district administrator. The latter, though, provides the essen-
tial supporting services, and in making up the district budget, he
prepares the preliminary estimates for the various services; there-
fore all district departments are dependent upon him. At the same
time, he is also the executive officer charged with carrying out
the laws passed by the district legislature composed solely of in-
digenes. However, there have yet to be taken steps to relate the
district administrations to these legislative bodies, so as to make
them both parts of an integrated institution at the district level.
In the Territory’s scheme of government, the district govern-
ments are primarily responsible for domestic relations, inheri-
tance, and land law. The construction and maintenance of sec-
ondary roads connecting the municipalities and of docks used
extensively for travel between the municipalities also fall within
the districts’ jurisdiction. Liquor control, including the imposition
of wholesale license fees and taxes on alcoholic beverages, is as-
signed to the district. Exclusive issuance of licenses for wholesale
businesses, save a named few kept under Territorial supervision,
is also exercised by the districts. District revenues may be aug-
mented by sales taxes imposed by act of the district legislature.
In the functions of public education and health, the district gov-
ernments retain an undefined responsibility for support, but in the
main these are directly funded through revenues allocated by the
Territorial government.
The indigenous inhabitants regard the district administrator
and the various executive agencies in the district as part of the
American administration, a superimposed government in which
they have little part other than as employees. Speaking for the
high commissioner, the district administrator is expected to pro-
mote the Administering Authority’s program. This results in there
being no locally accountable political executive, and the district
administrator is held in check only by the limits to which the dis-
trict legislature allows itself to be led and by the degree of enthu-
siasm with which the Micronesians willingly cooperate with the
district administration. There is a growing interest in local selec-
tion of the district administrator, possibly by election, which aims
toward making him and his administration part of the indigenous
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government, like the district legislatures which are looked upon
as “Micronesian.” One of the laws passed by the first Congress of
Micronesia provides the vehicle for securing local accountability
by providing for the chartering of district governments. In place of
a field organization of the Trust Territory, there would emerge at
the district level a locally responsible government in a way compa-
rable to state governors and government in the United States and
their relationship to Washington. It is open to question whether
the Trust Territory’s limited resources and population warrant
such a Federally modeled form of government; on the other hand,
it would promote a greater adaptability to district diversity and
would materially encourage the indigenes’ sense of commitment
to furthering their own governance.
The degree of discretion which a district administrator may ex-
ercise in arranging his district’s organization and in directing the
course of its activities depends upon the scope of power allocated
him and the extent to which he has been delegated authority to
act without obtaining Saipan’s clearance. There has been little
consistency in this, as it has varied with both the policies of high
commissioners and the personality of the district administrator.
Usually the latter is not free to choose the heads for the district
departments and has no independent power to reallocate funds
inter-departmentally once the annual budget has been fixed at Ter-
ritory Headquarters. He normally has broad authority in outlining
the district organization, but the building blocks remain primarily
those functional activities found in all other districts and fall un-
der the policy supervision of Saipan.
One or two assistants aid each district administrator, and he
may place some of the district departments directly under them.
In the Truk district, for example, the assistant district administra-
tor for Administration supervises finance, supply, personnel, and
field trips, while the assistant for Public Affairs works closely with
the district legislature, keeps the census, and is charged with
political, community, and social development. The major line activ-
ities in Truk, such as agriculture, education, public health, and the
office of land management, are directly under the supervision of
the district administrator.
Gradually Micronesians have risen within the district adminis-
tration to hold ever higher posts of authority, until in 1965 the
first indigene was named a district administrator. It is only a ques-
tion of time before this will be repeated in the other districts.
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Meanwhile, in all, indigenes serve as assistant district commis-
sioners. Notwithstanding, so long as most of the major decisions
continue to be made at the Territory Headquarters, it remains
problematical whether this “localization” of personnel will cause
the Micronesians to modify their attitude that the district govern-
ment is “American.”
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT
The structural and functional similarities of the Japanese
South Seas Government under Mandate status and that erected
by the American administration testify to the paramountcy of
geography and of need for comparable governmental services
over abstract doctrines, no matter how much the two countries’
fundamental political philosophies may have differed. The ide-
ological imprint is disclosed more by the manner in which the
administering personnel have disported themselves and the way
they have related to the Micronesians. The major differences in
the activities of the two powers stem mainly from Japan’s in-
troduction of thousands of its nationals into Micronesia and its
exploitation of the resources of the area for its own advantage;
American policy has been to reserve the region primarily for
the benefit of its indigenous inhabitants and, until recently, to
move no faster in social and economic innovations than the Mi-
cronesians themselves desired and were able. In attitude, the
Japanese civilian administrators were arrogant and sometimes
harsh in their treatment of the Micronesians. To the indigenes
the Americans at times may appear no less arbitrary, but the
human rights of the Micronesians have been for the most part
faithfully observed. In addition to being given political freedom,
the Micronesians have also been gradually prepared for the full
exercise of political self-determination.
Under Executive Order of the President, as relayed through the
Secretary of the Interior, the high commissioner has been charged
with the exercise of executive and—until recently curtailed by the
convening of the Congress of Micronesia—legislative24 authority
over the Trust Territory. Under the Mandate, the Japanese direc-
tor of the South Seas Government similarly wielded executive and
legislative powers. The Trust Territory is covered by few enact-
ments of the U.S. Congress, so that practically all statutory law
24 See pp. 179–181 for a fuller discussion of the high commissioner’s former
legislative powers.
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in the Territory falls within the compass of the Trust Territory
Code as now augmented by acts of the Congress of Micronesia and
urgency orders of the high commissioner. In contrast, the most
important laws of the Japanese empire, such as the “Six Codes,”
were equally applicable in the Mandated territory. In matters af-
fecting the indigenous inhabitants, both Japan25 and the United
States have recognized local precedent and custom as tempering
the fiat of the law of the ministering nation.
The United States was remiss in not moving the Headquarters
of the high commissioner into the Trust Territory, and the area was
administered from Hawaii up to September, 1954, and then from
Guam until June 30, 1962, when “provisional” Headquarters were
located on Saipan within the Trust Area. Previously, President
Truman had designated Dublon in the Truk lagoon as the perma-
nent headquarters site, and technically this decision has never
been reversed, although no effort is being made to implement it.
In contrast, Japan early placed the governor of the Mandate in
the Palaus, so that government could be carried on from within
the area. The Japanese administration underwent a number of
modifications, but by World War II, the South Seas Government at
Koror consisted of the Governor, a Secretariat, the Departments of
Domestic Affairs and of Economic Development (or Colonization),
and an appellate court. Hospitals, schools, courts, and post offices
throughout the Mandate reported directly to Palau rather than to
the six branch bureau chiefs of the districts in which they were
placed. A Confidential Affairs Section, Archives Section, and Re-
search Section together comprised the Headquarters Secretariat.
In the Department of Domestic Affairs was located responsibility
for financial affairs, taxation, police, public works, and planning.
The Department of Economic Development was similarly divided
into sections, administering agriculture and forestry, commerce
and industry, communications, and postal matters.26
When the Trusteeship was launched, the Federal agencies of
the United States undertook direct administration of the postal
services and the manning of the weather stations. Except for this
and the court system which was divorced to make it indepen-
dent, the balance of the government was placed under the high
25 See Peter C. Pauwels, The Japanese Mandated Islands (Bandoeng: G. C. T.
Van Dorp, 1936), pp. 76–77.
26 Roy E. James, “The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” in Rupert Emer-
son et al., America’s Pacific Dependencies (New York: American Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1949), pp. 110–111.
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commissioner and in many ways functionally resembled that of the
Japanese. Over the years, modifications in structure have reflected
early attempts to set up field headquarters within the Territory
for some of the services, and also contractions and augmentations
in Federal funding necessitating or permitting such changes. Cur-
rently, the Office of the High Commissioner includes the attorney
general, the public defender, the internal auditor, and a special
assistant (see chart, p. 36). The deputy high commissioner and
the assistant commissioners are also located in this office. “The
four [now five] Assistant Commissioners and the Attorney Gen-
eral perform both line and staff functions in assisting the High
Commissioner in the overall direction of the executive branch.
They exercise the authority of the High Commissioner with re-
spect to the activities of the government within their respective
areas of responsibility. With the Deputy High Commissioner, they
also serve collectively to advise the High Commissioner on mat-
ters of policy and program, functioning as a de facto ‘cabinet.’
“Under the … Assistant Commissioners are heads of depart-
ments and specialists who are responsible for the technical direc-
tion of their program operations throughout the Territory and for
the provision of necessary staff, professional and technical serv-
ices. The Assistant Commissioner for Public Affairs has basic re-
sponsibility for Political Development, Information Services, Pub-
lications, Research Coordination, and International Agency Coor-
dination.”27 Education and community development fall within the
jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner for Education, and pub-
lic health under an Assistant Commissioner with corresponding
title. The Assistant Commissioner for Resources and Development
oversees the activities of agriculture and cooperative services,
economics and commerce, fisheries, land management, and trans-
portation. The full gambit of administrative services falls within
the purview of the Assistant Commissioner for Administration:
budget and finance, communications, engineering and construc-
tion service, maintenance, management improvement, personnel,
property and supply, and the Liaison Offices on Guam and Kwa-
jalein. With few exceptions—such as the plant pathologist on Pon-
ape and the staff entomologist on Palau—all Headquarters staff
are stationed on Saipan.
The chain of communications may run directly between the dis-
27 18th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1965, pp.
24–25.
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trict administrators and the high commissioner, or via the depart-
ment heads at Headquarters and then to the assistant commission-
ers. The physical dispersal of the Trust Territory over a vast area
has of itself raised difficult communication problems, but these
have been unduly complicated by the extreme centralization of
authority and the limited scope permitted department heads at
Headquarters. A survey in 1963 found the latter used essentially
as staff officers, exercising no real operating authority and not
dealing directly with, or supervising, their counterparts heading
functional departments within the districts. The recent addition
of the five assistant commissioners potentially only foretells an
exacerbation of this centralization on Saipan. The files record inor-
dinate time lags between requests for information emanating from
Headquarters, or requests relayed from the field for authorization
to take action, and the responding communication. In practice,
“home-office”-field relations have never had as a basis a well-
demarcated location of authority, and the recent expansion of
services associated with the enlarged Federal appropriations has
only further revealed this weakness. It is impossible to adminis-
ter a far-flung area such as the Trust Territory efficiently without
great delegation of authority to the field, and this the Administer-
ing Authority has been unwilling to grant. There has been a lack
of long-range policies with progressive development steps specifi-
cally spelled out, and there is no corps steeped in the traditions
of a colonial service which would permit broad grants of power to
be assigned to the field with confidence. These facts have contrib-
uted to this overcentralization at Headquarters and the ambiguity
of the district administrator’s position.
In order to assure maximum independence for the courts, the
judicial branch is placed outside the authority of the high com-
missioner and the Congress of Micronesia. The chief justice and
the associate justices of the High Court are appointed by and
accountable to the secretary of the interior.28 The chief justice
supervises an imposing judicial structure, starting with the lowly
community courts and culminating in the appellate division of
the High Court. The community court judges enjoy a civil and
criminal law jurisdiction corresponding roughly to that of the
American justice of the peace. Above these courts, the district
judges for the six administrative districts may hear all but ma-
28 As was the high commissioner, until P. L. 90–16 of the U.S. Congress
provided for his appointment by the President, subject to Senate confirmation.
38 Governmental Strata
jor felony cases, civil suits in which sizeable sums of money are
at stake, and cases involving a few subjects reserved for the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the High Court, such as contested land
titles and eminent domain proceedings. The High Court has both
original and appellate jurisdiction and discretionary review pow-
ers over actions of the lower courts. Three Americans staff the
High Court, but Micronesians sit with them either as judges on
the court or as assessors to advise on local law and custom. Ex-
cept for these three justices and two American community court
judges who hold sessions in the Kwajalein area primarily for
cases arising on the anti-missile testing site, the entire judicial
branch is staffed by indigenes: 109 community court judges, 24
district court judges, and all court clerks and Trust Territory em-
ployees serving the unified court.
The delineation of Trust Territory expenditures by functional
categories requires making a number of estimates as well as
more or less arbitrary allocations of expenditures. For one thing,
geographical dispersal and other contributing factors cause the
“overhead” cost element for transportation, communications, and
other support services to loom extremely large; it is believed that
every government program requires almost $1.00 of overhead
expenditure for each $2.00 of direct program cost.29
ESTIMATED FUNCTIONAL EXPENDITURES OF TERRITORIAL
GOVERNMENT, 1966–6730
Direct services to individuals
Education $9,300,000 44%
Health and medical 5,600,000 26
Utility and other
direct services 2,900,000 14
General government
Headquarters and
district executive offices $600.000
Protection and enforcement 500,000
Judicial 200,000
Overhead 500,000 $1,800,000 9
Direct development programs
Economic development $800,000
Political development 70,000
Community development 100,000
Overhead 400,000 1,370,000 7
$20,970,000
29 Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., “Economic Development Plan for Mi-
cronesia” (Washington: 1966), Part III, p. 533 [modified by author].
30 Ibid., pp. 534–536.
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For this same 1966–67 period, Micronesian governmental expendi-
tures totaled an estimated $700,000, and support for the members
and activities of Territorial legislative bodies used up three-fourths
of these funds.31 However, this does not present a fully representa-
tive picture because in this year the Congress of Micronesia did
not appropriate all moneys available to it for expenditure within
the Territory; if these had been computed in, the share of legisla-
tive expenditures would have declined to a little under 50 per cent.
With augmented funds available to the Trust Territory from Fed-
eral appropriations, and with increased Territorial revenues subject
to expenditure in accordance with the directions of the Congress
of Micronesia and the district legislatures, greater emphasis upon
development programs and direct service activities may be antici-
pated, as well as a marked decrease in the percentage of Territorial
revenues devoted to legislative costs.
None of the four nations which have governed the region now in-
cluded within the Trust Territory established a colonial service in
which its personnel was trained for colonial duty.32 The administra-
tion of Micronesia has understandably embodied both a degree of
rote copying of the system of government observed by the metro-
politan country and a large element of improvisation. The Japanese
sent regular civil servants to administer the Islands; United States
policy similarly is to employ American citizens under U.S. Civil Ser-
vice regulations and procedures, except for school teachers and a
few others who are hired on a contractual, non-civil-service basis.
The Americans work under a grade structure and classification sys-
tem which follows the U.S. Classification Act of 1949.
Indigenous personnel are employed under a separate title and
pay plan, with lower remuneration despite possession of the same
technical qualifications, which gives the appearance of treating
Micronesians as second-class employees in their own government.
This has engendered considerable dissatisfaction on the part of
Micronesians, who regard themselves as underpaid and their
American superiors as delaying advancement of local personnel
in order to preserve their own, more lucrative positions. With
the Micronesians taking an ever larger share through the leg-
islative process in setting policy on the district and Territorial
levels, it is only a question of time before a unified personnel ser-
31 Ibid., p. 535.
32 The short-lived training under the U.S. Navy may be regarded as an attempt
to institute a colonial service.
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vice will be installed. Had the United States a colonial service,
displaced Americans might be transferred to other areas or pen-
sioned under a system anticipating this very contingency; as it
is, some of the long-time administrators have been content with
the status quo and reluctant to advocate innovations which might
“rock the boat.” All this only compounds the bitterness of those
indigenous inhabitants now beginning to take an active part in Mi-
cronesian politics and pressing for rapid change.
Political institutions recently introduced into Micronesia are
more geographically inclusive and more specialized than any the
people of the region have ever known. No comparable effort had
previously been made to unite Micronesians within and across dis-
trict and ethnic lines. The specialization to which they are now ex-
posed extends not just to separating the branches of government
and the distinct functions of government but also to differentiating
the political structure from other social configurations. Elections
without reference to caste, class, or other discriminating measure;
equality before the law; and the official conceived of as a servant
of the people rather than the figure around whom all community
prestige turns have interposed an egalitarianism new to the area.
It is to be anticipated that this deluge of novel concepts is as yet
only partially assimilated. To the followers of a defeated candi-
date, it may be only logical to refuse to acknowledge the elected
magistrate and to maintain they are being deprived of their “Bill of
Rights”; that majority rule subsumes cooperation of the defeated
minority is still to be fully understood.33
Because of all this, for some time to come traditional political
systems in each district will continue to function to a greater or
lesser degree alongside the new structure of government. Some-
times their respective jurisdictions will be sharply differentiated,
with little integration of the two. At other times it will be difficult
to know where one system ends and the other begins. Today, if a
juvenile from an outlying village commits a crime on Koror, the dis-
trict headquarters of Palau, the community court will frequently
suspend the sentence and allow the Palauan chiefs to proceed
through the application of modified custom. The chiefs then sum-
mon the father of the delinquent and the chief of his village and
publicly shame them for allowing the minor to come to the dis-
trict headquarters and engage in the anti-social behavior which
33 Recounted in “Second Annual Truk Congress, Sept. 15–19, 1958,” p. 2.
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brought him before the judge. The court system here provides a
new dimension for the activities of the traditional leaders and a
new use for the Palauan sanction of social ostracism; both politi-
cal systems nicely articulate to face jointly the problem of juvenile
delinquency. This represents a more realistic way to accommodate
the traditional political structure than any doctrinaire approach,
such as “indirect rule,” with which the Americans first turned
to the task of administering the Trust Territory. After all, even
indirect rule is not just “find the chief” but in fact consists of “pro-
gressive adaptation of native institutions to modern conditions.”34
34 Lucy P. Mair, Native Policies in Africa (London: C. Routledge & Sons, Ltd.,
1936), pp. 56, 57.
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CHAPTER 3
District Legislatures—Antecedents,
Powers, and Structure
IN THE PRE-CONTACT PERIOD, Micronesia lived according
to custom, but without differentiated institutions for modifying,
consolidating, interpreting, or punatively enforcing it. The wrong
against the community (crime) was not distinguished from a per-
sonal injury (tort), just as kin ties, economic linkages, magic, and
the employment of traditional power were part and parcel of a sin-
gle body of governing rules. Only a decade ago the Palauan district
congress was being assured that it could by law punish adultery
(the crime) while retaining traditional Palauan prescriptions regu-
lating the obligations of the parties to the adultery (the tort).1 The
exercise of law-making powers by indigenous legislative bodies
consequently waited upon the comprehension of the Western con-
ceptual underpinnings of “law,” as distinct from custom applied
through a reciprocal set of relationships, as much as it did upon
the training of Micronesians in the mechanics of legislatures mod-
eled on modern lines. Because of this, and not just the lateness in
the express granting of legislating powers, the legislative cham-
bers established by the Americans in the Trust Territory were
performing other functions appropriate to their collegial form and
representative character before they began enacting laws.
Innovating legislatures as part of governing the Trust Territory
did not constitute as onerous an undertaking as it might first ap-
pear. Collegial processes and forms in the Micronesian cultures
predated the advent of Western rule. The basic institutions in
traditional island government contained the seeds of representa-
tion, with the clan chief acting on the part of his people, and
widespread throughout the region has been the council or group
meeting for consultation and often for decision-making. The literal
translation of Olbiil era Kelulau, the official name of the Palau dis-
trict congress between 1955 and 1963, is “meeting place of whis-
pers,” perpetuating the reference to the highest political council
of the region in which negotiations had been carried on between
principals by means of messages whispered to messengers. For
1 See Minutes of Spring Session, 1956, of Palau District Congress.
lower level political undertakings, clan heads met with their para-
mount chief, following rules of procedure, priorities of debate, and
prescribed seating assignments, with their collective decisions an-
nounced to the public by the chief as his own determinations. The
lore of the itang (sage) in the Truk area, by identifying the proper
course to follow, facilitated political determinations as well as other
forms of communal action; its prescriptions in a way resembled
modern parliamentary procedure and its mastery by the relatively
few in even advanced Western countries. The high proportion of al-
abs (heads of commoner lineages) elected to the Marshall Islands
Congress, coupled with the inclusion of iroij (royalty) in that body,
imparted to the congress a little of the character associated with
traditional consultations of alabs with their iroij laplap (paramount
chiefs).
The prevalence of class structure, with rule by hereditary rank,
only superficially was wholly antithetical to the institution of the
modern legislature, with its egalitarian features. In spite of the
nominal power enjoyed by traditional chiefs, they rarely took de-
cisive action without sounding out opinion from representative in-
dividuals and public discussions. Limited forms of representation,
reference to public opinion, and familiarity with group processes
derived from traditional councils all facilitated the adaptation of
the more sophisticated political forms of the West.
By no means all aspects of life in pre-contact Micronesia fa-
vored the advent of legislatures. Most Micronesian societies were
consensus societies, so that action was frequently deferred until
unanimity, or at least the silence of the opposition, was achieved, a
slow, time-consuming process. Superior-subordinate relationships
did not countenance open challenge or disagreement across sta-
tus lines and long conditioned subordinates to roles of followers.
For this and other reasons, indirection has long been a well-de-
fined course to follow. And probably most discrepant, the people in
some of the Micronesian cultures, because of long ingrained pat-
terns of conduct, do not generalize easily; in novel circumstances,
rather than run the risk of making a mistake, the tendency is to
avoid doing anything at all. When the situation demands action
and fixed habits are inappropriate, the response is likely to be
vague, evasive, and ambiguous.2 All this ill-prepared Micronesians
2 See Thorwald Esbensen, “A Report on Political Education in Truk” [Moen,
Truk]: Oct. 6, 1957; Thomas Gladwin and Seymour B. Sarason, Truk: Man in Par-
adise (New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation, 1953), pp. 226, 453.
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to make the decisions required of members in a legislature cast in
the American mold, presuming open debate, free presentation of
views, and majority action.
Facets of one culture, when engrafted onto another, may later
prove to be dysfunctional, neutral, or facilitative in ways never
contemplated at the time of the transfer. Micronesia’s encounters
with the West prior to American assumption of jurisdiction over
the Trust Territory added a number of institutions which fortui-
tously helped prepare the indigenes for acceptance of the modern
legislature and equipped them with some of the skills necessary
for its operation. For a century the Protestant church in the Mar-
shalls and Eastern Carolines inculcated concepts of equality be-
fore God and taught democratic processes such as the election of
church officials. The deacon and komat in the Marshallese church
hierarchy merely denote the transformation of the Congregational
deacon and committeeman. The Reverend George Lock wood,
who was a missionary in the Marshalls between 1928 and 1932,
founded the “Eklesia in Marshall” (Association of Marshall Islands
Churches), which held biennial all-Marshalls church conferences,
and instructed the members in parliamentary procedure through
the use of Robert’s Rules of Order. Governing these Protestant
bodies, members became familiar with nominating committees,
the rudiments of presenting and voting on motions, and also the
employment of dilatory tactics such as “laying on the table.”
Heavy reliance was placed on the use of committees in running
Mission affairs, a fit prelude to American legislative practices.
Probably the first law-making chamber in the Trust Territory3
was the seven-man elected body which met on Ponape in 1874 un-
der the direction of Missionary Sturges. Although called to pass
a law on adultery, its initial legislative action regulated land ten-
ure. The laws it adopted, in addition to property measures, were
more or less a codification of the Ten Commandments.4 The con-
cern for enactment of the decalogue had its historical parallels
3 The king of Kusaie, fighting a losing battle to maintain his authority
against the inroads of the mission, in 1869 appointed commoners from the
island’s districts to meet monthly in council with him and the chiefs to deli-
berate on island affairs. It may be argued that this was the first law-making
body. James L. Lewis, Kusaiean Acculturation, CIMA Final Report No. 17
(Washington: National Research Council, Pacific Science Board, 1948), pp.
36–37.
4 See George L. Coale, “A Study of Chieftainship, Missionary Contact, and
Culture Change on Ponape, 1852–1900” (M.A. thesis, University of Southern Cal-
ifornia: 1951), pp. 72–73.
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in Hawaii a half century earlier.5 This missionary plan to weaken
structurally the chieftainship system on Ponape by introducing
democratic forms and processes never fully succeeded, and the
reintroduction of the legislature awaited the return of the Amer-
icans after World War II.
Both the Spanish and the Japanese experimented with forms
of legislative councils, which may be treated as precursors of
those founded by the Americans. In the Marianas, first for Guam
and then, after 1850, for Saipan and the other Northern Islands,
district meetings were held between district “chiefs” and village
and ward “chiefs.” A method of indirect selection introduced an
element of representation into these formal gatherings. As the
councils were convened only when unusual problems were to be
met, they offered an opportunity for innovative decisions akin to
legislating.
On the eastern edge of Micronesia, for the Marshalls the Jap-
anese instituted biennial magistrates’ conferences, which gave
to the Radak and Ralik chains of islands an incipient sense of
Marshallese political unity. Dressed in uniforms supplied by the
Japanese and following strict protocol, the Japanese-appointed
magistrates kept to a prepared agenda and mainly acceded to
that ministering nation’s predeterminations by ratifying the res-
olutions awaiting them. “The magistrates did not meet to make
plans”—as one member of the Marshallese Congress differen-
tiated the latter’s activities; the main purpose of these island
magistrates’ meetings under the Japanese was to receive from the
administration the instructions for their respective areas. Inciden-
tally, though, the magistrates were alerted to problems beyond the
confines of their own atolls, and this indirectly prepared the way
for the American-sponsored district congress.
Long recognized as an agent of culture change, the schools
played an important role in conditioning Micronesians for accept-
ing and participating in assemblies with law-making power. In
addition to communicating factual knowledge about democratic
government and the political institutions designed to achieve and
maintain it, the schools early founded by American missionaries,
and later also those run under public auspices by the American
administration, acquainted young Micronesians with both demo-
cratic practices and the intricacies of parliamentary action in the
5 Norman Meller, “Missionaries to Hawaii,” Western Political Quarterly, 11:4
(Dec., 1958), 788.
46 District Legislatures—Antecedents, Powers, and Structure
making of group decisions. Student leaders were selected for
more than their traditional status. Through widening horizons and
the development of skills, a grounding favorable to the introduc-
tion of district legislatures was being laid. It was undoubtedly his
education in Hawaii and close mission ties that were responsible
for Henry Nanpei’s ambitions to set up a legislature in Ponape dur-
ing the period of the German administration.6
PRECURSORS TO DISTRICT LEGISLATURES
Under American aegis municipal government came into exist-
ence much earlier than the district legislatures. However, as the
indigenous leaders themselves noted, “it is in this [latter] area that
the political growth of Micronesian people is most apparent. The
reason for this growth is probably due to the fact that there were
no similar bodies previously existing from which attitudes could
be formed, habits obtained and outlooks colored which could have
caused obstacles to impede development. In short, they do not
have ‘rivalries’ with which to compete. Another reason is the fact
that ‘they have money.’ They levy taxes which they can collect. The
money from the revenues collected by these congresses is spent
for education, health and other ventures which benefit the people
directly.”7
In most of the Trust Territory, the district legislatures were pre-
ceded by some form of advisory body serving above the level of
village or municipal government. For the most part, their area
of jurisdiction was circumscribed, and their major contribution
was as two-way communication channels between the administra-
tion and their localities. At best they observed only rudimentary
forms of parliamentary procedure. Mainly they were an occasion
for local officials to meet with the administration to be “informed,
reminded, requested, notified, [and] advised,”8 and to seek clarifi-
cation of instructions. The early formation of a district legislature
in Palau, followed by that in the Marshalls, meant that the lives of
these legislative progenitors lasted longer on Truk, Ponape, and
Yap. Saipan’s municipal council may also be included among the
precursors.
6 See John L. Fischer and Ann M. Fischer, The Eastern Carolines (New Haven:
Human Relations Area Files, 1957), pp. 41, 50.
7 “Report of the Political Development Sub-committee to the Council of Mi-
cronesia,” Oct. 1, 1962, p. 3.
8 From reference to the Ponape Council of Municipal Officials’ meeting in
John Sandelmann, Some Observations on the Problem of “Self Government” in
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: 1953), p. 56.
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Soon after the end of the war, the Americans created a Truk
atoll council of native leaders, which proceeded to choose an atoll
chief. This endeavor to fabricate a unified political structure above
the local level collapsed, and in its place a Truk advisory council,
consisting of the island chiefs and their assistants, met monthly
with the military government. Representing approximately two-
thirds of the district’s population, they nicely serviced the need
of a communication conduit as well as a sounding body for the
shaping of administrative decisions by American personnel. As
the chiefs would have to execute any proposals they themselves
advanced, the council encouraged reasonableness on their part.
Gladwin notes the evolvement of informal meetings, after the
“official” sessions had adjourned, at which discussion mainly con-
cerned the resolution of inconsistencies between administration
policy and local custom.9 This may be likened to the informal su-
pervision of the administration, which occupies a material part of
the modern legislature’s attention.
In 1952 an all-Truk Conference of Magistrates was held, and
explorations at this time indicated the feasibility of establishing
a district council of magistrates to meet annually. Before these
conferences were in good part superseded by the Truk District
Legislature, they had stretched into week-long sessions, following
administration-prepared agendas and with committees reporting
to the conference their recommendations on the numerous prob-
lems raised. Action proposed did not necessarily require legisla-
tion but might call for executive or community measures, and it
was not too unusual for these reports to be hortatory in nature.
To bridge the year-long interval, the 1953 District Conference of
Magistrates elected a Permanent Advisory Committee with “au-
thority to represent all islands in the Truk district in advising the
District Administrator and his staff with respect to matters of gov-
ernment….”10 The committee met as often as once every several
weeks for this purpose. In practice, it preferred to refer questions
of any importance, especially those having to do with money, to
the annual conference rather than taking action itself.
On Ponape, monthly meetings of district chiefs and their repre-
sentatives with the government administrators to discuss prob-
lems pertaining to the whole island date back to the early post-war
9 Thomas Gladwin, “Civil Administration in Truk: A Rejoinder,” Human Orga-
nization, 9:4 (Winter, 1950), 22–23. The same phenomenon was reported for Yap;
see Sandelmann, op. cit., p. 119.
10 10th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1957, p. 26.
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period. These sessions of the officers of the five municipalities on
Ponape, speaking for almost two-thirds of the people in the dis-
trict, may be treated as the “beginning of a representative and leg-
islative body.”11 They were succeeded around 1950 by a 22-member
representative body elected for the island of Ponape. “All meetings
were held with the United States administration officers as the di-
rectors of the meetings. There was no division into upper and lower
house. Chiefs and common people met together.”12 Later, this was
replaced by the bicameral Ponape Island Congress.
The Saipanese, with American assistance, in 1947 adopted a
charter for the municipal government of the island. It carried
more than municipal import, however, for about seven-eighths of
all people in the Northern Marianas live on Saipan. The original
document provided for an eleven-member unicameral legislature,
called the High Council. Two years later, the civil administration
on Saipan appended a second legislative chamber, the House of
Commissioners. In the following year the addition of this house
was in effect ratified and supplemented by the granting of a sec-
ond Saipan charter, in which the bicameral body was modeled
after the pattern set by the congress on Guam. The new body,
with fifteen commissioners in the “lower” house and eleven coun-
cilmen in the “upper,” actually performed most of its work in joint
session. The House of Commissioners as a rule had its way on sub-
jects of local ward nature, but items involving all of Saipan were
the concern of the councilmen. The commissioners also had execu-
tive duties over their respective wards, so that the legislative body
embodied a combination of legislative and executive attributes un-
common to the American scene.
Commentators13 studying the Saipan congress at mid-century
found its deliberations marked by endless discussion and bick-
ering and general ineffectiveness. This was largely because the
members’ scope of power was never defined vis-a-vis the executive
branch, so that their duties and the extent of their authority re-
11 John L. Fischer, “Present and Potential Development of Ponapean Society,”
Dec. 5, 1950 (University of Hawaii Sinclair Library, Micro. 594, no. 10).
12 From paper of Oliver Nanpei, read at First Trust Territory Conference on Self-
Government (Truk: 1953), p. 16.
13 Alexander Spoehr, Saipan: the Ethnology of a War-Devastated Island, Fiel-
diana: Anthropology, Vol. 41 (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum, 1954),
pp. 174–176; also see Robert R. Solenberger, “Continuity of Local Political In-
stitutions in the Marianas,” Human Organization, 23:1 (Spring, 1964), 58; U.S.
Department of the Interior, Management Survey of the Government of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: 1951), I, 51; 6th Annual Report of the
United States to the United Nations, 1953, p. 16.
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mained confused. Much of their time was wasted on procedural and
jurisdictional matters rather than spent in taking definitive action
to resolve the substantive problems before them. Nevertheless, the
experience gained in a legislative body conforming to parliament-
ary rules and employing a full system of committees prepared the
Saipanese for ready assumption of responsibility for the running of
a district legislature when one was finally authorized in 1963.
The degree of involvement of American personnel in these early
advisory groups varied from district to district. Typically, the
American administrators would meet with them at the opening
of each session to present the problems currently faced by the
administration; thereafter, there was no single pattern which gov-
erned the Americans’ part in the work of the various bodies. On
Ponape, meetings were left almost completely to Ponapeans, who
could freely discuss all questions brought before them and would
later report to the administrator. In contrast, American person-
nel took an active part throughout the period of the Truk atoll
magistrates’ conferences and the Truk District Conferences of
Magistrates which succeeded them. The same lack of pattern was
to apply to the American administrators’ relation to the district
legislatures which followed the advisory groups.
These preliminary bodies stimulated the beginnings of a
district-wide identity which had never been stirred under the pre-
ceding metropolitan nations. The former Administering Authori-
ties had utilized a system of centralized district administration,
but it had little meaning for the indigenes who had no share in
its direction. Micronesian government was generally local, and
at best extended spacially no farther than the confines of the
confederations known to Palau. After World War II, across all
of Micronesia the inhabitants were for the first time being pre-
sented with an opportunity to develop a sense of understanding
of district-wide problems and take part in their resolution. En-
veloping this may have been a slight aura of play acting, carrying
overtones of Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, just as has cloaked the
activities of the later district-wide legislatures, but in retrospect,
the institution of these preliminary consultative councils was an
essential step along the course of alerting the people of the Trust
Territory to the potential and procedures of legislating bodies.
FOUNDING DISTRICT LEGISLATURES
Section 41 of the Code of the Trust Territory authorizes the
district administrator to create local advisory councils for com-
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munities, individual islands, or groups of islands as may seem
appropriate. Long before this authorization was promulgated
as part of the code in 1952, regional advisory bodies began
developing in a rather haphazard way in accordance with the
wide administrative latitude allotted each district’s civil admin-
istration. The initial period under the naval administration was
one of experimentation, and there was no disposition to force
uniformity. In due time the stamp of approval for the innovations
would be obtained from the high commissioner. Some of these
advisory groups have already been mentioned as the precursor
councils preceding the founding of district legislatures.
Early in the administration of the Territory, the failure of the
United States Congress to take action on organic legislation cast
a shadow over the whole process of setting up regional legislative
bodies. When this constraint was lifted by the Federal Congress’
abandoning its efforts at organic legislation, the Territorial admin-
istration was free to extend the scope of powers of the district
assemblies. Standardization in conformance with the desires of
the United Nations and in response to the exchange of knowledge
about each district’s experiences resulted in greater comparability
in regional legislatures as the years passed. The quest for
administrative efficiency also looked favorably upon uniformity of
charter provisions, and the drafting of a model legislative charter
(see Appendix) and a set of model rules by the 1960’s foretold that
the heterodoxy of the original founding period would continue no
longer.
The first district legislatures served groups having cultural co-
hesion—Palauans, Marshallese, Ponapeans; later legislatures
were more heterogeneous in membership. Palau has the distinc-
tion of establishing the first regional deliberative body, which
through evolutionary steps developed into today’s district legis-
lature. The actual founding dates back to May of 1947 when a
convention was held on Koror, and the first session of the elected
Palau Congress met on July 4, 1947.14 All this occurred prior to the
approval of the Trusteeship Agreement by the United States and
while the area was still under Military Government. Indicative of
14 For Palau District Congress, see Dorothy E. Richard, U.S. Naval Administra-
tion in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, 1957), III, 396–98; Arthur J. Vidich, “The Political Impact of
Colonial Administration” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: March 31, 1952), pp.
280–281; Arthur J. Vidich, Political Factionalism in Palau, CIMA Final Report No. 23
(Washington: National Research Council, Pacific Science Board, 1949), pp. 78–79.
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the permissive administration of the period is the fact that the con-
gress was not officially approved until a year later, and a charter
did not receive the high commissioner’s sanction until September
20, 1948. The organizational plans, devised by the Palauan chiefs
and others they called upon for technical assistance, made provi-
sion for a partially-elected legislative body, an appointed judiciary,
and an administrative council consisting of the two high chiefs of
Palau and eight other chiefs to head the departments of the lo-
cal government. This Palauan government dealt with “all-Palau”
problems; all of its policy determinations were subject to approval
of the naval administrators. In 1948, the administrative council
and its operating functions was replaced by a new council with
solely advisory powers (see Palau District Order No. 3–48, Appen-
dix), and a new congress was also introduced (see Palau District
Order Nos. 4–48 and 1–49, Appendix). (District Order No. 1–49
incorporates the rules adopted at the 1947 session, as modified
over time.) Magistrates were now members; from the inception of
the first congress in 1947, the two high chiefs and the paramount
chiefs of the Palau districts regularly attended all congressional
sessions. Although the Yap area was administratively within the
Palau district during this early period, its peoples at no time ever
joined in congressional activities. Part of this historical sequence
of events has become blurred over time, which helps to explain
why in 1957 the Palau district held a “tenth-anniversary celebra-
tion” on the “founding of its Congress in 1948 [italics added].”15
After the Palau Congress had been in existence for a few years,
efforts commenced to revise and refurbish the brief District Order,
substituting a new charter spelling out in greater detail the mem-
bership, functions, and procedures of the district legislative body.
Also, the Palau legislators desired to meet semi-annually instead
of only once a year. Resolution No. 7–53 of the Palau Congress
would have the Council of Advisors replaced by another body, the
Tebechelel Olbiil, responsible to the congress. Resolution No. 8
of the same congressional session called for a council of chiefs,
consisting of the two high chiefs and one paramount chief for
each of the Palauan communities. Both resolutions recommended
that these councils “be incorporated into the structure of the
government if and when a charter is granted by the High Com-
missioner….” A special Palauan charter committee sought to equip
15 Annual Report of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior,
1958, p. 28.
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each council with a distinct mission: the Tebechelel Olbiil was to
be a consultant on administrative matters and its members were
to serve without vote in the Olbiil era Kelulau, the name to be
given to the district congress; the chiefs were to be advisors on
custom, with powers to delay for a whole legislative session mat-
ters affecting tradition. The president of the congress particularly
approved of the Tebechelel Olbiil as a body of executive advisors,
as he disliked the exposed position connoted in one-man authority,
and Palauan traditions of leadership favored a council over a sin-
gle individual.
Upon further collaboration between Palauans and members
of the district administration in the formulation of the charter,
and the suggestion of numerous alternative provisions by the
high commissioner’s staff, a new charter was issued by the high
commissioner in January of 1955. Its fundamental aim was to
unite traditional, administrative, and liberal forms “to produce a
progressive self-responsibility.”16 This only set up the Olbiil era
Kelulau and left vague the status of the Tebechelel Olbiil as advi-
sor to the president of the congress. Both chiefs and magistrates
continued as members of the district congress and for eight years
participated in its activities, although nominally without ability to
vote on resolutions which were to become law. Finally in 1963,
with the backing of the district administration to get it through the
congress, another charter was adopted which continued the mem-
bership of the chiefs, but deprived of power to vote or hold office,
and removed the magistrates.17 At the same time the Tebechelel
Olbiil was abolished. Interestingly, the course of this legislative
development in Palau was charted partially in light of American
experience in Samoa with traditional chiefs participating in the
Samoan Fono (legislature) as a matter of right and by the desire
to avoid Samoa’s failure to tie its units of local government closely
with the central administration through legislative membership.
Unlike in the early military government in Palau, in the Mar-
shalls the district administration acknowledged the social position
of the iroij in the traditional culture, but at first granted them
no governmental authority. This policy was reversed with the
founding of the Marshall Islands Congress. In March of 1948 a
conference of magistrates and scribes of the Majuro district was
16 Letter of HiCom to DistAd Palau, June 2, 1964.
17 For consideration of role of chiefs in the Palau district legislature, see pp.
127–131.
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held to consider subjects of district-wide interest. It was followed
by an all-Marshalls conference in 1949, and from the latter arose
the administration’s sponsorship of a Marshallese congress. In
July of 1949 a conference of iroij was convoked and within three
days “unanimously approved” the draft charter presented to it for
review. The deputy high commissioner ratified the charter in 1949,
and the first session of the bicameral congress, with one house
composed of iroij and the other of “elected” representatives, met
for the first time in July of 1950.
The pattern of procedure which the Marshallese congress was
to follow was set during the preceding 1949 magistrates’ confer-
ence. Administrative officers first addressed the indigenes, and
the latter then engaged in informal, off-the-record meetings, fi-
nally reporting their conclusions for formal action. When the con-
gress convened in the following year, after a range of problems
had been presented by the administration, the two houses sep-
arated to analyze the problems but then in joint session delib-
erated upon each chamber’s proposals, and in this way adopted
recommendations to be forwarded to the district administration.
From the time of the early 1949 conference, the value of working
towards a unified Marshalls district was stressed. Under the De-
partment of Interior’s administration, the co-equal role of the
hereditary iroij with the representative commoners in the Mar-
shallese congress did not meet with favor, and at the urging of the
American administrators a second charter was framed in 1958.
Much to the Americans’ chagrin, the iroij basically retained their
former role and, in addition, secured protections against revision
of traditional rights which the bicameral body could have modi-
fied.18 The reduction in the number of elected members in 1964
only further entrenched the position of the hereditary members.
Almost contemporaneously with the Marshallese, the people of
the Northern Marianas expressed their desire to form a govern-
ing body for their district. Early in 1950, they laid before the
administration a charter with but a single organ of government.
The Senate, as it was to be known, would have been endowed with
full executive and legislative powers, except for a limited veto, and
with judicial powers over local matters. The high commissioner
conceded that “the people of Saipan have made excellent progress
in political development, but it is believed that they are not at
18 For consideration of role of iroij in the Marshall Islands Congress, see pp.
132–141.
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this time prepared to assume the broad powers of government in-
cluded in the ‘Charter for the Marianas Union,’”19 and he vetoed
the novel scheme.
The following year, the high commissioner and his staff pre-
pared a revised charter which granted neither executive nor leg-
islative powers but merely created a body to advise the high
commissioner and civil administrator on Saipan. This was in line
with the policy of the administration “to encourage a gradual de-
velopment of democratic processes” and reflected its view that the
charter proposed by the Saipanese would have overtaxed their po-
litical capacity.20 Later, the United States reported to the United
Nations that “at the request of the various municipal councils,
esablishment of a congress for the district of Saipan is held in
abeyance for the time being.”21 In view of the impending cleavage
of the Marianas district because of a C.I.A. training program on
Saipan, one cannot but regard with a little cynicism this explana-
tion that the postponement was sought by the council members
to allow them to solve pressing local problems before attempting
to institute a legislative advisory body on a district-wide basis.
Much later, after the abandonment of the C.I.A. program and as
efforts to draft a charter were renewed, protection of the other
Mariana islands against being engulfed by the preponderant pop-
ulation of Saipan posed problems to be overcome. A charter was
finally formulated for a district-wide legislature to meet in 1963,
its jurisdiction covering the reunited Northern Mariana islands.
The area’s “readiness” for a district legislature was indicated by
its easy adoption of rules of procedure, its forming standing com-
mittees, and its emphasizing committee work at its initial session.
Like Palau, the Ponape district offered an opportunity for the
early structuring of a district-wide legislature. This was postponed
for many years by internal factors—both factionalism on Ponape
Island and disagreements among members of the high commis-
sioner’s staff over the advisability of a legislative body for the
whole of the Ponape district. Discussions leading to the formation
of a legislature began in 1949 after a referendum favored the
preparation of a charter for a district-wide congress. However, the
high commissioner disapproved of the draft District Orders creat-
19 Letter of HiCom, Feb. 24, 1950, quoted in Richard, op. cit., p. 395.
20 4th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1951,
p. 19.
21 5th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1952
p. 15.
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ing such a body which were presented to him in 1950 and the
charter calling for a bicameral congress, drafted by a “Provisional
Ponape Congress” meeting in 1951. Difference of customs in the
several parts of the district and the impracticability of members’
attending from islands outside of Ponape were reasons expressed
for the rejection. A period of confusion ensued, with the Ponape
area next opting for an island congress and the high commis-
sioner then disfavoring a body for the island of Ponape alone. Out
of this seeming inability to reach a meeting of minds, in May of
1952 there finally emerged a bicameral Ponape Island Congress
in which chiefs, elected representatives, and non-voting delegates
from the Outer-Island colonies resident on the island of Ponape
could all take part.
Dissatisfaction with the resolution of the problem of a district-
wide legislature continued on Ponape. At its December, 1953,
meeting, the Island Congress declared there should be an all-
Ponape district legislature to meet once a year. At the session in
November of 1956, Joint Resolution No. 10, which would have con-
verted the Ponape Island Congress into a district congress, was
tabled, but the congress appointed a committee to study ways and
means of developing a district-wide legislative body. With the two
houses “in constant disagreement”22 over the future organization
of the congress, the question was finally settled by calling a con-
vention of representatives of each municipality to undertake the
drafting of a new charter which would include all peoples of the
Ponape district. The convention decided to eliminate further rep-
resentation of Ponapean title holders, which resolved the problem
of the Outer Islands’ not having within their traditional structure
persons with comparable titles who could sit in a House of Nobles
of a bicameral body.23 The new legislature for the whole of the
Ponape district convened in September of 1958.
As the Trukese were deemed “not prepared to cope with the
complexities of centralized government,”24 a district-wide legis-
lative body for that portion of the Trust Territory was late in
developing. By 1956 the Truk District Conference of Magistrates
unanimously voted to set up a legislature with representatives
elected by popular vote. “The granting of the Truk Congress Char-
22 1959 United Nations Visiting Mission Report, par. 55.
23 For consideration of role of chiefs in Ponape Island Congress, see pp.
123–127.
24 3rd Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1950,
p. 17.
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ter followed many hours of work and study both on the part of
Micronesian leaders and Administration workers in order that the
significance of the action might be comprehended by the people
and they might be prepared to assume the responsibilities as well
as obligations bestowed by the charter.”25 The Secretary of the In-
terior officially presented Truk’s charter when visiting the district
in August of 1957, and the first Trukese congress convened on No-
vember 4, three years ahead of the estimated target date.
At first, many of these district legislatures were assigned the
pretentious title of “congress,” and both that name and “legisla-
ture” have been employed somewhat interchangeably in Trust
Territory terminology. Not all indigenous legislators have been
happy with this usage, and in the Marshalls the members volun-
teered for their body the name of kwelok, signifying a gathering
or meeting. The district administrator, too, though the title of the
Marshall Islands Congress inappropriate and preferred “council”
as more properly fitting the body’s nature. Nothing came of this,
but later charters in other districts have abandoned the name of
“congress,” and today most of the district bodies are referred to
as “legislatures” in their enabling acts, reserving the higher status
title for the all-Trust Territory Congress of Micronesia.
The efforts of the administration played a key part in interesting
the indigenous inhabitants in the founding of the new legislatures
and in preparing them to participate in their operation. There
were no exact cultural parallels, and hampered by a language
barrier, the indigenes had to be instructed on the significance
of the new political institutions. In addition, they had to be as-
sisted through the intricacies of formal voting, fiscal years, and
the myriad other elements surrounding the subject matter and
process of legislatures, which are taken as a matter of course in
more sophisticated areas. As the Micronesians became conversant
with the activities of their initial district-wide legislatures, they
came to play a more active role in the restructuring of the later
bodies which replaced them, so that the current charters today
represent a combination of administration-sponsored sections in-
terlaced with indigene-initiated provisions.
The granting of a second or third charter for a district has been
occasioned by a number of factors. The local suggestion of a se-
ries of basic amendments by a district legislature has sometimes
25 Annual Report of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior,
1958, p. 27.
57
been the signal for the drafting of a new charter by the staff of
the high commissioner when it is of the opinion that the existing
structure has proven unwieldy or that legislative procedures re-
quire revision. Contributing to the issuance of new charters has
been the long-range administrative objective of institutionalizing
the unicameral body throughout the Territory, extending the juris-
diction of each legislature to encompass the whole of its district,
and limiting membership to elected representatives as soon as po-
litical acculturation has advanced to the point where it permits the
elimination in the legislatures of traditional leaders without risk
of traumatic disruption of the relationships which govern normal
social intercourse. Partially reflecting this, within the districts, ef-
forts toward the redrafting of charters have continuously been
encouraged by the district administrators. The granting of four
new charters in 1963 also gave evidence of a new-found interest
in extending uniformity through a basic matrix of charter pro-
visions, to be modified and expanded as necessary to meet the
requirements and idiosyncracies of each district. The involvement
of legislators and district administration personnel in the charter
granting process assured that the contents of the various charters
would remain to some degree dissimilar. It can be expected that
in the future the administration will play an ever smaller role in
chartering the district legislatures which will succeed the present
assemblies, and that because of this, greater variation rather than
more conformity will characterize these bodies as they respond to
the districts’ differing needs.
POWERS
The district legislatures of the Trust Territory well demon-
strate that law-making is only one of the properties of legislative
bodies. So gradually and unevenly was legislating power acquired
that a cross-section of all of the districts at any one time would
have revealed no single pattern. This flowed partly from the am-
bivalence of the Administering Authority, which was willing to
facilitate the efforts of indigenes aimed at self-government but at
the same time was hesitant to undermine the reserved authority
of the high commissioner to control the Trust Territory’s course
of development. Reference to the charters for guidance is of little
aid, for their language, especially as they have been amended,
constitutes an uninformative amalgam of Micronesian-prompted
phraseology and administration-inspired additions and revisions.
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As a consequence, legislative powers were expanded more by con-
vention than by express grant.
It has never been clearly understood by either indigenous legis-
lators or the district administration precisely what was to be
the district legislature’s scope of responsibility. The conceptual
separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial bun-
dles is completely foreign to customary political practices in Mi-
cronesia and, in truth, did not particularly fit the evolving needs
of the respective districts. On the other hand, district adminis-
trators, formerly enjoying authority in both executive and legisla-
tive realms, could only look critically upon the district bodies’
intrusion into the latter area except when the legislatures’ recom-
mendations coincided with the course they themselves believed
proper. The exclusion of Federally supplied funds from the juris-
diction of the district legislatures meant that these bodies per-
force had to develop extra-legal means if they were to affect the
funds’ administration in any way. This indefiniteness of the district
legislature’s part in the system of district government yet remains.
Communications. As initially conceived, the major role of the
district legislature was to serve in an advisory capacity to the ad-
ministration. It was not appreciated that while performing this
inchoate legislative function, the individual members and each dis-
trict body collectively would not only be a source of intelligence
for the district administration but also become a major return con-
duit for the dissemination of information about the district’s ad-
ministration. In the Palaus, the Marshalls, Ponape Island—wherever
the early district legislative bodies were chartered—the legislators
met informally with constituents and not infrequently with the
local government officials prior to coming to the district headquar-
ters for the convening of the district congress. Upon adjournment,
they reported back, sometimes to the council of the municipal-
ity, at other times to gatherings called for the purpose, so that
the people of their area might know what had transpired at the
session just adjourned. One of the important reasons for district
legislators to attend sessions was to ascertain what was occur-
ring at district headquarters which might be to the benefit of
their home municipality. To the legislative halls were brought all
the requests and complaints expressed locally, and many of these
became embodied in the resolutions formally submitted to the at-
tention of the district administrator. In turn, the administration
was heavily dependent upon the district legislators’ understand-
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ing of the administrative programs and their interpretation of them
for the people back home. In a region without newspapers and with
only limited radio and postal coverage, such verbal intercourse be-
comes essential to the processes of administration.
Legislative communication consisted of more than a vertical
flow of information between administration and legislator. Inside
the legislative body itself, sometimes through the committees,
members exchanged points of view and developed expertise in
specific subject-matter areas. Via the legislature, then, communi-
cations between different sub-regions and groupings within the
district’s society were facilitated, factual knowledge shared, dis-
trict opinion structured, and district-wide aspirations fostered.
Contemporaneous with the work of the district bodies’ becom-
ing more formalized, journals reporting the legislative proceed-
ings were distributed to the magistrates of the municipalities, and
returning members brought back with them both copies of the
measures which had been introduced at the adjourned session
and materials distributed by the district administration. However,
as Micronesia remains primarily an oral-language culture, the
information conveyed by word of mouth has most likely exerted
more impact than all the written materials distributed. The broad-
casting of district legislative sessions now beginning to reach
throughout the Territory is but the successor to the first district
legislator returning home to inform the people of his community
about everything that had happened at the initial session of the
district’s legislative body.
Formulating and unifying public opinion. Allied to communi-
cation, but intrinsically different, has been the material contribu-
tion which the district legislatures have made to the structuring
of public opinion. Wherever these congresses have been formed,
“they represent federations of numerous areas customarily under
independent local authorities.”26 Until the district legislatures and
their precursor advisory bodies began grappling with district-wide
problems, and in turn aided their constituents in looking beyond
the boundaries of their village or island, it is difficult to detect
the existence of any but localized public opinion. At the first Trust
Territory Conference on Self-Government held in 1953, Oliver
Nanpei, in a paper referring to the Ponape Islands Congress,
noted how its committee system helped give shape to expression
26 6th Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 18.
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of the public will. “For example, the committee dealing with fish-
eries went around and talked to many people who fished around
the Island. They learned to get ideas about markets in their minds
and to express their thoughts to the administration.”27
From the founding of the district legislatures, the administra-
tion stressed the importance of developing a district-wide outlook,
and this helped mold legislative attitudes and actions. In numer-
ous subtle ways, a district identity has emerged from what had
been, at best, localized concern. In 1953 the Marshallese were
telling the United Nations Visiting Mission that their culture and
their district were unique and they did not want to lose themselves
in an amalgamation with other Micronesians. By 1956, the iroij
could propose that the Majuro anthem, “Ij Yokwe lok Ailin eo Ao,”
be declared the “national anthem for the entire Marshalls for the
time being [italics added].”28 Later this same function of promot-
ing regional unity was to be borne by the Council of Micronesia
and to reach full flower in initiation of an all-Trust-Territory-iden-
tity as one of the contributions of the new Congress of Micronesia.
Island trading companies. Appropriate to the geographic isola-
tion and limited economy of Micronesia, its peoples have been un-
usually dependent upon trading companies which purchase their
copra and other exportable products of soil and sea and in return
sell them food and trade goods to supplement their subsistence-
type living. All Japanese commercial activity came to a halt in
World War II. On take over by the American military forces, a Fed-
eral agency, the United States Commercial Company, and later
the Island Trading Company, incorporated by the high commis-
sioner under the laws of Guam, furnished these services. Under
pressure from United States congressmen to close out I.T.C., it be-
came manifest that indigenous businessmen would have to step
into the breach, and both in Palau and in the Marshalls the district
legislatures undertook to encourage the setting up of trading com-
panies. The Western Caroline Trading Company was chartered in
1948 through the efforts of the Palau Congress and the Council
of Chiefs. MIECO, the Marshall Islands Importing and Exporting
Company, was formed through similar cooperative activity in the
Marshalls, with the Marshallese congress’ having a key role in the
27 Record of the First Trust Territory Conference on Self-Government (Truk:
1953), p. 18.
28 Journal of the House of Iroij, 1956 Marshall Islands Congress, Aug. 28
p. 2.
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solicitation of capital to found the new company. The Truk district
legislature also has shown interest in the financing of the Truk
Trading Company.
Historical precedents favored the Marshallese congress’
concerning itself in the commercial activity of the district. Govern-
ment by the Germans was introduced through a private firm, the
Jaluit Company’s, administering the area; in the Japanese period
the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha worked closely with the government. The
Americans continued this direct public tie with commercial activ-
ity, first with the U.S.C.C. and then the I.T.C. It was only natural
for the Marshallese not to draw any sharp dichotomy between the
public and private sectors of the economy and, at the first ses-
sion of the Marshall Islands Congress, to adopt a resolution for
the election of MIECO officers and to fix the salary of the MIECO
manager. As evidence of its quasi-public nature, for many years
MIECO distributed its balance sheet, statement of profit and loss,
and statement of net worth to the Marshall Islands Congress when
in session, and its manager reported personally to the congress
on the year’s business just concluded. To this day, the Marshallese
congress concerns itself with the management policies and prac-
tices of the company. In a way this is reminiscent of the period
when, to encourage economic development, American state leg-
islatures blurred the lines between private and public enterprise
through grants of public funds to private promoters and followed
the course of their activities as though they were public projects.
Administration and administrative supervision. All legislatures
engage in a degree of direct administration, tending to their own
wants through the activities of their staffs. As illustration, Resolu-
tion No. 5–53 of Palau sets up a permanent secretariat responsible
for maintaining the records of the congress and, by implication,
for caring for congressional facilities. But the district legislatures
in Micronesia have engaged in administrative activities wider than
their own housekeeping chores, in good part because the nature
of the new legislative bodies and the duties of their members were
originally not well understood. Many islanders believed the advis-
ory duties with which the legislatures started their careers were
of such little moment that the legislators must also be expected
to participate in local government. Congressmen in Ponape saw
to it that their constituents did their share of community road
work, made reports, and otherwise conformed with governmental
requirements. The district administrator cited to the 1958 Truk
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District Congress five different islands on which legislators had
assumed authority over municipal government. In at least one mu-
nicipality in Palau a congressman, by virtue of his status as a
district legislator, was included in the rubekul (local government
council). Gradually this misunderstanding cleared, but though the
district legislators then curbed their direct intervention in local
government, they continued in many cases to consult with munic-
ipal officials and to be the conduit for contact between municipal
government and district headquarters. The result was that the
legislators retained their influence over local operations.
A second reason for district legislators’ direct involvement in
administration arose out of the schism which saw the indigenous
population identifying the administration at district headquarters
as “American” while the district legislatures were regarded as
“Micronesian.” Logically, then, greater self-government meant the
extension of legislative activity into executive affairs. The ill-fated
Charter for the Marianas Union, vetoed by the high commissioner
in 1950, would have given the legislature full executive powers
in the running of the Marianas district administration. The Palau
Congress succeeded to the water transportation equipment of the
defunct Palau Association organized under the military govern-
ment and then entered into a contract with the Western Caroline
Trading Company to maintain the system. One of the reasons for
the legislators’ desiring a permanent secretariat was to ensure the
legislature’s supervision of these transportation operations. When
Palau was granted a new charter in 1955, it expressly authorized
the Olbiil era Kelulau to “acquire and administer real and personal
property,” thereby in effect ratifying the previous legislative ac-
tion. The gradual assumption of district-wide taxing authority by
the congresses was accompanied by the appointment of district
treasurers and the establishment of tax collection machinery un-
der legislative aegis. To truncate this expansion of the legislative
branch of government, by Executive Order No. 83 the high com-
missioner in 1962 directed that the office of district treasurer be
integrated into the staff of the district administrator and in a sin-
gle order amended all of the district charters (see Appendix).
A recent example of direct legislative involvement in the de-
tails of administration occurred during the 1965 elections for
the Congress of Micronesia when, at the request of the district
administrator, the members of the Marshall Islands Congress
supervised in their respective islands the elections to choose
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solons for the new Territorial congress. Back in 1962, the po-
litical development sub-committee of the Council of Micronesia
which toured the Territory reported that “it was observed by the
committee that in most of the districts they visited congresses’
roles were not clearly defined. Most congresses are assuming
responsibilities which should properly belong in the Executive
branch.” The sub-committee recommended that the problem be
dealt with “before it is too late” so that the district congresses
could be developed “into bona fide legislative bodies.”29
As the district chambers through legislation began creating and
prescribing the duties of district administrative agencies, the exer-
cise of the legislatures’ oversight powers came to resemble more
closely the practices of state legislative bodies in the United States.
The Palau Board of Education was authorized to issue regulations
having the force and effect of law, conditioned upon any regulation’s
being subject to rescinding by resolution of the Palau Congress.30
Members of a series of executive boards created by the Mariana
District Legislature could be appointed by the district administra-
tor, subject to confirmation either by the district legislature or the
holdover committee of that body.31 In 1964 the Truk District Legis-
lature and the district administrator found themselves engaged in a
dispute over an act which would have given the Truk Speaker power
to appoint and remove the district tax collector.32 The district ad-
ministrator was of the opinion that the legislature was invading his
authority; he also disapproved of a legislative proposal specifying
the number of police for each municipality within the Truk district.33
The district legislatures now have full appropriating powers
over moneys collected under their authority or allocated to the
district by the Congress of Micronesia. However, the bulk of the
expenditures for running the district administration are met out
of Federal expenditures. District bodies have no part in either
shaping the district administrators’ budget requests before they
are transmitted to the high commissioner and Washington or in
the expenditure of Federal funds by district agencies after they
29 “Report of the Political Development Sub-Committee …,” op. cit., p. 3.
30 Resolution No. 13–55, Palau Congress.
31 See, for example, Acts No. 34–65 and 38–65, Mariana Islands District Legisla-
ture.
32 Act No. 3–64, Truk District Legislature. It should be noted that district legisla-
tures have exercised appointment powers to Territorial administrative bodies, such
as the Copra Stabilization Board.
33 Act No. 4–64, Truk District Legislature.
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are appropriated by the Congress of the United States and allo-
cated by Headquarters at Saipan. In one district, Truk, the district
administrator initiated the practice of referring his preliminary
$1,500,000 budget to the Truk legislators for debate and recom-
mendations before it was forwarded to the high commissioner.
The legislature summoned the department heads to justify their
budget requests and then proposed modifications. However, the
high commissioner prohibited continuation of legislative review
and also vetoed a bill passed by the first Congress of Micronesia
which would have made legislative review mandatory. Although
the confidentiality of the Federal executive budget process may
now preclude revealing the contents of the Territorial budget
to the district legislators in advance of its referral to Washing-
ton—the justification for the high commissioner’s veto of Assembly
Bill No. 2 of the first congress—it would seem only a matter of time
before the administrative oversight powers of the district legisla-
tures will be extended in some way to include district budgets,
even though the money is not appropriated at the district level.
Another development throughout the Trust Territory has seen
the district legislatures calling the personnel of the district admin-
istration to account for the manner in which they have undertaken
the execution of laws, whether enacted by the legislature or of
Territory-wide scope. Early in its life, the Marshallese congress
objected to alleged discrimination in health care. In Truk, the dis-
trict legislators are recipients of numerous petitions of grievances,
which they have called on the district administrator to correct,
usually without investigation into the accuracy of the petitions’
charges. Observation of the Truk solons in action reveals that they
look upon the legislature as an instrument for forcing the district
administration to mend its ways. The Truk District Legislature has
also utilized the device of asking the administration to set up study
commissions to make recommendations upon which legislative ac-
tion may be based. As a variant of this legislative supervision, the
Speaker of the Truk legislature has used his office to complain
of allegedly lax administration by district agencies and to request
that they respond personally to his charges.
The charters of district legislatures now either contain pro-
vision for the use of subpoenas in furthering their investigative
powers or are being amended to grant the right to issue the
writ. The mere possession of this power has strengthened super-
visory activities. Under threat of subpoena, the Marianas district
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administrator directed his public works officer to appear before
a legislative committee after the officer had indicated his un-
willingness to subject himself to legislative interrogation. In a
comparable situation, the Palau district administrator sought to
obtain “protection” for his staff members by requiring questions in
writing prior to their requested appearance before the legislature.
It is only a matter of time before employment of the investigat-
ing powers will be coupled with appeals to public opinion to bring
pressure upon the district administrators to modify the course
of executive action even though the legislatures may not possess
direct power over assignment of Federal funds. Illustrative of a
related tactic, the Ponape District Legislature now adopts reso-
lutions asking for the enforcement of laws which it previously
passed and which it believes are not being administered satis-
factorily. With the district administrator now designated as the
executive accountable for the enforcement of district legislation
under Public Law 1–6 enacted by the first Congress of Microne-
sia, other district legislatures may adopt this stratagem of chiding
the district administration instead of relying upon more direct ac-
tion through use of their investigatory powers. In any event, the
ultimate weapon in administrative oversight is the dispatch of a
petition to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations or a com-
plaint to a U.N. Visiting Mission. Relatively ineffective when used
indiscriminately as a blunderbuss, this power arms the district leg-
islatures with a unique potential to sway administrative actions
even though they do not possess legal authority to direct them.
Law-making powers. The shift from advisory to full legislating
powers happened so gradually that it is recognizable only in ret-
rospect. During the Navy period, the Administering Authority had
contemplated giving the district bodies law-making authority sub-
ject to the veto of the civil administrators, but it then abandoned
the idea. Technically, consultation with the local district bodies
supplied only advice to the district administrators, but even before
the first district legislature convened, it was recognized that in ac-
tual practice the expression of local opinion was likely to carry the
weight of legislative decision except “in the relatively rare cases
when official policy overrules them.”34 Nevertheless, the fiction
of the district legislatures as solely advisory was maintained from
34 Stanford University School of Naval Administration, Handbook of the
Trust Territory (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1948), p.
106.
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the time the initial district legislature was convened in Palau until
fairly recently. Palau District Order No. 4–48 stated “the function
of the Palau Congress is purely advisory to the Civil Administra-
tor,” and the supplementary instructions issued as part of Order
No. 1–49 declared that the “Congress is empowered only to render
opinions and make recommendations to the Civil Administrator.”
To reinforce this, the latter order added that the civil administra-
tor was not required to follow such recommendations; “however,
he will, in all cases, take account of such opinions and recommen-
dations” (see Appendix).
In reporting to the United Nations on the district assemblies,
the United States committed itself to expanding their advisory
powers “as the people mastered the techniques and procedures of
legislation.”35 In fact, the procedure followed had the high com-
missioner concur with district recommendations phrased in the
form of resolutions. This resulted in both American personnel and
indigenes’ treating the process as akin to legislating, despite the
legal fiction that the law-making power resided entirely in the high
commissioner. When the “power of resolution upon any subject”
was granted to the Palau Olbiil era Kelulau by the new charter
of 1955, and then to this was joined the supplemental provision
necessitating the high commissioner to act upon these resolutions
under penalty of their becoming effective should he fail to do
so, “legal” legislating authority was allocated to the district body.
The Administering Authority acknowledged that this was only an
enlargement of powers already granted and that these powers
“would be extended to other district legislative advisory bodies as
they advance in experience and their charters are amended.”36
If the year 1955 be taken as marking the first delegation of the
high commissioner’s law-making power, full implementation was
delayed until the following year. In March of 1956, Section 20 of
the Code of the Trust Territory was amended by Executive Or-
der No. 55 to give acts of chartered legislative bodies full force
and make a law effective when approved by the high commis-
sioner or otherwise confirmed according to the charter or laws
of the Trust Territory. Before this change, after submission and
high commissioner ratification, district orders still needed to be
prepared and promulgated. The amendment opened the way for
35 3rd Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 19.
36 11th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1958,
p. 15.
67
legislative enactments’ automatically becoming effective should
the high commissioner fail to veto them.
In contrast to the early charter for the Marshall Islands Con-
gress, which specifically authorized the congress to make
recommendations on such matters as “civil and criminal law, and
regulation of shipping and commerce” (see 1949 constitution, Ap-
pendix), the more recently granted charters merely recognize in
general terms that the legislative power of the district is vested
in their legislatures. Most contain separate authorization for the
levying of taxes and the expenditure of the funds, although the al-
location of a number of tax sources to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Congress of Micronesia has now reduced the scope of these
grants. Almost universally the district legislators look upon their
financial powers as their greatest strength, and undoubtedly the
district-wide taxes originally imposed pursuant to district legisla-
tion and the continued expenditure of funds pursuant to district
determination have given the present district legislatures their
current political prominence.
For a short while the Administering Authority toyed with
precluding the district legislature from concerning itself with tra-
ditional matters, in line with the “Barnett thesis.” As anthropol-
ogist for the Trust Territory, Homer G. Barnett propounded that
the customary system of authority should “have jurisdiction over
those matters which are traditional, as it always has; and then
restricting the authority of the new political order, whatever it
is, to the solution of problems that we [Americans], by our pres-
ence in their midst, have introduced…. There will be simply two
parallel patterns of authority functioning in two entirely different
spheres of interest…. this means continuing to let the old author-
ity deal with all matters that are traditional.”37 It was decided
“that the Marshallese Congress should be made the object of an
experiment to develop the processes of democratic government
without prejudice or damage to native custom.” The Marshallese
were to be encouraged to consider in their congress “only those
matters which are foreign to their culture and outside the scope
of traditional controls.”38 Two years later this artificial duality was
abandoned, for this conception of two separate cultures existing
side by side did not square with reality.
37 Official Transcript of Proceedings—Conference of District Administrators
of the Trust Territory, Feb. 28, 1952, pp. 1–97.
38 Letter of Dep HiCom to DistAd Marshalls, March 28, 1952.
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A vague area of uncertainty still delimits the boundaries of the
district legislators’ law-making powers. Their actions may not be
contrary to the governing provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement,
Presidential Executive Orders, Interior Department Orders, or the
applicable laws of the United States. Nor may any district legisla-
tive body enact laws that contradict the Code and Public Laws of
the Trust Territory or Emergency District Orders approved by the
high commissioner. Legislature members have been of the opinion
that all matters covered by the Trust Territory Code were outside
their legislating authority, and with the new Congress of Micronesia
succeeding to the legislating powers of the high commissioner, this
assumption is now correct. In the past, however, the approval of a
district legislative enactment by the high commissioner could have
constituted an implied amendment of the Code’s provisions. Compa-
rable confusion applied to the relation of the legislatures to district
orders, but in compliance with a 1963 memorandum of the high
commissioner, all district orders are gradually being reviewed for
repeal, amendment, or transformation into district laws. Contempo-
raneous with the expansion of the district legislatures’ powers, the
district administrators were directed to curtail their promulgation
of district orders; insofar as possible, measures having the force and
effect of law were to be submitted to the legislatures for enactment
rather than issued as district orders. This form of administrative
law-making at the district level has gradually atrophied to the pre-
sent limited empowerment of the district administrators to issue
“emergency district orders.”
The delay of the high commissioner in ruling on measures
coming to him from the districts caused considerable disgruntle-
ment throughout the Trust Territory. Months would pass while
the enactments were reviewed at Headquarters. In defense of the
high commissioner, all delay was not the fault of the personnel
at Headquarters; some was due to slowness at the district level
in preparing resolutions in final form and laboriously translating
them into English.
In 1954, when the Marshallese congress met without learning
the disposition of the resolutions adopted at its 1953 session, it
proposed that a time limit be fixed for action by the high commis-
sioner. The high commissioner suggested modification of this 1954
resolution before it be made effective, but as no session of the
congress was held in 1955, somehow it was never implemented.
The new charter for Palau, granted in 1955, contained a section
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fixing a hundred-and-eighty-day maximum for the high commis-
sioner’s review, with inaction during that period to be treated as
constituting ratification of the measure. Referring to this, when
commenting on the delay in approving the 1953 Palau resolutions,
the high commissioner noted: “it is regrettable that answers were
not given sooner. It is for this reason that we forced our own hand
by including [this] section….”39
The same mandate was incorporated in the 1958 charters
granted to the Marshalls and Ponape and was included in the Yap
Island Congress charter of 1959. The period was further short-
ened in later charters, with a maximum of sixty days specified in
the Ponape and Palau charters of 1963. Finally, this was cut to
thirty days in the Truk and the Mariana charters of the same year,
but it was found that this short a time did not afford a reason-
able review period for the high commissioner, and Act No. 2 of
the fall 1964 session of the Truk legislature extended the period
to sixty days. A civil defense plan for Truk (Act No. 2–64) and a
resolution adopted by the Yap Islands Congress (Resolution No.
1–64) became law without signature of the high commissioner in
conformance with these charter provisions; whether or not an act
passed by the Truk district legislature in the spring of 1963 (Act
No. 10–63) became effective by the same route is still a matter of
contention. These proscriptions against inaction of the high com-
missioner do not apply to charter amendments, as attested to by
the lag of over ten months between passage and effectuation of
the 1963 amendments to the Marshallese charter.
The latest modification in this evolutionary development of the
legislative power of the district bodies has been the formalizing of
the district administrator’s role in granting executive concurrence.
Early in the growth of district legislative power, the high commis-
sioner requested receipt of information from the district adminis-
trators on enactments forwarded from the district congresses, and
he normally followed their recommendations. The charter granted
to the Yap Islands Congress in 1959 for the first time provided for
veto by the district administrator; if a measure were passed over
his objections by an extraordinary majority vote, it was only then
to be sent to the high commissioner. This feature was copied in the
Palau, Marianas, and Ponape charters of 1963. Truk’s charter of
the same year allowed the district administrator to veto measures,
39 Letter of HiCom to DistAd Palau, June 2, 1954.
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but they were still to be transferred to the high commissioner with-
out further action on the part of the district legislators. The future
course of executive approval for district legislative action was fore-
shadowed by the provisions of the Mariana Islands district charter
which left the action of the district administrator as final unless the
high commissioner disapproved of the district officer’s decision. By
act of the Congress of Micronesia, since 1966 all districts now ob-
serve the same procedure, which formally elevates the importance
of the district administrator in the granting of executive approval.
Should he sign the measure before him or fail to take action within
thirty days, the bill becomes law without possibility of review by the
high commissioner. Only when a district legislature enacts a mea-
sure over the veto of the district officer does it now go to the high
commissioner for concurrence, and once again a thirty-day period
is allowed under legal threat of the measure’s becoming law should
it not be vetoed. If permitted to exercise full discretion, the district
administrator now occupies a crucial position of influence in the
course of district law-making.
As the district legislatures began testing their powers, the high
commissioner did not hesitate to vary appropriations or question
the substantive provisions contained in the resolutions forwarded
to him. With the introduction of greater formality and the obser-
vance of practices modeled on typically American legislative-
executive relations, the right of the high commissioner to revise
resolutions unilaterally when signing them became more tenu-
ous.40 The logic of the express grant of legislating powers to the
district chambers dictated that the participation of the district
administrator and the high commissioner ought to be limited to
acceptance or rejection, once the formal enactment was presented
to them. In responding to this, the new charters added item veto
powers, allowing the high commissioner to express his approval
of a bill while cutting or eliminating its appropriations, which
by implication foreclosed his exercise of other amendatory effort.
Even this item veto power is not contemplated by the 1966 amend-
ments to the Trust Territory Code which take precedence over the
previously granted charters.
Micronesian ignorance of the attributes and processes of legis-
40 This right of modification was questioned as early as 1955, when the
first resolutions adopted by the Palau Olbiil era Kelulau were submitted to the
high commissioner. Memo from Staff Anthropologist to Acting HiCom, Aug. 6,
1955.
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lative bodies, indigenous cultural patterns which encourage
passivity in group situations and abhor frontal confrontation, and
the general lack of knowledge concerning the workings of the
American-sponsored district government all help explain the lim-
ited, incremental growth of district legislatures. Absence of con-
trol over the expenditure of Federally appropriated funds and the
broad area of action preempted by the scope of the Trust Territor-
ial Code further contributed to discouraging indigenous direction
of district affairs. Gradually, the district legislators have begun
to appreciate the distinction between legal authority and politi-
cal influence and the use of the latter to gain ends not achievable
through the former. Even to this day, district legislators remain
unsure of their formal powers, and their efforts at political ma-
nipulation are fairly unsophisticated. With the law-making powers
presently at their disposal and their ever greater effort to hold the
district administration to account, there is little question that the
legislative bodies in all of the administrative districts now possess
the potential for playing an aggressive role at this intermediate
level of Territorial government.
STRUCTURE
The Administering Authority justified the early charters: “while
the bicameral system of advisory bodies may seem unwieldy and un-
necessary, it has been approved in recognition of the desires of the
people. It will probably be desirable to utilize this type of govern-
mental structure wherever the native customs still recognize and
respect the power of chieftain classes.”41 It need not have been
so defensive, for though the terminology of the charters called for
bicameral district legislatures, unicameralism or a modified ver-
sion thereof was the practice. The use at the 1949 Marshallese
Magistrates Conference of “House of Lords” and “House of Com-
mons” in referring to the contemplated Marshallese congress, and
the specification that the Ponape Island Congress was to be com-
posed of a “Nobles’ House” and a “People’s House” served more
to acknowledge the inclusion of traditional chiefs than to require
full bicameralism. In both areas the houses met separately to for-
mulate proposals but jointly passed the resolutions which were to
be submitted to the high commissioner for his action. The records
41 5th Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 16.
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kept by these legislative bodies do not reveal this, nor do the
titles of the measures they adopted. In Ponape, under the 1952
charter, members from both houses even sat on the joint commit-
tees framing recommendations. While the Marshallese did have
a degree of cross-communication, the membership of each cham-
ber’s committees remained separate. However, once in joint
session, the kajurs (commoners) could outvote the iroij (nobles),
and on crucial questions concerning land ownership rights, the
iroij would not force the issue to a decision when facing adamant
kajur opposition. Even on Saipan, when the civil administration
created a second legislative body called the “House of Commis-
sioners” for the municipality, “at first these two groups met sep-
arately, but in order to simplify procedures and achieve a more
workable organization they decided to meet together …,”42 and
bills were approved in joint session. The United Nations Trustee-
ship Council looked with favor on a conversion from bicameral
to unicameral legislatures, as did the Administering Authority.
The composition of the Palau Congress was proof that the tra-
ditional chiefs could be accommodated without need of even a
formal nod to bicameralism. Thus the former bicameralism for
deliberation and unicameralism for definitive decision-making
disappeared from the later charters, and today all call for uni-
cameral district bodies (see chart, pp. 76–77).
Unlike the colonial popular assemblies of early America, the
number of members in the district legislatures in the Trust Ter-
ritory has been decreasing over time. Several factors have con-
tributed to this end. There has been little grass-roots demand for
increased representation. Until recently, with the legislatures’ lim-
ited resources, reducing the number of legislators allowed longer
sessions and made more money available for the remaining mem-
bers. Then, too, in Palau, the elimination of the magistrates from
the 1963 charter separated the executive from the legislative
branch and may be viewed as a strategy to enhance the power of
the district legislature vis-a-vis the administration.
Except for the provision made in the 1963 Ponape charter for
Kolonia, a splitting of the Saipan municipality, a few electoral
precincts in Truk, and the arrangements in the last Palau charter
for at-large members, all solons elected to district legislatures
have represented single municipalities. Usually, each municipality
42 Spoehr, op. cit., p. 174.
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has been granted at least one member, despite its miniscule
population, while the more heavily populated areas have been
relatively discriminated against even though offered multiple
representation. Offsetting the disproportion has been the small
size of even the largest election district, facilitating ready con-
tact between the elector and his representative should the
voter desire to make his wishes known or the legislator to
communicate personally with his constituents. Of course, when
an island distant from district headquarters has elected rep-
resentatives who have physically not resided, and possibly not
visited, in that island for many years, the representatives have
at best an attenuated sense of identification with “home,” and
communication opportunities between constituent and legisla-
tor have been minimal.
In its effort to encourage political development, the Administer-
ing Authority insisted upon no uniform plan for representation, so
that Palau could elect twenty-eight members to its congress while
Truk, with twice the population, settled upon a twenty-seven-mem-
ber body. In the Marshall Islands district, after initially setting the
ratio of one elected representative for the first five hundred pop-
ulation, a second member for the next five hundred, and a third
for all population over a thousand, the 1951 session cut this in
half. Except for allowing additional representation for all multiples
of two hundred fifty, the ratio was continued in the new char-
ter of 1958. Later even this was found unwieldy, and the Twelfth
Marshallese Congress in 1963 recommended reducing the size of
the elected membership again to that employed when the district
congress was inaugurated. This resulted in a drop in elected rep-
resentatives from seventy-seven in the 1964 session to forty-one
in 1965.
Running counter to this trend toward diminishing size has been
the aspiration of the areas around district headquarters, whose
populations have expanded greatly, for representation proportion-
ate to their size. Under the 1963 charter, the election of five mem-
bers at large in the Palau area furnishes Koror with an excellent
opportunity to decide their selection while maintaining control
over the choice of the five members elected solely from Koror
municipality. The Marianas district has recently expressed dissat-
isfaction with the fixed membership provided by its charter, and
would like to substitute the formula of one representative for
every eight hundred population on Rota, Saipan, Tinian and the
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northern islands, which will benefit Saipan, the seat of the district
administration.
The first two congresses, those established in Palau and the
Marshalls, met annually. This failed to fix a precedent, and today,
except in the Marshalls, all of the district legislative bodies con-
vene semi-annually. Although the Truk and Mariana districts face
transportation problems and representatives from distant areas
frequently arrive late for the sessions, the difficulties encountered
in the Marshalls far surpass those of the other districts. July
through October have been the favorite months for travel by in-
digenes in the Marshalls, as the weather then is most suitable
for sailing, and the annual convening date of the Marshall Islands
Congress was originally fixed with this in mind.43 In 1955 and
in 1959 it was necessary to forego holding sessions of the Mar-
shallese congress due to transportation problems; the latter post-
ponement was also caused by the inability of the congress to
finance its costs as well as by the time-consuming, change-over
procedures necessitated by the adoption of the new charter. Again
in 1966 and 1967 transportation difficulties precluded convening
the congress.
The short, three-day meetings of the early Palau and Ponape
congresses contrast with the more lengthy sessions of today. As
district legislatures have taken up more complicated legislation,
they have become accustomed to longer work periods, and in
some cases this has roughly doubled the sessions’ length. This
points up the significance of the ten-day limitation written into
the Yap charter of 1959 and the twenty-day restrictions of both
the Ponape charter of 1958 (since eliminated) and the current
Mariana Islands district charter. The ploy of the Truk district leg-
islature to convene in the Mortlocks in 1965 was given short shrift
by the district administrator, who objected that, as the headquar-
ters for the district, Moen Island should properly be the site for
all meetings and that it would be too expensive and inconvenient
to hold the session elsewhere. Other district legislatures have ex-
pressed no dissatisfaction with holding their meetings at district
administration headquarters.
Alldistrictchartershavemadeprovision for theselectionofpresiding
43 The breadfruit season also originally entered into the fixing of the meeting
date. See Notes of 1949 Iroij Conference, Marshall Islands District, p. 8. Cur-
rently, the conjunction of the meeting with the summer school vacation is proba-
bly a more important consideration.
75
Di
76 District Legislatures—Antecedents, Powers, and Structure
Di
77
officers from the membership of the legislative bodies. In the Mar-
shalls, the president must be at least thirty years of age, and in
Palau it is now declared that only elected members are eligible to
serve as officers, effectively disqualifying the chiefs. The charters
of the other districts are silent on officers’ qualifications. In many
of the districts, the presiding officers exert leadership both during
the session and in the legislative interim, but only the president
of the Mariana Islands district legislature is a full-time officer and
compensated accordingly.
A permanent secretary or secretariat has been built into all of
the district congresses. In some, a secretary—occasionally called
“clerk”—or secretary and assistant, aided by the staff of the dis-
trict administration, perform all the services that are necessary
in carrying on the correspondence of the legislature, preparing
notices and reports, keeping legislative and financial records, ob-
taining supplies, and publishing the journal. The drafting of mea-
sures and an embryonic reference service are also lodged with the
secretary. Usually, the person serving as secretary has been a non-
member, but one of the elected members was named to this post
under the 1958 Marshall Islands charter, and the secretary of the
Yap Islands Congress is a member of that body. In the Marianas,
provision is made for a legislative secretary, who is a legislator and
for a non-member executive secretary. Exemplifying the variations
found within the districts, the Truk District Congress in 1962 set
a term of four years for its secretary, while the charter of the Yap
Islands Congress limits the secretary’s service to a period of two
years or less.
Even though appointed by his district legislature, the district
treasurer is now on the staff of the district administrator and sub-
ject to removal for cause at any time by the latter. The treasurer
receives and disburses funds pursuant to the authority of the leg-
islative assembly and under the direction and supervision of the
administrator. At one time the post was sometimes combined with
that of legislative secretary, but in all districts today, the collection
and accounting for district-imposed taxes is a separate, full-time
undertaking. The treasurer remains identified with the legislature
as distinct from the district administration, contributing to the am-
biguity of his position.
The members of the various district legislatures have had occa-
sion to require the assistance of a parliamentarian, sometimes
because of the inexperience of the members and at others because
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they have become so adroit at parliamentary maneuvering that
only a skilled parliamentarian can keep track of the flow of legisla-
tive business. In the Marianas and Ponape, one of the elected
members is named to serve in this post; in other districts, staff
from the public affairs office of the district administration aid.
District administration staff have also been utilized for drafting
legislative measures. More recently, there is a noticeable trend to
hiring legislative counsel to advise their respective bodies on le-
gal matters and to undertake drafting chores, and the services of
Peace Corps Volunteers have been called upon for the same pur-
pose. Even with the gradual expansion of the district legislative
staffs, the personnel of the public affairs office of each district ad-
ministration continue to work closely with their respective district
legislatures, helping in drafting, factual reference, and in liaison
with the district administration.
Committees in the first district assemblies corresponded in num-
ber and jurisdiction to the major problem areas outlined by the
district administrator at the opening of each session. Following the
model draft, the new charters granted in 1963 limit the number of
standing committees to four: appropriations, economics, political,
and social. The Mariana Islands district is an exception, and in
place of the first-named committee, the charter sets up a Holdover
Committee; recently an amendment to the charter added an appro-
priations committee as well. The need for uniformity in committee
structure has been more assumed than demonstrated.
Reminiscent of the committees on legislation which were tried
in the American colonial legislatures around the period of the Rev-
olutionary War, the 1958 charter for Ponape and that granted to
Yap in 1959 called for special committees with bill-drafting du-
ties. Both of these charters contemplated that a member would
introduce a proposal for a measure at one session. After being
accepted, the measure would be referred to the legislative com-
mittee for formal preparation and then could be enacted by the
congress at its next regular session. In Ponape, the committee
even employed a permanent staff. As this “special feature” was
found to be dysfunctional, it was eliminated in the new Ponape
charter of 1963 and, in practice, ignored in Yap.
At the same time that the civil administrator in Palau estab-
lished the first Palau Congress, by District Order he named a coun-
cil with the inelegantly phrased duty “to keep its fingers on the
pulse of the people and so inform the civil administrator on public
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policy” (see Appendix). The council was conceived of as advisory
to the administrator, and though it might originate legislation, its
proposed measures would be presented to the congress via the
civil administrator. This prestigeful body, which met on the aver-
age of about once a month, in fact also acted as liaison between
administration and the Palau Congress and exerted great influ-
ence over the latter’s decisions. In 1953, the congress adopted
a resolution which would make the advisory council responsible
to it instead of to the district administrator. The charter granted
in 1955 replaced the Palau Council with the Tebechelel Olbiil, to
be appointed by the president of the congress with congress’ ap-
proval and to serve as advisor to the president. The new body,
which contained both legislators and non-legislative members, in
fact also continued as a consultant group for the district admin-
istrator when the congress was not in session. Because of the
proximity of these advisors to the seat of administration, this
group supplied the impetus for much of the Palauan-inspired leg-
islation, and to eliminate its influence, the Palauans asked that it
be abolished when the Palauan charter of 1963 was formulated.
The other districts also felt the need of some form of advisory
body composed of indigenes with which the district administrators
could meet in the interim between sessions of the district assem-
blies. In addition, the sore need of the new legislatures for policy
leadership, and the necessity of making provision for administra-
tive machinery to plan the holding of each session, encouraged
the growth of comparable interim bodies in the other districts.
The second session of the Marshall Islands Congress created a
Holdover Committee “to study and prepare recommendations for
presentation at the next session of the Congress.”44 It was to have
other powers to act for the congress in the legislative interim, but
these were initially ill-defined and have never been fully clarified
other than by everyone’s agreement that the committee could not
act with relation to Marshallese land rights and other basic customs.
The name “holdover committee” was borrowed from terminology
employed in Hawaii a few years earlier, and from the Marshalls its
usage spread to the other districts. At first the civil administrator
tried to limit the committee’s membership to a single person upon
the grounds of expense and efficiency, but this was reversed, and
the size set at ten and later at twelve members.
44 5th Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 15.
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Composed mainly of individuals residing on Majuro, the Mar-
shallese Holdover Committee has met informally at least annually
with the district administrator and made plans for the calling of
each congress and for the items on its agenda. In years when the
congress did not convene, it has acted on essential legislative mat-
ters, extending taxes and even appropriating funds. It played an
important role in the examination of the 1958 charter provisions
as originally framed by the administration. A charter amendment
was adopted in 1956 specifying that only in case of an emer-
gency which might result in great jeopardy and catastrophe to the
Marshallese people was the Holdover Committee automatically
empowered to act with full authority of the Marshallese congress;
however it has not conformed to this restriction and has turned
its attention to far more than the settlement of “any unfinished
Congressional business.”45 The 1958 charter’s limitation on the
Holdover Committee’s allocation of district funds other than for
purposes for which they were appropriated by the congress has
also been observed in the breech. Unlike the Palau advisory group,
the Marshallese Holdover Committee continues, although it is less
formal a body than the Palau experiment and more a collective
name for the Marshallese leaders located at Majuro.
Years before the founding of a district legislature in Truk, a Per-
manent Advisory Committee of the annual Conference of Island
Magistrates served as a consultative body to the district adminis-
trator. On the chartering of the Truk legislature in 1957, a Hold-
over Committee, with members representing the geographical
areas of the district, in part carried on the activities of the advi-
sory committee by meeting before the sitting of the Truk Congress
to determine its agenda and to prepare measures for considera-
tion; after adjournment, it again convened to wind up the business
of the congress. Just as in the Palau district, members from dis-
tant islands looked askance at any body serving as advisor to the
district administrator if the body’s members would be drawn only
from those persons residing close to district headquarters, and the
Holdover Committee was abolished in 1963.
The Holdover Committee in the Marianas, consisting as it does
of the president, the legislative secretary, and the chairmen of
the district legislature’s four standing committees, exercises piv-
otal powers of agenda formation and assignment of measures for
45 Resolution No. 15–56, Marshall Islands Congress.
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committee deliberation. However, the fact that the bulk of the dis-
trict’s population lives close to administration headquarters has
helped obviate both the same suspicion and the same need for
an interim consultative body as has been experienced in the Mar-
shalls, Truk, and Palau.
MEMBERSHIP
Almost any citizen eligible to vote in the Trust Territory may
be elected to a district legislature. The age and residence require-
ments are only nominally restrictive. The first Ponape charter
(1952) disqualified the holders of the four highest titles in each
wehy (district) from election to the People’s House, since they
automatically sat in the Nobles’ House, and prohibited all other
nobles from holding concurrent seats in both chambers. Neither
the Marshallese constitution of 1949 nor the 1955 Palau charter
precluded the election of chiefs, but each made special provision
for the possibility of their sitting as elected representatives. In
recognition of their status in the Marshallese culture, the iroij
have been eligible as of right to sit and vote in the Marshallese
congress since it was founded. In Palau, the 1963 charter has con-
tinued the presence in the legislature of the two high chiefs and
the paramount chiefs of the municipalities but has now materially
restricted their participation to mainly that of debate.
By 1963, holders of elected municipal office were barred from
all district legislative bodies other than in the Marshall Islands.
Their ineligibility applies only to sitting as a legislator, so that if
elected they may resign their municipal posts to accept a district
legislative seat. (The language of the Yapese charter remains am-
biguous in this regard.) In the Marianas, Palau, and Truk, this
prohibition also runs against holding judicial office. Truk by char-
ter extended this disqualification to any person holding a “staff
position” in the district administration, which has been interpreted
as referring to “a department head, assistant department head and
those particular positions immediately on the staff of the District
Administrator where policy matters were involved.”46 In a 1963
memorandum, the Truk district administrator identified over two
dozen positions covered by this “conflict of interest” provision. The
district administrator of Palau went even further than the Truk
administrator and, by district directive in 1964, attempted to apply
46 Memo from Acting Deputy HiCom to DistAd Truk, Oct. 25, 1963.
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a blanket disqualification to any member of the executive branch;
his prescription was later rescinded as the district charter pro-
vided no basis for its issuance.
At the instigation of the Administering Authority, in all elections
for the office of district legislator held after December 31, 1968,
judges, members of the insular constabulary, and employees of
the Trust Territory or district administration in positions of assis-
tant department head or higher will be ineligible as candidates.
Originally, the administration had suggested that the cut-off date
be fixed at 1966, on the grounds that it was advisable for the
separation between the three branches of government to “be ac-
complished as soon as possible.” The misgivings expressed by the
Congress of Micronesia were occasioned by such practicalities as
that two-thirds of the Ponape legislature might be disqualified by
the new limitations.47 As a result the deadline prohibiting such
dual service was postponed to the end of 1968.
The compromise extension may have delayed the day of deci-
sion, but it also incorporated an unfortunate feature not found in
any of the charter provisions. In the future, a person occupying
a position in either the judicial or executive branches must elect
to sever his relations before running for a legislative post, rather
than deciding to do so after having been successful in his bid for a
legislative seat. Given the limited opportunities for employment in
the Territory, for some time to come this may have the unfortunate
consequence of discouraging the movement of top personnel from
the executive and judicial branches into the political arena of the
legislature.
Considering the Micronesian attitude towards age as a measure
of competence, the charters have all set fairly minimal age
requirements for candidacy. Truk’s first charter in 1957 declared
a representative had to be at least thirty years old to serve, but
in the following year an amendment reduced the minimum age
to twenty-six. Except for a further lowering of the age to twenty-
three by the Truk charter of 1963, all other districts now require
a uniform minimum age of twenty-five years.
Mr. Rifai of the United Arab Republic in 1961 raised the ques-
tion in the Trusteeship Council whether there should not be
greater uniformity in representation and lengths of service. Ac-
cording to him, the existing situation “was not conducive to the
47 Saipan District Panorama, July 30, 1965, p. 1.
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creation of a territorial conscience and the feeling that the inhabi-
tants were part of a single territory.”48 If an analogy is drawn with
the American experience of diversity in state legislative bodies,
this criticism may not be accorded much weight, but it correctly
assessed the lack of any general pattern in the length of terms for
district legislators. They have varied from one to four years. Over
time, the four-year term has come into favor and, with the 1967
amendment to the Marianas charter, is now found in five of the
six districts. Only Truk with a two-year term prescribes a shorter
period of legislative service, but the Ponape district legislature
has begun to discuss establishing a comparable term. The length-
ening of terms probably can best be attributed to the members’
realization that a longer time in office facilitates mastering the
procedures and subject matter with which they are called upon to
deal. A new addition to both the Palau and Ponape charters, al-
though from the records unused to date, is the right to recall an
elected representative during his term in office.
Not all members entitled to seats in the district assemblies have
appeared each year. Transportation difficulties account for part of
this failure. The limited legislating power of the beginning con-
gresses, with a concommitant lack of status, and the members’
dependence upon the local municipality’s collecting money to help
defray their costs while at the district center undoubtedly dis-
couraged attendance. As in the early legislatures of Europe, the
support of a representative was treated as an obligation of the
municipality enjoying the benefit of his services. Even though the
district administration might furnish transportation and subsis-
tence for the period the legislature was in session, in areas like
the Marshalls where members have had to wait months at Majuro
before obtaining deck space back home, attendance at a session
constituted a personal financial burden.49
While the Palau charter authorized members to receive com-
pensation and allowances from their municipalities, and in nearly
all cases congressmen were receiving “some token salary,” the
Palau Olbiil era Kelulau at its first meeting initiated the payment
48 TCOR, 27th Sess., 1148th meeting, June 14, 1961, par. 47.
49 As illustrative of the monetary contribution made by the municipalities of
one district to their representatives, for the thirty-eight members of the 1956
Marshallese House of Assembly for whom data are available (out of a total of
42), nine received nothing and another eleven less than $30. The mean average
payment was $44; three assemblymen were each recipients of $100 or over for
attending this session.
84 District Legislatures—Antecedents, Powers, and Structure
of a per diem.50 Since then, the charters of all district legislatures
have been amended to authorize legislators’ remuneration from
district collected revenues, and the pattern has been for members’
per diem to increase over time. Between 1955 and 1963 the daily
rate doubled in Palau from the munificent sum of $1.50, with
a fourteen-day maximum, to $3.00, without any maximum pre-
scribed; by the latter date, an additional $3.00 a day was also
allowed for committee sessions and for an extra two-day period
before and after each committee meeting. Larger sums have been
allotted by other legislatures, as the Marianas’ provision of $12.00
a day for each session attended and a per diem of $10.00 for
members “traveling away from their home-islands on legislative
business.”51 The district legislatures look upon these payments
not as salaries but primarily as reimbursement for expenses in-
curred. As a case in point, a 1962 Truk act furnished $5.00 a
day but required $3.50 to be deducted for each day of meeting a
representative did not attend. In no district is the specified remu-
neration so large that it refutes the generalization that members
normally stand for office because of the prestige associated with
the legislative post or because of a sense of public obligation
rather than for their own financial betterment.
The physical accommodations for district offices in the Territory
have never been more than minimally adequate, and usually the
legislatures have met in temporary chambers at district headquar-
ters under disadvantageous conditions. This is changing as struc-
tures have been set aside for legislative use or district tax moneys
have been appropriated for the construction of congressional halls.
As of now, a survey of legislative facilities across the Territory re-
veals great disparities. Just as the members are now allotting larger
stipends to themselves, so have they been turning attention toward
improving their physical facilities. Even air conditioning for the leg-
islative hall, a luxury for the Trust Territory, was proposed by the
Mariana district legislature in its 1966 budget. It is only a matter of
time before each legislative body will have its own vehicle (usually
a truck) and miscellaneous minor extravagances such as a Polaroid
camera, presumably for its staff’s use.
The model charter states that “members of the legislature dur-
50 Letter of Assistant DistAd Palau to HiCom, May 19, 1955. Prior to 1955, the
Palau Congress had few funds at its disposal and “discussions which surrounded
the proposed expenditures of monies collected were marked by a strong and not
altogether undesirable note of parsimony.” Ibid.
51 Act No. 3–63, Marianas District Legislature.
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ing their attendance at the Legislature and in going to and return-
ing from the same, shall not be subject to civil process and shall, in
all cases except felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest. No member shall be held to answer before any tribunal
other than the Legislature itself for any speech or debate in the
Legislature” (see Appendix). This section has been incorporated
into all of the charters granted in 1963, and it may be anticipated
that it will be added to the charters for the Marshalls and Yap
when the constituent legislation of these two districts is modified.
A few of the district legislators involved in minor traffic violations
during a period when they were engaged in the performance of
their legislative duties have already had occasion to resort to this
grant of privileges and immunities for protection.
Few women have been members of the district legislatures.52 In
1950, Palau elected two female members, and it is reported “both
showed an intelligent and intense desire to participate actively in
government.”53 Although the Marshallese women are interested
in politics and will participate in local political discussions, none
has ever been elected; however, as many as five leroij (female
paramount chiefs) have sat at one time in the House of Iroij of
the Marshall Islands Congress. Two women ran for representative
in the 1966 Truk elections, and their success foretells that more
women will regularly fill legislative posts. Their number will most
likely always remain fewer than the male component for, just as in
the United States, Micronesian cultural patterns do not encourage
a woman’s holding an elected political post.
At the various workshops and instruction sessions which the
district legislators have attended, the necessity for acting for the
district as a whole, rather than for their respective municipality,
has been emphasized and reemphasized. Probably as frequently,
it has been stressed that “when voting on a resolution, do not
allow your personal desires or opinions to influence your deci-
sions. Vote as you know the people who elected you want you to
vote.”54 It therefore might be expected that when a district legis-
lator is queried as to his representational role, he will reply not
52 In 1955 the high commissioner indicated about fifteen women, or ap-
proximately 10 per cent, were members of various councils and congresses. If
applicable only to district legislatures and their progenitors, this number appears
too high. See TCOR, 16th Sess., 617th meeting, June 16, 1955, par. 95.
53 Richard, op. cit., p. 482.
54 Address of the DistAd, Proceedings of the Fifth Ponape Island Congress,
Nov. 13–22, 1956, p. 15.
86 District Legislatures—Antecedents, Powers, and Structure
as he actually views himself as a legislator but as he has been in-
structed to behave. Two surveys conducted almost a decade apart
reveal that members of two of the district legislatures in the Ter-
ritory consider that they adhere to representational roles similar
to those reported in comparable studies of American state legis-
latures.55 Of the seventeen members of the House of Assembly
interviewed in the Marshalls in 1956 and the twenty-six mem-
bers of the unicameral Truk district legislature similarly surveyed
in 1965, the largest components thought of themselves as able
to decide issues in accordance with their own judgment (Trustee
role), irrespective of the wishes or instructions of constituents. Far
smaller components of each legislative body stated they felt duty
bound to comply with their constituents’ wishes (Delegate role)
or indicated an ambivalence which showed constant adherence to
neither polar type (Politico role).
LEGISLATIVE ROLE CONCEPTS
Legislative
Role
Marshall
House of
Assembly
(17 responses)
1956
Truk
District
Legislature
(26 responses)
1965
Truk
Constituents *
(26 responses)
1965
Trustee 12 12 2
Politico 2 8 —
Delegate 3 5 20
Not Classified — 1 4
* Views legislators thought their constituents held about the role legislators
should observe.
When the Truk district legislators were queried as to how the
people of their districts expected them to perform their role, over
three-quarters replied that their constituents believed them bound
to follow instructions received from the voters. It is not known
whether this is an honest assessment or represents a structuring
of responses so as to echo the various hortatory intructions which
they have received from American administrators.
The Marshall Islands Congress of 1956 is illustrative of both
the type of persons who sit in that district legislature and the
contrasts between the popularly chosen representatives and the
hereditary chiefs within that body. Compared to the population
55 For fuller discussion of this, see pp. 284–287.
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PROFILE OF 1956 MARSHALL ISLANDS CONGRESS
(in percentages)
HOUSE OF IROIJ
(n = 28)
HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY
(n = 42)
Education:
In Missionary Schools 75.0 83.3
In Japanese Schools 28.6 28.6
In American Schools 21.4 21.4
None or not indicated 7.1 2.4
Travel:
Trust Territory—yes 50.0 45.2
Trust Territory—no 35.7 33.3
Trust Territory—not indicated 14.3 21.4
Japan 25.0 16.7
Hawaii 14.3 2.4
Mainland U.S. 10.7 —
Language Ability (spoken):
English 28.6 35.7
Japanese 28.6 42.8
German 17.9 —
Other Micronesian 10.7 16.7
Government Employment:
Present
District 10.7 16.7
Local office 10.7 40.5
Previous
American 53.6 59.5
Japanese 35.7 21.4
Teacher or former teacher 14.2 42.8
Religion:
Protestant 71.4 90.5
Catholic 28.6 4.8
Not indicated — 4.8
No religious office 75.0 57.1
Deacon or komat 17.8 42.8
Not indicated 7.1 —
Married 96.4 95.3
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PROFILE OF 1956 MARSHALL ISLANDS CONGRESS (Cont’d)
(in percentages)
Age:
Median 52.0 years 44.0 years
Mean 51.3 years 45.0 years
Median number of children 3 5
as a whole, the legislators were better educated, more traveled,
enjoyed a greater command of English and, through present or
former employment, were more conversant with the operations of
government introduced by the Americans. In cross-house compar-
isons, the elected representatives were noticeably younger, more
closely mirrored the prevailing Protestantism of the Marshalls,
and had often been prepared for public office by service as school
teachers. A goodly component of the representatives were also oc-
cupying municipal posts. Although the upper chamber nominally
consisted of iroij laplap or leroij, in fact they constituted only fif-
teen of the twenty-eight members present. The House of Assembly
did not represent a cross-section of the body politic but, rather,
was heavily weighted toward persons of importance in traditional
Marshallese society. Half of the forty-two assemblymen were alabs
(heads of the bwij—lineage—entitled to work the land) or iroij erik
(lesser nobles), and another ten were in the bwij errito (the oldest
lineage), and thus close in line to become alabs upon the death of
the incumbents.56
In mid-1956 the Marshall Islands Congress consisted primarily
of members with status associated with land. Representation of
their own interests or of their class loomed large, for most of
the assemblymen were selected indirectly by municipal councils
made up of alabs. Since then, direct election of assemblymen has
spread through the district, but the resulting representation of
the more diffuse electorate was accompanied with relatively lit-
tle change in the composition of the Marshallese congress. The
members elected to the 1965 unicameral body were still almost
all Protestant, about half were deacons and komats, a little larger
percentage spoke English, and if anything a higher proportion of
their numbers enjoyed positions of status associated with custom-
56 See Jack A. Tobin, Land Tenure in the Marshall Islands, Atoll Research Bul-
letin No. 11 (Washington: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council. rev.
1956), p. 15.
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ary land rights. The greatest apparent difference from a decade
previously was that experience as a school teacher had dropped in
importance as an avenue for the political socialization of elected
assemblymen. The wedding of the traditional and the introduced
political systems in the structuring of the congress continued to
bring to the legislative hall persons distinguished by their pre-
scriptive claims to leadership.
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CHAPTER 4
District Legislatures—
Their Procedures and Process
ELEMENTS ENCOURAGING both uniformity and diversity con-
tributed to shaping the procedures followed by today’s district leg-
islatures. Lack of knowledge and multiplicity of innovative effort
provided centrifugal forces, while the basic body of parliamentary
practice common to all American legislative bodies added a cen-
tripetal pull. What has finally emerged is a mixture of customary
conduct and introduced methods, with the latter more an overlay
than comprising part of an alloy. Careful observation of the district
legislatures at work continues to reveal the presence of traditional
patterns, notwithstanding the letter of the formal rules which pro-
port to govern all legislative actions.
A concerted effort was made in most districts to equip the mem-
bers of the new legislative bodies with an understanding of the
rudiments of parliamentary affairs. At the very first meeting of
the Marshallese congress, in 1950, naval administration personnel
gave “instructions” to the neophyte members. At the next session,
a former Hawaiian legislator continued the training by drawing up
for the members’ use a set of rules which borrowed some of that
other Pacific Territory’s unique practices1 and applied them to the
Marshallese scene.
Once the legislatures commenced functioning, impromptu
meetings and organized workshops have been held by the ad-
ministrators in the different districts when they have believed
turnover in the composition of the legislative assemblies war-
ranted mounting another program in parliamentary procedure.
Coaching in the running of local councils, as part of the municipal
chartering project, included the preparation of handbooks for mu-
nicipal officials’ use and furthered the exposure of district legis-
lators to parliamentary methods. From all this there emanated a
series of simplified legislative manuals published in district lan-
guages, some of them literal translations of published trade hand-
1 Such as ijab bojak, a direct translation of Hawaii’s kanalua (undecided). See
p. 310.
books, others the embodiment of staff members’ understanding of
parliamentary procedure, modified as was thought necessary to fit
local needs. Basic to many of these, as well as to the model stand-
ing rules prepared at the Headquarters of the high commissioner,
was Robert’s Rules of Order, even though it is primarily intended
for use by clubs and informal organizations and leaves much to be
desired when applied to parliamentary bodies.
ORGANIZING
The format followed in organizing each newly elected legis-
lature is fairly similar throughout the Territory. The opening day
normally sees an invocation, presentation of credentials for the
seating of members, and the selection of officers. The endeavor to
obtain formal credentials has not been very successful, and leg-
islative records bearing entries that a member has been disqual-
ified because of improper or inadequate documentation are rare.
The previous session’s presiding officer may chair the meeting un-
til new officers are chosen. The naming of committees generally
waited upon an itemization by the district administrator or his
representatives of subjects to be considered, but this is unneces-
sary as the new charters now prescribe a fixed number of standing
committees. The opening day of the district legislature may find
the district treasurer reporting on district-levied revenues, and
the secretary, on unfinished legislative business. In most districts,
all the steps necessary to organize the legislature are commonly
observed in the session which follows an election; in the other ses-
sions, practices may be telescoped.
The presiding officer is chosen primarily because of personal
support based upon friendship, community status, relative capac-
ity, competence in oral English, and, sometimes, a willingness to
stand up to the district administrator. The last quality is valued be-
cause the officer, whether called Speaker or President, assumes
the responsibility of “speaking” for his body vis-a-vis the adminis-
tration, a task which most Micronesians are culturally conditioned
to shun. Not uncommonly, a number of persons are placed in nom-
ination, and the candidate receiving a plurality by secret ballot is
declared elected. At first the administration, covertly or openly,
influenced the selection of the presiding officer, but the district
legislatures have become jealous of their powers and of the right
to choose their own officers. Maneuverings in advance of the ses-
sion line up support for potential candidates, but it has only been
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with the emergence of parties that pre-organization caucusing has
taken on a formal pattern.
Election, appointment, and even drawing members by lot were
methods employed in naming committees as the district legisla-
tures first got under way. The trend has been to assign the selec-
tion of chairmen and members of each committee to the presiding
officer, although a charter provision granting this power has not
prevented such officers’ calling for nominations and votes’ being
taken to determine committee membership. Before naming any-
one to a committee post, the presiding officer may consult with
the prospective appointees, and as a rule all designations are
premised upon the interests and capacities of the legislators. The
presiding officer will also try to secure a degree of geographical
spread within each committee, and in districts where there are
admitted cleavages, as in Ponape, each area’s delegation may be
asked to indicate its choices for committee seats. Seniority rules
do not apply to district legislatures. Unlike in their American state
counterparts, where promises for committee chairmanship or pre-
ferred committee assignments may be the currency for garnering
political support, in many of the district legislatures committee
service is regarded as onerous, and the members approached may
have to be cajoled into accepting. As the legislatures become in-
tegrated into their respective district’s power structure and the
prestige of committee chairmen grows, it may be anticipated that
members will vie for committee posts, a development which has
already begun in some districts.
While most of the work of the first legislatures turned around
matters presented by the district administrators, some issues
were brought to the legislative halls by the members themselves.
Later, holdover committees or the officers of the district bodies be-
gan preparing the legislative agenda prior to the convening date.
In some districts, such as Palau, the presiding officer distributed
a tentative agenda in advance of the session to allow the mem-
bers to discuss it with their constituents, to propose additions and
modifications, and come prepared to act upon the matters finally
agreed upon for discussion. All of this was necessary to impart
an impetus to the new legislative bodies, for as expressed by a
member who attended the first session of the Marshall Islands
Congress, “We didn’t know quite what to discuss at the meet-
ing, so we asked them [Navy Administrators].” Matters now come
quite spontaneously to the district legislatures; they are either
93
relayed by legislators from their constituents or originate with
the members themselves. The opening address of the district ad-
ministrator remains a guiding factor in pointing the attention of
the legislators to the major difficulties facing the district and in
acquainting them with the administration’s viewpoint on those
problems. The more recent accompaniment of such messages with
drafts of legislation further facilitates legislative deliberation and
assures at least attentive scrutiny of the proposals, if not final
passage. While in the United States there has been a shift in ini-
tiative from the legislature to the executive, the opposite has been
occurring in the Trust Territory as district legislators become con-
versant with their bodies’ procedures, more aware of their own
powers, and less dependent upon the administration’s designation
of items to which to turn their attention.
The district legislatures all employ the services of committees
to screen the matters before them and to recommend appropriate
action. Here, again, a change has taken place. Within the first few
days of the session, the early assemblies referred as many as pos-
sible of the subjects before them to their committees. This was
followed by a protracted series of committee meetings, while ple-
nary sessions were deferred, and all committees then reported
back to their parent body. Now, the district legislatures usually
meet briefly each day before adjourning to allow their committees
to complete their work loads, and references to committee are
made throughout the course of the session. The Marianas legis-
lature, which is the most sophisticated in its methods, each day
follows an agenda of thirteen items, starting with roll call, commu-
nications and petitions, messages from the district administrator,
reports of committees, introduction and first reading of measures,
special orders of business, and second reading of bills, and winds
its way, finally, to adjournment for the day, when committees are
once again free to sit.
LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
From their inception the district legislatures have been uncer-
tain with both the form and content of legislative measures. Part
of this confusion stems from the legislatures’ nominally advisory
character, according to which their role was merely one of “re-
questing” or “recommending” governmental action. Despite the
law-making powers they have now been granted, due to the in-
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ability of district legislatures to direct the expenditure of Federal
money, they perforce have to continue framing requests.
Another element adding to the confusion has been the lax em-
ployment of terminology in the charters and in legislative practice.
The original charter to Palau in 1949 refers to “bills,” even though
this body was only an advisory council. The next congress struc-
tured, the Marshallese, could submit “recommendations in writing
in the form of resolutions.” The Marshalls used four different
forms of resolutions. While a measure referred to as an “Iroij
Resolution” or “Assembly Resolution” normally was adopted by
only the one house named, there was no assurance of this, and
the distinction between concurrent and joint resolutions never
became manifest to legislators or administration. Nor did the ad-
ministration appreciate that sometimes the appellation “joint” was
reserved for a resolution redrafted when the houses of the Mar-
shallese congress were sitting in joint session. To compound the
uncertainty, four types of resolutions were employed under the
Ponape charter of 1952.2 This form of confusion continues to this
day, for the most recent Palau charter (1963) carries references
to “bills, resolutions, and memorials,” the Marianas charter of the
same year recognizes “bills, resolutions and recommendations,”
the 1958 Marshalls charter acknowledges that some “acts of Con-
gress” (italics added) may not have the force and effect of law,
and the Yap Islands Congress of the following year refers to “bills
becoming resolutions” and also to “representations of congress.”
Even where charter provisions are more carefully drawn, as in the
1963 Truk charter which provides for only bills and resolutions,
the drafting practices followed confuse the two. Bill No. 1 of the
7th Truk District Congress of 1963 was “a resolution,” while Bill
No. 2 of the same congress was “an act.” The Trukese legislators
appear to appreciate that the resolution format is to be employed
when they cannot or do not want to legislate, but nonetheless, all
measures still carry a “bill” designation. Upon adjournment, when
the measures are sorted out for district administrator action and
referral to the high commissioner where necessary, some are then
relabeled as “acts” and others as “resolutions.”
District legislators are just learning that more than an expres-
sion of legislative intent is necessary to constitute a law. Under
the circumstances which surround social enforcement of custom,
2 See Proceedings of the Fifth Ponape Island Congress, Nov. 13–22, 1956, pp.
66–67.
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the inclusion of administrative detail is unnecessary, for the tradi-
tional system can readily implement any modification or innova-
tion. However, in enactments by legislative bodies, the manner in
which and the agency by which the legislative will is to be en-
forced must be stated, or at least the measures must be fitted into
the matrix of existing law and administration so that it will auto-
matically bridge what would otherwise be a fatal hiatus. Unfortu-
nately for achieving enactment through the latter method, many
of the district legislators are not familiar with either the Trust Ter-
ritory Code or district laws, or with the activities of the district ad-
ministration in executing laws. A further hindrance is the fact that
many Micronesians do not formulate their preferences clearly,
both because they are not trained to think that specifically and be-
cause of reluctance to take positive stands publicly. As a result of
this trinity of inexperience, ignorance, and intent, the legislative
product is vulnerable to the criticism of ambiguity. The disqualifi-
cation of persons with posts in the administration from sitting in
the district legislatures will only exacerbate this shortcoming until
members receive the assistance of skilled legislative counsel.
When the members attempt to supply the detail they believe
necessary for adequate drafting, they easily fall into one of a num-
ber of traps. Sometimes they assume that the law has cognizance
of what is known to them, only to find that their proposal is fatally
defective because of vagueness. Resolution No. 2–61 of the Yap
Islands Congress would make it a crime to refuse to perform or
purposely ignore community duties pursuant to Yapese custom.
The high commissioner rejected this on the grounds that the cus-
toms must be set out to enable the courts to have notice of them
and the constabulary to enforce them. Another common error, be-
coming too precise without regard to the future impact of the
proposed measure, results in the absurdity or incongruity of the
detail incorporated. The Marshallese House of Assembly in 1953
“resolved that each delegate should have a minimum of two terms
[and] that each delegate should be chosen from those persons who
have attended a previous Congress as a delegate.”3 In both cases
the intent of the indigenous legislators was relatively clear, and
probably adequate as a petition for encouraging the Administer-
ing Authority to take corrective action. As legislation, these efforts
of the district bodies were found wanting.
3 Resolution No. 3, 1953 Journal of Marshall Islands Congress.
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A member usually presents a measure to the legislature in
fairly general form, expecting that before it is adopted it will be re-
drafted as required to accomplish its purposes. As a rule he is the
sole sponsor, not necessarily because there can be only one but
because this conforms to custom. Indeed, in the Marianas there is
even the fear that if more than two authors were permitted, this
might result in the political parties automatically lining up behind
their respective members to endorse all legislation. The rewriting
which occurs after a measure is introduced is usually performed
by the legislative staff and the personnel assigned by the dis-
trict administration. As noted,4 some of the district assemblies
went through the same stage of evolution as American colonial
legislatures, with members in effect offering only the substance of
a proposal, and if the proposal were accepted by the legislative
body, a drafting committee then putting it into shape for legisla-
tive action. This formalistic division has now disappeared.
The charter of the Yap Islands Congress expressly calls for hold-
ing a measure over for two sessions unless an extraordinary major-
ity vote approves earlier passage. Much the same practice occurs
in the other district legislatures which meet semi-annually, as the
members approach problems cautiously, in part because of cultural
antipathy to precipitous action and also due to the advice long ten-
dered by administration personnel. If difficulties are encountered,
or a general feeling of uncertainty prevails with regard to a partic-
ular program, the district legislators commonly postpone passage
for one or more sessions until most everyone is satisfied, or at least
willing to refrain from voicing any strenuous objections. A mini-
mal degree of delay is required by the newest charters granted in
1963, which mandate two readings on separate days before a mea-
sure may be adopted. However, in all district legislatures there is
generally little danger of hasty passage, for in the absence of un-
usually strong administration or constituent demands, and without
legislative leadership firmly directing the course of legislative busi-
ness, the work of the district bodies drags slowly along to the last
few days of each session. It may even be generalized that one of
the problems resulting from the proclivity of the district legislatures
to postpone decision-making is how to keep them fully engaged
throughout the whole period scheduled for their sessions.
Following the example of the United States Congress and also
4 P. 79.
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of some state legislatures, the Trust Territory’s district bodies
have been encouraged to authorize appropriations in separate
measures, and then, by a single budget bill, appropriate out of
district revenues the moneys necessary to finance all programs
for the next fiscal period. This has the advantage of relating ex-
penditures to estimated revenues, but it may discourage adequate
funding after the initial drive for passage of a program has been
spent. In the Marianas district, bills containing money authoriza-
tions are sometimes held after passage until the budget act is
firmed up, and it is only then that they are forwarded to the dis-
trict administrator for approval.
The presiding officer, during the course of the daily session,
carries a heavy burden of factual explanation and psychological
prompting of members to definitive action. He keeps up a run-
ning chatter of comment, supplying background information and
pointing out implied concurrences in the remarks of speakers,
all to aid the members in understanding the issue and reach-
ing a collective decision. This style of leadership, besides being
peculiarly compatible with Micronesian mores, may be funda-
mental to making the legislature work, corresponding to the
experience reported for another institution, the local council.5
In Palau, where classes of members are barred from balloting
on some issues, before a vote, the presiding officer may remind
the chamber of the disqualification. Similarly, the size of the
vote necessary for affirmative action may be announced by the
presiding officer before tallying commences. Presiding officers
endeavor to maintain harmony in their chambers and adopt a va-
riety of stratagems to this end. One of their chores is to prevent
the members from wandering too far into irrelevancies during
the course of debate. Sometimes they bring issues to a head
by indicating they believe discussion has proceeded sufficiently
long; it is rare for any member to stop debate by moving the
“previous question.” During the course of the session, the pre-
siding officer may attend committee sittings to assist in their
work and may even meet with their chairmen to speed up the
flow of legislative business, but this is not standard practice. In
the main, the speakers of the district legislatures are well styled
as “presiding officers,” for they believe it is more important to
5 See, e.g., Conrad Bentzen, Land and Livelihood on Mokil, CIMA Final Re-
port No. 25, Part II [Washington: National Research Council, Pacific Science
Board, 1949], pp. 164–169.
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act as a referee, until a consensus takes shape, than as a protag-
onist favoring one side or the other of any question. The presiding
officer’s role may be expected to change as district legislatures be-
come more programmatic in concern and constituents look to their
representatives for ever more concrete accomplishments.
COMMITTEES
Rather than being “little legislatures,” committees of the dis-
trict legislatures are merely devices for tackling portions of the
work load of their parent bodies. As explained to the Fourth An-
nual Conference of Truk Island Magistrates a decade ago, if every
member of the family participated in each part of the operation
of gathering breadfruit, building a fire, cooking the fruit, pound-
ing it, and then looking for leaves to wrap the breadfruit, a much
longer time would be required than if each member were assigned
a fraction of the total operation. Correspondingly, if the work of
a legislature is divided among committees, more can be accom-
plished than if the whole body devotes attention seriatim to each
problem before it.6
From the founding of district bodies, committees have been em-
ployed to spread the burden. Committees have suggested appro-
priate solutions for the various problems raised and have phrased
in more apt terminology the ideas voiced by individual members
during the opening days of each session. While the prime service
of the committees has been to provide factual background and
to develop solutions for the district’s difficulties, they have not
been denied power to screen the measures introduced by individ-
ual members. In the main, though, the function of the standing
committees has been one of proposing and refining, rather than
evaluating policy, so that it has been exceptional for them to re-
ject legislation referred to them because of their disagreement
with the measures’ sponsors over policy. After committees have
prepared their reports, the district legislatures have not hesitated
to return measures for further refinement in accordance with the
legislature’s instructions. Committee chairmen do not necessarily
carry the burden of defending the committee report upon the floor
of the legislature, but should questions arise, they often take the
brunt of general session discussion.
6 Proceedings of Fourth Annual Conference of Truk Island Magistrates, Jan.
17–24, 1956, p. 2.
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Committees of the Territory’s legislatures have depended
heavily upon the collective knowledge of their members. Some-
times this has been because of a lack of familiarity with the means
of obtaining outside assistance; other times it has been due to
a lack of rapport with those from whom such aid might be ob-
tained. Then, too, there are legislators who seem to believe that
a need to seek information and solutions outside the circle of
their committee membership constitutes an admission of personal
inadequacy. Possibly because of limited facilities, committee meet-
ings have been somewhat casual, occasionally held in a member’s
house or consisting of visits by some or all of the membership
to the offices of the administration. The appointment of non-leg-
islators to committees, as in Palau, expanded committee compe-
tence but also introduced an element of potential irresponsibility,
which led to the discontinuance of the practice. Over time there
has been a gradual systemization of committee action, but most
committees still engage in little advance planning and somewhat
naïvely expect the administration to respond immediately, without
preparatory notice, to their call. Different committees of the same
legislative body may investigate identical subjects, despite the ex-
clusive jurisdiction delineated for each. In some districts, standing
committees carry on their work between sittings, continuing their
study of measures and preparing the ground work for future leg-
islation at subsequent sessions.
As the legislative process has grown more sophisticated, non-
government “interests” have begun appearing before commit-
tees to state their positions favoring or opposing legislation. The
legislature’s relations with the district administration have be-
come more regularized to assure the flow of information from
the administration to the committees. Concomittantly, informal
contacts between district administration personnel and subject-
matter committees have been built; where this has not occurred,
their lack has constituted a potential friction point between
legislature and executive. Some district administrators have
assigned personnel with whom the committees may work in fi-
nalizing bills and resolutions. The latest stage in the evolution of
committees has been their use for shaping and mobilizing pub-
lic opinion through hearings, investigations, and the issuance of
public statements.
In the absence of positive legislative leadership, the administra-
tion of each committee has been no stronger than its median
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member. Without any seniority system and with members disin-
clined to adopt forceful directory roles, many committees have
not appreciably eased their parent bodies’ burden both because
they are reluctant to bottle up measures and because they report
measures out after only incomplete study. Also, since they have
failed to satisfy fully the need to narrow viewpoints to a single
solution, their members do not necessarily feel bound to support
the committee’s report and in the legislative chamber may oppose
the recommendations with which they concurred in committee. On
the other hand, given the relative inexperience of the Microne-
sian legislators with modern government, the early structuring of
committees into the district legislatures materially facilitated the
legislative process and the refinement of the legislative product.
FLOOR ACTION
The format of debate and decision-making called for by the
district legislatures sharply contrasts with that followed in tradi-
tional council meetings. At the district sessions there is only lim-
ited time available for reaching decisions and for engaging in the
customary formalities. Free expression of viewpoint, confronta-
tion to sharpen the issue, and voting to reach a determination
where unanimity cannot be achieved all run contrary to traditional
norms. Customary practices had to be replaced by the parlia-
mentary procedures of the West. All this contributed to the inter-
minable debate, the speaking in circles like an amaidechedui,7 the
liberal use of metaphor, and the irrelevancies commented upon by
observers of the early district legislatures, which continue to a de-
gree. For a considerable period, the legislator, on rising, would
comply with the traditional forms of avoiding giving offense by de-
livering a lengthy assurance of accord with the preceding speaker,
and only gradually would he get around to disagreeing. Vestiges
of a consensus society, in the form of debate continuing after a
majority vote has been obtained, linger on. When to all of this is
added the members’ lack of subject-matter knowledge over the
novel questions brought to their attention and their general
insecurity in dealing with the government of the Americans, dis-
7 An amaidechedui is a small Palauan lizard which climbs in a spiral; the
simile is used to describe the culturally patterned circumlocution typical of
Palauan debate. See Roland W. Force, Leadership and Cultural Change in
Palau, Fieldiana: Anthropology, Vol. 50 (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Mu-
seum, 1960), p. 143.
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cussion on the floor of the district legislatures understandingly has
been prolonged and positive decisions arrived at only with difficulty.
In the early Ponapean congress, it was reported that “the com-
mon people thought that they could not express their own opinion,
for under Ponapean custom, ordinary people do not have the
choice of talking before the high chiefs.”8 Informants advise that a
sense of hesitation continues to this day on the part of some com-
moners. In Yap, differences in rank do not prevent members from
posing an issue or speaking on a matter before the congress, but
there is a tendency to be circumspect in challenging the position
of a higher status person. (No one from a low caste yet sits in the
Yap Islands Congress.) Reluctance of some of the members from
the Low Islands to take a strong stand has been observed in the
Truk district legislature. In Palau, persons from high ranking fam-
ilies play a prominent part in debate. The chiefs, who as a rule are
old, “senior” citizens, sit in the back of the chamber and forego
an active role. A position taken by one of the high chiefs may be
disputed, but at times members have been unwilling to commit
themselves when a sharp difference of opinion has arisen between
the chiefs in the Palau district legislature. In these and other ways,
Micronesian traditional status relationships complicate and pro-
long the debate of a legislative session.
The district legislators are exhibiting an ever greater degree of
familiarity with the more common motions and strategies of par-
liamentary procedure, although they sometimes employ practices
which might cause raised eyebrows in more experienced legisla-
tive bodies. The successful adoption of an amendment may carry
the original motion to which it was made. When a series of alter-
natives are under discussion, the members may be afforded the
opportunity of registering their preferences, and the one receiv-
ing a plurality is accepted. The practice identifies the single most
popular choice, but not necessarily that on which a majority of
legislators might be willing to compromise. Oral amendments of-
fered from the floor still cause confusion, sometimes because they
will be phrased as suggestions rather than as formal motions to
change the specific terminology of the matter under debate, and
other times because the amendment does not harmonize with the
remainder of the text. But, overall, there has been an air of cama-
raderie, a sense of joint sharing in an undertaking unaccustomed
8 Paper of Oliver Nanpei, read at First Trust Territory Conference on Self-Gov-
ernment (Truk: 1953), p. 16.
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to all, and a willingness to experiment with the new rather than
sullen or resigned rote performance, all of which augur well for
the continued success of the district assemblies.
The charters of all of the district legislatures require more than
a simple majority for a quorum necessary to undertake legisla-
tive business. With the exception of the Marshall Islands Congress
(two-thirds), a quorum of three-fourths of the total membership is
mandated. Some of these charters do not prescribe agreement of
a majority of the legislature’s total membership for enactment of
a measure but only a majority of the quorum. Voting is ordinarily
by the raising of hands; secret ballot votes are not unknown when
the members do not wish to publicize their individual preferences.
Legislative records report that measures have been defeated be-
cause of failure to obtain the requisite vote, testifying to the
observance of the charter requirements.
Use of roll calls to tally members’ votes is now general practice.
However, incorporation of the roll call into the permanent legis-
lative journal in order to publish an account of each member’s
decision yet remains something of a novelty. A decade ago, when
the introduction of the roll call was attempted in the Marshalls,
each member treated the calling of his name as an invitation to
rise and state his stand on the measure being voted upon. Roll
calls, permanently committed to writing, probably will not become
part of the established procedures of the district bodies until con-
stituent interest grows and a member’s voting record becomes of
political moment to his future election.
All of the district legislatures have employed legal or extra-
legal procedures for putting measures they have adopted into
final form for submission to the district administrator and the
high commissioner. In the Marianas, modification after enact-
ment may affect only grammar, punctuation, and comparable
matters, and no substantive change may be made. In contrast
to this, some of the earlier district legislatures did little more
than voice approval of a principle, without any details for admin-
istrative implementation, and after adjournment this bare skeleton
would be materially expanded. In the Palaus, the office of the district
administration would undertake the revision; the draft would then
be reviewed by a committee named for the purpose, which would
accept or reject it, depending upon whether the committee
believed it conformed with the ideas of the congress. If the com-
mittee did not concur, it would direct the manner in which the
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draft should be amended. In the Marshalls, to this day the final
draft may not be firmed up for over two months after adjourn-
ment. Reference to the contents of measures submitted to the
high commissioner can be misleading, for measures may embody
provisions not even discussed within the legislative chamber but
believed necessary by the staff of a district administration to im-
plement the legislative intent. With the legislative employment
of staff skilled in drafting, and with the legislative and executive
branches of government drawing apart so that the district leg-
islatures are now more concerned over the exact detail of the
measures they adopt, this form of extra-legal refinement of dis-
trict legislative enactments will probably disappear.
The objective of complete and accurate record keeping has
never been fully understood by the staffs of the Micronesian dis-
trict legislatures, and most minutes of sessions have been sketchy
at best. On occasion, gaps in the formal accounts have been filled
in with volunteered material solely to have some data on record,
as required by the district administration. Since neither legisla-
tors nor the courts have exerted pressure to improve legislative
records, this will await the staffing of district legislatures with per-
sonnel whose professional standards prompt them to achieve a
more careful accounting of legislative actions.
Most of the districts keep summary journals, sometimes pub-
lished only in a Micronesian language. In the Marianas, a tape
record is kept of the entire proceedings, which is later broadcast,
and from this the staff prepares a verbatim journal, but the latter
operation falls far behind the holding of the legislative session.
Currently, in the Marshalls, the radio station of the District Edu-
cation Department cuts a tape of all legislative proceedings for
broadcasting, and the secretary has been using this as the source
for his summary journal. These journals contain little but refer-
ence to the addresses by the district administrators, the bills and
resolutions introduced and some history of their passage, and
proof that the necessary vote has been achieved for each measure
enacted.
In multi-lingual districts, legislative debates are in the domi-
nant language, as Ponapean in the Ponape district and Chamorro
in the Marianas. In the latter, the rules read that “English shall
be the preferred spoken language of the legislature,” but they
also add that another language is not precluded, and members de-
bate primarily in Chamorro. The original records of the district
104 District Legislatures— Their Procedures and Process
legislature are kept in the language used for floor debate, and
translations into English may be made for the convenience of
the American administration. Relatively few indigenes associated
with the district legislatures have complete mastery of the English
language, so careful comparison between the English and Mi-
cronesian language versions of legislative records reveals dis-
crepancies. In 1916, a commentary on the use of the Hawaiian
language in Hawaii’s legislative debates and official documents
noted that it made “the carrying on of government more difficult
and expensive.”9 This has of course disappeared from the Hawai-
ian scene, just as has the Chamorro language from the debate on
Guam, and similar reliance on English by Micronesian district leg-
islators will probably occur in the future.
Until recently, schisms within the membership of a district
legislature have primarily reflected personality clashes and the
presence of cliques following the lead of key members. The dis-
parate growth of the areas around the district headquarters has
meant that their needs have become different from those in the
outlying areas. This differentiation has caused a degree of friction
within the district legislatures and sometimes shows in divisions
between “urban” and “rural” blocs, with the latter objecting to the
predominant allocation of public improvements to the headquar-
ters’ areas.10 The fight in the Palau legislature over reestablishing
some form of a holdover committee to meet with the district ad-
ministrator in the interim between legislative sessions carried
overtones of anti-Koror feeling. The members who would be ap-
pointed to such a committee would have to be legislators from
Koror or closely adjacent areas, and it was believed this would
lead the district administration to attach too much importance to
the views of Koror people. On Ponape, there are not bitter divi-
sions between the representatives from Ponape, Kusaie, and the
low islands, but the existence of these three groupings is acknowl-
edged. The Kusaie and low island delegations each tend to hold
together, while the members from Ponape Island frequently divide
their vote. The Marshalls’ geographic cleavage between the Radak
and Ralik chains has not assumed major importance in separating
9 Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Labor Conditions in
Hawaii, Senate Doc. No. 432, 64th Congress, 1st Sess. (1916), p. 67.
10 Or see the decision of the Ponape Island Congress not to meet in 1955, as
a result of the difficulties arising out of the dispute between Kolonia (the Ponape
district center) and Net Municipality, until the issue was resolved. 1956 United
Nations Visiting Mission Report, pars. 143, 144.
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members into opposing camps,11 although the variance between the
two chains with respect to land and copra rights does differentiate
their outlook. The technique sometimes adopted in the Marshallese
congress to avoid a decision on which opposition is anticipated has
been to suggest that it is a problem peculiar to one or the other is-
land chain and should be settled by the people of that area.
The birth of political parties in the Palaus and Marianas has
seen members dividing along party lines, both on issues and on
the organizing of their respective bodies. However, officer and
committee posts are not reserved solely for the majority party
in either body, and in the absence of recorded roll call votes,
it is not possible to demonstrate any partisan differences which
sharply separate the members of the rival political organizations.
Occasionally “religious groups have expressed a stand with re-
spect to specific measures, such as the manufacture and use of
alcoholic beverages,”12 but it is exceptional for legislators to split
neatly into religious groupings opposing each other within the leg-
islative halls. In some districts, teachers’ organizations have been
successful in shaping legislative decisions, enjoying access through
the teachers and former teachers found in the legislative mem-
bership. Businessmen’s organizations are appearing in the Trust
Territory, and the position of some legislators, favoring or opposing
the administration’s plans, has mirrored the views of these business
organizations as communicated to or shared by the businessmen-
members of the district legislatures. Unlike with party and pressure
group activity in the United States, relatively little of district legisla-
tive activity can be traced directly to these groupings.
Faced with the uncertainties of a novel political institution and
repeatedly reminded that the district legislatures are of critical
importance to the people of Micronesia in realizing greater self-
government, district legislators have inevitably emphasized the
formal side of running a legislature and have been less sensitive
to the substance of power which may be exercised through
the legislative process. Prescriptive decorum has always sur-
rounded important traditional institutions in Micronesia, and this
has led the new legislatures similarly to stress formalism. Also, it
11 Early in the history of the Marshall Islands Congress, an issue over the pay-
ment of medical charges ended with a rump session of Ralik members held on Ebeye
in the Kwajalein atoll, and their decision that each person should be responsible for
his own hospitalization costs.
12 11th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1958,
p. 34.
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is easier to transfer the trappings and the institutionalized pro-
cedures associated with a Western-style legislature than it is to
equip legislative members with an understanding of the scope of
power they are receiving and a sense of assurance as they grasp it.
Workshops can communicate the former, but power relationships
themselves must be restructured to achieve the latter.
The formalism of the district legislatures follows no single pat-
tern. To many, the tape recorder is something of a toy, and though
proceedings are faithfully recorded, the use of these tapes in
any way has been relatively limited. Public address systems add
decibels to the soft-spoken Micronesian. The Palau legislature in
1960 announced a contest for the purpose of selecting its official
seal. Marshallese legislators early requested distinctive identifi-
cation badges, only to be embarrassed by the administration’s
innocent supplying of markers “similar to the wooden tags which
the Japanese administrators forced malefactors to wear publicly
as partial punishment.”13 In the Marianas, formalism is manifest
in the manner in which the presiding officer is addressed and ref-
erences are made to other members. In all districts, befitting the
importance of the legislative body, as well as consonant with Mi-
cronesian custom, dignity of dress is exaggerated as measured in
relation to the clothing ordinarily worn by the members. The shift-
ing of major interest from compliance with form to substance must
await the understanding by the members themselves of the signif-
icance of the expanding jurisdiction of the district legislature and
their fuller exercise of the powers now available to them.
SUBJECT-MATTER INTEREST
The quantity of legislation adopted by the district legislatures
has not been particularly impressive. For example, the first three
sessions of the Marshallese congress in total passed only sixty-three
resolutions—thirty-four so-called “joint,” another eleven “concur-
rent,” and the balance either “Iroij” or “Assembly.” The two sessions
held in Truk in 1964 adopted but fifteen acts and thirty resolutions,
while from 1963 through 1965 the Mariana Islands District Legisla-
ture added forty-nine acts to that district’s laws.
Since their founding, almost every conceivable subject has in
some manner come before one or more of the district legislatures.
Even though the legislatures have been precluded from legislating
13 Memo from District Anthropologist to Acting DistAd Marshalls, Sept. 15,
1953.
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on a wide range of matters, this has not prevented them from ex-
pressing their collective views in what, in effect, are legislative
resolutions. As illustration, “requests for action by the United States
Congress” are now handled by the Territorial Government;14 never-
theless, the Marianas sent a delegation to Washington in the spring
of 1966 to urge amendments of United States laws governing en-
listment of men from the Marianas in the U.S. Armed Forces. For
the most part, the district legislative output has been directed to-
ward governmental activities and has shown relatively little interest
in relationships among private persons, relationships with which
government at best is involved only in fixing the approved rules
of conduct, acting as umpire, and ensuring enforcement of these
rules. As the legislators have become cognizant of their political
roles, like their counterparts in the United States, they have begun
adopting congratulatory resolutions and expressions of condo-
lence in an effort to build personal popularity.
The first Marshallese congress which met in 1950 adopted
twenty-seven resolutions. Illustrative of the scope of concern of
this early legislature, five resolutions involved trade stores and
commercial activity, an equal number applied to traditional rights
and customs, three to health and sanitation, three to agriculture
and conservation, and two each to taxation, school support, and
the judicial system. The balance covered a swath of miscellany.
The original Ponape legislature dealt with such matters as raising
the interest rate on savings accounts, maintenance of a road
around Ponape, and the expenditure of tax moneys; the following
year this island congress turned its attention to exempting the sale
of kerosene from taxation, returning guns to the people, and re-
quiring all persons to follow the practice of using two names. The
spring session of the 1955 Palau congress adopted resolutions on
taxes, alcoholic beverage importation, firearm control, establish-
ing local government title to lands and roads, as well as enacting
an inheritance law, taking a number of conservation measures,
and limiting liability under Micronesian custom. Greater sophis-
tication in subject matter is revealed as the sessions passed, so
that by 1961, provision was being made for a loan fund to furnish
economic assistance for homesteaders, the promotion of coconut,
cacao, and mahogany planting, and the codification of the laws
and resolutions enacted by district legislatures.
14 Public Law 1–6 of 1965, Congress of Micronesia.
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The tax system of the Trust Territory has developed in a
chaotic way, encompassing levies by municipalities, the Territorial
Government, and the district legislatures. Until recently, when the
Congress of Micronesia interjected an element of rationality into
the tax structure in line with the recommendations of the Solomon
Report, many of the district taxes were imposed on products
already taxed by other levels of government. Early, the Palau legis-
lature placed a sales tax on “luxuries,” such as fountain pens, large
ornamental vases, and expensive shoes. License fees, sumptuary
levies on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, and import and export
taxes yielded the districts sufficient revenues to release the munici-
palities from part of their responsibility for education. Until the
Territorial Government accepted the burden of educational costs,
the district legislatures spent “a rather large proportion of their
budgets on teachers’ salaries.”15 More recently, a marked increase
has been noted in the proportion of the district budget expended by
the legislators for themselves. “Support of the legislature … (with
personal services payments, building and office expenses) has left
little available for project spending in most districts.”16
BUDGETED EXPENDITURES, DISTRICT LEGISLATURES,
1965–6617
DISTRICT LEGISLATIVE OTHER PURPOSES TOTAL
Mariana 48.9% 51.1% $ 47,224
Marshalls a 30.2 69.8 132,848
Palau 59.3 40.7 22,935
Ponape 34.6 65.4 46,988
Truk b 21.4 78.6 78,387
Yap c 28.8 71.2 95,007
a Marshalls for calendar 1965.
b An additional $17,500 for “Other Purposes” was vetoed.
c “Legislative” includes $20,000 for “Municipal Government Building.”
As the district legislators constitute a virtual bridge between
the traditional and Western political systems, of interest has been
the extent to which they have turned their attention to traditional
subjects. In the main, the endeavors of the district legislatures
have been more to exhort the Micronesians to continue to support
local customs than to make customs legally mandatory. A resolu-
15 As commented upon by Mr. Edmonds, New Zealand; TCOR, 27th Sess.,
1148th meeting, June 14, 1961, par. 67.
16 John R. Tabb, “Public Finance in Micronesia,” prepared as part of report of
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., 1966.
17 Ibid., extropolated from pp. 10–12.
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tion declaring that law and order should be preserved, respect for
custom ought to be given by all, and everyone should have the
right to be honored18 could hardly be objected to by the Adminis-
tering Authority on grounds of the principles enunciated. But dec-
larations such as this are too vague to allow enforcement through
either the courts or the administrative machinery of the Territory
Government, so that at best they have only served to reinforce
the customs singled out for attention through the constraints of
traditional social structure. More effective in gaining compliance
has been the deliberate adoption of a law paralleling a traditional
norm, such as the Palauan law on incest, so that mere charge and
judicial trial will bring punishment through social disapproval ex-
pressed in customary manner, and not necessarily through a fine
or imprisonment imposed by a court upon conviction. An allied
variant has been the careful evaluation of proposals for new laws
to ensure they are in harmony with traditional relations still being
observed. The draft of a Ponapean law on intestacy, and the de-
claration that magistrates should determine the persons entitled
to succeed to land in such cases, were amended to recognize the
right of the nanmarki to make the award, thus avoiding further
erosion of the nanmarki’s chiefly position.
Despite the Barnett thesis that the district legislatures should
limit themselves to problems arising out of Western contact and
that these new institutions should forbear traditional matters,19
the Micronesian legislators have long taken steps “to overcome
through legislation certain cultural practices which are essentially
opposed to behavior more appropriate to independent political
status.”20 Thus the burden of traditional food and money ex-
changes has been a subject of interest to the Palauan congress
on a number of occasions, as they have come in conflict with new
ways. Declaration No. 1–62 of the Palau Congress reads:
A DECLARATION OF HIGH CHIEFS AND
OTHER CHIEFS OF THE PALAU DISTRICT TO
ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY CUSTOMARY PRACTICES
Whereas, the Olbiil era Kelulau at its Fall Session of 1962 dis-
18 Resolution No. 25, First Marshallese Congress, referred to in Dorothy E.
Richard, U.S. Naval Administration in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), III, 404.
19 See p. 68.
20 Roland W. Force and Maryanne Force, “Political Change in Micronesia,” in
Roland W. Force, ed., Induced Political Change in the Pacific (Honolulu: Bishop
Museum Press, 1965), p. 12.
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cussed the possibility of eliminating certain unnecessary customary
practices in the Palau District; and
Whereas, the fourteen hereditary chiefs, … after carefully studying
and observing the matter noted that food preparations connected with
such customary practices often constitute unnecessary economic wastes
and are harmful to living conditions and the economic stability of Palau.
It is therefore declared by all the chiefs of the Palau District and en-
dorsed by the Olbiil era Kelulau that the following practices, kall ra sis,
kall ra chomengades, kall ra ngasech ra mlechel and senk ra ngalk are
not obligatory and therefore they do not have to be performed nor do we
have to spend money for them under customary obligation.
Passed by unanimous vote of the members of the Olbiil era Kelulau
present and voting at its Fall Session of 1962.
Here, through the district legislature, the chiefs were
proclaiming that the economic burdens associated with wakes,
honoring the grave, the first child ceremony, and presentation of
gifts to the baby need no longer be borne. The declaration neither
prohibited the practices nor declared any punishment; the legis-
lature was being utilized as the appropriate forum through which
to announce a modification in traditional obligations, and by en-
dorsing the modification, the status of the legislature was added
to that of the chiefs in overcoming any resistance to the change.
Previously, in 1955, and again in 1959 and 1963, individual or fam-
ily social liabilities under Palauan custom were declared modified
through action taken by the district legislature. Through resolu-
tion of the Ponape district legislature, a somewhat parallel effort
to ban some types of feasts, because of their competitive charac-
ter resembling the “potlatch” of the Northwest American Indians,
failed to pass. Unlike that in Palau, the Ponape legislature did not
approve of using its process to revise traditions which depended
only on social sanctions for their enforcement.
A degree of similarity is increasingly revealed in the concerns
of the various district legislatures. For example, by 1958, five had
passed laws setting the minimum salary schedules for teachers,
this before the costs of the educational system were transferred
to the Trust Territory Government. Alcoholic beverage control is
now administered in all of the districts pursuant to district legis-
lative enactment. Under the statutes adopted by the Congress of
Micronesia, an ever greater degree of parallel action by all six
district legislatures may be expected. It may even be hypothe-
sized that there is a commonality of subject-matter interest in
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all Pacific Island legislatures, giving due account for developmen-
tal time lags. At the November, 1951, session of the provisional
Ponape legislature, antedating the official approval of the Ponape
Island Congress, “the dog tax was abolished as discouraging food
production.”21 Exactly half a century before, the first legislature of
the Territory of Hawaii earned the name of “lady dog legislature”
because of spending most of its time wrangling over dog taxes. Its
members were not as frank in admitting that roast dog was still an
important part of the Hawaiian luau.
THE DISTRICT LEGISLATURE’S WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS
A legislature presents a multiplicity of aspects, depending
upon the viewer’s perspective. To the legislators’ constituents
favoring or resenting the legislature’s enactments, to the local
governmental officials who may regard the legislator as competi-
tor or ally, to the personnel of the Administering Authority who
ambivalently view the development of self-government through
the legislative process as both an accomplishment and a threat,
and to the high commissioner who must defend the actions of the
district legislatures as well as his replies to them before national
and international review, the district legislature is a many-faceted
institution.
Of necessity the high commissioner has had to rely upon the
district administrators and his staff at Territorial Headquarters for
guidance in responding to the district legislative enactments sub-
mitted to him for approval. This inevitably led to the scrutinizing
of legislative enactments for their disadvantageous elements and
contributed an in-built administrative bias towards conservatism.
To offset it, the high commissioner has had to add a counterbalan-
cing viewpoint designed to encourage indigenous expression even
when district legislation may be thought inopportune and its for-
mulation technically deficient. Without undertaking any statistical
analysis, the impression gained is that over the years a sizeable
number of measures have been vetoed by the high commissioner
and that these vetoes have been based less on the technical objec-
tions of his staff than on the substantive issues they have raised.
Picking examples at random, of the sixteen resolutions adopted by
the Marshallese congress at its 1956 session, six were in effect
vetoed, five for policy reasons. At approximately the same period,
21 Kolonia en Pohapey, Dec. 6, 1951.
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a representative of the Tebechelel Olbiil (Administrative Coun-
cil) explained to the Olbiil era Kelulau (Palau Congress) the high
commissioner’s reasons for disapproving parts of the 1955 Palau
budget adopted that spring:
It is not approvable by the Government to build up a Budget to support
the Municipalities.
It is not approvable to pile more upon the boat license fees.
By the resolution cigarettes would bear too much tax.
Per diem rate for the members of the Olbiil era Kelulau is little too high
and reduction must be considered next session.
Taxation on cigarettes and perfumery should be collected by a different
system, that is to tax all the other imported goods equally with the ciga-
rettes and perfumery.22
A decade later the high commissioner was still vetoing an ap-
preciable number of measures, many times for policy reasons.
After the spring 1964 session of the Truk district legislature, seven
acts were approved and two were vetoed for technical reasons;
in the following fall, of the six acts adopted by this district legis-
lature, four were disallowed, only one for irregularities; the spring
1965 session saw nineteen acts sent to the high commissioner, of
which he signed all but four, and two of the latter were disapproved
on policy grounds. The Mariana Islands District Legislature passed
seventeen acts at its spring session in 1965, and the high com-
missioner disagreed with the objectives of three and vetoed a
fourth on a technicality. The amendment of district charters to
allow the district administrator to veto measures, and the dis-
trict legislatures to pass them again over his rejection, assures
that the procedurally deficient bills will be detected at the dis-
trict level, while the high commissioner will increasingly be called
upon to deal only with basic policy issues. Regardless of the grow-
ing competence of the district legislatures, disagreements over
programmatic issues will continue, and the district assemblies will
thereby be in position to play an ever more important role as a me-
diating institution between the United States administration and
the Micronesian people. To the Administering Authority, the ac-
tions of the district legislatures will continue to be viewed with a
degree of trepidation, as a necessary part of political self-expres-
22 Minutes of the Tenth Convention of the Olbiil era Kelulau, Oct., 1955.
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sion but subject to the gnawing doubts of a parent toward the
adequacy of an offspring’s efforts.
The effectiveness of the district legislature has depended in large
degree upon the nature of the informal relationships existing be-
tween it and district administrator. By positing agenda items and
proposing drafts of measures, the district administrators have sig-
nificantly influenced the content of the legislative output. Their ad-
vice has not been taken lightly, for the legislators realize they must
rely upon the administration to help them arrive at decisions. The
district administrators in turn know that the legislators serve as a
bridge between their municipalities and the district center, and the
administrators are dependent upon this aid to facilitate the districts’
administration. With law-making through District Order now almost
completely foreclosed, the district administrators have become even
more reliant upon the district legislatures. The district administra-
tors have not been adverse to using the legislators as a “front” to
support programs which the high commissioner has not favored.
When district legislature and district administrator join ranks in
close policy agreement, they present a hard combination for the
high commissioner to turn—as witness the high commissioner’s re-
versing himself in finally approving Resolution No. 3 of the 1955
Marshallese congress, which set up a local option plan for alcholic
beverages, after first rejecting it.23 In short, the relationship is a
symbiotic one, and each of the parties derives an advantage from
maintaining a good working association with the other.
On the other hand, it is natural for the district administrator
to view the district legislature as a challenge to his authority
for, given the course of the Trust Territory’s political development,
this was the very purpose for having legislatures. Once glimpsing
the promise of self-governance, the Micronesian legislators have
looked upon the Administering Authority as delaying the movement
of indigenes into positions of responsibility and their attainment
of ever greater policy-making powers. The district administrator
easily may become the symbolic embodiment of all such resent-
ment, and this but adds greater friction to the articulating of the
two branches of government essential to the American-devised
system in the Territory. A lack of cordial personal relationship be-
tween legislators and district administrator only aggravates the
latent suspicion and distrust of the former, while the latter in
23 See letters of DistAd Marshalls to Deputy HiCom, March 3, 1955, and Deputy
HiCom to DistAd Marshalls, May 2, 1955.
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turn comes to regard the legislators as deliberately meddling in
the running of the district and taking every opportunity to needle
the administration. Legislative inexperience becomes synonymous
with personal incompetence, and the interdependence of the two
branches sometimes becomes lost in personal animosity.
The emergence of organized politics adds another dimension,
one which can widen the distance between a popularly chosen
legislature and commissioner-appointed district administrator.
However, as more Micronesians are selected for district admin-
istrator posts and provided that their ties with the district legis-
latures are cooperative and not antagonistic, there may develop
within each district a sense of solidarity of purpose which is at
best only nascent among Micronesians at the present time.
With the chartering of the district legislatures, the center of
power has potentially shifted from the municipalities, the other
political unit introduced by the Americans and staffed wholly by
indigenes. In a district like the Marianas, where the Saipan muni-
cipality had grown into the most complex of all local government
in the Trust Territory, the Mariana Islands District Legislature
has had difficulty in establishing saliency, let alone primacy. Even
today, some of the people on Saipan do not consider a post in
the district legislature to be necessarily higher than one on the
Saipan Municipal Council, and whether a person runs for one or
the other legislative body may depend on how strongly he feels an
interest in solely Saipanese affairs. In other districts where local
government has not advanced much beyond the scope of activities
performed traditionally, the district legislators have more easily
moved to the vanguard of indigenous political leadership. The es-
tablishing of the Truk district legislature in 1957 was followed the
next year by the Truk atoll magistrates’ voting to discontinue their
monthly meetings. It was not thought profitable to call the an-
nual Palau Magistrates Conference into session between 1962 and
1966. As foreseen by the district administrator when talking to the
Truk chiefs in 1956, a representative sent to district headquarters
to attend the district legislature “will come in here each year for a
week or so and spend a week talking about the district problems
and he will go back to his island probably better informed about
the district problems than the chief [magistrate] would be.”24
There has always been a degree of consultation between the
24 Proceedings of Fourth Island Conference of Truk Island Magistrates, Jan.
17–24, 1956, p. 47.
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district legislators and the municipal officials of their constituencies.
Magistrates have directed attention to many problems which have
become the basis of measures considered by the district legisla-
tures; indeed, for the fifteen years that Palauan magistrates were
members of that district’s legislature, they could introduce such
measures directly. The removal of the magistrates from that body
signaled that they were too closely identified with the Executive
branch and that they did not properly belong in a legislative body.
Not so incidentally, they also constituted an elected group and so
were a threat to the popularly-chosen legislators. The disqualifica-
tion of elected municipal officers in the legislative charters more
recently granted by the high commissioner only attests to the inten-
tion to further limit municipal officers to local policy matters.
A late development has been the organizing of local officials to
present measures to the district legislatures. The magistrates of
Ponape have formed a committee to draft desired legislation so
that the wishes of the municipal officials may be formally brought
to the attention of their district body. The district administrator
of Palau reactivated the Palau Magistrates Conference in 1966,
in part to “discuss and coordinate with the magistrates possible
legislation to be submitted to the Spring Session [1966] of the
Palau District Legislature.”25 Municipalities’ taxing powers have
now been limited, and in addition to their having to come to the
district legislatures for authorization to impose and collect excise
taxes, they must look to their districts’ solons for other forms of
financial assistance if they are to continue furnishing accustomed
municipal services. The competition betweeen officials originally
inherent in the structuring of two levels of government, one local
and the other district, has not been eliminated, but the position of
the district legislator has recently been enhanced in comparison
to that of the municipal officer.
At least initially, few people understood the purpose of the dis-
trict legislatures or the function of the representatives. The first
Marshallese congress in 1950 did not include the “best leaders”
from some of the atolls because it was felt “they would probably
be without voice and the whole affair would be dictated to by the
[Civil Administrator] CivAd and his various Department Heads.”26
Today most Micronesians continue to know relatively little about
how the legislature of their district runs its business or the place
25 Palau Post, March 25, 1966.
26 Memo of CivAd Marshalls to HiCom, Oct. 9, 1950.
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it occupies in the district’s government. The voters were, and in
many of the outlying areas still are, willing to send representatives
to the district headquarters primarily because the Administering
Authority tells them it is important they do so, and because this
direction is reinforced by the word of their traditional leaders
who still command their respect. However, even in the outlying
reaches, each year the schools graduate more and more of Mi-
cronesia’s youth who have been instructed in the rudiments of
democratic government and the key role of the legislature in a
democratic system. Moreover, wherever their homes, the people
of the Territory have learned that the district legislatures can ac-
complish things which affect them personally, and for whatever
the specific reason, throughout the whole of Micronesia there has
been a growing respect for the legislature as a vehicle of change.
A decade ago, the Fischers wrote that public confidence in
the Ponape Congress would depend “on the experience of the
congress, the issues which it takes up for discussion, the quality
of the decisions which it makes, the support which it receives
from the American administration, the degree of responsibility
which it is permitted and a number of other factors which can-
not be predicted in detail….”27 The same statement could as well
have been applied to all of the other district legislatures in the
Trust Territory and have been expanded by reference to such
items as the number of measures which are vetoed and the ex-
tent to which the district legislature becomes identified as the
champion of the rights of the district inhabitants. What has tran-
spired is that, in many of these areas, the district legislatures
have deported themselves in ways which have brought them, if
not eminence, at least prominence.
As problems have grown bigger than the confines of a single
municipality, they have gravitated to the legislative forum for reso-
lution. This has not always strengthened public regard for the
competence of the legislature, as its jurisdiction may not extend
to these subjects. Locally generated requests to the legislators
for an increase in the price of copra or for greater administrative
services which are funded out of Federal moneys do not lead to
enhancing the district legislature’s status. At best, all that the dis-
trict legislature may do is adopt a resolution. But in the Marshalls
the people know the congress played a major part in organizing
27 John L. Fischer and Ann M. Fischer, The Eastern Carolines (New Haven:
Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 187.
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MIECO, the district’s largest trading company, and in this and
other districts they understand that the burden of local school
salaries was transferred, by the legislatures, from the municipal
to the district level. With money to appropriate, the district bod-
ies can now provide scholarships, construct radio stations, and aid
local public works, all of which make for greater impact on the av-
erage Micronesian than their passage of a law regulating abstract
obligations owed between private parties. Of course, the impo-
sition of taxes means an added burden on the constituents and
easily furthers the contention that they are levied just to support
the “politicians”; like citizens the world over, the Micronesians
would prefer to enjoy the benefits which legislatures bring without
having to pay their costs. Perhaps the best measure of how Mi-
cronesians regard the district legislatures is that they hold them
as “ours,” while the executive and judicial branches of the district
government are the “Americans’ government.”
A final dimension just taking form in a district legislature’s web
of relationships is its link to other Micronesian legislative bodies.
Observation of the practices of other districts’ legislatures com-
menced with the founding of the first regional assemblies. In 1957,
for example, it was reported that inter-legislature visits, “which
are encouraged and sponsored by the Administration, took place …
in all districts where congresses held sessions.”28 Knowledge that
some administrative districts had been granted legislatures spurred
their founding in others. However, efforts at cross-district legislative
cooperation still remain premature. Concerted action was proposed
in 1962 through an exchange of correspondence initiated by the
president of the Truk District Congress, enclosing a draft resolution
calling for the turn over of the Trust Territory copra processing tax
to the district legislatures. Though it did not succeed in its purpose,
this is but the forerunner of comparable endeavors to come.
Precisely how the district legislatures will dovetail their work
with that of the new Congress of Micronesia remains uncertain.
In anticipation of the congress’ convening, a few district enact-
ments were vetoed by the high commissioner on the ground that
their subjects would be covered in bills to be brought before the
congress for enactment as Territory-wide laws. The order of the
Secretary of the Interior which established the congress materi-
ally curtailed the district tax base, and the taxing laws have had to
28 11th Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 16.
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be revised accordingly. At its first session, the congress provided
for the sharing of Territorial import and export collections with the
districts, to be expended as budgeted by the district legislatures,
so that cooperation rather than competition has distinguished the
founding of the new Territory-wide congress. The general feeling
of district good will toward this historic congress was marked by
the passage of legislation in three districts (Palau, Truk, and Yap),
and analogous action of the Holdover Committee in the Marshalls,
to appropriate moneys to their respective congressional delega-
tions as an entertainment fund for appropriately feting the new
Territorial body. Whether relations will continue as cordial after
district legislators are denied the privilege of running for election
to the Congress of Micronesia remains problematical. Most prob-
ably, this will see the appearance of a new overlay of politicians
who give their major attention to Territory-wide matters but are
dependent for support upon the resolution of the problems of their
home constituencies. This in turn is likely to be followed by an
ever greater dependence by the district legislatures upon the di-
rections and subventions flowing from the Territorial congress.
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CHAPTER 5
Traditional Leaders
and the District Legislatures
TO THE EXTENT basic “principles” have guided American
administration in the Trust Territory, one has been to allow the
maximum amount of self-rule to the indigenous society compatible
with the maintenance of law and order. The Americans entered
the area with the preconception that the chiefs were the legiti-
mate rulers, but they misunderstood the nature of that leadership
within Micronesian society. They not only countenanced the con-
tinuation of chiefly authority when not overtly conflicting with
American democratic concepts but also initially strengthened the
chiefs’ functional role which had been eroded during the German
and Japanese periods. Sometimes it was even expanded over that
theretofore enjoyed, due to the American failure to reintroduce
the restraints on arbitrary use of power formerly an essential part
of the traditional society.
When the Americans took control of Micronesia, they found no
single pattern of indigenous leadership. In the Marianas, all that
remained of the high chief or noble class was the perpetuation
of their name, “Chamorri,” since applied by the Spanish to all
the peoples of the archipelago. In contrast, the chiefs in the Yap
region, particularly in the low islands to the east in the mid-Car-
olines, continued to exercise much the same authority over their
peoples as when first subjected to Western rule.
The Truk atoll furnishes an excellent example of how the Amer-
ican administering personnel helped perpetuate an “invented”
chiefly structure and how that structure disappeared from the leg-
islative scene with the chartering of a congress for the district.
Aboriginally, chieftanship in Truk was “largely local and per-
sonal,”1 with attributes of authority vested in a number of classes,
1 Marc J. Swartz, “Personality and Structure: Political Acquiesence in
Truk,” in Roland W. Force, ed., Induced Political Change in the Pacific
(Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1965), p. 17. For other material on Truk,
see Marc J. Swartz, “Leadership and Status Conflict on Romonum, Truk,”
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 15:2 (Summer, 1959), 213; John L.
Fischer and Ann M. Fischer, The Far Eastern Carolines (New Haven: Hu-
the village the largest permanent political unit, and the geograph-
ical jurisdiction of a chief of one type not necessarily coinciding
with that of another. The traditional chief was the oldest capable
man in the chiefly lineage, and obvious senility constituted the
measure of incompetency. This proved inadequate for the pur-
poses of an administering country, whether German, Japanese, or
American. All three recognized indigenous leaders, starting with
the “flag” chiefs established by the Germans, responsible to them
for an island or a group of islands; thus, they brought into being
an office for which there was no precedent in the Trukese culture.
The superior physical power of the metropolitan nation and tra-
ditional patterns of subservience and respect combined to secure
the cooperation of the village chiefs. Persons with hereditary claim
to some chiefly title might be selected by the Trukese for these
new posts, or leaders might be named by the area administrator
without regard to local preferences.
Under early American military and civil government, the Ad-
ministering Authority for a while was dealing with an artificial
seven-level hierarchy, headed by a chief for all islands in the Truk
lagoon. American reorganization of this Truk political structure
eliminated some of the layers, and it was finally simplified into
recognition of a single “chief” for each of the Truk atoll islands
except Falo, which voted to remain under Moen. Over time these
administrative leaders had assumed many of the characteristics of
the old local chieftans, including being tendered the respect and
owed the traditional obligations of local groups.
The importation of elections by the Americans was not followed
by any immediate replacement of incumbents, and when it was
necessary for popular choice to name new office holders, succes-
sion followed along hereditary lines or, if not appropriate, then at
the direction of the retiring chiefs. When a matrilineal line was un-
able to nominate a suitable person, the office might pass to the
incumbent’s son, as in the case of the renowned leader of Moen
Island, Chief Petrus Mailo, who described himself as “not a chiefly
man Relations Area Files, 1957); John L. Fischer, “Totemism on Truk and
Ponape,” American Anthropologist, 59:2 (April, 1957), 250; Thomas Gladwin,
“Civil Administration on Truk: A Rejoinder,” Human Organization, 9:4 (Win-
ter, 1950), 15; Edward T. Hall, Jr., “Military Government on Truk,” Human
Organization, 9:2 (Summer, 1950), 25; Edward T. Hall and Karl J. Pelzer,
The Economy of the Truk Islands, USCC Economic Survey No. 7 (Honolulu:
1947); George P. Murdock and Ward H. Goodenough, “Social Organization of
Truk,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 3:4 (Winter, 1947), 331.
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person” but only a “bush-dweller.”2 The council of Truk atoll chiefs
and later the all-Truk Magistrates Conference served as precursor
legislative bodies, but when a wholly new institution in the form
of an elected district-wide congress was set up, it was relatively
easy for a group of younger leaders to come to the fore. There was
no compelling reason for the Administering Authority to make any
special provision to accommodate the island chiefs in the district
legislature, as a different leadership role was being structured to
which they had no vestige of traditional claim. Upon holding elec-
tions, the voters chose few of them for the new posts. Significantly,
the atypical Chief Petrus, whose personal qualifications and be-
havior well fitted him for a place in the new institution, emerged
as speaker of the first Trukese legislature.
In the Palau, Marshall Islands, and Ponape districts, the
American administrators believed it would be advantageous to
assure customary leaders membership in the respective con-
gresses. The standing of the legislative bodies would be en-
hanced by their presence, and with the chiefs automatically
represented, the voters would feel no obligation to elect them
and so would be free to choose commoners. Then, too, not shar-
ing the diffidence of the commoner in presenting their views
to the American administration, the chiefs would be less reluc-
tant to voice their thoughts upon controversial issues clearly
and frankly in public. The presence of the chiefs would provide
spokesmen for traditionalism, at the least guaranteeing that
more than the viewpoint of one status group would be brought to
the legislative halls, and would interject a conservative element
into legislative debate and decision. Each of the three districts
embraced status societies which knew varying degrees of mo-
bility but in which political power was expressed through the
persons occupying the positions of highest authority. The Admin-
istering Authority hoped that the incorporation of these symbolic
representatives would ease the founding of the new institutions
which contemplated full popular participation by all adults with-
out regard for status distinction.
2 “Speech of Chief Petrus Mailo before Truk High School Students” [Moen,
Truk: Truk Education Department], Oct. 4, 1964; see also Thomas Gladwin,
“Petrus Mailo, Chief of Moen,” in Joseph B. Cassagrande, ed., In the Company
of Man (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 42; Frank Mahoney, “The In-
novations of a Savings System on Truk,” American Anthropologist, 62:3 (June,
1960), 465.
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THE PONAPEAN CHIEFS—WITHDRAWAL3
The traditional political system on Ponape Island, with its
duality of leaders, bears resemblance to the division of power
encountered in the Samoas. Each of the five Ponapean wehis (dis-
tricts) has its royal line of chiefs associated with the nanmarki, and
the noble line headed by the naniken. Both lines consist of eleven
subordinate title-holders in ranked order. The nominal head of the
wehi is the nanmarki himself, but customarily the naniken trans-
mitted the policy decisions attributed to the former, in a manner
akin to the Polynesian “talking chief,” and probably wielded the
greater political power. A wehi is divided into kousap (sections),
each with its own two lines of chiefs, so that a person may pos-
sess both wehi and kousap titles. In addition, the senior chiefs can
award honorary titles, so that almost every adult man may have
some prestigeful place in the indigenous society, even though the
honorary titles do not carry any strictly ranked status.
Eligibility to become a chief depends upon inheritance and
proven ability, and individuals holding titles in the nanmarki or
naniken lines advance in rank upon the vacating of a higher title by
death, resignation, or removal. Traditionally the holders of the two
top titles are to confer together on the appointment of other leaders,
and each has the right to fill the paralleling senior post upon its va-
cancy; in practice, the naming of new title-holders is a consultative
matter. As clans are matrilineal and intermarriage between chiefly
sub-clans is encouraged, father and son might hold both highest ti-
tles; even today a son’s eligibility for promotion in one line may be
strengthened by the father having a title in the other.
3 Based on Fischer and Fischer, op. cit., pp. 174–177; Memo of Frank
Mahoney, “Homesteading in Matalanim,” May 24, 1954; John Sandelmann,
Some Observations on the Problem of “Self Government” in the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: 1953); George L. Coale, “A Study of
Chieftanship, Missionary Contact, and Culture Change on Ponape” (M.A. the-
sis, University of Southern California: 1951); Saul H. Riesenberg, Ponapean
Political and Social Organization, CIMA Final Report No. 15 (Washington:
Office of Naval Research, 1949); William R. Bascom, “Ponape: The Cycle of
Empire,” The Scientific Monthly, 70:3 (March, 1950), 141; William R. Bas-
com, Ponape: A Pacific Economy in Transition, USCC Economic Survey No.
8 (Honolulu: 1946).
For reference to traditional political systems of Kusaie and Mokil, see Fis-
cher and Fischer, op. cit.; James L. Lewis, Kusaiean Acculturation, CIMA Final
Report No. 17 (Washington: Office of Naval Research, 1948); J. E. Weckler,
Land and Livelihood on Mokil, CIMA Final Report No. 11, Part I (Washing-
ton: Office of Naval Research, 1949); Conrad Bentzen, Land and Livelihood
on Mokil, CIMA Final Report No. 25, Part II (Washington: Office of Naval Re-
search, 1949).
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An absolute monarch in theory, because of his great wau
(mana), the nanmarki could not deal directly with the aramas
mwal (common people) in the administration of his office. The
naniken served as an intermediary, interposing a moderating
force, and in fact government was conducted in observance of
public opinion, with royalty and nobles mediating each other’s po-
litical arbitrariness. The kousap chief, the kaun, despite being a
feudal vassal of the nanmarki and usually the leader of the most
powerful lineage of the kousap, was appointed only after the nan-
marki consulted the wishes of the aramas. The primary executive
activities of the senior titles traditionally consisted of a series of
reciprocal relationships between them and their subjects. As own-
ers of the land, the former received first fruits, feasts, free labor,
and other benefits and, in turn, owed obligations of defense and
care of their liege subjects. These high chiefs also interpreted cus-
tomary law, punished criminal behavior, and rendered decisions in
civil disagreements.
Much of this political structure was weakened by the coming of
the Protestant missionaries to Ponape in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, due to the modifications they introduced, and later by the
Germans when they took over governance of the island at the end
of the century. Starting with the German administration, the feu-
dal system was replaced by fee simple ownership, and the land
was divided so that each man owned his farmstead. Some of the
specialized functions befitting the various statuses of chieftanship
were assigned to the new political institutions; the nanmarki ap-
peared in public and directly managed wehi affairs, and under
the Japanese the naniken became wehi judge. Tribute was cur-
tailed as the high chiefs became salaried governmental officers
in charge of local government; nonetheless the ceremonial life
of Ponapean society continued to center around the chiefs, and
they retained their influence in many aspects of their peoples’ eco-
nomic and social affairs. Patterns of deference and use of honorific
language in addressing the high chiefs set them apart. Ponape
social structure continued to legitimate leadership roles for the
persons holding chiefly titles, roles which also demanded their
neutrality in disputes and the abhorrence of favoritism of any kind.
The prominence of their titles and the commoner’s humility and
unpretentiousness counterindicated the establishment of any leg-
islature for Ponape in which the high chiefs were not granted a
prominent part. If proof were needed, it was conclusively supplied
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by the early attempts of the Americans to structure a unicameral
body, which saw mainly traditional leaders “elected” to the tenta-
tive Ponape legislature that never was authorized to assemble.
The Provisional Congress which was called “to act as constitu-
tional assembly to express the desires of the people regarding
self-government” met at Kolonia in March of 1951.4 By ballot it de-
cided upon a bicameral congress, with each of Ponape’s five wehis
represented by five title-holders in the Nobles’ House. Four of each
wehis’ highest titles—nanmarki, wasai, naniken, and nalaim—auto-
matically became members, and the nanmarki and naniken were
directed jointly to appoint for their respective wehi one high ranking
leader outside their lines. All four of the named high chiefs of each
wehi were declared ineligible for election to the People’s House,
a disqualification not applying to the fifth title-holder, other than
that he could not concurrently hold seats in both houses.
From 1951 to 1958 the high ranking chiefs of Ponape Island
attended the semi-annual meetings of this congress and at first
introduced a major share of the resolutions enacted. In the 1951
session, before the charter was officially ratified, it was mainly
the joint resolutions originating in the Nobles’ House which were
adopted. At the time, the district administrator noted that “this
does not indicate necessarily that the chiefs … forced their deci-
sions on the People’s representatives; rather that the resolutions
of the chiefs were in most cases more explicit and thorough.”5
At the May 1952 meeting of the congress, there were nineteen
joint resolutions in all; of these the nobles had sponsored thirteen,
and twelve of their resolutions were approved. Only three which
had been proposed from the People’s House similarly succeeded
of passage. The high commissioner expressed the hope that “this
unbalanced ratio does not imply a feeling of subservience by the
People’s House in its relations to the Congress.” The district ad-
ministrator replied that the natural preponderance enjoyed by the
resolutions of the Nobles’ House “reflected basic Ponapean atti-
tudes. Most Ponapeans still acknowledge the higher titles as their
‘true’ leaders and spokesmen even when as usually happens, these
respond to the pressure of public opinion…. the more responsible
and influential Ponapean leaders today hold high positions in the
traditional system and derive much status from this fact…. The
predominance can thus be attributed in part to a higher average
4 Quoted in Sandelmann, op. cit., p. 73.
5 Ibid, p. 76.
125
level of political skill and in part to a feeling of confidence derived
from social superiority according to native custom.”6
As the work of the Ponape Island Congress expanded, the
potential threat to their status which the Ponapean high titled
chiefs saw in the legislature markedly diminished, and many of
them no longer wanted to continue taking part in the new body.
Membership required them to stand up and state a positive po-
sition in a manner to which they were unaccustomed. Most,
having an inadequate command of English, found it difficult to
deal with the business put before them in that language and
awkward to have to depend upon the services of an interpreter.
They were not prepared to resolve the problems brought to the
new congress and were more than willing to allow the younger
educated Ponapeans to tackle them, just so long as traditional
rights and relations were sustained. The chiefs’ dominant role
in shaping the product of the congress began to wane, and
their numbers attending the semi-annual sessions commenced
to thin. A report of the meeting held in December, 1953, refers
to disagreements between the two houses over availability of
guns and taxing of kerosene. At the November 1956 meeting,
only three nanmarkis and one naniken answered the roll call
of the Nobles’ House. Of the upper house’s three resolutions,
only one was adopted by both houses and became a resolution
of the congress; the People’s House introduced six, of which
four received congressional approval. In addition, the Nobles’
House could not obtain concurrence of the other chamber to
two of the joint resolutions advanced by the Agenda Commit-
tee. With the rise of a new political elite, trained to deal with
the American administration, the high-ranking chiefs were will-
ing to relinquish their ex officio places in the congress and let
those of their number who wished to remain in the legislative
halls run for office like any commoner. Paraphrasing the words
of the high commissioner, the initiative to establish a unicam-
eral legislature, abolishing the hereditary house, “had come
from the hereditary nobles themselves.”7
The new charter granted in 1958 for a district-wide legislature
omits all reference to the chiefs. Persons with high titles, or in
line for them, have since been elected to the congress, but they
have been a minority and have received no privileged treatment.
6 Exchanged between HiCom and DistAd Ponape, quoted in ibid., p. 78.
7 TCOR, 22d Sess., 894th meeting, June 16, 1958, par. 42.
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In deference to the Outer Islands representatives, the “common
language” is used. The personal discomfort of the Ponapean com-
moner in not addressing the chiefs in the traditional “nobles’
language” is revealed by the non-titled members’ jokes about it
among themselves after the session. Almost everyone acknowl-
edges that, on issues involving basic tradition, the Ponapean rank-
ing chiefs can still muster enough support to effect the outcome
of the congressional decision through reasoning with legislators
from their wehi or by conferring honorary titles which would place
the legislators under obligation. For the bulk of the matters before
the congress, the high ranking chiefs have withdrawn from institu-
tionalized participation.
THE PALAU CHIEFS—WITHERING AWAY8
The village constituted the original political unit of Palau and
was traditionally ruled by a klobak of ten or more heads of the
ranking clans. The highest ranking member served as village chief
and was assisted as well as circumscribed by the klobak. The
klobak planned the economic activities of the village, directed
its affairs, and apprehended and punished lawbreakers. Five to
ten villages were loosely joined to comprise a district, which had
its paramount chief and district klobak. Position in the latter
was determined by ranking clan status within the larger unit, so
that some villages had no representation and the head of a low
ranking clan might have little standing within a district klobak
but appreciable power in his own village klobak. The district
klobak concerned itself with warfare, maintenance of peace and
order within the district, interdistrict exchanges, land disputes,
breaches of custom, and other subjects of importance which de-
fied village solution. The whole of Palau was divided into rival
district confederations; the main outlines and chiefly positions of
the Koror and Melekeok Confederations existing on the coming
8 For publications treating the Palauan chiefly system, see Robert
Kellogg McKnight, “Competition in Palau” (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State Uni-
versity: 1960); Roland W. Force, Leadership and Cultural Change in
Palau, Fieldiana: Anthropology, Vol. 50 (Chicago: Chicago Natural History
Museum, 1960); Arthur J. Vidich, “The Political Impact of Colonial Ad-
ministration” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: 1952); Arthur J. Vidich,
Political Factionalism in Palau, CIMA Final Report No. 23 (Washington: Of-
fice of Naval Research, 1949); John Useem, Report on Palau, CIMA Final
Report No. 21 (Washington: Office of Naval Research, 1949); John Useem,
“The Changing Structure of a Micronesian Society,” American Anthropolo-
gist, 47:4 (Oct.-Dec., 1945), 567.
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of the Spaniards were crystallized by the administering country’s
prohibition of warfare as well as other practices such as blolobo
(institutionalized concubinage) which had facilitated adjustment
of political ties. At this time the paramount chiefs of Koror and
Melekeok, the two highest districts, were supreme not alone in
their own districts but also in their respective confederations. To-
day the Reklai (Melekeok) and Ibidul (Koror) continue to be the
loci of greatest traditional power in Palau.
The status of a Palauan chief was associated with claims he
could make on others and was subject to demands to which he
had to respond. Obedience to legitimate orders, deference, gifts
and service, and the right to arbitrate personal relationships were
his, but he was also required to perform his political role in a pre-
scribed manner, make contributions commensurate with his rank
in the social hierarchy, and accept responsibility for the acts of
the members of his political unit against persons of other units.
These rights, duties, and obligations were balanced in such a
way as to minimize conflict between chiefs and others of repute
in the traditional society. Excesses of the chiefs were counter-
checked by religious dignitaries. As a similar check, the clans
were sub-grouped in consecutive pairs in opposition to each other,
and villages and districts correspondingly vied for social ranking
and political power. No chief could act without consultation and
consensus of the other title-holders. Overall, a conception of reci-
procity supplied a regulating principle for the exchange of gifts,
economic goods, and services.
The introduction of Christianity by the Spaniards elimi-
nated the shamans and removed one of the institutionalized
forces opposing chiefly power as well as foreclosed the possi-
bility of a low ranking rubak (male head of a kinship group)
invoking religious sanctions against higher-ranking persons
abusing their prerogatives. With political alliances no longer
variable, the chiefs found their positions more secure but,
at the same time, dependent upon cooperation with the for-
eign administrators. The role of paramount district chiefs changed
from a symbolic to a functional one, and their theoretical powers
as group heads became actual as the administrators of the
Western governments assumed they commanded the right to
execute freely the prerogatives of their office. The status of
chief was also modified, because lineage no longer solely de-
cided succession and the administering personnel removed
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recalcitrant chiefs or placed in chiefly position persons more
competent to deal with the problems of introduced govern-
ment, regardless of their right under tradition to the title.
Gradually the chiefs’ political power became contingent on the
colonial administration, and by the end of the Japanese period
they were virtually stripped of all initiating functions and had be-
come almost puppet-like figures. In the chiefs’ place rose a whole
new class of indigenes who derived power and position in the
Palauan society through their direct association with the Japanese
administration. Supplanting the district klobak in political impor-
tance was the rubekul, oriented toward dealing with the foreigner
and composed of village chiefs and others with ascribed or at-
tained status appropriate to the new duties of local government.
When the Americans came to Palau during World War II, they
followed the dictum that respect for channels of indigenous au-
thority would encourage a maximum degree of social control
from within the native system. However they misconstrued this
policy of indirect rule as restoring the chiefs to their former
station but possessed of powers as now seen through Western
eyes. Later, when there was an all-Palau government under
indigenous direction—something which had never existed in pre-
contact days—with chiefs in the highest posts and no longer
counterbalanced by the checks of the former system, the tra-
ditional leaders gained a more important position than ever
before. But many factors contributed to the erosion of the
chiefs’ position in the executive branch of this Palau central
government and their ever narrowing role in the Palau district
legislature: the chiefs’ remaining base of “traditional” power
was inadequate to sustain their new-found status; they demon-
strated inability to cope with their expanded jurisdiction; there
was a competing body of Palauans with skills which better fitted
them for staffing and running a Palauan district government;
and there was a basic incompatibility between American demo-
cratic concepts of free choice of political leaders and the rigid
Palauan class distinctions supporting the chiefs.
The District Order establishing the first congress which met
in Palau from 1947 to 1955 contains no reference to the two
high chiefs or the paramount chiefs of the districts, but from the
first they were afforded a place in the congressional chamber.
With the granting of the new charter in 1955, they were declared
full members of the Olbiil era Kelulau (Palau Congress), enjoying
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all powers other than voting on “resolutions” destined to become
laws. According to Palau’s third charter of 1963, the chiefs con-
tinue in the Palau legislature but are now stripped of all voting
power and also are ineligible to hold office in the unicameral body.
Commentators on the Palauan scene claim that the chiefs were re-
tained in the new legislature because their status would benefit
the legislative branch in its challenge of the executive and because
some still have the ability to sway the vote of the older people in
the legislative elections, especially on Babelthuap.
On the occasion of the first session of the Olbiil era Kelulau, the
assistant district administrator addressed the members concern-
ing salaries for the high chiefs:
At the time the war ended the Palau Islands were in a particularly des-
perate and disorganized condition. The Navy administration, recognizing
the leadership and the responsibility of the High Chiefs Reklai and Ibedul
for the people of Palau, placed them on the government payroll as admin-
istrative advisors. This decision was based on two facts: the recognized
need of the Palau people for a focus for their loyalty and the fact that
the people of Palau had no organized government of their own and no
source of revenue with which to maintain these two chiefs. For this rea-
son the government has continued to maintain the salaries of these two
men, an expenditure which it considers to be only a token recognition of
their great value to the Trust Territory. Now that the Olbiil era Kelulau,
representing the people of the Palau District, will have revenues at its
disposal, it seems only logical that they would desire to assume the re-
sponsibility of compensating these two leaders. If the Olbiil era Kelulau
should determine that it has no responsibility for or to these High Chiefs,
the government does not propose at this time to drop either man from its
payroll. However, such a response on behalf of the Palauan people will
undoubtedly be noted.9
The congress replied by voting each of the high chiefs $15.00 a
month, the same amount provided its president. When the latter’s
stipend was increased in 1957, the high chiefs’ monthly allotments
were raised to $20.00. By 1961 all this was reversed, and by 1963,
each chief, including the two high chiefs, was receiving only a
token payment, semi-annually, of $5.00 for the legislative session.
Equal, as distinguished from extraordinary, provision for the chiefs
is now the rule, so that for fiscal year 1968, legislators and chiefs re-
ceived identical per diem payments for attending sessions.
The precise quantum of power still retained by the chiefs in
9 Minutes of Ninth Session of Palau Legislature, April, 1955.
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the Palauan legislature is difficult to ascertain. Early in its history,
congressmen who presumed to speak out without the approval of
the high chiefs were reprimanded by them. Roland Force supplies
several illustrations of traditional leaders’ controlling the actions
of the congress to maintain the status quo,10 and the legislative
records yield other evidence of their views’ setting the legisla-
ture’s position.11 It is certain that the chiefs are still consulted on
matters affecting Palauan custom, and congressmen report being
dissuaded by the high chiefs from sponsoring legislation to elim-
inate specific traditional exchange and contribution obligations
found vexing by the younger adults in modern-day Palau. But the
chiefs do not necessarily present an undivided front. Coulter notes
that the High Chief Ibedul in the mid-1950’s was “eager to push
innovations economically, socially, and politically, while Reklai …
[was] conservative, and … [wished] to retain as many native cus-
toms as he … [could].”12
The chiefs sit to the side of the legislative chamber, chewing
betel-nut, sometimes falling asleep as old men will, and many
seemingly not understanding much of what is transpiring on the
floor. Some take little part in floor debate; others are more aggres-
sive. All of this is a little misleading, for before anything is brought
to the legislature, in one way or another the high chiefs and some
of the paramount chiefs are informed. Should there be objection,
they do not hesitate to declare their views to the elected members,
frequently outside the chamber, and in this way influence action
on the floor. If the two high chiefs are in accord, the paramount
chiefs normally follow their cue, and their combined opposition
materially helps to shape the legislative outcome. Theirs remains
a negating power, generally sufficient to delay if not defeat a mea-
sure when they are united, but the initiative has passed to the
elected members more conversant with the activities of the gov-
ernment introduced by the Americans. It is thought to be only a
matter of time before the chiefs’ station as arbiters of Palauan tra-
ditional ways will wither to the point where they will no longer sit
in the legislative halls as a matter of right.
10 Force, Leadership …, op. cit., pp. 118–119.
11 See, for example, opposition of chiefs, at the spring, 1956, session of the
Olbiil era Kelulau, to reinstituting kabekel (war canoe) races.
12 John W. Coulter, The Pacific Dependencies of the United States (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 205.
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MARSHALL ISLANDS—THE CHIEFS TRIUMPHANT13
In the Marshalls, traditional leadership is tied with matri-
lineages and intimately bound to landed tenure, and each bwij
(lineage) of kajur (commoners) is led by an alab (senior head). At
the base of the socio-political-economic pyramid are the kajur on
the land, sharing inherited usufruct rights; at the top are the iroij,
a noble class which receives the benefits of controlled worker pro-
duction. The very apex is occupied by the paramount chief (iroij
laplap or iroij elap), the ranking member of the senior ruling lin-
eage, who traditionally owned all land and all chattels real within
his jurisdiction. Above the kajur and close to the iroij were lin-
eages with bwirak rank, regarded as an upper class without right
of succession to the iroij laplap, and the jib (“fringes of nobility”)
held a place between bwirak and kajur. One or more atolls might
fall under the control of a single iroij laplap, while other atolls
were divided among a number of them. Succession usually was
hereditary, and in pre-European times warfare served to transfer
jurisdiction between rival iroij.
In the person of the iroij laplap resided the sacred doctrine of
the stars, sea, medicine, and magic, and when he had assistants
to whom he delegated part of this responsibility, their knowledge
was sanctified as a corollary of his. Formerly, the iroij were served
by the kajur, receiving food, manufactures, water conveyance, and
military assistance. In turn the iroij reciprocated by furnishing re-
lief to victims of natural disasters and maintaining inter-familial
order. Buttressed by their supernatural powers, the iroij laplap
could exact absolute obedience from their subjects under penalty
of death and were the recipients of tribute, in the Radak (eastern)
chain gathered by the iroij erik (sub-chiefs of the noble class).14
13 For Marshall Islands, see Jack A. Tobin, Land Tenure in the Marshall
Islands, Atoll Research Bulletin No. 11 (Washington: Pacific Science Board, Na-
tional Research Council, rev. 1956), also published in Land Tenure Patterns, Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands (Guam, M.I.: office of the High Commissioner,
1958), pp. 1–76; Alexander Spoehr, Majuro, A Village in the Marshall Islands, Fiel-
diana: Anthropology, Vol. 39 (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum, 1949);
Maragaret E. Chave, Anthropological Study of Mixed Bloods in Majuro, CIMA Fi-
nal Report No. 7 (Honolulu: 1949); Leonard E. Mason, Anthropology—Geography
Study of Arno Atoll, Atoll Research Bulletin No. 10 (Washington: Pacific Science
Board, National Research Council, 1952); Leonard E. Mason, The Economic Or-
ganization of the Marshall Islanders, USCC Economic Survey No. 9 (Honolulu:
1947).
14 “In the days before any of the foreign administrations came to the
Marshalls, the term iroij erik referred only to those directly in line to suc-
ceed to the position of iroij lablab, whereas the Japanese very definitely
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German administration put an end to warfare, freezing the
territorial positions of the iroij, which added a new note of inflexi-
bility to the social system. Since Western contact, the iroij have
slowly been superseded, and though the Germans governed
through the iroij, the Japanese administration was conducted in
a manner designed to undermine the indigenous political system.
With the development of the copra industry during the German pe-
riod, tribute to the iroij was converted very largely into a share of
the copra production, which was collected for their benefit. Japan-
ese recognition of the kajur as owner of the trees and possessor
of legal usufruct rights was antithetical to the concept of absolute
iroij ownership of land. By World War II it had been determined
that the iroij laplap, in dealing with kajur usage of land, no longer
possessed arbitrary powers and had to act with an honest regard
for the welfare of their people. This, coupled with the supplant-
ing of the iroij as supreme authorities within a feudal order, led to
a deterioration of the political status of the iroij laplap, although
they retained much of their prestigeful place in the Marshallese
social organization.
Today, two major social classes continue to be recognized, the
iroij and the kajur, with the bwirak blurring into the iroij and the
jib into the commoner. As an added factor, some of the persons
classed as iroij laplap are considered to be of “tainted” blood be-
cause of descent from inter-class marriage by kajur and iroij. A
century ago “iroij laplap” meant the “ruling chief … who had to
have royal blood on both sides of his family. The term as applied
today is that they have some royal blood, either from mother or
father but inherit the large lands of the iroij laplap.”15
In the Marshalls, unlike in other districts, the Americans did
not deliberately structure government around the local chiefs. The
reason for this distinctive treatment probably lies in the Ameri-
can armed forces’ early entry into this area and their finding that
if the political jurisdiction of the iroij were restored, it would not
be coterminous with viable units of local government. The iroij
applied the term both to people who had come to be known as iroij in tel
(that is, royal collectors) and to leatoktok (title of the old-time head of the
commoners, and advisors, but not of royal blood) and to others who were
allowed to exercise similar powers but had no iroij blood.” Kumtak Jatios v.
L. Levi et al, Civil Action No. 1, Appellate Division of High Court, Trust Ter-
ritory of Pacific Islands, decided Aug. 10, 1954, pp. 2, 3.
15 Memo Acting DistAd Marshalls to HiCom, Oct. 17, 1960. The accuracy
of this generalization as applied to both the Radak and Ralik Island chains has
been challenged.
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laplap were therefore regarded as social, not as political, figures.
Just like other Marshallese, they were eligible to election by se-
cret ballot as atoll magistrates and, in addition, had seats and
voting privileges on the atoll councils, “but the influence of the
iroij varies from one area to the other dependent on the attitude
of the people, the personality of the iroij concerned, etc.” It was
declared the policy of the administration that “in the final analysis
it is incumbent upon the people themselves to operate the munic-
ipal councils properly and to defer to iroij or not, as the case may
be.”16 Only on Ujelang, after the people from Eniwetok atoll were
moved there to permit atomic testing on their ancestral home, did
their two iroij laplap as a matter of hereditary right continue serv-
ing as joint magistrates.
In contrast to practices under the Japanese period, the Ameri-
cans did not standardize the share of the copra proceeds to be paid
the iroij; the amount they received in some atolls became a matter
of voluntary agreement between iroij, alab, and dri jerbal (worker),
much to the chagrin of the iroij. Concomitantly, the accountability
of the iroij for medical expenses, as a modification of part of their
traditional obligation for care of their people, commenced to be ig-
nored by the iroij. The American administration held the position
that the Marshallese people were becoming dissatisfied with the tra-
ditional iroij relationships and that its role was to protect all the
Marshallese people by allowing free decisions to be reached on the
iroij status.17 To the iroij, it appeared that the Americans were en-
couraging the operation of the municipal councils to “destroy iroijs’
wills and rights or take over iroijs’ concerns.”18
An element important to all of Micronesia has been the
interposition of a new set of criteria which lies outside the tra-
ditional class systems. Medical practitioners, school teachers,
pastors, and persons with knowledge of Western commerce, all
English-speakers, have achieved a status from their skills and
insight which competes with that derived from the old system.
Spoehr in 1950 found that “in the sphere of local politics, how-
ever, formal training does not exist, nor have new standards for
16 Memo CivAd Marshalls to HiCom, Aug. 29, 1950.
17 See comments of HiCom, quoted in Dorothy E. Richard, U.S. Naval Adminis-
tration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, 1957), III, 1084.
18 From a petition to 1950 UN Visiting Mission against actions of atoll
councils, signed by eighteen “iroij.” Visiting Mission Report 1951, Annex 1, p.
21 (T/Pet. 10/7).
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judging competence developed in comparable fashion. As a result,
the tendency to look to the nobility for leadership is most appar-
ent … in the political field.”19 Limited in context to Majuro, this
evaluation could have been applied broadside to the whole Mar-
shalls. Since the children of leaders with ascribed status have also
become members of the new professions, a sharp schism over po-
litical leadership has not developed between the two groups as the
result of Westernized training.
In 1949, the Administering Authority called a meeting of iroij
laplap, following an all-Marshalls’ conference of magistrates and
scribes. Of the twenty iroij who appeared, five had attended the
magistrates’ conference. At this first gathering of iroij, the civil
administrator for the Marshalls laid before them the plans for a
bicameral district-wide legislature with one house composed of
hereditary paramount chiefs. By the creation of a separate cham-
ber for the iroij, the administration was both indicating its “desire
to support worthwhile indigenous customs”20 and proposing to
mobilize iroij active cooperation. In turn, the iroij were “alerted
to the latent outlook of a new dawn for their class [with estab-
lishment of the House of Iroij]…. The institutionalization of their
privileged status … injected into their group fresh vigor to re-
sist the process of internal weakening and timely extinction. They
recognize[d] in democratic practices and principles of the West ef-
ficient tools for the defense of their class interests.”21
The original “constitution” of the Marshall Islands Congress
declared the House of Iroij was to be composed “of all persons
holding the position of paramount chief in accordance with the
traditions, usages, and customs of the Marshallese people. The
successor to a deceased or incapacitated paramount chief, rec-
ognized as that chief’s proper and legal successor in accordance
with Marshallese custom and tradition … [was to] automatically
succeed to his predecessor’s seat in the House of Iroij. In case
of conflicting claims to paramount chieftainship, the Congress …
[was to] establish procedure for investigating the claims and for
approving the proper succession” (Art. II, Sec. 2).
In operation, much of this language was superfluous. The con-
gress was not called upon to resolve disputes, for almost anyone
with reputed claim who presented himself was allowed to sit as
19 Spoehr, op. cit., p. 94.
20 See comments of HiCom, quoted in Richard, op. cit.
21 Sandelmann, op. cit., p. 109.
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an iroij or as his representative. The kajur did nothing to correct
this, according to an informant, “because the old traditions are
involved and hold them back from taking necessary measures to
stop it.” The indeterminant composition of the House of Iroij was
revealed at its very first meeting in 1950, when only eight of the
twenty persons22 who attended had also been present at the previ-
ous 1949 Conference of Iroij. The following year the total number
in the House of Iroij increased to thirty-one, and thereafter it
fluctuated between eighteen and twenty-eight members. At the
1956 session of the Marshallese congress, for example, fifteen iroij
laplap, seven iroij erik, and six others without acknowledged sta-
tus comprised the membership of the House of Iroij. In all, some
sixty-seven different individuals participated in the eight meetings
of the House of Iroij held between 1950 and 1958, after which a
new charter creating a unicameral legislature was granted.
From the initial session of the Marshall Islands Congress, the
respective rights and obligations of iroij, alabs, and dri jerbals
(workers) regarding land were heatedly debated without any
definitive resolution. The iroij laplap declaimed unequivocally that
as of right they owned all the land, a claim which was sustained
by a small percentage of older kajur; the majority of kajur, young
and old, disagreed, stating that land was held in common. Year af-
ter year the congress adopted resolutions general to the point of
ambiguity calling for respect of Marshallese customs, proper us-
age of land, and mutual satisfaction in the distribution of copra
shares. The administration was of the opinion that many of these
resolutions were forced through the congress by the iroij efforts
to retrieve some of their waning power. Declarations on the own-
ership of land assumed particular importance in light of the Mar-
shallese demands for sizeable payments by the United States for
land and improvements damaged or occupied on various atolls.
This litigation contributed to the reluctance of all parties to force
the issue to decision. At no time did the kajur seek to eliminate
the rights of the minority iroij, for the Marshallese processes of
compromise and adjustment do not lend themselves to any such
abrupt break with custom. Rather, maneuvering continued around
the phrasing of resolutions before the congress, with charges and
counter-charges of changing the terminology of measures on their
22 The Administering Authority apparently thought the upper house of the
Marshall Islands Congress would be composed of fifteen iroij. TCOR, 5th Sess.,
17th meeting, July 11, 1949, p. 206.
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drafting after passage, and even allegations of resolutions’ disap-
pearing from the final legislative record. Meanwhile, a deference
to the iroij laplap remained, and many of the kajur continued to
look to the iroij for leadership. One of the manifestations of this
was the Marshallese refusal, under the instigation of the iroij, to
accept the settlements for their land claims offered by the Ad-
ministering Authority. This united position helped to hold iroij and
kajur together until sizeably larger payments were forthcoming.
The high commissioner was adamant that the Marshallese con-
gress be changed to a unicameral form. He was convinced that
the House of Iroij succeeded in stopping resolutions sponsored by
the House of Commoners and that its members would then turn
around and, as iroij, ask for things to their own interest, so that
the congress was not expressing the views of the Marshallese.
As early as 1956, when amendments to the original charter were
adopted, the high commissioner noted “that the entire original
charter of the Congress needs careful examination for possible
revision.”23 The iroij were not opposed to this, possibly because
they foresaw that the mere form of the congress did not neces-
sarily foreclose the weight of their traditional position. The staff
of the high commissioner submitted a wholly new charter for the
examination of the Marshallese Holdover Committee in the spring
of 1958. The committee accepted it almost verbatim, including
the provisions converting the congress into a unicameral body
and allowing only “rightful iroij” to sit in the congress, but unani-
mously objected to denial of voting privileges to the iroij members.
The high commissioner strongly opposed granting lifetime mem-
bership with full voting rights to the iroij laplap, as he did not
consider that in concert with the ideals of democracy. At his insti-
gation another meeting of the Holdover Committee was called to
reconsider its decision, and a compromise was reached.
The charter draft submitted to the Marshallese congress for
adoption followed the Palau model in that it did not grant the iroij
voting rights on resolutions. But to protect them, the charter also
declared that “matters affecting customary rights on land tenure,
or land rights, as between Iroij, Alab, and Dri Jerbal” were out-
side the law-making power of the congress, and disputes thereon
were “to be the province of the High Court only” (Art. VI, Sec. 1).
A two-day floor fight ensued at the 1958 session, with the assis-
23 Letter HiCom to Acting DistAd Marshalls, Nov. 21, 1956.
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tant district administrator addressing the congress in support of
the modified draft and using as arguments the advantages of Terri-
tory-wide uniformity, the necessity of compliance with the United
Nations’ demand for elected representation, and the democratic
government to be gained through reducing the chiefs’ role in all
districts to one of advice and consultation. The Marshallese con-
gress rejected the compromise, and the iroij emerged triumphant
with both full voting rights in the unicameral body and mainten-
ance of the compromise language preempting the law-making
powers of the new legislature in the whole area of customary
land rights. At best the administration could only take solace in
the potential of the unicameral form for minimizing the powers of
the iroij by permitting the iroij to be outvoted by the elected ka-
jur. A number of years earlier a commentator on the Marshallese
scene had concluded that, with the iroij once in the congress,
“any reform drive is doomed to failure that aims at the abolition
of the congressional House of Iroij and the reorganization of the
Marshallese Council as a unicameral body.”24 His prophecy was
erroneous as to structural change, but in terms of power relation-
ships, he proved more right than wrong.
The charter directed the new congress at its first session to
“determine by majority vote those who shall be admitted to mem-
bership as iroij laplap who shall retain membership for life” (Art.
II, Sec. 5). The district administration contemplated rigidly enforc-
ing the credentials clause “to see to it that only iroijs are certified
and not blooded members of their families….”25 Earlier it had been
anticipated that approximately thirteen would qualify, and against
this small number, “the elected membership will dominate.”26 The
high commissioner reported to the Trusteeship Council that the new
Marshallese charter would call for about 20 per cent representation
by hereditary chiefs and 80 per cent by elected congressmen. When
the unicameral body first met in 1960, there were some forty iroij
on the list for consideration! Selection of the iroij took a day and a
half, with the vote proceeding atoll by atoll. When it was completed,
nineteen iroij had been seated for life, and a novel principle for iden-
tifying iroij had been applied.
… some … are not Iroijlaplap in the strict sense of this hereditary
title; although all have the duties and responsibilities of an Iroijlaplap.
24 Sandelmann, op. cit., p. 109.
25 Memo Acting DistAd Marshalls to HiCom, Nov. 4, 1958.
26 Memo Acting DistAd Marshalls to HiCom, April 15, 1958.
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Each one has his or her own rights and can exercise such rights to ex-
ecute business and independently decide important matters relating to
land under that jurisdiction….
In other words, the term Iroijlaplap has been given a new meaning which
evolved out from long and hard debates in the Congress during the exam-
ination and certification of its permanent members. While I may disagree
with the decision of the Congress, in my position, I have no choice but to
be guided accordingly by the rule of the majority.27
The acting district administrator for the Marshalls concluded that
the claims of iroij had become so confused over time that, to dis-
qualify any of those seated, an anthropologist would have to make
a thorough study of the entire iroij clans.28 The administration ac-
ceded to the fait accompli.
A further embarrassment to the American administration was the
fact that the Marshall Islands Congress named the Administering Au-
thority as one of the iroij entitled to a seat. Lands on Majuro had long
been disputed by two rival groups of claimants.29 The administration
scrupulously refrained from interfering, and from the 1950 session of
the congress on, representatives of the opposing forces were seated
in the House of Iroij. The decision designating the Trust Territory
government as the iroij of the “twenty-twenty” group, one of the con-
testants, in effect eliminated any of the members of the group from the
new congress. This drew an indignant rejection from the high commis-
sioner, on the grounds that “the naming of the iroij laplap, if any, is for
the people concerned to accomplish within their local customs, if they
want such a title within their social organization.”30
The new charter envisioned the termination of the practice of
iroij representatives and supernumeraries’ sitting through the leg-
islative proceedings, and the congress was instructed that substi-
tutes could not serve for the iroij laplap. Notwithstanding, as
noted by the president of the congress, five of the iroij were not
personally in the first unicameral congress but present “by their
designated representatives…. It was within the scope of … [Mar-
shallese] customs that the Iroijlaplap having been absent could
logically be represented by their designated representatives. Such
27 Letter to Acting DistAd Marshalls from President of Marshall Islands Con-
gress, Oct. 12, 1960.
28 Memo Acting DistAd Marshalls to HiCom, Oct. 17, 1960.
29 See Jack A. Tobin, “An Investigation of the Socio-Political Schism on Majuro
Atoll,” Aug. 20, 1953 (University of Hawaii Sinclair Library); also see Spoehr, op. cit.,
pp. 84–91.
30 Message of HiCom, Aug. 17, 1960.
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representatives, however, must by custom be qualified to act with
full authority, and in this case, the Congress found all to be rightful
heirs to the rights and prerogatives of those who were represented.”
Beside these representatives “there were a few guests…. While
these people had the privilege of being heard and participating in
the discussions of matters, they were not allowed the right to vote.31
In sum total, the form of the Marshallese congress was changed
by the new charter, but the alignment of power remained undis-
turbed and the iroij class retained its vital role. Chosen as presi-
dent was an elected representative who was the son of an iroij and
leroij, had been a former member of the House of Iroij, and was
a recognized spokesman for the iroij. He was backed by the iroij
laplap seated at the congress and by “the older fellows from the
northern and western atolls [who] followed the iroij, rather than
voted of their own free will.”32 At the opening meeting of the uni-
cameral congress, of the twelve members elected to the important
Holdover Committee, two were iroij laplap, another two—the pres-
ident of the congress and an iroij erik—had formerly sat in the
House of Iroij, and at least three others were identified as men fa-
vorable to iroij interests. Thus the iroij faction had a clear majority
on this interim committee.
The iroij congressmen have continued to take an active interest
in the affairs of the legislature but, as a group, allow the elected
representatives to exercise the lead on matters which do not affect
Marshallese customs or land rights. Without recorded roll calls,
it is not possible to demonstrate pro-iroij, anti-iroij divisions on
measures brought to a vote, but the split between the factions
in the congress persists. The question of seating additional iroij
arose at the 1964 session of the congress; it was decided to defer
action until the traditional recognition of these persons as iroij
laplap had occurred and then to follow public opinion. The 1963
amendment to the Marshallese charter, cutting down the number
of the elected representatives, increased the relative strength of
the iroij in the congress. This change is diametrically opposite to
the withering away of iroij influence anticipated by the Adminis-
tering Authority when it first proposed a unicameral legislature
for the Marshalls. But all this only reflects the general attitude
of the Marshallese toward their iroij and the reluctance to break
openly with tradition for fear this may undermine landed tenures
31 Letter to Acting DistAd Marshalls from President…, op. cit.
32 Memo Acting DistAd Marshalls to HiCom, Oct. 4, 1960.
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and the security inherent in the continuation of the iroij institution.
At the 1965 elections to the Congress of Micronesia, of the Mar-
shalls’ six-member delegation, one was an iroij laplap, another an
iroij erik, and a third of iroij descent, the president elected at the
first session of the new Marshallese legislature—tacit evidence that
many Marshallese still look to their iroij for political leadership.
LAND AND TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP
In these three administrative districts the distinctive interplay
between the indigenous leadership and the legislative institution
introduced by the Americans prompts the search for an explana-
tion. Immediately significant, although not to be considered the
efficient cause for the difference, is that the levels of chiefly par-
ticipation in the district legislatures correlate positively with the
importance of the chiefs’ respective roles with relation to land.
In Ponape, half a century ago under the German administra-
tion, land reform gave the common people deed-holding title to
their lands. Certain traditional obligations to the nanmarki were
incorporated into these deeds, in effect continuing to recognize
Ponape’s stratified society, but the net result was to remove the
chiefs from effective control over use of the lands. At the same
time, the German government declared uncultivated lands not as-
signed to anyone as belonging to the district in which they were
located, and available for homesteading. The Japanese regarded
all lands not covered by individual title as government owned and
subject to government control. All of these modifications removed
the element of land from the feudal ties binding commoners to tra-
ditional leaders.33
Before Western contact, most of aboriginal Palau was divided
into clan lands, with the public domain in the interior of the is-
lands, the mangrove swamps, and the reefs controlled by the
village klobak (council) or, in a few cases, by the district klobak.
Village and district chiefs had claim to parts of the product from
clan lands. Lineages within each clan were assigned rights to
use land, under the control of their lineage heads, but the clan
retained ultimate title. At the turn of the century, land tenure
concepts began undergoing considerable change. By the Japanese
period, the traditional public domain was declared to be govern-
ment land. Individual land ownership concepts in Palau date back
33 John L. Fischer, “Contemporary Ponape Island Land Tenure,” in Land
Tenure Patterns…, op. cit., pp. 77–160.
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to the German times, and under the Japanese many clan and lin-
eage lands held in group ownership were divided and registered
as individually owned. However, the recognition of exclusive in-
dividual titles in contradistinction to the exercise of user rights
through the lineage or clan remains unclear, denoting the contin-
uing transitional status of Palauan land tenures.34
In the Marshalls, the concept of iroij complete ownership of the
land has only been modified to “one of joint ownership of land
rights with the chiefs possessing certain rights and the common-
ers possessing other rights in the land and holding these rights
as a member of a lineage in common with the other lineage mem-
bers.”35 “The system of land tenure and usufruct has not changed
drastically despite the acculturative forces of three different re-
gimes and the orientation toward a cash economy.”36
The intrinsic importance of land to the Micronesian cultures
suggests that the Marshallese iroij had far more to protect
through securing a place in the district legislature than did the
Ponapean traditional leaders. This logic is supported by Palau’s
position more intermediary in transition from indigenous to in-
troduced land tenure systems, and the Palauan traditional chiefs’
enjoying a comparable importance in their district legislature.
However, it is more accurate to regard the changes in land tenure
of the three districts as but symbolic of ongoing and far more com-
plex cultural modifications, in turn accompanied by alteration of
the districts’ indigenous political systems. In effect, with varian-
ces in land tenure went an erosion of the powers of the traditional
leaders. For those lacking the characteristics now necessary for
legitimating their presence in the new institutions having author-
ity to make definitive political decisions, it was but to be expected
that they would withdraw from the legislature.
34 Shigeru Kaneshiro, “Land Tenure in the Palau Islands,” in ibid, pp.
289–336.
35 Jack A. Tobin, op. cit., p. 7.
36 Ibid, p. 11.
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CHAPTER 6
The Ngobochei1—Negotiating
a New District Legislature
July, 1965
FM HICOMTERPAC SAIPAN
TO DISTAD YAP
UNCLAS X REUR MEMO JUNE 25 X HEADQUARTERS WILL AT-
TEMPT TO COVER ESTIMATED TRAVEL AND PER DIEM
EXPENSES FOR COMMITTEE TO FORM YAP DISTRICT–WIDE
LEGISLATURE X DR. NORMAN MELLER CMM PROF POL SCI
UH CMM AVAILABLE TO ATTEND AUGUST MEETING MEN-
TIONED YOUR MEMO IF HELD PRIOR AUGUST 21 X PLS
REPLY RETURN DISPATCH ON THREE QUESTIONS CLN
WHETHER POSSIBLE FOR WOLEAI MEMBER COME TO YAP IN
AUGUST CMM WHETHER COMMITTEE PLANS TO MEET IN
AUGUST CMM WHETHER COMMITTEE WISHES SERVICES DR.
MELLER …
July, 1965
FM DISTAD YAP
TO HICOMTERPAC SAIPAN
UNCLAS X REUR 200420Z X ABLE CMM WOLEAI DELEGATE
WILL BE IN YAP BY AUGUST 14 OR 15 X BAKER CMM COM-
MITTEE WILL SCHEDULE MEETING DURING WEEK OF 16 TO
20 AUGUST X CHARLIE CMM COMMITTEE WILL WELCOME
DR. MELLER ASSISTANCE X SUGGEST DR. MELLER ARRIVE
YAP 13 AUGUST AND PLAN DEPARTURE FOR GUAM 20 AU-
GUST
FOR ONE WEEK in the summer of 1965, the author played the
part of an honest broker, aiding the Administering Authority’s on-
going effort to establish a district-wide legislature for the Yap
administrative area. Ostensibly, indigene interest was premised
upon the desire to fall in line with the other five administrative dis-
tricts. In reality, and typical of all political maneuvering in the Yap
area, the exploratory talks were motivated by concealed drives for
power on the part of both entrenched and emergent leadership
groups, and the whole was clouded by mistrust and complicated
1 The word “Ngobochei” has two connotations: one is a know-nothing, intrud-
ing foreign meddler in local affairs; the other is the stranger in the Yapese midst
who is an intelligent guide in the management of Yapese affairs.
by the relatively primitive political forms and processes still ob-
served in the Outer Islands of the old Yap empire. All this stemmed
partially from the competition developing between persons identi-
fied with one or the other of two political institutions introduced
by the United States for the governance of the four adjoining high
islands of Yap, an area usually referred to collectively just as Yap,
the Yap Islands, or as Yap Islands proper. Another element was the
breaking away of the low islands to the east from their traditional
ties with Yap and the rise of Ulithi as a potential leading force in
the old Yap empire. Contributing were the disruptive influences
of education, disparate population growths, and the faster pace of
political change elsewhere in the Trust Territory which impinged
upon this most conservative portion of Micronesia. These factors
together comprised the backdrop for the negotiations, which in
turn became wholly meaningful only in light of traditional govern-
ment in the Yap region and its modification over time.
TRADITIONAL SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF YAP DISTRICT2
Both the peoples of Yap and those of the Ngek (eastern) is-
lands, which together constituted the old Yap empire, possessed
2 This portion is based upon a number of sources. When conflicts in content were en-
countered, the author attempted a reconciliation. William H. Alkire, “Cultural Adaption
in the Caroline Islands,” The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 69:1 (March, 1960), 123;
William H. Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll and Inter-Island Socioeconomic Ties, Illinois Studies
in Anthropology No. 5 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965); Edwin B. Burrows,
“From Value to Ethos on Ifaluk Atoll,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 8:1
(Spring, 1952), 13; Edwin G. Burrows and Melford E. Spiro, An Atoll Culture, Ethnogra-
phy of Ifaluk in the Central Carolines, CIMA Final Report Nos. 16 and 18 (New Haven:
Human Relations Area Files, 1953); Civil Affairs Handbook, West Caroline Islands
(Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1944); William A. Lessa, The
Ethnography of Ulithi Atoll, CIMA Final Report No. 28 (Los Angeles: University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles, 1950); William A. Lessa, “The Place of Ulithi in the Yap Empire,”
Human Organization, 9:1 (Spring, 1950), 16; William A. Lessa, “Ulithi and the Outer Na-
tive World,” American Anthropologist, 52:1 (Jan.–March, 1950), 27; William A. Lessa and
Marvin Spiegelman, Ulithian Personality as Seen Through Ethnological Materials and
Thematic Test Analysis, University of California Publications in Culture and Society, Vol.
2, No. 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), pp. 243–301; Micronesians of
Yap and Their Depopulation, CIMA Final Report No. 24 (Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Mu-
seum, Harvard University, 1949); Dorothy È. Richard, U.S. Naval Administration in the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Vol. Ill (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, 1957); Father Salesius, Die Karolinen-Insel Jap (Berlin: Wilhelm Susserot, circa
1906) [Human Relations Area Files translation]; John Sandelmann, Some Observations
on the Problem of “Self Government” in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Hon-
olulu: 1953); David M. Schneider, “The Kinship System and Village Organization of Yap,
West Caroline Islands, Micronesia” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: 1949); David M.
Schneider, “Political Organization, Supernatural Sanctions and the Punishment for In-
cest on Yap,” American Anthropologist, 59:5 (Oct., 1957), 791; Stanford University
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a unique social organization. The empire was a composite of kin-
ship system, class-caste hierarchy, and village-district organiza-
tion. The two geographical sub-regions were held together by
relationships that embodied political, religious, landlord-tenant,
and parent-child ties. In a number of ways and to varying degrees,
these bonds still play a significant part in shaping the form and
processes of local government in the Yap administrative district.
Traditional Yap recognized extraordinary class distinctions,
with each village originally belonging to one of nine social classes.
The four3 lowest classes comprised a serf caste, subordinate to
their masters in the higher classes which may have originally been
racially derived. The serf villages occupied land owned by families
in the high ranking villages, and theoretically a serf family could
be dispossessed if it failed to work and perform ceremonial ser-
vices for its master as required by tradition. In return, the masters
took a paternal interest in their serfs’ welfare, so that the relation-
ship resembled that of patron-dependent and was not synonymous
with slavery. The social freedom of the serfs was restricted in
many other ways to demonstrate their inferior status; for example,
they were prohibited to wear combs in their hair and had to move
out of the path of the free people. If exploitation occurred, a low
class family could establish a new tie with another high ranking
one. Class position was somewhat fluid, and ranking could change
depending upon success at war and political maneuvering. A de-
gree of cross-class marriage was permitted, but within a limited
range, and rarely between upper and lower castes. A low caste vil-
lage and its people always retained that status, although it might
shift its attachment to a different high caste village. Unlike in the
Western world where class position is correlated with levels of liv-
ing, birth rates, infant mortality, life expectancy, and comparable
other distinctive features, none of these relationships hold for Yap;
it is in the exercise of power and the rights to special privilege that
the two castes have differed.
School of Naval Administration, Handbook of the Trust Territory (Washington: Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1948); John Useem, Report on Yap and Palau, USCC
Economic Survey No. 6 (Honolulu: 1946); John Useem, “Human Resources of Microne-
sia,” Far Eastern Survey, 17:1 (Jan. 14, 1948), 1; Tadao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands Under
Japanese Mandate (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1939).
3 Some sources refer to a total of eight classes and to the milingai people
(serfs) as consisting of but three classes; the Japanese tried to compress all
classes into five, with the nobles as the highest, the serfs as the lowest, and three
intermediate commoner classes.
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A village was composed of a number of clans, each clan having
up to ten households and ranked according to prestige. Men were
divided into as many as six ranks within each village, primarily ac-
cording to age, with the two highest of these ranks distinguished
by ownership of certain status-giving land and thus attainable only
in noble villages. The chief of each village (pilung ko binau) usually
held his position by virtue of his identification with a particular
plot of land which afforded chiefly powers to its owner. Low caste
villages were organized in the same way as higher caste ones, with
their village chiefs and lesser chiefs, village councils, magicians,
and sacred places. Villages in turn were grouped into districts for
political and defense purposes.
In principle, the chieftainship of a village was hereditary,
probably originally passing through the female line of the high-
est ranking clan, but over time this was modified also to permit
patrilineal succession, most commonly from father to son. The
chief was afforded symbolic deference and enjoyed a well-
defined role in village ceremonial life, but he had no great
supervisory power except in consort with the secondary chiefs
or all of the clan heads in council. However, the chief’s orders
once given were absolute, and the self-discipline of the village
assured compliance.
During the Japanese period, the village chief’s authority was
greatly restricted, and since then major matters have had to be re-
ferred to district chiefs or to representatives of the Administering
Authority. District chiefs (pilung ko nug) may come from only the
two highest classes and traditionally have had high prestige. In an-
cestral times the responsibilities of the district chief ranged from
communal matters, such as conducting war, to the details of family
affairs. Much of this authority remains today, and the district chief
continues to direct public policy and oversee the administration of
village chiefs. Because foreigners have regarded the district chiefs
as possessors of unqualified powers, they have attempted to gov-
ern Yap through the chiefs and have thereby enhanced the district
chief’s authority.
Yap has known no high degree of political integration. In an-
cient times Yap was divided into three districts, each of which
was of equal rank. The Germans regrouped the villages into nine
districts or falak, a name which apparently represents a Yapese
corruption of the German flagge, or flag. Under the Japanese, the
districts were increased to ten, under the direction of eight district
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chiefs, and their number some time later was expanded to ten.
These geographical groupings were established for the adminis-
trative convenience of the metropolitan nations, and the Yapese
continued to recognize the domination of certain districts over
others. Nevertheless, the districting served to establish new socio-
political groupings, which are today treated as almost endemic to
Yapese society.
The Yapese people are independent, anything but obse-
quious, unaggressive in relations with strangers, and among
themselves critical of the boastful, presumptuous, and preten-
tious. They have neither awe of the government official nor
uncritical admiration of his culture. Early American adminis-
trators were convinced that the Yapese wanted neither modern
commerce nor education. When other administrative districts
started leveling municipal taxes, the Yapese refused to follow
suit and for a while adopted an attitude of almost passive re-
sistance. Forewarned by the Japanese experience, when the
Yapese seemed to delight in resisting imposed innovations,
including those patently intended for their benefit, American
administrators patiently allowed time for this to work itself
out. No Yapese, whether under the Germans, Japanese, or the
Americans, has accepted “the promise that his destiny is to
be directed by a foreign agency, either within Yap, or outside
of Yap.”4 Although the Yapese have acquired a reputation for
ultra-conservatism and do not lightly alter their basic patterns
of living, they have shown themselves to be “eager for develop-
ment and progress in political organization and in other fields
as well, provided it is accomplished at a pace and in a manner
of their own choosing.”5 They adopt and adapt as best calcu-
lated to preserve the Yapese identity.
Two of the districts of Yap (see map p. 233) exercised suze-
rainty over the low islands of the old Yap empire, which stretch
some seven hundred miles to the east. With the exception of the
small atoll of Ngulu (present population about forty-five), which
was a satellite of Galiman (Gurror) district, all of these islands
owed allegiance to Gagil, and through the island of Ulithi as an
intermediary, practically all were identified with the clans of two
villages in this Yapese district. Ulithi played the key role in the
4 Quoted in Sandelmann, op. cit., p. 92.
5 Annual Report of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the
Interior, 1958, p. 29.
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political, landowning-kin, magic-religious ties which held the em-
pire together. While it was subordinate to Yap, it was superior to
“Woleai,” the designation by which all islands to the east of Ulithi,
including the atoll of Woleai, are collectively known to the Yapese
and Ulithians.
Orders from the paramount chief of Gagil traveled east
along a single communication channel: first to the paramount
chief of Mogmog on Ulithi atoll, and then at his direction to
other islands on Ulithi and externally to Fais and Sorol and
also to the Woleai atoll. From Woleai the orders were next re-
layed to Eauripik, Faraulep, and Ifalik, which passed them on
to Lamotrek, which in turn forwarded them to Elato and Sa-
tawal. Satawal then transmitted them to Puluwat, which finally
sent them to Namonuito, Pulap, and Pulusuk. (These three is-
lands and Puluwat are now administered as part of the Truk
district.) This communication order was scrupulously observed,
and for their part, the chiefs of the islands east of Ulithi
never consulted directly with Gagil, but only through Ulithi.
Ulithi derived its political power and prestige from being the
intermediary between Yap and Woleai, and it relayed orders
and irregularly collected tribute (piteglitamol) as the agent of
the paramount chief in Gagil. Reflective of this, succession
to the paramount chieftainship of Ulithi required formal ap-
proval from Yap. The chain of communication also identified
the respective super-subordinate relationship between the is-
lands of the old Yap empire. Within each island, administration
proceeded completely independently, so that only nominal au-
thority was actually possessed by an off-island superior.
Some of the upper caste clans of Gagil were considered owners
of the lands on the islands to the east and, because of this, occu-
pied the relation of “parents” to their Outer Island “children.” Out
of these ties there developed a system of periodic sawei (gift) ex-
changes, with the “children” clans from “Woleai” sending presents
to Ulithi and then fleets of canoes from that atoll bringing them to
Yap and returning with as many if not more gifts, which were then
distributed on Ulithi and islands to the east. Should an Outer Is-
lander visit Yap, these same relationships assured him treatment
like a child of a specific clan, and any Yapese “parent” would re-
ceive corresponding care from his adult “child” if he were to travel
to the Outer Islands. As “parents,” the Gagil clans fed, clothed,
and sheltered their “children,” supervised their actions, and gave
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them parting gifts when they left for home; the Outer Islanders
in turn owed filial respect and obedience. Ulithi enjoyed a simi-
lar sawei relationship with “Woleai,” so that the clans of the latter
were “children” of “parents” both on Ulithi and Yap.
A third form of exchange between the Outer Islands and
Yap, usually via Ulithi, consisted of the presentation of offer-
ings (mepel) to the head religious functionaries of Gagil. This
exchange was independent of the political and sawei relation-
ships. Gifts were sent regularly to propitiate the ghosts of
the parent lineages on Yap, probably for the benefits which
these spirits were believed to bring to the Outer Islanders. The
head of the Woloi matrilineal clan of Gagil, as paramount chief,
also relied upon magic to maintain his political hold over the
Yap empire. From sacred places on Ulithi, his magicians could
plague the Outer Islands with epidemics, typhoons, and other
assorted forms of natural disaster. Conversely, white magic
would assure food and fertility and could ward off calamity.
Under threat of supernatural punishment, Outer Islanders jour-
neying to Yap were required to observe many taboos in their
dealings with the Yapese. The traditional socio-political ties
of the two areas were thus held together by magico-religious
links as well as by the economic advantages derived by all par-
ties from various exchange relationships which complemented
the islands’ limited resources.
Classes and rankings also existed on the Outer Islands, so
that everyone had his place, but without the sharp caste distinc-
tions observed on Yap. The major line of cleavage, which ran
between chiefs and commoners, was discernible mainly on for-
mal occasions. The chiefs were aligned in definite order of rank,
and their clans, correspondingly; clans without hereditary chiefs
occupied a lower status. Within clans, lineages held positions of
traditional seniority. Chiefly titles were mainly hereditary along
matrilineal lines. As the people were very law-abiding, the chiefs
directed their attention primarily to supervising communal un-
dertakings and conducting external relations. On some of the
islands, land-ownership districts were distinguished from political
districts, with the chiefs of the latter owing their positions to their
status in the chain of political authority originating on Yap. Island-
wide decisions would be the prerogative of these “political” chiefs.
Only with respect to relationships with Yap or the other islands
in the Ngek (eastern) chain of communications was political au-
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thority centered in the person of a paramount chief. A council of
elders, which included representatives from each kin group, nor-
mally administered village affairs. On some of the smaller islands,
all of the people assembled for political meetings, although they
usually allowed their senior lineage heads to speak for them. Bely-
ing the seeming aristocratic nature of the society, the prestige and
authority of age afforded the older people great freedom in voicing
their opinions, and this opportunity for one’s views to gain expres-
sion introduced a strong element of democratic participation. To a
great degree, this mildly gerontocratic socio-political system con-
tinues today in the Outer Islands.
In their relations with the Yapese, the Outer Islanders had
the status of low-caste serfs. The sawei system may have as-
sured their care while visiting Yap, but it also permitted them to
be treated with contempt. The restrictions on dress, language,
food, and social intercourse were at the very least irksome, and
in truth degrading. The Outer Islanders accepted their role until
the introduction of new forces caused a deterioration in the ties
between the two areas. In German times, the Administering Au-
thority supplied stores of food after disastrous typhoons on the
Outer Islands, which practice undercut one of the strong sawei
ties. Christianity was adopted far earlier on some of the Outer
Islands than on Yap and freed these Outer Islanders from fear of
supernatural reprisals. The Japanese administration prohibited
inter-island voyages in native canoes, inhibiting the indigenes’
freedom of movement, and World War II seriously interrupted
the Japanese sailings. After the Americans assumed jurisdiction,
the infrequent trips of naval vessels was not conducive to a
resumption of periodic exchanges, and by mid-century pitegli-
tamol, sawei, and mepel had practically stopped coming into
Yap from Ulithi. The education gained in both Japanese and
American schools enabled the Outer Islanders to view their ties
with Yap on a more critical level and to meet the Yapese as in-
tellectual equals. And finally, the advent of foreign power rule
has been conducive to replacing Yapese suzerainty with new
administrative influences and to superimposing German, then
Japanese, and now American administrators over the native poli-
ties of the Outer Islanders. The foreigners have replaced the
Yapese in the framework of the old organization.
The Outer Islanders acknowledged the higher rank of the
Yapese, but this did not foreclose their regarding the Yapese as
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arrogant and dishonest and looking down upon Yapese society as
torn with suspicion and dissention. For their part, the people of
Gagil came to recognize only grudgingly their sawei obligations
to care for Outer Islanders on Yap, and these obligations deterio-
rated to a point where they became instead a generalized Yapese
responsibility. Through the new Council of Magistrates introduced
by the Americans, Outer Island students attending school were
provided housing in special dormitories and food was contributed
from all of the districts. The Roman Catholic Church made avail-
able for the temporary shelter of Outer Island visitors a small
piece of land, an area known as “Madrich,” close to the American
district headquarters on Yap.
For a while the Americans observed the fiction that the
Council of Magistrates, because Gagil and Galiman were rep-
resented on the council, could speak for the Ngek islands as
well. However, American ideology was incompatible with the
caste basis of the old Yapese empire, and it was only a mat-
ter of time before the break from Yap would be acknowledged.
The American administrators were informed by the people on
the outlying islands that they desired to be relieved of their
“thralldom” to Yap. As they expressed it, “We want the chance
to become ‘up’ men and not remain dog men as the Yap chiefs
want us to be.”6 The year 1951 conveniently marks the for-
mal ending to the political ties between Yap and its empire,
when the Council of Magistrates, probably at American insti-
gation, adopted a resolution declaring that “a) servitude in all
its forms is abolished; b) inhabitants of … [islands to east] are
to be treated as equals in every respect; [and] c) the chiefs of
the outlying atolls and islands are invited to join the Council
of District Chiefs of Yap as equals….”7 This, of course, did not
terminate any social or supernatural relationships the Outer Is-
landers might wish to continue.
With the slackening of Yapese bonds over the Outer Islands,
Ulithi’s position in relation to “Woleai” has correspondingly risen.
The linkages of the traditional political organization continue to
be active and important, and the social contacts between Ulithi
and “Woleai” remain friendly. The islands farther east followed
Ulithi’s conversion to Catholicism as though the suggestion were
an order. The Americans as the Administering Authority usually
6 Micronesians of Yap and Their Depopulation, op. cit., p. 198.
7 Quoted in Sandelmann, op. cit., p. 92.
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institute pilot projects on Ulithi before attempting similar mea-
sures on the other islands and frequently relay policy decisions
through that atoll, so the old traditional conduits of communica-
tion still hold. The placing of a junior high school on Ulithi has
diverted the Ngek students from Yap, and “Woleai” parents are
now beginning to allow their daughters to leave home for edu-
cation, something they hesitated to do when advanced schooling
was available only on Yap. Having enjoyed far more contact with
the Americans and consequently having acquired a degree of so-
phistication in dealing with American political innovations, the
Ulithians, as the most Christianized, educated, and acculturated
of the Outer Islanders, are today in a position to expand their
power to the east. In contrast to Ulithi, changes in the internal
economic, political, and kinship organizations of the remaining
Outer Islands have been relatively minimal, as impinging forces
generated by the administering metropolitan countries have been
communicated mainly through traditional channels in ways com-
patible to the existing culture. All this redounds to the advantage
of Ulithi which, through the influence it can exert along traditional
lines, can hope to weld the Outer Islands together as a potent
power bloc in any district-wide Yap government and, as the leader,
can hope to gain a prominence in American-introduced institu-
tions in a way reminiscent of the glory that was Yap’s in the old
empire.
AMERICAN-INTRODUCED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The Americans built their administrative system for the Yap
Islands upon the ten political-social subdivisions left by the Jap-
anese, naming them “municipalities” and the traditional chief of
each subdivision “magistrate.” The Navy administrators early en-
couraged designation of magistrates through elections, but much
to their consternation, in the first elections the ten ranking chiefs
were selected. Within the municipality, the chief-council meeting
was retained, with the magistrate and the municipal secretary
presiding over the attending chiefs from all the villages. Gradually,
due to age or lack of familiarity with the ways of the American
administration, the traditional chiefs designated others to act in
their stead as magistrates, and individuals came to be elected
for their popularity, integrity, and recognized abilities rather than
solely for their chiefly status. However, the magistrates continued
to be, if not chiefs, men of very high class. For long the function
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of the municipality as distinct from the village remained confused.
The traditional relations within the village easily lent themselves
to the performance of communal tasks, but it was “difficult for a
municipal government to improve its municipality when there is
no law (which gives it authority) and the people as a whole pay
little attention to it.”8 Political-social domination of lower ranking
municipalities by others of higher class persisted, and some vil-
lages looked not to the magistrate of their own municipality but to
one from the area in which their traditional overlords resided.
To facilitate American-Yapese administrative contacts, the
elected magistrates commenced meeting periodically with mem-
bers of the district administration in a rather informally consti-
tuted discussion group, primarily to hear the pronouncements
of the administration. Attending with the magistrates were the
ten municipal secretaries, special representatives of a number
of district departments, and the president and vice-president of
the Fak e Pul, an organization of young Yapese. At first, only
the chiefs of the senior districts spoke, but expression of views
progressively broadened. This Magistrates’ Council served both
to provide the administration with an “advisory sounding board”
and to unite all municipalities in island-wide undertakings.
Gradually, the powers and responsibilities of the council be-
came clarified when certain functions were centralized, and
starting in 1956, the council commenced operating under a
“statement on organization and functions” drawn up in a series
of meetings and approved by the district administrator. Magis-
trates were to be elected for three-year terms by secret ballot
through universal suffrage, and they in turn would appoint and
remove their municipal secretaries. An executive committee,
composed of the president, vice-president, secretary, and trea-
surer of the council, represented the council and, between the
monthly meetings of the council, met in an advisory and liaison
capacity with the Yap district administrator. The council was
empowered to appoint boards and designate committees as ad-
visory groups, and some “thirty non-Council-member leaders
and progressive citizens” sat with the magistrates and sec-
retaries in the periodic meetings.9 Through its treasurer, the
8 Paper of Marnifen, read at First Trust Territory Conference on Self-Govern-
ment (Truk: 1953), p. 24.
9 Memo DistAd Yap to HiCom, “Chartering Municipalities,” circa 1957, p.
3.
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council levied and collected taxes, budgeting was conducted on
an island-wide basis, and the council functioned as an embry-
onic island legislature. It also directly administered activities
such as local agricultural and public works projects. Its out-
standing characteristic was a desire and willingness to initiate
and plan its own programs of improvements and to support
them with labor, material, and funds.
When confronted with the Administering Authority’s municipal
chartering program, the council recommended against its institu-
tion in Yap until after “the council or an island-wide body is
chartered and future needs and organization make chartering of
the smaller governmental units necessary or desirable.”10 The
chartering of municipalities was delayed, as well, on the ground
that those first chartered would most likely be the traditionally
dominant, so that caste cleavages would be bolstered. All this co-
incided with Trust Territory policy, for only in Truk had municipal
chartering commenced prior to issuance of a charter for the dis-
trict congress.
After the council appointed a chartering committee, almost a
year of discussion was required for setting up a congress for Yap.
Particularly troublesome was the division of authority between the
new legislative body and the existing council, and the former’s
“detracting from the established and recognized prestige and sta-
tus of the Council.”11 The charter finally agreed upon for the new
congress provided for two representatives for each of Yap’s ten
municipalities. The chartering committee and the council were
“unanimous and consistent in proposing equal representation un-
til traditional class and rank distinctions between persons and
municipalities have further decreased in local political-social-eco-
nomic importance.”12 In addition to taxing and enacting resolu-
tions “to provide for and maintain the welfare of the residents of
Yap,” the congress was directed to prepare an annual budget for
the disbursement of revenues collected under its authority (Art.
II). All would become law upon receiving the signature of the
high commissioner or upon his failure to act within six months.
Although unstated, the long-range plans contemplated eventual
inclusion of the Outer Islands in the district political structure.
The convening of the congress in June of 1959, after the grant
10 Ibid.
11 Memo DistAd Yap to HiCom, Dec. 17, 1958.
12 Letter of DistAd Yap to HiCom, Dec. 31, 1958.
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of a charter the previous February, did not lead to any marked
diminution in the power of the council and, if anything, reinforced
its status. Into the new body went younger, Western-oriented men,
while the council continued to be made up of older Yapese “who
have the unqualified respect of the electorate, [and] are in a better
position to introduce and pass on legislation than is the Yap Is-
lands Congress.” The same commentator, writing as of the end of
1962, also noted that the congressmen “introduced laws and vote
the way the Council tells them to.”13 The council served as the
budget committee for the congress, and prior to each spring meet-
ing, the Executive Committee of the council prepared a budget for
the following fiscal year. As an executive group, the council han-
dled nearly all specific projects for the Yap Islands. As befitted this
executive character, nominations to Yap district boards originated
in the council before being submitted for approval by the congress
and confirmation by the district administration.
At the end of 1962, the Yap district administrator proposed to
charter the Yap Islands Council and each of the ten municipalities.
The high commissioner was opposed to granting a legal basis for
the council, and his staff advised him to phase out the council by
forming a single municipal government for the Yap Islands, with
the congress as the municipal council.14 Faced with this conflict-
ing advice, the high commissioner disapproved of the Yap district
administrator’s proposal, presumably because of Headquarter’s
desire to merge the traditional leadership in the council with the
congress instead of strengthening the council and maintaining its
identity with the Yapese chiefs. However, the high commissioner
took no steps to eliminate the council.
The stumbling block to bringing traditional leaders into the
congress lay in the congressional charter’s prohibition against
magistrates’ being elected to the congress. Rather, the chiefs have
continued to be part of the Yap Islands Council, and the council,
to serve as a type of collective executive body for the congress.
Since the chiefs have been able to direct the Yapese to work with-
out pay upon local projects, such as road maintenance and bridge
repair, the council has been able to promote “voluntary” public
works as well as to administer those supported from congressional
funds. Cooperating with the district administrator, the council has
helped keep order and has facilitated the smooth functioning of
13 Memo Assistant DistAd Yap to DistAd, circa Dec. 1962.
14 Memo Political Affairs Officer to HiCom, Dec. 11, 1962.
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the district administration. In its pivotal position, it has stabilized
and strengthened the governments of the local municipalities.
More money is appropriated for its personnel than for that of con-
gress. (In fiscal year 1965, $3,680 was proposed for Yap Islands
Congress salaries, $11,752 for Yap Islands Council salaries, and
$1,000 for each as entertainment allowance.)
Over the last few years a marked rivalry has developed between
the congressmen and the members of the Yap Islands Council. The
former are mainly governmental employees,15 younger, American-
educated, and Western-oriented. They have questioned the budget
as proposed by the council, have refused to accept the council’s
recommendation for location of the new congressional building,
and have declined to finance councilmen traveling to Palau on the
problem of Palauan disorderliness on Yap. The role of the council
as a legislative committee to introduce resolutions is being re-
sisted. The suggestion of the district administrator to the Kanifay
School Board—that it should first present its proposed draft for a
change in the law to the Yap Islands Council because “if the Coun-
cil finds your proposal should be passed, I believe the Congress
will give it favorable consideration”—is no longer as sound advice
as it once would have been.16
The members of the council see their power decreasing with
this coming of age of the Yap Islands Congress. They are aware
that the administration is debating abolishing the council and
reorganizing local government so that a single magistrate, as-
sisted by a ten-man council, will serve the whole of the Yap Islands
proper. All this would be forestalled with the conversion of the Yap
Islands Congress into a district-wide legislative body entrusted
with matters of district concern and no longer preoccupied with
legislating for the municipal problems of Yap. The Yap Islands
Council, possibly in a new form, could re-emerge as the undis-
puted power center of the Yap Islands government.
ATTEMPTS TO FORM A DISTRICT-WIDE LEGISLATURE
Until 1959, political contact between American administrators
and Outer Islanders occurred on an island by island basis; in
15 At the spring, 1965, meeting of the congress, fifteen employees from the
district administration and the agriculture, constabulary, education, public works,
and public defender’s departments were granted leave to attend the Yap Islands
Congress. (Yap District Memo, April 22, 1965). This represented three-fourths of
the congressional membership.
16 Memo DistAd Yap to Kanifay School Board, March 23, 1965.
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that year, for the first time, a conference for the entire area was
convened on Woleai. Hereditary chiefs or their representatives,
accompanied by advisors and interpreters, met with the district
administrator to discuss common problems pertaining to public
health, education, agriculture, taxation, and field-trip operations.
They tentatively agreed upon the erection of a building to accom-
modate Outer Islanders visiting Yap and the planting of a garden
for satisfying their food needs, but these were never fully effected.
Although Trust Territory plans called for repetition of these Outer
Island meetings on a yearly basis, epidemics and rehabilitation ef-
forts necessitated by natural disasters within the district caused
their postponement.
At the second meeting, in 1962 on Ulithi, the conferees turned
their attention to a district-wide legislature, although under very
unpropitious circumstances. The Outer Islanders discovered to
their chagrin that they were being subjected to a 3 per cent sales
tax levied by the Yap Islands Congress on non-food items and were
incensed that this had been levied without prior consultation.17
Several chiefs, by way of emphasizing their request for the re-
turn of this money, added that should the Outer Islands decide to
participate in any tax program, they would want representatives
in the congress. This line of discussion prompted an invitation
for observers from the Outer Islands to attend the spring 1962
meeting of the Yap Islands Congress, to which the highest rank-
ing chief replied that “to send several observers from the Outer
Islands to attend the Congress is something like sending a blind
man to observe the session.”18 Background information, training
in parliamentary procedure, and an understanding of the purposes
of the Yap Islands Congress were all identified as prerequisites
to observation tours. It was also at this 1962 conference that the
district administrator proposed that the Outer Islanders consider
the formation of a district-wide legislature, in which the Outer Is-
lands would have seventeen seats in a thirty-seven-member body,
a proportion to their advantage as computed upon the relative
populations of the two areas at that time. The seeds for the leg-
islature were planted, but it would take a more favorable climate
for them to germinate.
17 The Yap Islands Congress on several occasions has ignored the limits of its
jurisdiction and has considered laws applicable to the whole administrative dis-
trict.
18 From notes of DistAd Yap on Outer Island Conference, Morning Sess., Jan.
9, 1962.
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The 1962 conference raised a number of other matters per-
tinent to the organizing of a district-wide legislative body. The
administration party carefully explained the function of repre-
sentation, as distinguished from attendance as an observer, and
offered to translate the charter of the Yap Islands Congress into
Ulithian so that its provisions could be studied in the Outer
Islands. The American school teacher resident on Ulithi also pro-
posed to teach an adult class in parliamentary procedure, using
Robert’s Rules of Order and materials pertinent to the activities
of the Yap Islands Congress. Probably the events of most lasting
impact in drawing the Outer Islands out of their isolation were
the explanation tendered at this conference on the workings of
the Council of Micronesia for the whole Trust Territory and the
proposal that the Outer Islanders designate a delegate to attend
the council for the next two years as one of the representatives
from Yap district. Previously, the Yap Islands Council had been
choosing both delegates, but with one term vacant, the adminis-
tration considered that the Outer Islands should be represented.
The chief so named, Belarmino Hethy of Ulithi, was to be a mem-
ber of the Council of Micronesia’s Political Committee which, at
the November 1963 meeting of the council, played a key role in
the structuring of the future Congress of Micronesia. Hethy was
later to be the spokesman for the Outer Islands in the 1965 ne-
gotiations for setting up a district-wide legislature for Yap.
In 1963, the Political Affairs Office at Headquarters on Saipan
submitted a new congressional charter calling for Outer Islands
participation, which the Yap Islands Congress approved. A repre-
sentative from the office then toured the islands to the east at
the request of the congress to obtain Outer Islander reaction.
As was to be anticipated, the Outer Islanders would not commit
themselves on the new charter other than to indicate it was unac-
ceptable in its proposed form because they were allotted only five
seats, a representation out of proportion to their population. Chief
Hethy accompanied this field trip to report his observations on
the work of the Council of Micronesia and, as spokesman for the
paramount chief on Ulithi, to make preliminary plans for a later
Outer Islands Conference at which the modification of the Yap
Islands Congress charter could be discussed further. This 1963
conference never materialized, the revision of the Yap Islands Con-
gress charter died, and here the matter rested until interest in
the formation of district-wide legislature was reactivated during
158 The Ngobochei—Negotiating a New District Legislature
the preparations made for holding elections for the Congress of
Micronesia in the latter part of 1964. If there ever had been a de-
sire to establish a separate government and legislative body solely
for the Outer Islands, as an alternative to joining with Yap, it was
quashed at the 1964 meeting of the chiefs on Ulithi when the dis-
trict administrator announced that cost precluded anything but a
single district government for the whole area.
With the Congress of Micronesia’s elections imminent, the Yap
administrative district set up two election committees, with the
members of one from the Outer Islands. After the polling, the
latter committee returned with the field-trip ship to count the bal-
lots at Colonia. At this time, informal discussions were initiated
between these Outer Islanders and Yap Islands’ representatives
regarding the need for a district-wide legislature. Later, the prin-
cipal members of this Outer Island election committee again re-
turned to Colonia to participate in the briefing of the Yap del-
egation before it left for Saipan to take part in the pre-session
workshop and the opening of the Congress of Micronesia. It was
on this occasion that the district administrator was asked to at-
tend a meeting between these Outer Islanders and officers and
members of the Yap Islands Congress and Council. Out of the
meeting emerged a formal committee “to study means of orga-
nizing the people of Yap Islands proper and the people of Outer
Islands of Yap District in order to create a district-wide Legisla-
ture.”19 Four exploratory meetings, two in the Yap district center
and two in the Outer Islands, were proposed. At a send-off banquet
given the congressmen-elect, which the Outer Islanders attended
as special guests, the keynote of the evening was expressed “in
a speech dedicated to the importance of full discussion of all
matters of public interest directed toward the development of a
community which can work together for a better Yap district.”20
None of the three Outer Islanders on the negotiating committee
were high chiefs. Although they by themselves could not commit
their respective areas, their presence signified that the paramount
chiefs of the islands to the east desired these exploratory talks.
Also of importance, the first Outer Island committee member,
Hethy, usually represented the paramount chief from Mogmog Is-
land of Ulithi atoll in Ulithi’s dealings with the rest of the Outer
Islands. This placed him at the apex of the communications and
19 Memo DistAd Yap to HiCom, June 25, 1965.
20 The Rai Review, June 23, 1965, p. 6.
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super-subordinate chain of relationships which stem from Mogmog
to the whole of the Ngek islands. Carlos Fong, a school teacher
from Asor Island on Ulithi, had accompanied Hethy to Saipan as his
interpreter for the Council of Micronesia and contributed the ben-
efit of his experience gained from having lived on Yap. The third
member of the negotiating committee, Chief Yalmai from Woleai,
had probably been included in the original elections committee
because he was fairly young in cultural terms (middle aged), rec-
ognized as intellectually quick, and experienced in dealing with
Western administrators. To the negotiation sessions Yalmai brought
Robert Gatelmar, a school teacher also from Woleai, who was nom-
inally to assist him as an interpreter in English if necessary. For
the Yap Islands, on the negotiating committee were Francis Luktun,
Magistrate of Weloy Municipality and Secretary of the Yap Islands
Council; Joachim Falmog, President of the Yap Islands Congress;
and Fran Defngin, Assistant Anthropologist for the district and an
accomplished polyglot able to speak Ulithian, Woleaian, and Yapese,
besides Japanese and English. Luktun served as the chairman of the
Yap Political Advisory Committee; the presence of Falmog and Defn-
gin assured representation of the congress and persons knowledge-
able of the administration’s position. Almost as ex officio members,
the two delegates and two assemblymen elected to the Congress
of Micronesia played major roles throughout the negotiations for a
district-wide legislature.
THE NEGOTIATIONS
Timing in the Trust Territory is always an approximate matter
at best. Despite previous assurance to the contrary, the arrival of
the field-trip ship was delayed, and Chief Hethy of Ulithi and Chief
Yalmai of Woleai could not reach Yap until August 18, two days
before the author’s scheduled departure. Improvisation is also a
necessity in the Trust Territory, and in this case it permitted a
series of exploratory meetings with each of the identified groups
concerned with the founding of a district-wide legislature before
there was a full session of the negotiating committee. As a transi-
tory American, the author could probe into questions so delicate
that none of the parties to the negotiations would raise them, and
this strategy was deliberately adopted to bring into the open all
potential major stumbling blocks to the formation and functioning
of a legislature for Yap. It sometimes appeared during the course
of the week that this strategy might scuttle the negotiations before
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they even commenced. Extracts from extended field notes made
during the course of the week, follow.
Morning of August 16: Met with Carlos Fong and John Rugul-
mar, Assemblyman to the Congress of Micronesia from Ulithi. Early
in the discussions, emphasized that I considered my position to be
one of raising “embarrassing” questions so as to develop a possi-
ble modus operandi for bringing all of the groups together. Con-
firmed that the Outer Islanders view entering into a political enter-
prise with Yap with much trepidation. The Outer Islanders consider
themselves unskilled, few of them have the necessary education to
“stand up” to the educated persons on Yap, the procedures of a dis-
trict legislature are unknown, and they fear being “taken” should
they join a district-wide legislature. Detected a great deal of suspi-
cion concerning the motives and intentions of the Yapese.
Spent a considerable length of time explaining the possibility
of commencing with limited legislative powers which could be
gradually augmented as Outer Island members become more se-
cure; partial participation and gradual step-by-step expansion;
and the inclusion of protective devices such as extraordinary ma-
jority votes to adopt a measure, requiring designated subjects to
run the gauntlet of two sessions, the use of local option legislation,
and incorporation of provision for referendum. Kept reiterating:
if the Outer Island members will determine precisely what it is
they fear, it will then be possible to provide in-built protection. It
is absolutely essential that they think out, talk out, work out their
fears to the end that a viable legislature be structured with these
in mind. If they can not do so, any legislature which might be es-
tablished will prove to be only an empty shell.
They presented four problems: 1) who will carry the burden of
the organizational discussions in the Outer Islands; 2) what will
be the size of the district-wide legislature; 3) what should be the
qualifications for members of the legislature; 4) what jurisdiction
will be given to the district-wide legislature? The last was initially
proposed in terms limited to taxation but was expended by the
manner in which the response was phrased.
Discrete queries disclosed it is not the identity of the persons
who will “sell” the district-wide legislature which is the problem,
but rather a need to fix the responsibility. At the present time
it remains undefined. It was agreed this constitutes primarily an
administrative matter and can properly be left for the six-man ne-
gotiating committee to resolve.
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The size of the legislature posed a disturbing issue. The Outer
Islanders hope to receive equal representation with the
Yapese—in numbers, voting strength, and importance of role to
be played in the new legislature. Tentatively, each of the Outer
Islands are to have at least one representative. This afforded me
the opportunity to muse over the mathematics. As a minimum,
seventeen or eighteen representatives would be necessary, and
since some of the Outer Islands, such as Ulithi and Woleai, have
disproportionately large populations, they would consider them-
selves entitled to more than one representative. From twenty to
twenty-five representatives would be required for the Outer Is-
lands should this formula be implemented. With the Yap Islanders
having equal representation, an ungainly legislature of from forty
to fifty members would result. Besides, the Yap Islands now have
the predominate share of population and would probably want to
have the membership of the new legislature divided proportion-
ately between the two areas. Would the limited resources of the
Yap district permit such a large legislature, with its per diem ex-
penses, transportation costs, and salary for each member? This
portion of the discussion ended with Fong and Rugulmar suggest-
ing that possibly a twenty-member body might be the solution,
with ten from the Outer Islands and an equal number from Yap.
More extended consideration remains warranted.
The reference to qualifications for members was primarily one
of exploration. They think the age of twenty-five too young, and
thirty more in keeping with the Yap district folkways. Residence
would be required, but qualified to mean island “identification”
and not physical presence, i.e. a person born a Ulithian is to be
treated as meeting the residence requirement even though he has
not resided on that atoll for a long period of time. A woman can-
not be elected from an Outer Island, but they concurred it would
only be superfluous to incorporate this as a limitation in any pro-
posed charter. I inquired about provision for the participation of
Outer Island chiefs. They were generally of the opinion that many
of the Outer Island chiefs are too old and inexperienced in mod-
ern ways to permit their automatically becoming members with
full voting rights. On the other hand, allowing them to appear as
discussants might be adopted should this prove essential to elimi-
nating opposition from their quarter.
No hesitancy was manifest in assigning the new body jurisdic-
tion comparable to that exercised by the other district legisla-
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tures, except for taxation. Taxation is a stumbling block. The Outer
Islanders are being taxed without knowledge of the proceeds’ dis-
tribution, and this has caused considerable suspicion. They want
all taxes clarified and revenues allocated according to the source
of collection. I pointed out that the major sources of taxation now
and for the foreseeable future will be on the Yap Islands, and a pol-
icy of allocating revenues according to source of collection would
be to Yapese advantage. This presented a new perspective. Left
this issue with the impression that the tax levied on goods pur-
chased by the Outer Islanders symbolizes the “trickery” which
Outer Islanders believe surrounds dealings with the Yapese. This
may prove to be the stumbling block over which the legislature
may falter.
Languages used for legislative proceedings will present a diffi-
cult problem. Initially, at least, must anticipate translation into at
least Yapese, Ulithian, and English. This will slow down proceed-
ings until English can be used as a common language.
Pushed into the sensitive area of housing and food and con-
firmed that the facilities at Madrich are considered inadequate
and would reflect poorly upon the status of an Outer Island leg-
islator should he have to reside there while attending the district
legislature. They responded warmly to the suggestion that, in
place of receiving food by way of a gift from the Yapese, arrange-
ments be made for Outer Island legislators to purchase all their
staples. Changes of this nature would help in erasing intimations
of subordinate status.
Closed the meeting with the warning that I proposed to ask sim-
ilar “embarrassing” questions to all other groups and that they
should discount any rumors which might arise suggesting that I
was denigrating the Outer Islanders. Their response was immedi-
ate and warm: these issues ought be raised and resolved before
any district-wide legislature was formed.
Afternoon of August 16: Meeting with Executive Committee of
the Yap Islands Council; also attending were the two delegates to
the Congress of Micronesia, the assemblyman from Yap Islands,
and a few others. According to the chiefs, a mistake was originally
made in chartering the Yap Islands Congress. It was intended to
be a district-wide body, and the chiefs of Yap were willing then and
desire now to have such a legislature.
Asked if the Yapese were prepared to treat the Outer Islanders
as equals in a legislative body. Do not the Outer Islanders have
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lower status and are they not considered inferior to Yapese? The
response was a denial. Once the relationship between the two ar-
eas meant the Outer Islanders were subordinate to the people in
Gagil; this was traditional but no longer true. I shifted the ap-
proach by asking how the chief and people of Gagil would react
to the Outer Islanders’ receiving equal treatment. This evoked
the answer that the Outer Islands are now independent of Gagil.
Comparable queries produced the same response: if the people
from the Outer Islands think they are being treated as inferiors,
it is in their minds and is not intended by the Yapese. Upon my
pointing out that the arrangements provided for Outer Islanders
visiting Yap reinforce this feeling of inferiority, the reply brushed
this aside: this is a matter which can be handled after the new
legislature begins functioning. All responses were premised upon
legal equality, and the participants either deliberately or possi-
bly unconsciously ignored all differences of social status between
Yapese and Outer Islanders.
Switched to a different area by inquiring if the Yap Islands
Council was willing to accept a secondary role upon the formation
of a district-wide legislature. The latter inevitably would result in
downgrading the importance of the council, and the Yapese chiefs
might lose some of their influence. For one thing, the legislature
would then have to deal with two sets of traditional chiefs.
“Yes, we are willing to take a back seat. We are willing to become
a municipal council.” Now for the first time was revealed the pro-
posal of the Yap Islands Council. The council would be reorganized
to be composed of ten members, one from each of the ten munici-
palities. The council would then be incorporated as the Yap Island
Municipality. As a group, the councilmen would exercise legislative
power; as individuals, they would carry out and execute the munic-
ipal ordinances they adopted as well as all laws applicable to the
Yap Islands which might be passed by the legislature. Local matters
would again be returned to the council and, in effect, the ten mu-
nicipalities would become boroughs, each under the control of its
councilman. An ingenious proposal, but I did not know whether the
administration would approve this commission form of local govern-
ment. I was authorized to sound out the administration’s reaction.
Inquired about representation. The reply disclosed that this had
already been discussed and a formula carefully worked out. Repre-
sentation would be based upon population, and both Yap and the
Outer Islands would receive their proportionate shares. They had
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in mind a legislature of about eighteen members, ten from Yap and
eight from the Outer Islands, with one representative to 379 peo-
ple on Yap and one member for every 310 people on the Outer
Islands.21 Pointed out that at the moment the Yap Islands have a
majority of the population but that the Outer Islands are growing
at a faster rate, and in the not too distant future, use of a popula-
tion formula would leave the Yap Islanders with only a minority of
the membership. This contingency apparently had not been con-
templated, but they did not seem to be perturbed by the possibility
of Outer Island control of the district legislature.
From this it was possible to digress into a discussion of building
protections into the structure and processes of a legislature and
of the various forms that such protections can take. Covered much
the same ground as this morning.
The potential problem of the Outer Islands chiefs’ unwillingness
to approve the founding of a district-wide legislature unless they
can personally participate was raised, only to be met by the coun-
cil’s refusal to face up to this contingency until it arises. The Outer
Islands chiefs ought to have confidence in their representatives,
and this response closed the matter insofar as the councilmen
were concerned.
In this and other matters, either because they do not wish
to anticipate difficult questions or because this type of advance
strategic planning is foreign to traditional ways, I was unable to
engender proposals for solutions to potential problems. Possibly,
with regard to the Outer Islands chiefs, they are of the opinion it
is impossible for these aged gentlemen22 to contemplate an active
role in any legislature.
Morning of August 17: Meeting with representatives of Yap
Islands Congress, plus all Yap delegation to the Congress of Micro-
nesia other than assemblyman from Outer Islands. The negotiating
committee does not have as firm a mandate as I was led to believe.
When this six-member committee convenes, the Yap Islanders are
to cover such matters as how the Outer Islanders were taxed with-
out being members of the Yap Islands Congress. Out of this and
the discussion of comparable other items may come a successful
21 Population data in the Trust Territory are always approximate. The au-
thor therefore requested population statistics of the district administration
and used the 3,982-Yap, 2,456-Outer Islands data supplied for further negoti-
ations.
22 A survey of thirty-five chiefs in the Outer Islands disclosed a median age of
fifty-nine years, with one-fourth over seventy.
165
culmination of legislative negotiations, but much spade work re-
mains to be done before the Outer Islanders will be mollified.
Representatives of the Yap Islands Congress confirmed there
are some subject-matter areas which are solely within the pre-
rogatives of the Yap Islands chiefs and are not considered part of
the jurisdiction of the congress. For example, fishing rights and
reef-land usage are not proper subjects for it to consider. This per-
mitted discussion of means by which the jurisdiction of the new
legislature could be limited or other safeguards inbuilt; developed
this much in the fashion as in the previous meetings.
Although they, too, contemplate the district legislature’s being
apportioned upon population, unlike the council, they have not
developed a formula for representation other than that the Yap Is-
lands should receive a majority. That in the not too distant future
the predominance of population will lean toward the Outer Is-
lands has not been foreseen. They volunteered the displeasing (to
them) prospect of an Outer Islands majority allocating tax rev-
enues primarily collected on a Yap Islands’ base. The discussion
ended inconclusively.
Upon inquiring whether the chiefs would have to be accommo-
dated in the new district-wide legislature, received a negative
response. “The chief represents land, and the elected representa-
tives represent the people, and there is no place for the chiefs
in the legislature.” Upon suggesting that the cooperation of the
Outer Islands chiefs might not be obtained unless they were as-
sured some role in the new legislature, was met with the rejoinder
that if the chiefs want to take part, they should run for office. On
my remonstrance that one with chiefly position would hardly run
the risk of standing for office, was informed that it is impossible
for a chief not to win.
Discussion next moved to the reactions which might be antici-
pated from the chiefs whose status and power would be implicitly
threatened by the institution of a district legislature whose mem-
bers were selected by secret ballot. Some of the members saw
this only as a continuation of the undermining of chiefly positions
which has been progressing since the American administration
began. Others felt that a representative system, on its face, is
not fundamentally opposed to Yapese tradition. Yapese chiefs have
long used “spokesmen” to represent them. This has been adapted
since German times to deal with the administrators of the metro-
politan nations which have exerted jurisdiction over Yap. Today,
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the persons elected to the Yap Islands Congress, and those serving
on the Yap Islands Council, are referred to as “chief of the white
men” to differentiate them from chiefs with hereditary status cho-
sen pursuant to Yapese custom. Under the circumstances, the
mere introduction of a representational system does not appear
to pose as great a threat to the position of the Yapese chief as it
might seem to the outsider. True, over the long run, the people
may refuse to vote as they are instructed by their chiefs, and a
conflict would then emerge into the open. The legislature for the
district will continue to take into account the views of the chiefs
and will not lightly disregard them.
There will be no problem in cutting down the size of the present
Yap Islands Congress when fewer than the present twenty can be
accommodated in Yap’s delegation to the new district legislature.
Currently there are many people holding office in the congress
who did not desire to become members but were more or less
forced by their chiefs or by pressure from the people of their lo-
cale to stand for office. They would welcome the opportunity to
withdraw gracefully.
A long discussion in Yapese followed my query about the rela-
tionship which today exists between Yapese and Outer Islanders. I
had preceded this by an introduction stressing that equality of sta-
tus in the legislature is essential for its success. As in the meeting
with the Yap Islands Council members, the response almost unan-
imously denied that the Yapese think of the Outer Islanders as
inferiors; they are not treated as inferiors; the only circumstance
in which this might occur is in contact between peoples from Gagil
and the Outer Islanders, with the former still remembering the
super-subordinate status that once existed. In rejoinder, referred
to the housing facilities at Madrich and the complaints about the
provision of food for Outer Islanders temporarily on Yap. Their ex-
planation was historical. Once Gagil had an obligation for both
sheltering and feeding Outer Islanders, but now the responsibil-
ity is borne by all of the municipalities. Any inadequacies existing
have nothing to do with the Yapese considering the Outer Islan-
ders to be of lower status. Once again there was a reluctance to
face the symbolic significance of Madrich and the other aspects of
life surrounding Outer Islanders’ residence on Yap as indicative of
their status.
The Yap Islands Congress sees the new legislature as tending
to district-wide matters, with Yap affairs left for a local municipal
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government. They had not anticipated the Yap Islands Council’s
being chartered as a municipal government but have no oppo-
sition to this happy solution for the growing rift they recognize
developing between them and the council.
Morning of August 18: Contacted by one of the members of
the Congress of Micronesia who advised me of a visitation from
a member of the Yap Islands Council. Should not some people
from Gagil, possibly the chiefs, sit in with the Outer Islanders dur-
ing the negotiations, or possibly meet with them ahead of time
to assure them that they can speak freely? Although it could not
be confirmed, the impression was left that this suggestion orig-
inated in Gagil. The delicacy of the proposal was apparent: the
offer might be sincerely intended to strengthen the negotiating
position of the Outer Islanders by demonstrating that they should
not feel constrained in any way, but it also carried the implication
that without such expression, Gagil retained rights of control over
the old empire. It was left to me to handle, on the grounds that
if either the Outer Islanders or the chiefs of Gagil took umbrage
to whichever way it was resolved, the blame could be put upon
the blunderings of an American. In this way, the legislative nego-
tiations could be saved the interjection of what otherwise could
constitute an awkward issue.
Afternoon of August 18: First meeting with full Outer Islands
delegation, accompanied by the assemblyman to the Congress of
Micronesia from Ulithi. Opened the discussion by inquiring why
the Outer Islands are now interested in a district-wide legislature
when in 1963 they showed no desire to join. Response was that
they were not opposed in principle to such a legislature but did not
approve of the charter that was proposed at that time. They had
considered themselves uneducated and also uninstructed in the
manner in which the Yap Islands Congress functioned. Besides,
the representation which would have been afforded—five Outer
Islander members to the Yap Islanders’ nineteen—was unaccept-
able.
Bases of representation were discussed but no formula ar-
rived at. All that was disclosed was a desire on the part of the
Outer Islanders to have a greater share in the formation of laws
which are going to affect them. On the other hand, there exists
a good deal of uncertainty, if not fear, about setting up a district-
wide legislature. Without an extensive educational program in
the Outer Islands, explaining the functions of a legislature, what
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it does and how it operates, and specifically what the legislature
for Yap will accomplish, they do not believe full cooperation by
the Outer Islands is possible. All this was tangential to the ques-
tion of representation but was the closest the members came to
answering my queries regarding the apportionment of a district-
wide legislature.
The question of whether the chiefs are to have a place in the new
legislature engendered a burst of animated discussion among the
Outer Islanders. The consensus appeared to be that it is not feasi-
ble to plan a district legislature without including the chiefs. The
alternative of directing their attention to running the municipal gov-
ernment, which is being proposed for the Yap Island chiefs, would
not be an acceptable substitute. The Outer Islands traditional lead-
ers will have to be accommodated in some way. This might be as in
the Palau legislature where the chiefs are allowed to debate but not
vote, and there is some sentiment for copying the Marshall Islands
Congress which permits the chiefs to exercise voting rights.
The ambivalence of the Outer Islanders toward the formation of
a legislature continued to crop up. Do the Outer Islands have to
join a district legislature? What will happen if they turn down this
bid? What is the administration’s position? Suppose the process is
deferred three or four years, or indefinitely, while an educational
process is set up in the Outer Islands to prepare the people there
for playing a full part in the legislature? More systematic observa-
tion of the Yap Islands Congress is needed, as no one from any
island but Ulithi has attended and the Ulithians understood lit-
tle and were unable to convey to the people back home sufficient
information to put them at ease.
I responded by referring to the new tax laws just passed by the
Congress of Micronesia which will provide revenue for appropria-
tion by all of the other district legislatures, but in the case of
Yap, the Outer Islands’ share will be allocated at the discretion of
the district administrator. This encountered a dignified rebuff. As
spokesman for the Outer Islands, Chief Hethy declared they do not
contemplate entering into a district-wide legislature just to ben-
efit from money due them, nor do they expect the Yapese to opt
for such a legislature for the purpose of obtaining congressionally
provided funds. “What is important in building a legislature is a
matter of people treating people properly and correctly and not
just getting money.” Pretty much my own words thrown back at
me, but in a different context!
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Additional meeting to be held tomorrow morning at which the
Outer Islanders will put together a possible agenda for the joint
negotiation session tomorrow afternoon. Suggested they familiar-
ize themselves with the proposed charter of 1963, as this touched
upon most of the matters which would have to be included in any
charter, although specifics could of course be varied.
As the meeting was breaking up, one of the Outer Islands
representatives volunteered the observation that the strategy of
discussing the formation of the legislature with each of the groups
separately may possibly have done more harm than good. He
implied that more problems may have been raised than can be
resolved. This permitted me to reiterate that I was not touching
upon sensitive areas to hurt feelings, or exacerbate tensions, but
that if there is to be a successful legislature, all members must
participate as equals, and this will be furthered by the elimination
of those aspects which symbolize status differences. Without an
open and frank approach, the causes of insecurity will not be re-
moved. Rather doubt that the other Outer Islands representatives
look upon my presence in the negotiations with the same suspi-
cion—tomorrow will tell.
Morning of August 19: Only Fong and Gatelmar from the Outer
Islands delegation attended. Both speak English, so meeting pro-
ceeded more rapidly. Much of the ground of yesterday afternoon’s
meeting recovered. At their request, went over 1963 proposed
charter, section by section, explaining terms and furnishing illus-
trations of alternative provisions which might be substituted. Re-
mainder of morning spent in philosophical discussion of political
and social change, acculturation in Yap area, and possibility of
preserving indigenous ways in a modern world. Made strong pitch
for the need to identify the traditional ways they desired to save
and to take positive steps to do so, instead of allowing them to die
with the old men.
Afternoon of August 19: Meeting with full negotiating commit-
tee around table in district headquarter’s social club; assistant
district commissioner and most of Yap delegation to Congress of
Micronesia also in attendance. Desultory small talk, with embar-
rassed pauses while waiting for someone to open session. Finally
President of Yap Islands Congress thanked me for holding prelim-
inary conferences. Now did I have anything to propose? Thanked
him, deliberately refrained from structuring meeting, and in effect
threw burden back on him. He tried same ploy with assistant
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district administrator, who replied in kind. Same effort repeated
again with similar parrying. For the next half hour, Yapese mem-
bers presented the advantages of forming a district-wide legisla-
ture, discussing this among themselves as much as directing their
comments to the Outer Islanders, while the latter listened and said
nothing.
Finally, as spokesman, Chief Hethy placed on the table the posi-
tion of the islands to the east. The Outer Islanders had not abso-
lutely refused to join a district-wide legislature in 1963. They would
not accept that proposal. They would not be here now unless some
need for action was felt. The Outer Islanders are generally inter-
ested: however, they are uncertain about participating, lack quali-
fied potential members, and are uninformed as to the advantages
which would flow from belonging to a district-wide legislature now.
This encouraged a series of responses which referred to the
lack of parallel acquaintance with legislative forms and proce-
dures experienced by the Yapese when the Yap Islands Congress
was first formed. The members of the Yap delegation to the Con-
gress of Micronesia alluded to a similar situation accompanying
the creation of their congress. The Outer Islands are not unique.
For the advantages which can be gained from a legislature, the
accomplishments of the Yap Islands Congress were paraded, in-
cluding the Outer Islands’ enjoying broadcasts from the radio
station at Colonia, which the congress has helped fund. Taking
part in a district-wide legislature will permit them to achieve
Outer Islands objectives, instead of having to petition the district
administrator, as is now the case. The Outer Islands delegation ap-
peared convinced.
From this, the negotiating conference moved on to a related
subject. As phrased by Chief Hethy, the Outer Islands still speak
through their chiefs. How can they send representatives to a district
legislature who can “speak” for the Outer Islanders until their peo-
ple from the islands understand why a legislature is necessary and
why representatives must come to Colonia? This pointed up the ne-
cessity for an educational program designed to acquaint the Outer
Islands leaders with the workings of a legislative body and the ad-
vantages to be gained by joining in a district-wide legislature.
Discussion then ranged over a number of matters, encompass-
ing district’s having its own legislative body and narrower consid-
erations, both broad aspects of the benefit to be achieved through
the Yap such as the procedures for the enactment of bills and the
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operation of the legislature vis-a-vis the administration. From the
afternoon session emerged five positive decisions, arrived at in the
order listed:
1. There is a definite need for and there should be a district-wide legisla-
ture.
2. The Outer Islands chiefs must be educated to appreciate the reasons
for establishment of such a legislature.
3. The meetings of the negotiating committee should be formalized by the
keeping of records.
4. To facilitate the establishment of a district-wide legislature, the
paramount chiefs of the eighteen Outer Islands should be invited to
travel to Colonia a few days prior to the opening of the Yap Islands
Congress in November. At that time, the members of the negotiating
committee should explain the reasons for setting up a district-wide
legislature and the Outer Islands visitors could be prepared for un-
derstanding the procedures of the Yap Islands Congress. Upon the
convening of the congress, the chiefs should sit as observers. From
this experience they ought gain some comprehension of the workings
of the legislative process and of the need for expanding the legisla-
ture to include the entire district.
5. The high commissioner should be requested to loan a member from his
Political Affairs staff to sit with the negotiating committee and to assist at
the proposed November session.
The problem of language complicated the conduct of the meet-
ing, as sometimes matters had to be translated from English into
Yapese, and from Yapese into Ulithian, and then the reverse. The
Yap Islands members carried the burden of the discussion and,
typically, the Outer Islanders were very reticent. Befitting his sta-
tus, Chief Hethy spoke for the latter, whereas all of the Yapese
freely took part. As the discussions continued, no mark of personal
subservience was demonstrated, and the members shared each
others’ cigarettes, lime for betel-nut chewing, and as betel-nut
supplies ran low, nuts as well. By the time the meeting adjourned,
a sound basis had been laid for future negotiations and good rap-
port established, which should carry the negotiations through the
more difficult periods which lie ahead.
Morning of August 20: Meeting of negotiating committee, with
outside participants present. The minutes of the previous meeting
were carefully corrected so that they express the five agreements
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reached the previous day. The subject of representation had been
suggested as one which ought to be clarified early in the negotia-
tions, and for the opening half hour the Yap Island members spoke
to this subject before the first comment was offered by the Outer
Islands. I was asked what would be the approximate representa-
tion for each of the two areas if the legislature were apportioned
upon population. Responded that a distribution between the two
regions in the ratio of roughly about 4 to 2.5 would justify an ap-
pointment of some ten or twelve representatives for Yap to about
eight from the Outer Islands. Each delegation’s members then
started canvassing among themselves the manner in which its
share might be divided. The Yap Islanders were of the opinion
that each Yap municipality must have at least one representa-
tive, which left some of the more populated municipalities on Yap
with inadequate representation, unless thirteen legislators were
allowed to the Yap Islands. On the other hand, the dispersion of
the Outer Islands makes it difficult to combine them into represen-
tative districts for the purpose of electing a single representative.
In a magnanimous gesture, the Yap Islands delegation proposed
that its share be limited to twelve members and that the Outer Is-
lands be entitled to nine, with which the Outer Islands delegation
expressed satisfaction.
On the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that Chief
Hethy, via the broadcasting station at Colonia, would explain to
the people in the Outer Islands all that had been decided. He
would then accompany the field-trip ship to make arrangements
for the eighteen paramount chiefs of the Outer Islands to come
to Yap late in October, preparatory to the next stage in setting up
the district-wide legislature. The assistant district administrator
would request the high commissioner for funds to finance the visit
of the Outer Islands chiefs. The groundwork had been laid, and
everything pointed to a successful conclusion.
THE AFTERMATH
Chief Hethy was true to his word and broadcast in Ulithian to
the Outer Islands over the Yap radio station. As the representa-
tive of the paramount chief of Mogmog, he accompanied the next
field-trip ship to each of the islands on the eastern run, to ac-
quaint the people with the details of the negotiations for setting
up a district-wide legislature and to alert them to send repre-
sentatives to the meeting on Yap scheduled for sometime in late
173
October. In his sessions with the chiefs of the various islands and
their representatives, he shared honors with Assemblyman Rugul-
mar who, as Solon for the Outer Islands District, explained what
had transpired at the first meeting of the Congress of Micronesia.
In their wake, the two men left little eddies of action, each in its
own way illustrating accommodation of the traditional leadership
to the introduction of a new political institution. What is related
here is the account of the succeeding deliberations of Woleai atoll,
the most heavily populated of all the islands of the old Yap em-
pire, in which Chief Yalmai, as one of the Outer Islands delegates,
played a stellar role.23
Before Hethy left Woleai on the field-trip ship, a meeting was
arranged on Utagai, traditionally the highest ranking island of the
atoll. The personal attendance of most of the ranking chiefs and
senior representatives from the important clans evinced the politi-
cal importance ascribed to the meeting. Fittingly, it was held in the
canoe house of the highest ranking village. As is proper etiquette
before senior chiefs, Yalmai professed not to understand fully what
had transpired on Yap, and then from his notes provided a running
account of the negotiations, down to the possible formula worked
out for representation in the proposed district-wide legislature.24
Also appropriate to the role of the “white man’s chief,” he em-
phasized that no binding commitments had been reached and that
further sessions would have to be held. For this purpose, each of
the Outer Islands chiefs was invited to come to Yap to consider
the formation of the legislature and express his wishes regard-
ing participation. From this point on, discussion centered around
who was to be sent to the October meeting and what they were to
do when they reached Yap. Yalmai and his interpreter, Gatelmar,
would return to Yap, accompanied by representatives from all of
the other islands. Each area would “decide for itself,” a phrase-
ology which indicated that the ranking chiefs would not attend
and that persons considered more qualified in the ways of Western
government would be co-opted.
At this initial meeting, the matter of taxes figured prominently,
and some wondered aloud whether taking part in the new legis-
23 For this portion of the account, the author is indebted to Dr. William H.
Alkire, who was engaged in field research on Woleai at the time the events here
related transpired.
24 He computed the formula for representation at about one member for every
300 population and had worked out each island’s representation, as Lamotrek one
representative, etc.
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lature would have as its only consequence heavier taxes for the
Outer Islands. There was agreement that, unless the representa-
tives who attended the next meeting understood everything that
was transpiring, they were not to affix their signatures to any pa-
per. Here reference was made to the previous attempt to have the
Outer Islands join in the formation of a district legislature and to
their refusal to commit themselves because they did not under-
stand all the ramifications. The problem of the language to be used
in the legislature figured prominently, and the view was expressed
that perhaps it might be best to delay becoming part of a new body
until enough people who could speak English well were graduated
from school and they could be sent to sit in the legislature. No
particular disagreement was voiced to the apportionment formula
presented by Yalmai, nor to the aliquot allocation of representa-
tives suggested. Rather, attention turned to how islands grouped
for the naming of more than one member in the legislature should
divide the representation among themselves. The balance of the
session was devoted to an ungermane matter, the failure of Woleai
students on Ulithi to pay the deference due by custom to the Ulith-
ian chiefs.
A second meeting held about a week later on Woleai Island,
of the atoll of the same name, was called to further consider
the unresolved problem of the students’ objectionable conduct on
Ulithi. It was feared that the Ulithi chiefs would take offense and
that this would redound to the detriment of the islands farther
east. At this time it was ascertained that all of the islands had not
yet chosen their representatives for the Yap conference, and it was
agreed to hold a third session on Utagai to firm up plans. During
the course of the Woleai meeting, one chief expressed the view
that the representatives should be instructed to follow the lead
of Mogmog at the Yap conference. However, others wanted more
information on the founding of a district legislature before agree-
ing to this course of action. The meeting served to place pressure
on the chiefs of the various islands to end their procrastinating.
On one of the Woleai islands not converted to Christianity, the is-
land’s three supernatural functionaries met the next day to choose
by divination of knots between the three candidates tentatively se-
lected as most competent to act as representative.
The final gathering took place a week later, again on Utagai, but
at another canoe shelter close to the house of a senior chief too
feeble to attend the original meeting. Signifying the importance
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of the occasion, most of the chiefs and senior clan representatives
were present. All islands had designated their representatives to
go to Yap. Except for Yalmai, no chief would be sent; instead, they
had selected senior men from chiefly clans or individuals who had
served as “chiefs of the white man.” All were fairly young by Outer
Islands standards and would be comfortable in dealing with Amer-
ican administrators on Yap.
At the first meeting, Yalmai had been careful to state he had
made the point at the Yap negotiations that, should the Outer
Islands join in a district legislature, this would not constitute a by-
passing of the Outer Islands chiefs. The chiefs themselves at the
third gathering referred to this subject, emphasizing that sending
representatives to the forthcoming Yap conference in no way re-
duced their authority. “We are still the chiefs.” Implicit was the
warning that the local political organization was not to be under-
mined by the structuring of any district legislature.
For the first time a problem which probably had been troubling
the chiefs was openly discussed. Would not this contemplated trip
parallel the old political canoe voyages and would not the Yapese
expect the representatives to fulfill all of the customary oblig-
ations and behave in traditional ways? Carefully, the old sawei
relationships were sketched for the instruction of the representa-
tives: how they were to dress (not wear red, a color traditionally
reserved for Yapese); who were their counterparts in Gagil with
whom they were to associate, to whom they were to present gifts,
and from whom a reciprocal gift could be anticipated; and other
pertinent protocol. Some of the younger men attending protested
that the legislature was a completely new organization, an Amer-
ican innovation, so traditional relationships should play no part.
The response was a cautious “maybe,” but it was best to play
it safe so that the Yapese would have no occasion to become
angry. Since most of Woleai is Catholic, gifts for Yap’s religious
functionaries could be dispensed with. And on this note, harken-
ing back to the traditional ties and behavior patterns of the old
Yapese empire, the meeting ended. Independently, one of the is-
lands which had not adopted Christianity decided also to make a
religious offering at Fais, to which it had close ties, if the field-trip
ship stopped there and did not sail directly to Yap.
Via radio the Outer Islanders then heard that transportation
for the representatives to Yap would be delayed. A few days later
came the news that the whole undertaking would be postponed
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at least a half year until the spring. There were insufficient funds
in the high commissioner’s budget to finance the transportation
and keep of so large a group of representatives. Since the revised
date was set for far into the future, the subject of the Yap meeting
dropped from discussion. At the end of the year, an American mak-
ing a flying trip to Woleai atoll was asked what had happened to
the legislative discussions on Yap and why they had been broken
off. To persons familiar with the past administration of the Trust
Territory, such an abrupt ending to even the best laid of plans will
be recognized as not too unusual an occurrence.25
25 At the end of 1967, the Yap Islands Legislature invited the Outer Islanders
to attend the May, 1968, session to work out the details for a district-wide legis-
lature (The Rai Review, Dec. 1, 1967, p. 1); and the upper house of the Congress
of Micronesia had previously requested the high commissioner to expedite the
formation of the legislature (S.R. 24 of 1967). In May, 1968, a district-wide legis-
lature was tentatively agreed to, with the Yap Islands to be represented by twelve
members, and the Outer Islands by eight.
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CHAPTER 7
Antecedents to the Congress
of Micronesia
THE ANTECEDENTS to the Congress of Micronesia may be
viewed from a number of vantage points, some within, and others
external to, the Trust Territory. The preparing of the Micronesian
people for eventual participation in a representative body of their
own choosing, its jurisdiction encompassing the entire Territory,
may be traced back to the founding of the district legislatures and
even the precursor bodies which preceded them. More immediate,
the advisory all-Territory meetings which antedated the Congress
of Micronesia, by bringing together Micronesians from the several
districts into cooperative activity, suggested an identity across dis-
trict and cultural boundaries which eventually was to bear fruit
in the nascent nationalism of the first congress. And from a third
internal perspective, it was the corpus of Territorial law which
provided the vehicle for the new congress’ exercise of powers, so
that the very evolution of Territorial law assumes significant perti-
nence.
Looking at the congress with a view to the influential events
which occurred outside of the Trust Territory, both national and
international focuses of attention appear. The indecision and ulti-
mately the failure of the Congress of the United States to provide
by statute for the organization of the Territory’s government even-
tually shifted the responsibility for structuring the new congress
onto the executive branch of the U.S. government. To a degree,
though, this effort at organic drafting left its mark on the provi-
sions engrafted into the Secretarial Order creating the Congress
of Micronesia. On the international scene, the drama of establish-
ing a Territorial legislature unfolded against the backdrop of the
United Nations. Both American and Micronesian principals played
their roles, sometimes improvising their lines, under the scrutiny
of world attention, and there is the suggestion that the nature of
the audience helped hurry the concluding act.
These various factors, although separately identifiable, jointly
exerted their impact in the structuring of the Congress of Micro-
nesia. The Secretary of Interior in 1951 by letter delegated his
legislative authority over the Trust Territory to the high commis-
sioner. The following year, in referring to this, Mr. Emil Sady, then
chief of the Pacific Islands Branch of the office of Territories also
stated that in the use of this power the high commissioner was
to be guided by the Organic Act then being debated by the Con-
gress of the United States. The interim before the bill’s adoption
was to be utilized as a trial period to test the adequacy of the
governmental structure which the Federal measure proposed for
the Trust Territory.1 A decade and a number of Secretarial Orders
later, after the high commissioner had materially expanded the
body of Territorial law through orders of his own issuance, a pres-
idential commission cast doubt over whether law-making power
had ever been properly vested in the high commissioner. Mean-
while, the United States Congress had long since abandoned its
efforts to enact organic legislation for the Territory. Mr. Sady’s re-
marks illustrate the interrelation of the many formative influences
impinging upon the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia,
and that it is only in aid of their consideration that they are treated
separately here.
TERRITORIAL LAW
On the creation of the trusteeship, July 18, 1947, Micronesia’s
existing body of law consisted of all local ordinances and procla-
mations, regulations, and orders of the former military government
which did not conflict with the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement
and Executive Order 9875, in which the President assigned the civil
administration of the Trust Territory to the Secretary of the Navy.
Proclamation No. 1 of the same date, announced by Admiral Louis
E. Denfield coincident with his appointment as high commissioner,
declared that existing customs, religious beliefs, and property right
would continue to be respected and reaffirmed the continued ef-
fectiveness of the Navy’s preexisting laws. This proclamation con-
stituted the Trust Territory’s first legislation. Thereafter, interim
regulations prepared by the deputy high commissioner at Guam
served as the “statutes of the Trust Territory.” When the deputy was
withdrawn from Guam and his staff combined with that of the high
commissioner at Pearl Harbor, all further civil administration enact-
ments were promulgated directly by the latter.
1 Official Transcript of Proceedings—Conference of District Administrators of
the Trust Territory Government, Feb. 28, 1952, p. C-1–4.
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The first of the interim regulations bears the date of February
11, 1948, over six months after the Territory’s transfer to civil ad-
ministration under the Navy. Legislation for the basic provisions
of government was delayed even further until May, due to a diver-
gence of opinion over a number of matters, including the use of
the secret ballot in elections. In all, the Navy had issued twenty-
three interim regulations, grouped in four series corresponding
to the date of the calendar year they bore, when the assignment
to Interior’s jurisdiction occurred in 1951. Under the Department
of Interior, the high commissioner commenced the practice of
decreeing Executive Orders for the administration of the Trust
Territory. All of this body of executively declared law was system-
atized when the Code of the Trust Territory took effect in Decem-
ber of 1952. The code repealed “all proclamations, regulations, or-
ders, and directives of the United States Military Government, all
[Navy] Civil Administration Orders (except District Orders), and
all Interim Regulations … not contained in” the code.2 Until the
Congress of Micronesia’s enactment of Public Law No. 1–1—the
adoption of an official flag for the Trust Territory—ushered in a
new era, the Code of the Trust Territory with supplemental Execu-
tive Orders of the high commissioner served as the basic statutory
law of the Territory.
Section 36 of the code declared that “subject to the supervision
and direction of the Secretary of the Interior, all… legislative pow-
ers of government …” were lodged in the high commissioner. Actu-
ally, Department of Interior Order No. 2658, originally delegating
the Secretary’s powers over the Trust Territory to the high com-
missioner, expressly mentioned executive power but contained no
comparable assignment of legislative authority. A new order pub-
lished five years later (No. 2812) required the high commissioner
to obtain secretarial approval of all new laws embodying impor-
tant changes in policy, but except by implication, this failed to fill
the original hiatus in the delegation of legislative authority. Little
change was introduced by the new order, and few laws were sub-
mitted for the ratification of the Secretary of Interior before being
put into effect. Following the recommendation of the Solomon
Commission, early in 1964 the Secretary of the Interior further
restricted the law-making powers of the high commissioner by
mandating Secretarial consent for all additional laws and amend-
2 Executive Order No. 32, promulgated by HiCom, Dec. 22, 1952.
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ments to any existing law, except in emergencies. The net effect was
to reduce the high commissioner’s scope of action so that he was left
with practically no legislating power without the concurrence of the
Secretary of the Interior. Full turn around occurred with the conven-
ing of the Congress of Micronesia, for enactments of the congress
receiving the high commissioner’s signature may now become effec-
tive without need of any recourse to Washington.
PRECURSORS TO THE CONGRESS
During the Navy administration, Interim Regulation 4–48 set
up a Legislative Advisory Committee, comprised of five members
appointed by the high commissioner from among the heads of Ter-
ritorial departments. Its responsibility was to draft regulations,
process laws, and consider legislation it deemed desirable for
the Trust Territory, as well as to discuss and advise the high
commissioner on policy issues. The original design was to expand
the committee by the addition of indigenous representatives, the
number to be resolved by the committee, but with an equal num-
ber from each administrative district to be selected in a manner
suggested by the district administrators and agreed to by the com-
mittee and the high commissioner. The committee was to “conduct
studies, prepare plans, and recommend legislation from time to
time to expand its functions to permit the steady evolution of this
committee from an executive advisory group to be a true legisla-
ture representing the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, at which
time the executive department representation will be discontin-
ued.”3 Interim Regulation 3–50, amending the earlier enactment’s
provisions relative to the staff of the high commissioner, continued
the existence of the committee. Appointed to the committee were
heads of divisions handling native affairs, but the addition of indi-
genes never materialized.
Near the end of Naval administration, the naming of Micro-
nesians to the committee was urged by the chief administrator
of field headquarters, who recommended “that immediate steps
be taken to extend the Legislative Advisory Committee … by the
addition of two or three indigenous representatives from each
administrative district, and all proposed laws and regulations in-
volving general policy be referred to this enlarged advisory com-
mittee for an opinion prior to their promulgation, except in cases
3 Interim Regulation 4–48, May 8, 1948, secs. 22, 23.
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of emergency.”4 Even in 1952, when the five-member Legislative
Advisory Committee had been replaced by heads of departments
serving as the High Commissioner’s Council, the idea of appoint-
ing indigenous inhabitants had not been relinquished, but with
headquarters of High Commissioner Thomas in Honolulu, the op-
erational obstacles could not be surmounted. As early as 1949 the
United States had reported to the United Nations that the Leg-
islative Advisory Committee was intended to be the nucleus for
an independent Territory-wide legislature. However, the legisla-
tive process in the Trust Territory was not to evolve along a path
paralleling that followed in English colonies, where the govern-
ment officials sitting in the legislative council have been joined
by unofficial members until the latter became the majority, and
law-making power is transferred from administrators to the rep-
resentatives of the locale. The promulgation of the Code of the
Trust Territory on December 22, 1952, marked the demise of the
Legislative Advisory Committee and of the conceptualized devel-
opment of the Trust Territory it denoted.
Simultaneous with the tentative efforts along the direction of
the English legislative council model, the Navy was also experi-
menting with what was to become the successful vehicle for the in-
stitution of a Territory-wide legislature, the representative advis-
ory conference or council. This proved to be more in harmony with
the American political idiom. After a few exploratory forays, the
advisory council composed of indigenes became institutionalized
subsequent to the Department of Interior’s assuming administra-
tive jurisdiction.
The first direct representation of Micronesians in a Territory-
wide meeting took place in Guam in September of 1949, at the
semi-annual conference of civil administrators, when administra-
tion personnel and two inhabitants from each district met primar-
ily to discuss economic affairs. Unawed by the participation of the
deputy high commissioner, members of Headquarters staff, civil-
ians from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and admin-
istration personnel from the districts, the appointed indigenous
representatives asked assistance in fishing, boat building, the
founding of additional industries, and the control of insect pests.
The perennial issue of contention, the settlement of land claims,
4 Quoted in Dorothy E. Richard, United States Naval Administration of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, 1957), III, 405.
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was raised for discussion. The Micronesians were not content with
a completely agricultural economy and sought Japanese technical
assistance for a number of economic activities; they also requested
expanded trade with Japan. In view of the opportunity for these in-
digenous representatives to communicate local attitudes and to pose
the problems the various districts faced, the meeting stood as a
prototype for the future Territorial legislature, notwithstanding the
administration’s disclaimer that the conference could not “in a strict
sense, be considered a Territory-wide legislative body.”5
Although “this first meeting of representatives from the entire
area was highly successful”6 and the results were described as
“gratifying,”7 no comparable gathering was called until 1953. The
pending shift of administrative responsibility from Navy to Interior
furnishes a possible explanation for the failure to follow up earlier
upon this initial conference. In July, 1953, “as one means of pro-
moting the concept and practice of self-government among the Mi-
cronesians,” two representatives from each of the then five admin-
istrative districts attended what was titled the “First Trust Terri-
tory Conference on Self Government” held on Truk. Any topic per-
tinent to “native social, economic, or political problems”8 could be
proposed for the agenda, but a review of the Conference Record
reveals that the delegates devoted much of their time to prepared
papers and responding to the questions the papers engendered.
The conference served the purpose of mutually acquainting the
participants with the governmental organization and the current
state of affairs in the various districts. It was the intention of the
American advisors to encourage more than an exchange of factual
information, but when the conference chairman moved toward
discussion of broader questions which dealt with Micronesians’
playing a greater role in their own governance, some of those
present protested that they were not empowered to express any
view which might commit their areas. (Here was demonstration of
willingness to facilitate the communication function of legislative
bodies, but not to make recommendations, the beginning stage of
the law-making function.) After the delegates were assured that
they would be speaking as individuals and not as representatives
5 3rd Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1950, p.
17.
6 High Commissioner, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Objectives in the
Administration of the Trust Territory (Honolulu: [circa 1952]), p. 7.
7 3rd Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 17.
8 Deputy HiCom to DistAds, Dec. 15, 1952.
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of their respective districts, the ensuing range of opinion revealed
the confusion evoked by reference to self-government in the Trust
Territory.
Both American advisors and Micronesian delegates contem-
plated periodic repetition of comparable conferences, but three
years elapsed before another was called. The reason for this gap lay
in the opinions behind High Commissioner Midkiff’s remarks to the
1954 session of the Trusteeship Council that no significant results
had been forthcoming from the Truk conference. High Commis-
sioner Nucker amplified the previous statement by saying at the
1956 meeting that the Truk conference had been held prematurely,
the delegates showed no awareness of Territory-wide problems, and
that it was difficult for them to understand what was expected of
them. Even the mechanical task of interpreting the different lan-
guages of the delegates had proven an arduous chore.
The step leading directly to the creation of a Territorial legisla-
ture was taken in 1956 when the high commissioner convened an
inter-district conference of Micronesian leaders at Trust Territory
Headquarters on Guam and reconvened the conference in 1957.
As reported to the Secretary of Interior, “The popularity of the
Inter-District Micronesian Conference among delegates and the
Micronesians generally, led to the decision to schedule it on an
annual basis….”9 More accurately, the need to structure a single,
Territory-wide institution in which indigenes could play a promin-
ent part dictated the decision, for the deliberations of the early
meetings were unknown to the average Micronesian adult,10 and
even the delegates remained confused over precisely what was to
be accomplished at the conferences. Rather, the week-long ses-
sions supplied a badly needed conduit, outside the official channel
of administrative communications, for Micronesian leaders to ob-
tain a fuller comprehension of the Administering Authority’s poli-
cies and objectives while at the same time the sessions afforded
the administration a means for gaining a better understanding
of district and local problems. Incidentally, informal discussions
between the delegates in their hotel rooms at the 1956 meeting
disclosed a determination to work toward setting up a “group rep-
resenting the whole Territory” and the existence of a consensus of
9 1958 Annual Report of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, p. 29.
10 This, notwithstanding the laborious translation and publication of the con-
ference proceedings in the various district languages.
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opinion that it was possible to do so without need to work toward
a common Micronesian culture.11
The second inter-district conference in 1957 was described to
the Trusteeship Council as “the outstanding event of the year.”12
The delegates discussed almost every major problem facing the
Territory—political development, taxation, agriculture, ship-
ping—and made a number of recommendations to the high
commissioner. The conference demonstrably encouraged a useful
exchange of views on common problems and prompted a feeling
of Territorial unity. In their third meeting, in 1958, the delegates
displayed growing concern for the objectives of the conference
and tended to emphasize the broader aspects of the Territory’s
needs rather than the interests of their respective localities. It was
at this meeting that the delegates voted to call themselves the
“Inter-District Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner,”
signifying the flowering of their consultative function. Three years
later, in 1961, they reconstituted themselves as the “Council of
Micronesia,” and at the same time, on the prompting of the high
commissioner, chose one of their members as chairman. Coinci-
dent with the last change in name, the council selected Robert’s
Rules of Order to “govern all parliamentary procedures”13 and
began the practice of formally delivering resolutions and recom-
mendations to the high commissioner upon their passage by the
council. While American personnel continued to work closely with
the council, the facts that the council cloaked itself with parlia-
mentary trappings and, particularly, that the chairmanship was
assumed by a Micronesian symbolized that power was shifting to
the indigenous membership. This change was recognized by the
district legislatures which began requesting that the council expe-
dite action which they sought.
At first, the Saipanese delegates, with their area under Naval
administration, attended only as observers; later they took part as
full council members. Each district designated its two delegates
for only a one-year term, but in 1959 the advisory body recom-
mended that the districts extend the membership to two years
and stagger terms so that each administrative district would be
assured at least one experienced representative in attendance.
11 From author’s 1956 field notes of interview with informant just returned
from attending the Inter-District Micronesian Conference.
12 TCOR, 22d Sess., 894th meeting, June 16, 1958, par. 43.
13 Minutes of the Sixth Inter-District Conference, 1961, p. 20.
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Typical of the Trust Territory’s lag in implementation, by 1964 only
half of the districts had modified their individual methods for select-
ing delegates. Further illustrating the diversity which persisted, the
“popular election” of delegates reported in Trust Territory publica-
tions embraced everything from district-wide elections by universal
adult suffrage, which in the Marshalls took three to five months to
complete, to indirect choice through the district legislature, to the
naming of a delegate by assembled island chiefs.
The staggering of members’ terms was calculated to provide
the continuity necessary to the performance of the body’s new
role as it gradually moved beyond the mere discussion of common
problems and exchange of views, the obtaining of a better
understanding of the Territorial administration, and the promotion
of a greater realization of the community of interest existing
among the islands of the Territory. By 1959 the advisory commit-
tee had a permanent subcommittee to investigate specific social
problems during the legislative interim; “the report and success
of the social subcommittee prompted the advisory committee to
create an economic subcommittee in 1960 and a political subcom-
mittee in 1961.”14 The last named subcommittee chose, as topics
to be studied between the 1961 and 1962 sessions, municipal
government, district congresses, and the Council of Micronesia it-
self. Through a personal tour of the Territory, supplemented by the
use of questionnaires, the political subcommittee consulted with
district and local officials about the possibility of the Council of
Micronesia’s serving as the “legislature” for the Trust Territory.
While the administration contemplated setting up a Territorial
legislature by 1965, it favored an intermediary stage in which
representation on a proportional basis would become an incorpo-
rated feature of the council once the popular election of all del-
egates was attained. The subcommittee, however, recommended
to the 1962 Council of Micronesia that a decision to function as
a “true legislative body” may be delayed “too long” and recom-
mended that another subcommittee be formed forthwith to review
ways and means for facilitating the change-over. The work of this
committee would then be followed by a constitutional convention
in each district to approve the findings of the committee.15
Meeting for the first time within the boundaries of the Trust
14 Micronesian Reporter, 13:2 (July–Aug., 1965), 16.
15 “Report of the Political Development Subcommittee [to the 1962 Council of
Micronesia],” Oct. 1, 1962, p. 3.
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Territory, the council in 1962 responded favorably to its subcommit-
tee’s report, declared in favor of a Territory-wide legislature, and
named what proved to be the initial drafting committee for the Con-
gress of Micronesia. This new political development subcommittee,
like its predecessor, toured the Territory, “meeting with the people,
district and municipal bodies, public officials and even political par-
ties as in the case of Saipan.”16 At a special session in March of
1963, the Council of Micronesia debated the subcommittee’s prelim-
inary proposals for the structuring of the congress and, in the form
of a resolution, adopted thirty-five items, of which the bicameral
nature of the congress was probably the most controversial. The
council delegates, after reporting back to their constituents, con-
vened again in November of 1963 in plenary session to reconsider
and, in the main, to reaffirm their earlier decisions. The drafting of
the final details of the new congressional charter then became the
burden of the high commissioner and the officials of the Interior De-
partment in Washington. At the November meeting, which was to
prove to be the last before the Council of Micronesia was disbanded,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior Carver pointed out the parallel
between the unity of purpose achieved by the council since 1956
and that attained when the Continental Congress eased distrust be-
tween the merchants of Boston and the planters of Virginia before
the adoption of the United States Constitution.
THE NATIONAL SCENE
Upon authorization by the Federal Congress, on July 18, 1947,
President Truman approved the Trusteeship Agreement between
the Security Council of the United Nations and the United States.
It was contemplated that with the Trusteeship inaugurated by
Executive Order, this would only usher in an interim adminis-
tration “pending the enactment of appropriate legislation by the
Congress of the United States providing for the future govern-
ment…” of the Trust Territory.17 Although the President declared
provision for the Territory’s administration to be “a responsibility
which falls primarily upon the Congress,”18 the congressmen at
16 Saipan District Panorama, Oct. 9, 1964, p. 1.
17 Presidential Executive Order No. 9875, July 18, 1947.
18 Public statement of President Truman issued on July 18, 1947. Public
Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman (Washington: Government Printing Of-
fice, 1963), p. 346. At least one commentator read the Trusteeship Agreement as
imposing a duty upon Congress to enact laws for governing the Trust Territory.
See Arthur L. Dean, ed., Issues in Micronesia, U.S. Paper No. 5 (New York: Amer-
ican Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947), p. 30.
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first demurred and ultimately decided differently. During the in-
terim of indecision, the President transferred administration from
Navy’s to Interior’s auspices. The adoption of Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 6 in 1953, which temporarily continued the civil administration
of the Trust Territory for only one additional year, evinced that
the congressmen concerned had not despaired of enacting legisla-
tion prescribing the Territorial government. By 1954 the Congress
collectively concluded that the Territory was unready for organic
legislation; the 83rd Congress, through Public Law 451 renounced
the endeavor and, instead, indefinitely prolonged the governance
of the Trust Territory as directed by the President. This meant that
the development of the legislative process in Micronesia was there-
after to be guided by the executive branch, under the scrutiny of
the congressional committees charged with overseeing the region’s
administration and furnishing the financing for its government. De-
spite the failure of the early attempts at organic drafting, these
efforts helped delineate the future course of legislative evolution
and may properly be recorded as antecedent factors contributing to
the founding of the Congress of Micronesia.
At the request of the President, in the summer of 1947, a special
committee of the State Department began preparing a rough draft
of an organic act for the Trust Territory. Pursuant to its terms, power
to legislate for the Trust Territory was to be invested in the Con-
gress of the United States. Upon consultation with the other inter-
ested Federal departments, there was objection to the fact that the
governor (as the region’s executive was to be named) was to be em-
powered to make directives having the force and effect of law. The
State Department draft contained no provision for a Territory-wide
legislative body, and this drew criticism on the ground that autho-
rization ought be incorporated for a general legislative or advisory
council, composed of indigenous representatives, to be founded by
the governor when he deemed appropriate.
In House Joint Resolution 391 and Senate Joint Resolution 221,
laid before the 80th Congress in 1948, note was taken of all these
criticisms. Legislative power was still to be lodged in the Con-
gress of the United States. Pending a Territorial legislature, the
governor was to be invested with the temporary ability to pro-
mulgate regulations “to govern the administration and financing
of the government of the Trust Territory….” When the gover-
nor believed it practicable, he was to prepare a plan for holding
an election by secret ballot, on the basis of universal and equal
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suffrage of “citizens” eighteen years of age or older, to select rep-
resentatives for a Territorial legislature. This body was to have
power to enact measures, not inconsistent with the proposed or-
ganic act, “concerning all matters relating to the government of
the Trust Territory, including taxation and other fiscal matters and
all matters on which the Governor may issue or prescribe regula-
tions….”19 Impliedly, the initiation of legislation was to be lodged
in the Territorial legislature, but the governor might recommend
measures for legislative attention. Bills passed over the gover-
nor’s veto were to be transmitted to the President, whose decision
was to be final. Reserved to the Congress of the United States
was the power to annul any enactment of the Territorial body. No
form for the Territory’s legislative assembly nor qualifications for
its membership was prescribed; all the “details” were left to the
criteria to be fixed by the governor’s plan. Sustaining any fully
operative legislating body was far beyond the capacity of the Terri-
tory’s indigenous inhabitants in 1948. Just as evident, acceptance
of general legislative responsibility for this distant area with its
minescule population and unique problems would have unneces-
sarily burdened an overworked Congress.
Action was deferred until a congressional visit could be made
to the Trust Territory. The subcommittee of the House Public
Lands Committee, which undertook the journey toward the end
of 1949, concluded that “until careful consideration can be given
to the social patterns of the Trust Territory, and the manner in
which these patterns can be adjusted to conform more closely
to American democratic principles without destroying the local
culture and customs, the Congress should not attempt to impose
upon the inhabitants of the Trust Territory a rigid framework
of government modeled on those of the United States Territo-
ries.”20 The subcommittee recommended only minimal organic
legislation. About this time, the pressure behind a drive for or-
ganic legislation for American Samoa was being relieved by the
prospect of Presidential transfer of jurisdiction from Navy to
the Department of Interior, and the same possibility provided
sufficient cause for deferring consideration of an organic law
governing the Trust Territory.
Senate Bill No. 2992 of the 82nd Congress, together with its
19 S.J.R. 221, H.J.R. 391, 80th Congress, 2d Sess. (1948), sec. 15.
20 U.S. Congress, House, “Report to the Public Lands Committee on the Pa-
cific” [Committee Print: 1950], p. 14.
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companion House of Representatives Bill No. 7427, represents the
high water mark in the move to have the U.S. Congress by formal
organic legislation set the scope as well as the detail of struc-
ture and procedure for the exercise of legislative authority in the
Trust Territory. It closely compares with the earlier drafts, but
the new proposal added an extra element by directing the high
commissioner “as soon as practicable [to] establish a Territorial
Advisory Council.”21 Adumbrating the fuller delineation to be in-
corporated over a decade later in the Secretary of Interior’s Order
creating the Congress of Micronesia, the bill prescribed that “the
Territorial Legislature shall have power to enact all measures for
the Government of the Trust Territory, not inconsistent with the
Trusteeship Agreement, this Act, and international agreements
and laws and regulations of the United States in force in the Trust
Territory.”22 If preferred, a bicameral body could be adopted. The
general format of the veto provisions in the previous measure was
retained, but in addition, an item veto was to be permitted. The
bill even limited the powers of the U.S. Congress to annul laws en-
acted by the Territorial legislature to a period of one year from
their receipt in Washington.
The varied influences which were contributing to shape the
drafts of organic legislation brought before the Congress received
their first legally effective expression in the Code of the Trust Ter-
ritory in 1952. Department of Interior Order No. 2658 had directed
the high commissioner, insofar as practicable, to make the interim
regulations conform to the provisions of the draft organic act sub-
mitted to the Senate, so the antecedents for Section 43 of the code
may be found on the congressional stage. As the Congress of the
United States had yet to act on any authorization for a Territorial
legislature, discretion dictated a slight modification when following
the congressional model in the form of deferring the legislature’s es-
tablishment until congressional concurrence was received.
Section 43. Territorial Advisory Council. The High Commissioner may es-
tablish a Territorial Advisory Council. He may, from time to time, assign
to the Territorial Advisory Council such legislative authority as may be
appropriate. At such time as the High Commissioner determines that
the people of the Trust Territory have reached a stage of political
development which would make it feasible for them to exercise legisla-
tive authority on territorial matters through a Territorial Legislature
he shall draft proposed legislation for the establishment of a Territo-
21 S.2992, 82d Congress (introduced April 9, 1952), sec. 15.
22 Ibid., sec. 17.
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rial Legislature and transmit it to the Secretary of the Interior for his
approval and submission to the Congress of the United States.
The portion prescribing congressional ratification was to prove
abortive, and the Congress of Micronesia owes its existence solely
to the executive branch. Fittingly, the Congress of Micronesia at
its first session repealed Section 43 of the code.23
The last significant effort to secure congressional assumption
of formal responsibility for structuring the Trust Territory’s gov-
ernment was embodied in House of Representatives Bill No. 5381,
which was dropped into the hopper of the House of Representa-
tives of the 83rd Congress on May 25, 1953. Unlike the former
measures, which the Congress regarded as “too elaborate and de-
tailed,” this draft “proposed more practical procedures.”24 In lieu
of only temporary legislative powers pending the setting up of
a Territorial legislature, the high commissioner now could pre-
scribe all laws required for the government of the Trust Territory.
Previous drafts had directed district administrators to erect local
advisory councils and had allowed for district advisory councils
composed of representatives selected by local bodies; whenever
feasible, the high commissioner was to have counseled with these
district bodies before issuing regulations. In this draft, provision
for consultation was eliminated. And finally, with one minor differ-
ence, it did no more than echo the language already part of the
Trust Territory Code governing the creation of both the Territorial
Advisory Council and Territorial legislature. The difference in the
new bill implies a little more urgency in setting up the Advisory
Council than is intimated by the code.
The 1953 draft contemplated only minimum restrictions on the
high commissioner’s discretion in the area of legislative author-
ity and allowed him great flexibility in the development of policies
and institutions dictated by the growing political consciousness
of the Trust Territory’s inhabitants. The following year, Congress
gave up the effort to erect even these modest limitations on ex-
ecutive power. Nevertheless, the growth of the legislative process
within the Trust Territory has taken place within the broad out-
23 Public Law No. 1–6, Laws and Resolutions, Congress of Micronesia, 1965.
The high commissioner did prepare a proposed Executive Order for secretarial
approval, but the Secretary elected to follow the pattern set by Samoa and issue
a Secretarial Order drafted in Washington.
24 U.S. Congress, House, Report of a Special Subcommittee, House Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, ‘Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” 84th
Congress, 1st. Sess. (1954), p. 20.
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lines envisioned by this organic legislation placed before the Con-
gress of the United States during the early years of the Territory’s
civil administration.
In 1961, a minor resurgence of interest in organic legislation
was heralded by House of Representatives Bill No. 9278 of the
87th Congress. It mandated a unicameral legislature for Microne-
sia, to be chosen indirectly by district congresses. The high com-
missioner was to have had legislative powers matching those of
the Territorial legislature, and in the event of conflict between the
laws passed by the two branches, those of the high commissioner
were to prevail. All of this was outside the pattern of the earlier
drafts, and except possibly for the recognition of the legislature’s
need for the services of a legislative counsel, it exerted no effect
upon the course of political development in the Trust Territory.
No congressional hearings were scheduled on the bill nor did the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs ask for reports
from the executive departments. The 89th and 90th Congresses
passed without any attempt being made to reintroduce the pro-
posal, and the whole matter of organic legislation for the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands again sank into limbo.
THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Each year when the United States has appeared before the
Trusteeship Council to render an accounting of its stewardship,25
the question of the nature and pace of political development in
the Trust Territory has occupied the attention of the council. As
part of this scrutiny, individual representatives on the council fre-
quently have offered recommendations on the establishment of
regional congresses and a Territory-wide legislature. The delega-
tion of the U.S.S.R. has perennially challenged the sincerity of
the United States efforts, regardless of the political events of the
year just concluded. Whether endeavoring to score propaganda
points or motivated by a more genuine interest in the welfare of
the Territory’s inhabitants, the Russians have made criticisms and
comments which have in part drawn attention to the lack of in-
digenous participation in the Trust Territory’s government and,
25 Because the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is designated a strategic
trusteeship, all functions of the United Nations relating to the area are techni-
cally assigned to the Security Council. In 1949, examination of the United States’
annual accounting of its administration of the Trust Territory was delegated to
the Trusteeship Council. Upon completion of the annual review, the latter reports
to the Security Council.
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of later years, have sought to speed the implementation of the
United States’ program for introducing a Territorial legislature.
In truth, a survey of the official record leaves the impression that
the United States has endeavored to avoid announcing any but the
most general of time tables for political change in Micronesia and,
even so, has occasionally found itself temporarily embarrassed
due to having outlined long-range plans, only to modify them later.
The unsuccessful endeavor to enact organic legislation for the
Trust Territory caused the United States delegation to have to
backtrack adroitly from its announced position. At the early meet-
ings of the council, after House Joint Resolution No. 391 and
Senate Joint Resolution No. 221 died in committee, each year the
United States reported that the executive departments concerned
were reviewing the draft of organic legislation for submission to
Congress. In 1952 it was declared that the draft legislation had
been prepared in the executive branch for congressional review
but the latter had taken no action as yet; the United States was
exerting every effort to promulgate an organic act, but it was
for congress to make the final decision. The 1953 report of the
Trusteeship Council to the Security Council noted that, in line with
the former’s recommendation favoring the enactment of basic legis-
lation for the Territory, a draft of an organic law had been resub-
mitted to the U.S. Congress. By 1954 the United States delegation
was preparing to extricate itself from the commitment, indicating it
was preferable that the adoption of organic legislation be permit-
ted to “come slowly and in response to a felt need” of the Island
people,26 and in 1955, High Commissioner Nucker stated it would
be several years before suitable legislation could be enacted for Mi-
cronesia. The aim was to present such legislation by 1960, although
the United States admitted it might even “take longer to produce a
really satisfactory and workable organic law.”27
At the 1957 meeting of the Trusteeship Council the high com-
missioner announced that he thought the time had come for an
expert in the drafting of constitutional legislation to undertake
exploratory inquiries within the Trust Territory with a view to
sketching an organic law. The impact of this statement was coun-
teracted, however, by the high commissioner’s communication of
the following year that the delegates at the 1957 Conference of
Micronesian Leaders had failed to understand the need for such
26 TCOR, 14th Sess., 550th meeting, July 7, 1954, par. 35.
27 TCOR, 16th Sess., 616th meeting, June 15, 1955, par. 63.
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an act. Finally, in 1960 the high commissioner advised the Trustee-
ship Council that “work was proceeding on the drafting of an
organic act … which … would be submitted in due course to the
United States Congress,”28 but that consultation with Microne-
sians was essential and “he did not think that the Micronesian
elite had attained a sufficiently high level to make it possible to
draw up an organic act forthwith.”29 The delegations of the other
nations on the Trusteeship Council understood full well that the
enactment of organic legislation would constitute the vehicle for
structuring permanent political institutions at the Territorial level,
so that the deferral of effort in this direction only intensified their
more pointed interest in the Administering Authority’s timetable
for the appearance of a Territory-wide legislature.
In reply to an inquiry from the U.S.S.R. at the 1949 meeting of
the Trusteeship Council, the United States stated that it had formu-
lated no express plans for the development of legislative bodies in
Micronesia. The following year the American delegate indicated it
was his country’s intention eventually to set up a competent legisla-
tive body for the Trust Territory; however, it was not known when
it would be possible to launch even a legislative advisory body for
the whole area. As early as 1949, the United States report to the
United Nations referred to the Legislative Advisory Committee on
the high commissioner’s staff as the forerunner to a future leg-
islative assembly, and this committee was again alluded to in the
1951 accounting before the Trusteeship Council. In the main, the
council responded sympathetically to the contention of the United
States that the planning for a Territorial congress would have to be
delayed until problems of transport, communication, and ethnocen-
tricity were settled, although by 1951 New Zealand was suggesting
informal Territory-wide conferences of representatives elected by
the various district legislatures then in existence.
At the 1955 meeting of the Trusteeship Council, the high com-
missioner, while stressing the need for making speed slowly,
added that the United States delegation could not foresee the
coming into being of a central legislative body “for some years.”30
The pace was quickened at the 1956 council meeting when the
United States delegation committed itself by saying the common
legislative body for the Trust Territory “would come into being in
28 TCOR, 16th Sess., 1059th meeting, April 25, 1960, par. 25.
29 Ibid., par. 33.
30 TCOR, 16th Sess., 620th meeting, June 21, 1955, par. 13.
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the foreseeable future,” and called attention to the significance
of the forthcoming conference of Micronesian leaders on Guam.31
The conversion of the advisory body to a permanent organization,
meeting annually, supplied the necessary fulcrum for members of
the Trusteeship Council to press for its metamorphosis into a fully
representative, legislating body. When, at the 1957 meeting, High
Commissioner Nucker stated it would be seven or eight years be-
fore the Territory would be able intelligently to elect individuals
to serve on a Territorial Council, a fixed target date was now
provided. Thereafter, renaming the leaders’ conference to be an
“Advisory Committee” was but the forerunner to further change,
and the United States finally committed itself to establishing a Ter-
ritorial legislative council by the year 1965.
On the international scene, the combined thrust of the Commu-
nist bloc and the newly emergent nations directed toward en-
abling all non-self-governing peoples to resolve their own political
destinies inevitably placed the United States in a defensive stance
in its ministrations of the Trust Territory. To a degree, the depend-
ably negative comments of the representatives from the U.S.S.R.
on the Trusteeship Council helped mitigate some of the pressure
by alienating other delegates who otherwise might have approved
the expression of more critical evaluations. Nevertheless, the gen-
eral position of the United Nation’s General Assembly—with its
adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, supplemented by the creation of
the Special Committee (Committee of 24) on the Situation with Re-
gard to Implementation of the Declaration—and the Trusteeship
Council’s increasingly searching examinations of political change
in the Trust Territory assured an environment hostile to any pro-
longed delay by the United States in the creation of Territory-wide
political institutions. The report of the 1961 visiting mission to
Micronesia underlined the need for transforming the Council of
Micronesia into a legislating body.
Once having fixed the year 1965 as the target date for setting
up the Congress of Micronesia, the United States was perforce re-
quired to implement the intention, and America’s friends on the
Trusteeship Council urged even greater speed. Within the Terri-
tory, the recommendations of the Council of Micronesia were only
firmed up in November of 1963. This left little time for negotia-
31 TCOR, 18th Sess., 711th meeting, June 21, 1956, pars. 4, 39.
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tions to resolve differences in viewpoint between the Council of
Micronesia, the high commissioner, and the authorities in Wash-
ington and, thereafter, for the erection of the necessary election
machinery and holding Territory-wide elections for members of
the new congress. As the attention of the Trusteeship Council was
fixed upon this crucial stage of the Territory’s political develop-
ment, every proposal of the Council of Micronesia not adopted by
the Administering Authority potentially would be subject to United
Nations review and might require American justification. Thus it
was that international interest in a Territory-wide legislature for
the Trust Territory lent strength to the position of the Council
of Micronesia and directly contributed to the final structuring of
the Congress of Micronesia. Time will weigh the wisdom of forc-
ing such a representative institution of “national” character before
the emergence of a “national” conscience.
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CHAPTER 8
A Charter for the Congress
of Micronesia
THE PROCESS of drawing up a charter for the Congress of
Micronesia extended over a period of several years.1 In mid-1962,
a preliminary draft, containing much of the detail of the final Sec-
retarial Order, was prepared in the Office of Territories of the
Department of Interior; after a series of meetings in the Trust
Territory, polishing of the completed document took place in Wash-
ington in the fall of 1964. Even then the task was not finished, and
three amendments for clarification and to “provide more felicitous
language”2 were made before the Congress of Micronesia first met
on Saipan in the summer of 1965.
Micronesians took part throughout almost the whole of the
process and received every encouragement to state their position
fully. By November 1963, when the members of the Council of Mi-
cronesia met for a second time to debate an itemized outline of the
charter, its major provisions had been discussed with their con-
stituents, and council votes may properly be treated as not just
based on the personal convictions of the council membership but,
on a number of occasions, as premised upon expressions of the
limited public opinion of the districts. Nevertheless, a review of
the whole drafting process leads to the conclusion that it was the
hand of the administration which limned the original sketch and
held the drafting pencil firmly when fleshing out the document, re-
1 This chapter is based upon the 1962 draft order prepared in the Office
of Territories, Department of the Interior, proposing the establishment of a
unicameral legislature; “Recommendations for Territorial Legislature,” pre-
sented by the Working Committee of the Territorial Legislature Committee,
Council of Micronesia, Jan. 9, 1963; “Proceedings Council of Micronesia,
Third Session, March 19 to March 26, 1963,” including Recommendation
3–1963 of the Council of Micronesia, Special Session, March 1963; “Pro-
ceedings Council of Micronesia, Fourth Session, November 12 to November
21, 1963,” including Appendix A; Report of 1964 United Nations Visit-
ing Mission, Supplement No. 2 (T/1628); TCOR, 32nd Sess., 1245th–1270th
meetings, May 28–June 30, 1965. Specific references thereto will be made
only for materials quoted.
2 Letter of Director of Office of Territories to Secretary of Interior, May 25,
1965.
fining and rejecting a number of its sections, adding the myriad
details, and covering its terms with a patina of legal jargon.
Baldly put, the operation in its totality was beyond the capacity
of the Micronesian participants; most could do little more than
concur with or demur to the more technical provisions. This realis-
tic appraisal of the limited Micronesian role does not reduce its
importance, nor is its significance thereby demeaned, for against
the reasoning of a Presidential commission and the wishes of the
administration, it was the council which opted for bicameralism.
Thereafter, not even the strong unicameral persuasion of the 1964
UN Visiting Mission or the doubts of representatives on the Trus-
teeship Council prevented this choice from being implemented.
Thus the ethnocentricity of the Trust Territory emerged trium-
phant, at least to the extent of safeguarding district identity and
slowing down action by means of a conservative second house
which was to protect traditional ways. No district-by-district pleb-
iscite on whether or not to form a Territory-wide legislature3 or
“constitutional convention” to ratify the congressional charter4
was ever held, but the Congress of Micronesia may quite properly
be regarded as having been generally structured to accommodate
the desires of the people of Micronesia. Undoubtedly, future modi-
fications will for the most part be determined by the indigenous
inhabitants themselves. Where this does not occur, just as in the
original drafting, the Administering Authority will attempt to an-
ticipate and make provision for Micronesian response, in an effort
to avoid projecting on an international backdrop issues of poten-
tial controversy.
The Administering Authority approached the creation of a leg-
islature for the Trust Territory as a collaborative and joint effort
requiring a setting forth of views from many quarters, only one of
which was the Council of Micronesia, albeit an important voice.
The council did not meet “as a chartered convention with dele-
gated authority from … [the high commissioner] to draft a legis-
lative document. Rather it met purely in an advisory capacity….
[Legally,] its recommendations … [did] not carry any more weight
than the other advisory expressions it [had] made on a variety of
matters in the past.”5 At the October 1962 session of the Council
3 Proposed by Delegate Santos at the Nov., 1963, meeting of the Council of
Micronesia.
4 See proposal of original political development subcommittee in its report to
the 1962 meeting of the Council of Micronesia, Oct., 1, 1962, p. 3.
5 Memorandum from Political Affairs Officer to HiCom, July 3, 1963, p. 3.
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of Micronesia, the Interior Department’s draft order was pre-
sented to the delegates for their consideration. A year later, at the
November 1963 meeting of the council, the delegates had before
them a background paper, prepared by the Political Affairs Office
of the high commissioner, containing a range of proposals, many
of which the council itself had advanced at a special session the
previous March.
At this crucial November meeting, the council picked its way
between the relatively few decisions before it: unicameralism vs.
bicameralism, size of membership, age and residence qualifica-
tions for legislators, length of terms, and frequency of session. In
some cases it non-committally adopted, “as submitted” from the
background paper, sections which contemplated the council would
decide between alternatives, in effect returning responsibility for
making a choice to the administration. In several instances the
council reinstated recommendations reached at the March meet-
ing which the background paper had omitted or replaced. What
emerged from the whole process was the demonstration of the
council members’ concern for those elements which related to
district representation, Micronesian involvement in elections, the
perquisites of legislative office, and the prospective balance of
power between congress and the high commissioner, all matters
of immediate personal interest or at least comprehensible to the
members in personal terms. The details of more abstract nature,
those relating to procedure, documentation, and comparable for-
malities, were left to the high commissioner and Washington to
resolve. In this, the council members revealed their lack of polit-
ical sophistication, for they failed to appreciate that it is by the
turn of the technical phrase that the terrain of legislative battle is
fixed and, not infrequently, victory or defeat predetermined.
The exchange of communications between Saipan and
Washington also evidenced the existence of a basic difference of
opinion between the high commissioner and the Office of Ter-
ritories. Except for the high commissioner’s finally counseling
the acceptance of the Council of Micronesia’s choice of bicam-
eralism, the general aim of Saipan’s attitude was to bulwark
powers of the high commissioner and to permit him as great
an area of future latitude as possible in dealing with the va-
garies of the new congress. Washington tended to regard all this
with a somewhat jaundiced eye and, in a number of instances,
narrowed or even deleted portions of the charter designed to
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strengthen the position of the high commissioner vis-a-vis the
congress. Sometimes the Office of Territories disclosed this vari-
ance in viewpoint in an indirect way by transferring authority for
final decision to Washington rather than allowing Headquarters
on Saipan to have the concluding word. Some of this divergence
may be the result of the suggestions volunteered by the 1964
UN Visiting Mission after it reviewed the tentative draft of the
congressional charter and, to a degree, may reflect accommo-
dation by the Department of Interior to UN opinion rather than
disagreement between Saipan and Washington.
From the foregoing discussion of contention it ought not be in-
ferred that, to the extent Council of Micronesia proposals were
amended or supplemented, all variances were resolved to the ad-
vantage of the Administering Authority. Sometimes the Microne-
sians would have limited themselves more than the final draft
makes necessary. In order for the congress to conduct its business,
the council would have required the presence of three-quarters of
the membership as a quorum instead of the more normal majority.
As another illustration, if the council had its way, the disqualifica-
tion of office holders from serving in the new congress would have
been effective from the very first election, rather than being de-
ferred until 1968. In any event, for the symmetry of the document
it was necessary to keep its provisions mutually consistent, and ac-
cordingly, many of the corrective modifications did not constitute
matters of major substance.
For the most part, the Administering Authority tackled the
problem of charter drafting warily, appreciating that the devel-
oping political self-consciousness within the Trust Territory and
the international setting which subjected the stewardship of the
United States to periodic scrutiny made the granting of any power
irreversible. It was not just benevolent altruism which originally
led the United States to undertake the governance of the Trust
Territory, and matters of national security still dictated that cau-
tion not be thrown to the winds. Complementing this fact, by its
actions, an irresponsible Micronesian congress with free-wheel-
ing discretion could materially embarass the United States before
the United Nations, even if the Micronesian thrusts through at-
tempts at law-making were parried by executive veto. At the start,
then, the new Congress of Micronesia would be equipped as well
as hedged with all of those procedural requirements whose value
had been proven by long American experience, and thereby aided
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while protected against itself during its formative period when its
capacity was yet unproven.
UNICAMERALISM/BICAMERALISM
The legislative committee of the Council of Micronesia, com-
prised of one representative from each of the six administrative
districts, was charged with the task of preparing a draft charter
for the full council’s deliberations. A three-man working subcom-
mittee met at the Trust Territory Headquarters with the Political
Affairs Office staff in the early part of January 1963. Aided by the
Office of Territories’ version which called for a single-house leg-
islature, the subcommittee opted for a unicameral body. Unicam-
eralism would expedite legislative activity, be less expensive and
less complicated, and the “unicameral form is considered supe-
rior by modern political scientists.”6 Thereafter, the full legislative
committee convened to discuss the report of the working commit-
tee but could not reach consensus over this structural issue. There
was no recourse but to refer the question to the full Council of
Micronesia for debate. The record of the council’s March meet-
ing discloses sharp clashes between the various delegations.
Fundamental to the debate were two sets of conflicting factors:
one—the interests of the large districts arraigned against the
small—which became significant with representation based upon
population in a singlehouse legislature; the other—the preserva-
tion of customary ways—to be achieved by the establishment of
a second house, which presumably would be more conservative
and would balance the radicalism of the lower house’s younger
membership. Some of the delegations even assumed the second
house would be composed of those with traditional authority.7 Pon-
ape was a district faced with reconciling the advantage its larger
population would afford in a unicameral body against the protec-
tion of traditionalism afforded by two houses, and its delegation
chose bicameralism.
During the course of the debate on the nature of the legislature,
the shift within the district legislatures from bicameralism to uni-
cameralism was alluded to, the paucity of qualified persons to fill
the posts of a bicameral body was stressed, and the general econ-
omy of a unicameral body emphasized. Against this were posited
the advantages of safeguarding district interests through a second
6 “Recommendations for Territorial Legislature,” op. cit., p. 1.
7 Memorandum from Political Affairs Officer, op. cit., p. 1.
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chamber structured to represent the districts, of slowing down the
legislative process, and protecting traditions and customs. Politi-
cal reasons motivated the remarks of some as “they had to speak
for bicameralism to placate the nobility at home, whose support
they need[ed] in future elections.”8 The delegate from Yap, who
had been a member of the working committee which proposed
unicameralism, voted against it at the special session, announcing
that after the 1962 meeting he had gone back to Yap and, after
listening to the people there, favored a bicameral body. In the fi-
nal ballot at the 1963 special session, only Truk and the Marianas
supported a unicameral legislature.
The issue was again joined at the regular session of the Council
of Micronesia meeting in November of 1963. The record of the
proceedings indicates that the administration favored unicameral-
ism but carefully refrained from instructing the delegates to vote
against bicameralism. The Truk delegation reported later that it
was the Yap delegation’s switch in favor of bicameralism which
was decisive on the first poll.9 Thereafter, although the debate
waxed hot and parliamentary maneuvering obfuscated the coun-
cil’s deliberations, bicameralism triumphed.
The delegates to the council had no assurance that the Admin-
istering Authority would accept their recommendation; therefore
they offered as a second choice the adoption of a unicameral
legislature with equal district representation. Their caution was
unnecessary, as the high commissioner counseled the Director of
the Office of Territories to honor the council’s first choice. “The
reasons impelling the Micronesians to favor the bicameral system
are somewhat the same as those which impelled the inclusion of
such a system in the American Constitution. This system has not
proved to be a failure and I doubt if it will in Micronesia. The pro-
ponents of the unicameral system have, so to speak been undercut
by our own forefathers.”10
The heat of the debate at the March and November 1963 ses-
sions of the Council of Micronesia, the closeness of the vote
which adopted bicameralism, and the inclusion of an alternative
countenancing the establishment of a unicameral legislature cu-
mulatively had the untoward effect of encouraging the 1964 UN
Visiting Mission to urge the adoption of the unicameral second
8 Ibid., p. 2.
9 Truk Tide, Jan. 15, 1964, pp. 8, 9.
10 Letter of HiCom to Director of Office of Territories, Dec. 18, 1963.
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choice, possibly with eighteen or even twenty-four members. The
report to the UN noted that “the Mission would be reluctant to
concede that the elaborate institutions of federalism, with their in-
evitable balancing of forces and diffusion of power, are needed in a
territory with a population the size of a small city.”11 Here the la-
tent contradiction between UN sponsorship of self-government and
the UN desire to direct that government’s course became apparent.
The Administering Authority remained undeterred, and indeed, as
time was now becoming of the essence, it probably was too late to
reverse a determination as fundamental as bicameralism.
Thus it was that the Congress of Micronesia was structured
with two houses (Sec. 2)12 and that the enactment of any legisla-
tive act requires the concurrence of both. Bills may originate in
either house and may be amended or rejected by the other (Sec.
13), so there is no legal basis for ranking one chamber above
the other. Nevertheless, in light of the debate which preceded the
founding of the congress and the general process of bicameral
American legislatures, from its very inception the House of Del-
egates, as the smaller of the two bodies, its members enjoying a
term of office double that of the two-year General Assembly,13 has
conceived its role as that of the “upper house,” with all the associ-
ated nuances of seniority.
At the special session of the Council of Micronesia which met in
the spring of 1963, the delegates agreed that upon the expiration
of one year, and if necessary at every regular session thereafter,
the nature of the new congress should be re-examined. If the con-
gress should so favor and the high commissioner approve, the
body would then be converted into a unicameral legislature. Some
of the interim drafts prepared after the March session omitted
this proviso, but in the final Secretarial Order it re-emerged in the
form of a requirement that the congress convene in joint session
at its fifth regular meeting in 1969 to debate the continuation of
the bicameral structure. The joint session’s recommendation, to
be adopted by a majority vote, is first to be submitted to the high
commissioner and by him relayed to the Secretary of the Interior
(Sec. 22). Despite the ability of the General Assembly to outvote
11 Report of 1964…, op. cit., par. 207.
12 All section references are to Secretary of Interior Order No. 2882, dated
Sept. 28, 1964, establishing the Congress of Micronesia. (See appendix.)
13 Throughout this book, the two houses of the Congress of Micronesia are
referred to by their original names, and not as “Senate” and “House of Represen-
tatives,” the changed names requested by the first congress.
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the House of Delegates in a joint session, short of paralyzing sta-
sis engendered by incapacity of the two bodies to cooperate, there
is little likelihood that the Micronesians will reverse their original
decision favoring bicameralism. Nevertheless, an “escape route”
has been left open, and the last word remains with the Secretary
of the Interior.
LAW-MAKING AND BUDGETARY POWERS
The Council of Micronesia directed relatively little attention
to the scope of the legislating authority to be granted the new
Territorial legislature. Probably this may be attributed to Inte-
rior’s original draft order, which declared the body’s legislative
power would “extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, except
that no such legislation may be inconsistent with (a) treaties or
international agreements of the United States; (b) the laws of the
United States applicable to the Trust Territory; or (c) sections 1
through 12 of the Code of the Trust Territory,” the “bill of rights”
sections of the code. The council would have supplemented this by
allowing the congress to amend the charter by a two-thirds vote,
followed by high commissioner approval, or as an alternative, by
action of the Secretary on his own initiative. This was eventu-
ally resolved by Secretary of Interior Order No. 2882 limiting all
amendments to the further order of the Secretary (Sec. 24). As
noted by the Director of the Office of Territories, the Secretarial
“Order in its major substantive provisions confers upon the Con-
gress as much or more legislative authority and responsibility as
was recommended by the Council.”14 In fact, greater law-making
power resides in the Territory now than before the advent of the
congress; by 1964 Secretarial Order all laws issued by the high
commissioner required Secretarial approval, while congressional
action now may become effective on executive approval without
any referral to Washington.
In elaborating before the Trusteeship Council on the limitations
placed around congressional action, the high commissioner
opined there were then about six acts of the United States Con-
gress which applied to the Territory, mainly relating to the au-
thorization of Federal appropriations, the opportunity to obtain
certain services furnished by the United States government, the
14 Letter of Director of Office of Territories to Legislative Secretary, Mari-
ana Islands District Legislature, Sept. 30, 1964, published in Saipan District
Panorama, Oct. 9, 1964, pp. 2, 3.
204 A Charter for the Congress of Micronesia
transfer of funds of the former Island Trading Company, and the
measure placing Micronesian radio operators under Federal Com-
munications Commission licensing.15 The treaties which conceiv-
ably might apply are more numerous but have little impact on the
internal governance of the Trust Territory.16
The Secretarial Order eventually put into effect also prohibits
the congress from imposing taxes upon United States or Trust
Territory property or from discriminating in taxation between res-
idents and non-residents. Inter-district import and export levies
are proscribed, and import duties on goods brought into the Trust
Territory are reserved solely to the Congress of Micronesia and
the high commissioner (Sec. 3). As none of the general laws of
the United States, such as criminal law, apply to the Trust Terri-
tory, “the Micronesian Congress therefore … [has] a wide range
of legislative authority, which … [embraces] almost every matter
affecting the general public, such as criminal law, business law,
administrative services and public services.”17
Denying the congress all power to amend the “bill of rights”
of the Trust Territory Code drew objection from those members
of the Council of Micronesia who favored direct governmental as-
sistance to religious institutions. Section 1 of the code, as it then
read, was highly specific in providing for the separation of church
and state. The Micronesian contention was that the new congress,
as the custodian of the legislating power for the Trust Territory,
was the proper body to delineate the bill of rights to be observed
within the area. In opposition was the position taken by the Inte-
rior Department that those portions of the code were based upon
the authority of the Trusteeship Agreement, as well as the Charter
of the United Nations and the Constitution of the United States:
“If a change should have to be made, it would have to be made by
the Administering Authority.”18 And so the matter rests, although
15 TCOR, 32nd Sess., 1247th meeting, June 2, 1965, par. 38. Others besides those
listed by the high commissioner are the Federal Disaster Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 1855–582, as
amended, and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, P.L. 88–452, 78 Stat. 504.
16 The United States lists 61 treaties and other international agreements
which potentially have application to the Trust Territory; included are 18 concern-
ing telecommunications and postal conventions; 10 related to security, mutual
defense, or otherwise war associated; 7 dealing with aircraft and air transport; 5
consular conventions; 4 on narcotic control; 2 concerned with the South Pacific
Commission; 2 providing for extradition; 2 on the international sugar agreement;
and 11 miscellaneous. See 17th Annual Report of the United States to the United
Nations, 1964, Appendix A, pp. 165–169.
17 TCOR, op. cit., par. 39.
18 “Proceedings Council of Micronesia, Fourth Session …,” op. cit., p. 22.
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a later amendment to this section of the code may throw the whole
question of governmental aid for religious institutions, particularly
schools, into the domain of the courts.
One of the features of the congressional charter which
prompted highly critical comments before the UN Trusteeship
Council, as well as causing strong expressions of dissatisfaction
among the members of the first Congress of Micronesia, was that
relating to the Congress of Micronesia’s curtailed control over the
purse. Briefly put, the congress is to have full discretion over its
own sources of funds and the manner in which they are to be used.
Moneys derived from Federal appropriations are not subject to the
congress’ direction, so that when congress enacts legislation re-
quiring the expenditure of funds in ways other than as Federally
budgeted, it must also supply the necessary moneys (Sec. 5, as
amended).19 In addition, in the Office of Territories’ draft consti-
tution, it was declared that the high commissioner was to submit
the Trust Territory budget to the new legislature for review. The
Council of Micronesia’s working subcommittee approved of this,
reasoning that “advice of the Congress will be valuable to the High
Commissioner and will develop Congress familiarity and experi-
ence in fiscal matters.”20 As finally included in the Secretarial
Order creating the congress, the high commissioner is directed
to present a preliminary budget plan to the congress in joint ses-
sion for its review, prior to sending his annual request for Federal
funds to the Secretary of the Interior. The high commissioner is
also to transmit congressional recommendations not fitted into
the final budget to the Secretary for his information (Sec. 5, as
amended). By virtue of these provisions, “the Trust Territory …
[will] probably have two budgets eventually, one which … [is]
part of the United States budget, and another deriving from the
revenue measures enacted by the Micronesian Congress itself,
which would be separate from the Administration’s budget and
quite autonomous.”21 With a more adequate system of taxation,
the amount that could be realized by the congress and be subject
to appropriation might be as much as $2,000,000; at the inception
19 It is now generally accepted that this does not prevent the congress
from enacting legislation requiring funds for implementation, without appro-
priating such moneys. Under these circumstances, the high commissioner is
not obligated to administer the act until funds are forthcoming from some
source.
20 “Recommendations for Territorial Legislature,” op. cit., p. 5.
21 TCOR, op. cit., par. 66.
206 A Charter for the Congress of Micronesia
of the congress it was estimated that the amount amenable to its
direct control would be around $500,000 a year.
The budgetary system of the United States requires that the
technical steps be instituted several years before the moneys are
appropriated by the U.S. Congress and are ready for expenditure.
The preliminary estimates for the fiscal year 1967, which would
start on July 1, 1966, almost a year after the convening of the first
Congress of Micronesia, would be prepared in April of 1965, and
these estimates constitute the “preliminary budget plan” deliv-
ered to the congress on Saipan. However, final estimated figures
might not be arrived at until after the congress’ adjournment. Fit-
ting the Congress of Micronesia into the United States budget
process in a meaningful manner thus raised difficulties. Empow-
ering the Congress of Micronesia to advise on an incomplete plan
which would not be implemented until almost a full year later,
and then only as modified by the U.S. Congress and the Admin-
istering Authority in consort, gave the Congress of Micronesia
little of the power of the purse so essential to a system of gov-
ernment based upon the separation of powers. The 1964 visiting
mission suggested that the Congress of Micronesia at least have
final say on the budget as it went from the Trust Territory to Wash-
ington. Although changes might be made by the Department of
Interior or by the U.S. Congress, “the Mission would hope for a
conscious effort to trust the combined wisdom of the Territorial
Administration and legislature. … No rights of the United States
Government would be infringed, while the Congress of Micronesia
would have an effective voice in budgetary policy.”22 Some dele-
gations in the UN Trusteeship Council would have gone further,
favoring a system under which the U.S. Congress would appropri-
ate block grants for the administration of the Territory and the
Federal funds would then be expended in accordance with the di-
rections of the Congress of Micronesia. At this stage of political
development, with the vast bulk of Territorial expenditures being
funded with Federal moneys, the U.S. Congress is not favorably
disposed to surrendering its prerogative of monetary control, irre-
spective of Territorial attitudes or international displeasure.
ELECTIONS
In the United States the traditional day for holding general
22 Report of 1964…, op. cit., par. 232.
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Federal elections falls on the first Tuesday following the first Mon-
day in November in even-numbered years. Although no compelling
reason required the adoption of the same day in the Territory,
from the outset, planning for the Secretarial Order called for bien-
nial congressional elections also to be conducted on this day (Sec.
9). The special date of January 19, 1965, was fixed for the first
general elections (Sec. 27), as insufficient time remained between
the late September promulgation of the Secretarial Order and the
normal November election day. It was also declared by the Sec-
retarial Order that legislators are to be elected by secret ballot
of the qualified voters of their respective districts, which required
the employment of novel strategies so as not to disenfranchise the
many illiterate Micronesians.
The Council of Micronesia debated spreading the election over
a period of three weeks, but upon the objection of the Marshalls
that the time span was too short to complete the polling, the
delimitation was amended to be six months. All this was ignored
in the drafting of the Secretarial Order, with its specification of a
single election date, regardless of the fact that the physical dis-
persion of the Trust Territory precludes the holding of a Territory-
wide election within even a 24-hour day. Through convenient in-
terpretation of the order, the first election in 1965 actually com-
menced on December 28 and was not completed until January 27.
The Council of Micronesia voiced no objection to a provision
in the draft order which declared that the franchise should be
vested in resident citizens of the Trust Territory who are eighteen
years of age and over. (Citizenship may be obtained by birth or
naturalization.) These voter requirements were later made part of
the Secretarial Order, along with a clause empowering the con-
gress to prescribe additional qualifications; no property, language,
or income limitation may ever be imposed, nor any disqualification
based upon illiteracy, tribal custom, or social position, nor upon
difference of race, color, ancestry, sex, or religious belief (Sec. 8).
This long list mainly represents the effort of Washington to guar-
antee full adult suffrage and to guard against any of the Territory’s
caste, class, or status delineations’ forming the basis of electoral
discrimination.
The method for nominating candidates gave rise to consider-
able debate in the Council of Micronesia. The original report of the
working subcommittee would have had nominations by petition
requiring ten to twenty signatures, accompanied by a good-faith
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election fee of ten dollars. Objections stressed that the fee might
prevent qualified persons from running. In lieu of this, it was
variously proposed that nomination of candidates be conducted
by district legislature or municipal council, or that primary elec-
tions be held. The whole nomination process caused concern in
the minds of some delegates fearful that candidates might come
from the nobility and rich or that the suspicions of the unsophisti-
cated might be engendered by nomination through use of petition.
More fundamentally, control of the nomination process promised
leverage for influencing the electorate’s vote, and some of the
delegates fully grasped the political significance of the alterna-
tive nominating procedures under consideration. The delegates
resolved the disagreement by an ambiguous decision to have the
system of elections kept flexible to suit the conditions of each
district. The Secretarial Order left the establishment of rules gov-
erning elections to the high commissioner for the first election and
to the laws thereafter prescribed by the congress (Sees. 9, 27).
MEMBERS’ QUALIFICATIONS, RIGHTS, AND DISABILITIES
A number of items in the congressional charter were by nature
peculiarly within the ken of understanding of the council mem-
bers. They could well appreciate the importance of the conditions
to qualify for candidacy, the necessity of adequate compensation,
and the need for supplementation of the legislative prerogatives
with staff and powers of investigation.
As finally expressed in the Secretarial Order, to be eligible for
election a prospective candidate has to be a citizen for at least
five years, twenty-five years of age or over at the time of election,
and a bona fide resident of the district from which he is elected
for at least the one year preceding the election (Sec. 7). In an
effort to secure persons with maturity, experience, emotional sta-
bility, and community respect, the working subcommittee of the
Council of Micronesia favored a minimum age of thirty years and
similarly incorporated a five-year citizenship period. The March
special session of the council in 1963 lowered the age to twenty-
five years for members of the General Assembly, but for the House
of Delegates it increased the citizenship requirement to at least
seven years and added the one-year residency. The working paper
before the November council meeting assembled a range of alter-
natives, should the legislature be unicameral, but merely repeated
the council’s qualifications for candidates seeking election to a bi-
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cameral legislative body. Despite its prior action, at the November
meeting the council voted in favor of setting the age for candidacy
at twenty-five years.
To some members of the UN Trusteeship Council the minimum
age of twenty-five for holding office seemed restrictively high in
view of the fact that it was the younger generation of Microne-
sia which had greater opportunities for education. To at least one
delegation it appeared more logical to place an age requirement
at twenty-one. The Administering Authority defended the choice
of the higher age on the ground that the Council of Micronesia
“wished to give recognition to traditional patterns and at the same
time to adapt them sufficiently to allow the younger generation to
play a significant role.”23 The high commissioner also pointed out
that in the Palau district, until recently, twenty-six years had been
a minimum age for voting and the qualification for holding office
had been even higher.
The Council of Micronesia delegates were also troubled by the
effect of temporary absence from the district—as for schooling,
business, and health—on a person’s candidacy. Notwithstanding a
vote that such absence not constitute a disqualification, the final
Secretarial Order is silent. However, the normal rule that a person
neither gains nor loses a residence while temporarily away from
his domicile is probably broad enough to remove cause for con-
cern. The requirement that in order to be eligible for election a
person must have been a bona fide resident of the administrative
district from which he is elected for at least one year directly pre-
ceding his election had as one of its consequences permitting a
person to run from any one of several General Assembly districts
just so long as residence within the administrative district could
be proven. This gave trouble during the course of the elections
held the succeeding January and was the subject of clarifying opin-
ions from the office of the Trust Territory’s Attorney General.
When the Office of Territories prepared its draft for
consideration by the Council of Micronesia, it proposed disqual-
ifying candidates who had been expelled from the legislature for
giving or receiving a bribe and also those convicted of felony un-
less pardoned and their civil rights restored. These limitations
were later folded into the Secretarial Order (Sec. 7). Prior to the
convening of the Congress of Micronesia, the latter disqualifica-
23 TCOR, op. cit., 1253rd meeting, par. 39.
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tion was amended so as to be applicable only to those convicted
of felony before a Trust Territory court or one with the jurisdic-
tion of a Federal court.24 The language of this section was to
play a prominent role in the challenge to the seating of Marianas
Delegate Jose Cruz when the first congress convened.
The prohibition against a congressman’s holding another posi-
tion went through many reformulations before being finalized in
the language of the Secretarial Order. The Office of Territories
proposed to deny a congressman the right to accept any other
public employment or to become a private employee. The working
subcommittee of the Council of Micronesia was of the opinion that
a legislator should not hold any other elected or appointed public
office or be employed in any governmental capacity, for the new
office was to be a “full time one.”25 The delegates to the Council
of Micronesia believed this limitation too onerous and rephrased it
so as to declare that individuals in staff positions26 with the Admin-
istering Authority on Territorial and district levels, as well as the
judiciary, were foreclosed from holding congressional office. The
high commissioner’s immediate preference was to further reduce
this restriction so as only to disqualify those in Headquarters-
staff positions and district judges. The delegates to the Council of
Micronesia later concluded that employees holding top-level pol-
icy positions in the districts or at Headquarters, and (presumably)
judges, should be considered ineligible for the office of congress-
man, although the proceedings of the Council of Micronesia for its
fourth session are not a model of clarity in respect to this point.
During the last stages of the drafting process, this section
underwent major revision on Saipan: ineligibilty to candidacy of
judges and administrative policy makers at both the district and
Headquarters level was to be effective at once, while at the 1968
elections to the congress a comparable disqualification was to
be extended to persons serving as members of the district legis-
24 Order No. 2882, Amendment No. 1, dated June 10, 1965. As the Attor-
ney General of the Trust Territory had already ruled that the original language
of the order only disqualified persons convicted in a Trust Territory court, the
effect of the amendment was to both broaden the original order and remove
all ambiguity.
25 See “Recommendations for Territorial Legislature,” op. cit., p. 5. Contem-
plated was full separation of powers between the three branches of government,
and not any parliamentary form such as that advocated by Dr. Harold Seidman.
Congressional Record, Senate, 86th Congress, 2d Sess. (Feb. 4, 1960), p. 2010.
26 The disqualifying of persons holding “staff” positions was first written into
the Truk charter of 1963; see pp. 82–83.
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latures and to compensated officials of municipalities. The total
impact would have been to encourage the emergence of a distinct
body of politicians identified with the Congress of Micronesia, sep-
arate from other decision-makers in the executive and judicial
branches of the Territorial government; it would also have placed
the Territorial-level legislator apart from office holders function-
ing in district and municipal government. Conceivably, it could
have had the unexpected consequence of opening a wholly new
role for traditional title-holders not dependent upon governmental
compensation for their livelihood.
All this was resolved by the Secretarial Order which deleted
any reference to disqualification for municipal office holding. For
other offices the limitation was not made effective until the 1968
elections, upon the premise that the “services of [the] most highly
qualified Micronesian leaders who would be extremely valuable
during [the] formative period of [the] Congress” would otherwise
be lost.27 In response to the 1964 UN Visiting Mission’s comments,
the provisions apply only to eligibility to serve rather than to run
as a candidate for office (Sec. 11). The effect of this last change
was to save an office holder from the necessity of resigning should
he wish to stand for a congressional post; the decision can be
deferred until his success at the polls has been determined. As
a result of this sequence of amendments, Secretarial Order No.
2882 setting up the congress is not in accord with the position
taken by the delegates to the Council of Micronesia and has drawn
the strong objections of at least one elected member of the House
of Delegates.28 Delegates at the Trusteeship Council have also
voiced the fear that by allowing current office holders to serve as
congressmen, the independence of the congress as opposed to the
Administering Authority might be compromised.
The prohibition against dual office holding is integrally tied to
the compensation to be paid congressmen, as the remuneration of
any currently held government post will be weighed by a prospec-
tive candidate against that receivable in the new legislative office.
The fixing of the congressional salary also turns around the
amount of work a congressman will be expected to perform, which
may be partially measured by the length and frequency of con-
gressional sessions. Little opportunity for employment outside of
27 Radiogram from HiCom to the Office of Territories, Sept., 1964.
28 Letter of Delegate John O. Ngiraked to Secretary of Interior Udall, Nov. 19,
1965.
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government presently exists in the Trust Territory, so the dele-
gates to the Council of Micronesia well understood the inter-re-
lationship of all these factors as they debated their recommenda-
tions for the congress.
The Office of Territories’ draft favored semi-annual congres-
sional sessions and an annual salary of $2,080 a year. The working
subcommittee of the council concurred on twice yearly sessions.
However, it was of the opinion that frequent traveling would pre-
vent congressmen from cultivating supplemental crops for subsis-
tence. Also it believed that congressmen ought to be attractively
paid, as an incentive to obtain qualified people and because of
the responsibilities and the nature of the position. As an alterna-
tive to the Office of Territories’ proposal, the committee suggested
an annual compensation pegged on the Micronesian pay plan at
C-3 level or above. This would be regarded as a very high income
for a Micronesian. After debating the matter of compensation, the
Council of Micronesia both at the March special session and the
November 1963 regular session opposed inclusion in the charter
of any express salary; instead, compensation should be fixed by
law. This would leave the matter to the discretion of the high com-
missioner for the first sitting of the congress, and thereafter the
congress would set its own pay. From the work paper prepared
by the Political Affairs Office for the November meeting, it was
clear that the Trust Territory administration approved of annual
sessions with remuneration at a daily rate computed on a scale
equivalent to proration of the Micronesian C schedule for each day
the congress met and while the members were on travel status.
In addition, members would be furnished travel and per diem at
the standard Trust Territory government rate. Also, each member
was to be allowed up to three weeks’ travel following a regular
session to report to his electorate. The final provisions of the Sec-
retarial Order bowed to the philosophy of the administration on
Saipan and incorporated into the congressional charter the figure
of sixteen dollars per day for each day the congress is in session,
while the members are in travel status to and from the provisional
Headquarters and when on other official legislative business. The
last embraces committee work in the interim between sessions. In
addition, travel expenses and per diem at standard Trust Territory
rates are to be allowed (Sec. 19). No compensation, travel, or per
diem may be allowed in excess of the amount budgeted.
The 1964 UN Visiting Mission detected a tendency by the
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administration “to look upon representational duties as something
of a temporary interruption in a member’s normal and private
activities,” as “perhaps a nostalgic glance backward (and not the
only one …) to the early days of the United States; a reminder of
a more leisurely approach to legislation.” It felt the circumstances
of Micronesia were quite distinct. The work of a congressman was
going to be of a full-time nature, and “the concept of working
members should be reflected in the arrangements made for them,
not least in the method by which they will be paid…. The Mission
considers it would be much preferable to pay an annual salary plus
the necessary allowances.” To the objection that a per diem al-
lowance might be needed to persuade members to attend sessions
regularly, the mission noted that “a fixed annual salary together
with an appropriate daily stipend during the Congressional ses-
sion would seem adequate.”29
The fixing of the congressional remuneration on a daily basis
was consonant with the decision of the Trust Territory administra-
tion for the congress to have only one session a year, supple-
mented by such special sessions as might be called by the high
commissioner (Sec. 12). This was unilaterally arrived at and in
conflict with the Council of Micronesia’s holding for semi-annual
sessions, one of them each year convening at different places
within the Territory.
Although some question was raised as to the thirty-day maxi-
mum length for sessions, the council did not feel it necessary to
ask for a longer period because of the contemplated semi-annual
meetings. As observed by the UN Visiting Mission, a thirty-day pe-
riod is not an ungenerous figure, but remains an arbitrary one. The
sufficiency of the thirty-day limitation has yet to be decided on the
basis of experience. Presciently, in meeting the objections voiced in
the Trusteeship Council that too restrictive a time had been allotted,
the high commissioner replied that a special session could always
be convened should the need arise. Precisely that occurred in 1965
when the first Congress of Micronesia did not complete its work
within the thirty days afforded, and was repeated the following
year. In retrospect, the same attitude which characterizes Ameri-
can state government, and has the executive branch look toward
the period when the legislature is not in session as a respite from
the interruption of legislative “interference,” appears to have dic-
29 Report of 1964…, op. cit., pars. 214–216.
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tated the decision to hold the Congress of Micronesia to an annual
session of but one month’s duration.
Dating from the preparation of the draft by the Office of Territo-
ries, the congressional charter declared that the congress should
be the sole judge of the election and qualifications of its members
and that members would receive immunity for any speech or de-
bate in the congress and be privileged from arrest during the
sessions of the congress and in traveling to and from the sessions.
Section 16 of the Secretarial Order also prescribes that the con-
gress “shall have and exercise all the authority and attributes
inherent in legislative assemblies….” The high commissioner has
assured the Trusteeship Council that this grant of power, together
with the authorization to institute and conduct investigations, is-
sue subpoenas, and administer oaths, enables the new congress to
erect a complete committee structure and to carry on investiga-
tions in the interim between sessions.
PROTECTIONS FOR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
From the outset, the council’s working subcommittee looked
with favor upon the high commissioner’s being empowered to
transmit communications and messages to the new legislative
body. As there was no reason for the high commissioner to be
other than pleased with this function, it remained in the final form
of the Secretarial Order (Sec. 4). But this afforded no protection
to the high commissioner should the congress refuse to follow his
lead. At the November 1963 meeting, the council had before it a
companion provision contained in the Office of Territories’ draft
which went much further, authorizing the high commissioner, with
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to promulgate legislation
which had been submitted to the congress as “urgent” and which
the congress had failed to pass either in its original form or
amended in a manner acceptable to the high commissioner. The
proceedings of this fourth session of the council indicate that
some of the delegates were troubled by the potential scope of
such designation and that the council voted to delete the power.
Nevertheless, this provision borrowed from American Samoa’s
constitution remained in the redraft prepared by Saipan, but with
the qualifier that the “urgent” label must be affixed no later than
seven days prior to the end of the session.
As an additional measure of protection, the high commissioner
also proposed that his power to promulgate laws when the congress
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was not in session be expressly recognized in the congressional
charter. The exercise of this power would be dependent upon his
finding that an emergency existed and that the public interest re-
quired such action. This ran counter to the prevailing sentiment in
Washington, where Secretarial Order No. 2876 was soon drastically
to limit the then currently possessed emergency law-making powers
of the high commissioner. As was to be anticipated, the Department
of Interior would not concur in allowing interim emergency power to
remain solely subject to the discretion of the high commissioner, and
this portion of the draft was deleted. The enactment of laws within
the Trust Territory, consequently, is dependent upon the Congress
of Micronesia’s being in session, and even promulgation of “urgent”
legislation by the high commissioner requires both prior referral to
the congress for adoption and ratification by the Secretary of the
Interior (Sec. 4). The high commissioner’s legislative program con-
stitutes but a fraction of the total work load of the congress, and
except for “urgent” legislation, the latter is entirely free to accept,
amend, or reject the administration’s bills. Furthermore, as noted
by the high commissioner before the Trusteeship Council, the con-
ditions on the promulgation of “urgent” legislation “would seem to
counter any tendency there might be to label ordinary legislative
proposals as ‘urgent!’”30
Throughout the period of firming up the congressional charter,
all were agreed upon lodging veto power over the acts of the
new congress in the high commissioner. This included partial ve-
toes over items of appropriation. When the delegates attending
the November meeting of the Council of Micronesia discovered
that reference to the veto had inadvertently been omitted from
the draft before them, they voted to reincorporate it (at the same
time eliminating retention by the high commissioner of the right to
promulgate “urgent” legislation). In the council’s version, the high
commissioner would have but twenty days to act upon legislation,
and should he fail to do so, a bill would become law without his sig-
nature. Upon his rejection, both houses by a two-thirds vote might
repass the measure, and if this time he did not approve within
fifteen days, the measure would be sent to the Secretary of the
Interior. Again a time limit, now ninety days from receipt, was to
be specified for Secretarial action; in the absence of a veto within
that period, the law was to become effective. These time limits
30 TCOR, op. cit., 1247th meeting, par. 90.
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were premised upon the district legislatures’ long experience with
delays at Trust Territory Headquarters following the forwarding
of their resolutions to the high commissioner for review and ap-
proval.
The final Secretarial Order made the veto clause conform more
closely to the usual practices of American legislative bodies. The
high commissioner is allowed ten days within which to act upon a
measure; otherwise a bill becomes law without receiving his signa-
ture. Should the congress by adjournment prevent the measure’s
return, the high commissioner has thirty days after the measure
is presented within which to sign, and if he fails to act, the bill
will be pocket vetoed (Sec. 14). The high commissioner did not
favor lodging in the new congress the power to adopt measures
over his veto and doubted that a repassage clause was neces-
sary or desirable “taking a practical view of political experience
and interest in Micronesia.”31 With this Washington did not agree
and returned to the final Secretarial Order the language it had
originally proposed, giving the congress the right to resubmit a
measure disapproved by the high commissioner upon obtaining a
two-thirds majority of the entire membership. Should such a bill
not receive the high commissioner’s signature within twenty days,
he must forward it together with his comments to Secretary of the
Interior. The latter must respond within ninety days or the mea-
sure dies. It was somewhat naive of the Micronesians to believe
that the Secretary, like the high commissioner some years before,
would willingly bind himself to act on pending legislation under
the penalty of its automatically going into effect should he fail to
veto it. As a compromise between the varying positions of Saipan
and Washington, the Secretarial Order precludes repassage over
veto at the same session of the congress in which the measure
originated; thereafter, within a period of fourteen months, a ve-
toed bill may be reconsidered (Sec. 14), a compromise which
again borrows from the constitution of American Samoa.
During the entire drafting process there was consensus that the
high commissioner ought be able to call the congress into special
session. Contrary to the view voiced in the Trusteeship Council
that this power should also be lodged in the body itself, so that
upon its own volition the congress might convene, no such posi-
31 It should also be added that the high commissioner noted this was dis-
cussed with the Assistant Secretary of the Interior during his visit to the Trust
Territory and was concurred in by him.
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tion appears to have been advocated within the Trust Territory
during the deliberations by the Council of Micronesia. It must be
added by way of commentary that the Proceedings of the Coun-
cil are little more than summary accounts, so it is impossible to
ascertain whether the delegates approved of all of the conditions
surrounding the holding of special sessions—namely, that the con-
gress would be limited to consideration of matters contained in
the call of the special session by the high commissioner and in his
messages to the congress while in special session. The delegates
to the council probably also failed to grasp the full significance of
the high commissioner’s authority to set the length of the special
session (Sec. 12).
The original draft prepared by the Office of Territories contains
one provision calculated to save the high commissioner from being
pressured by members of the congress who apply for appointment
to an office they have created for that purpose. The disqualifica-
tion of a congressman for a new office he has established runs for
one year beyond the term for which he was elected. This was re-
tained in the Secretarial Order and eliminates one means by which
congressmen might have obtained personal advantage in turn for
supporting the high commissioner’s programs before the congress
(Sec. 20).
PROCEDURAL DETAIL
A large part of the Secretarial Order setting up the Congress
of Micronesia deals with procedural detail intended to assure
harmony between the two houses, the maintenance of proper
records, and the following of reasonable procedures. Collectively,
they promise to ease the burden of the high commissioner by
insuring that minimal safeguards must be observed by the new
congress. Many of the provisions also protect the congressmen
themselves against questionable practices in which some of their
colleagues might engage to their mutual disadvantage. Later, with
the growth of organized pressure groups and the development
of a more structured public opinion in the Trust Territory, these
safeguards will also assist in securing a better informed public
and conveying community viewpoints to the congress in time to
influence the course of the congressional deliberations. More im-
mediately, many of them are designed to hold the congressmen
responsible for their official actions.
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On the infrequent occasions when the two houses of the con-
gress meet in joint session, the Speaker of the General Assembly
and not the President of the House of Delegates is to preside (Sec.
2). The enacting clause of all bills is specified in haec verba (Sec.
13). Neither house may adjourn for more than two consecutive
days, nor may either adjourn sine die without the concurrence of
the other (Sec. 15). Every legislative act is to have but one sub-
ject, which is to be expressed in the title; no law is to be amended
or revised by reference only to its title; and a bill, in order to be-
come law, must pass two readings in each house on separate days,
with the final passage originally being by majority vote “of all the
members present and voting” and this vote is to be entered in the
Journal (Sec. 17).32 In this last provision both Saipan and Wash-
ington dropped their caution, for as a majority of the members
comprise a quorum, the minimum vote legally necessary to pass a
bill is only one more than a quarter of the total membership. This
is consonant with the procedures of the Congress of the United
States, but measured by that of state legislatures, with which the
Congress of Micronesia might more properly be presently com-
pared, it is highly questionable.
Sessions of the congress are to be public, and even the Commit-
tee of the Whole may not transact its business in secret session.
All legislative proceedings are to be conducted in the English lan-
guage, and the Journal which each house is to keep of its proceed-
ings is similarly to be published in that language. However, notice
had to be taken of those Micronesians who lack fluency in English,
or otherwise the congress would be denied the participation of
many persons qualified to serve as legislators but unskilled in that
language. To care for this, knowledge of English is declared not
to be a qualification for membership in the congress, and lack-
ing English ability, no member may be denied the right to use
his native language, while the congress is directed to provide for
interpretation into English in all such cases (Sec. 17).
Should vacancies occur, the high commissioner is to call a spe-
cial election, unless less than six months remains of the term. In
the latter event, no special election will be held and the district
administrator of the district where the vacancy arises may fill the
office by appointment (Sec. 21).
32 This section of the order was amended in 1963 by Amendment 3 to require
a majority of all members.
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THE UNITED NATIONS’ INTERPOSITION
Throughout the whole process of limning the terms of the
new charter for the Congress of Micronesia, the anticipated
reaction of the United Nations was like a brooding eminence
seated at the drafting table. The very act of drawing up the
Secretarial Order into at least tentative form had as one of its
deadlines the visit of a UN mission to the Trust Territory in
1964. At that time the mission informally recommended a num-
ber of changes designed to grant powers to the new legislative
body which would assist it to develop an institutional sense of
responsibility and also further the growth of Territorial consen-
sus. For one thing, the mission regarded dubiously the section
allowing the high commissioner to name the legislative coun-
sel; the final version of the Secretarial Order continued this
for only the opening session, and thereafter the congress was
authorized to choose its own counsel, subject only to the high
commissioner’s concurrence in his competency (Sec. 23). The
visiting mission looked askance at the minor proposed restric-
tions which would narrow the new congress’ scope of power,
“such as those forbidding gambling casinos, divorce or special
tax inducements to corporations, which might be better left to
the discretion of an assembly presumed to be responsibly con-
stituted.”33 These, too, were deleted from the final Secretarial
Order. Apparently at the visiting mission’s instigation the draft
was revised to require office holders to resign only after their
congressional success at the polls. Later, even this was further
amended so as to defer its application for the first four years
of the new congress (Sec. 11).
In the main, the views of the visiting mission reflected in the
Secretarial Order dealt with peripheral portions of the draft. Its
critique applicable to the provision being made for compensation,
budgetary powers, and other matters going to the fundamentals
of the legislative process do not seem to have left any material im-
press upon the contents of the Secretarial Order.
The general tenor of the 1964 UN Visiting Mission’s report was
one of dissatisfaction with the timidity of the order creating the
Congress of Micronesia. The mission “formed the opinion that the
draft … might well meet the present wishes of most Microne-
sians.” This, according to the mission, was not sufficient, for the
33 Report of 1964 …, op. cit., par. 209.
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legislative structure “must positively encourage the enlargement”
of present views. “In a Territory where transition in some fields
has been almost hectic, the pace of political advancement cannot
be set by reference to the slowest or to those—the great major-
ity in any country—who are little interested. It depends rather on
the most advanced and the most active; those who will in fact be
the political leaders of the new Micronesia.”34 Though some of the
features of the tentative draft to which the mission objected were
removed in the final form of the Secretarial Order, the basis for
the mission’s dissatisfaction remains. Despite its endowment with
a broad scope of legislative authority, the new congress embarked
upon its unknown future limited in effective powers and circum-
scribed in the manner in which it can demonstrate its capacity for
responsible governance.
34 Ibid., par. 203.
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CHAPTER 9
Apportioning the New Congress
THE IMPRINTING OF the one-man-one-vote formula on Amer-
ican legislatures by the United States Supreme Court, and the
court’s prohibition on the delimitation of legislative district bound-
aries designed to discriminate, have left the apportionment
process in the United States garbed with an aura of disarming
simplicity. Actually, the process remains highly complex, with the
more general criteria of recognition for community of interest, lo-
cal governmental units, natural geographic boundaries, and the
practicality of maintaining constituency contact competing with
the precedent of historical compromises, political party favoritism,
individual member benefit, and configurations of power seeking
to obtain or preserve advantages. Apportionment of the Trust
Territory’s new congress proved no different, evidencing that de-
veloping areas just beginning to experiment with the use of the
legislative process also experience great difficulty in structuring
representation premised upon any abstract standard, including
that of equal population per representative. Even the fact that the
apportionment was left to a single person, the high commissioner,
did not mitigate the arduousness of the task.
Skewing of representation in the House of Delegates was as-
sured by the Council of Micronesia’s opting for bicameralism,
with two delegates to each of the six administrative districts. All
administrative districts, regardless of size, political development,
resources, or economic viability were to enjoy equal treatment in
this chamber of the congress. Little Yap, with a population of only
6,293, thus could play as great a role as Truk, with its 24,521
inhabitants.1 Although not intended, from the start the composi-
tion of the General Assembly added a further note of disparity by
virtue of the decision to fix its size at twenty-one members and as-
sign five representatives to the Truk administrative district, four
1 All population statistics are from the 17th Annual Report of the United
States to the United Nations, 1963, pp. 200–203. Currently, the population of the
Territory is over 90,000.
each to the Marshalls and Ponape, three each to the Marianas and
Palau, and two to Yap.
Both the size and the apportionment formula for the General
Assembly were arrived at somewhat by happenstance. The 1962
draft congressional charter of the Office of Territories contem-
plated a twenty-one-member unicameral legislature. The original
recommendations of the Council of Micronesia’s working commit-
tee contained apportionment formulas for a unicameral body con-
sisting of sixteen, eighteen, or twenty-one members. They also
incorporated a minimum of two representatives from each admin-
istrative district to “maintain proper representation … in view of
the geography of each district, population distribution, etc.”2 The
working committee believed that the responsibilities might “be
too big for one person from each district” and, simply put, that
two heads were better than one.3 After the Council of Micronesia
at the March special session in 1963 voted in favor of bicamer-
alism, it approved the proposal of its legislative committee that
the House of Delegates be composed of twelve members, two per
administrative district, and fixed on the figure of sixteen for the
membership of the General Assembly. Under this plan Truk was al-
located four assemblymen, the Marshalls and Ponape, three each,
and the remaining districts, two.
In the interim between the two meetings of the Council of Mi-
cronesia in 1963, the Political Affairs Officer on the Saipan staff
of the high commissioner, while favoring a unicameral legisla-
ture, noted that a sixteen-member body would conform roughly
to population distribution, despite over-representation of the Yap
district. An Assembly smaller than sixteen would introduce a seri-
ous distortion in representation based upon population, and giving
some districts only one seat appeared unwise. “If we want to make
it a larger body, I believe it would have to be a twenty-one member
body, for no number in between would allow a fair apportion-
ment on a population basis.”4 At this time the high commissioner
still entertained “serious doubts that a bicameral body would be
advisable” and supported the creation of a twenty-one-member
2 “Recommendations for Territorial Legislature,” presented by the Work-
ing Committee of the Territorial Legislative Committee, Council of Micronesia,
Jan. 9, 1963, p. 2. It should be noted that the apportionment shown under the
21-member body actually added to “22,” with Truk being allocated six represen-
tatives!
3 Ibid., pp. 2, 3.
4 Memorandum from Political Affairs Officer to HiCom, July 3, 1963, p. 1.
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unicameral legislature apportioned as was first suggested in the
Office of Territories’ draft and was later to be specified in the
Secretary of Interior Order No. 2882 for the General Assembly.
The high commissioner added that “this apportionment conforms
roughly, to the population distribution in the Trust Territory…. The
body cannot be made smaller without distortion of representa-
tion and, I feel, a twenty-one member body would be an effective
working group.”5 When the Council of Micronesia next met in No-
vember, at one stage of the proceedings the delegates voted that,
if a unicameral body on a population basis were to be adopted, the
number of members should be fixed at twenty-one; for a bicameral
congress, a minimum of two representatives should be assigned
to each administrative district in the chamber which would be
premised upon population.
From all these contributing sources emerged the present size
and districting of the General Assembly. In the process, a degree
of malapportionment was incorporated, for the fact that Truk’s
delegation has only five assemblymen means that this district is
underrepresented in favor of the Marianas. Ironically, it probably
would have been more equitable if the original sixteen-member
ACTUAL AND “IDEAL” REPRESENTATION BY POPULATION,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Actual “Ideal” Apportionment
Administrative Representatives by Population
District Population (21) 21 16 26
Yap 6,293 2 2 1 2
Mariana 10,275 3 2 2 3
Palau 10,628 3 3 2 3
Marshall 18,205 4 4 3 5
Ponape 18,293 4 4 3 6
Truk 24,521 5 6 5 7
88,215 21 21 16 26
“Ideal” apportionment determined by dividing mean district population (4,200.7)
into total population of administrative district. The number of assembly men
assigned as “ideal” is that which results in the least variation. (E.g., for a
21-member General Assembly, Truk is “entitled” to 5.84 seats. By allotting 6 as-
semblymen to Truk, the variation is +.16, whereas the actual apportionment of
5 resulted in Truk’s losing –.84. Representation “due” the Marianas is only 2.45;
actual apportionment of 3 seats afforded a gain of +.55.)
5 Letter of HiCom to Director of the Office of Territories, Sept. 27, 1963.
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size had been retained, or even if the council had agreed upon an
accurately apportioned twenty-six-member assembly.
RANGE OF VARIATION, DIFFERENT–SIZED
GENERAL ASSEMBLIES
Apportionment
Number of
Assemblymen Range Difference
Actual 21 –.84 to +.55 1.39
“Ideal” 16 –.30 to + .55 .85
“Ideal” 21 –.45 to + .50 .95
“Ideal” 26 –.37 to +.61 .98
“Range” merely notes the extreme under-and over-represented administrative
district for different-sized Assemblies, computed as for previous table.
It was accepted by all as axiomatic that if a bicameral congress
were established, one house would be structured upon population.
There were other factors so significant to the Trust Territory as to
have warranted at least consideration before the apportionment of
the lower chamber was fixed. As early as August of 1962, the Palau
magistrates, meeting in annual conference, passed a resolution stat-
ing their confidence “that when the time comes for converting the
Council [of Micronesia] into a territorial legislative body, steps will
be taken to insure democratic representation in that body both on
the basis of district population and ethnical groups.”6 Ethnic consid-
erations have figured prominently in other Pacific legislatures, but
it was unlikely that American practice would openly sanction its use.
However, a number of other factors besides population or ethnic
divisions could quite properly have been debated as prime criteria
in the allocation of General Assembly constituencies. The following
table indicates that if any of them had been employed, each admin-
istrative district’s share of seats could have markedly varied from
that mandated by the Secretarial Order.
As the United States Constitution does not automatically apply
to the Trust Territory, it would not necessarily require that the
standard of population be used for fixing representation in either
house. The district legislatures as apportioned have failed to give
full weight to the number of people residing in the larger centers,
so that accepted Territorial practices would have approved of
6 Resolution No. 2–62, Annual Conference of Palau Magistrates, Aug.
1962.
225
other measures. It is only that the United States is currently com-
mitted to the one-man-one-vote principle, and as Administering
Authority it would have been hard put both at home and in reply-
ing to its international distractors not to have adopted population
as the basis for at least one house of the new congress.
HYPOTHETICAL APPORTIONMENT OF 21-MEMBER GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, VARIOUS CRITERIA7
District
Actual
Apportionment Land Area Exports “Self-sufficiency”
Yap 2 1 1 3
Mariana 3 6 2 1
Palau 3 6 2 2
Marshall 4 2 8 5
Ponape 4 5 4 6
Truk 5 1 4 4
It will not be until 1971 that opportunity for correction of the
malapportionment built into the General Assembly will occur. In
that year the congress is directed to redistrict the lower house,
and reapportionment is to take place every ten years thereafter.
The malapportionment of the General Assembly may be righted
at any of these designated times, so that Truk may eventually ob-
tain its aliquot share of Assembly seats to which it is entitled by
its relative population. However, the charter still retains the con-
dition that each administrative district must receive at least two
assemblymen, so that inherent in this proviso is the possibility
that at some future date the small districts may receive even more
disproportionate representation in the congress.
DISTRICTING THE TERRITORY
The high commissioner was charged with delineating the
twenty-one Assembly constituencies, setting up the election ma-
7 Acreage, import, and export data taken from 17th Annual …, op. cit., pp.
249, 251–252. To obtain the number of assemblymen by land area, acreage was
tabulated and the mean acreage per constituency computed. This mean was then
divided into each administrative district’s area, and the closest fit used for rep-
resentation due. Representation based on dollar exports was similarly computed.
“Self-sufficiency” is merely the export-import ratio for each administrative dis-
trict, as follows: Ponape, 77%; Marshalls, 66.99%; Truk, 59.21%; Yap, 46.20%;
Palau, 24.28%; and Marianas, 18.75%. The Mariana district with the lowest “self-
sufficiency” is assigned one assemblyman as contrasted with Ponape with the
highest ratio and six assemblymen.
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chinery for choosing the new congressmen, and holding elections
throughout the Territory, all within less than four months. Ideally,
the boundaries of the districts should have been announced as
soon as possible, in order to facilitate the remainder of the un-
dertaking. Due to the difficulties encountered, over half of the
period was to elapse before the high commissioner issued Special
Order No. 7 on November 30,1964, districting the Territory. To
get the Herculean task underway, he requested the six district
administrators to prepare apportionment plans for their respec-
tive administrative areas. Their only express guidelines were the
provisions of the Secretarial Order which set the number of rep-
resentatives to which each administrative area was entitled and
directed that assembly districts be both “approximately equal” in
population and single-member constituencies.
After consulting with magistrates of the municipalities, district
legislators, and in some cases, traditional chiefs, the district ad-
ministrators responded with so wide an array of proposals as
to convey the impression they had conspired to attain diversity.
The Marshalls advocated running candidates at large. Truk fa-
vored multi-member districting, and the Mariana district outlined
not one but three tentative schemes, each embodying some form
of multi-member districting. From Palau came an apportionment
plan enacted gratuitously by the Palau district legislature which
hewed to the single-member-district criterion but would have par-
celled up the municipality of Koror, headquarters for the district.
Only Ponape’s initial apportionment was approved outright by the
high commissioner; the second plan of the Marshalls was similarly
accepted; the rest he either modified (Truk and the Marianas) or
substantially revised (Palau and Yap).8
The Marshall Islands district administrator originally wanted
to have the Marshall Islands Congress nominate candidates who
would then all run at large because “consensus of opinion here
is … [that] actual subdivision of district at this time will fur-
ther delay election….”9 The high commissioner’s reply noted
that he understood the “special problems of Marshalls District”
but that it was “imperative this election be standard with [that]
of Territory.”10 From Truk came the protest that the “magistrates
8 The Yap record is ambiguous, and the high commissioner’s revision may
have extended only to proposed districting for delegates.
9 Communication of DistAd Marshalls to HiCom, Oct. 20, 1964.
10 Communication of HiCom to DistAd Marshalls, Nov. 3, 1964.
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disfavor the idea of subdividing the District into single member
election districts. It is felt that this division will disturb their social
structure, as well as create a feeling of disunity among their peo-
ple. Instead they recommend that the District be divided into
two [multi-membered] electoral precincts …,” with the Mortlocks
combined with the Namoneas area of the Truk lagoon and the re-
maining outlying low islands combined with the Faichuk area.11
The high commissioner’s answer to this cited the Secretarial Or-
der’s mandate of single-member constituencies and “suggested”
five Assembly constituencies formed by dividing each of the two
locally proposed election districts into smaller segments.
Central to the whole problem of districting was the question
of the recognition to be afforded municipalities, and more specif-
ically, whether these units of local government, so carefully nur-
tured by the American administration, were to be split, combined
in part or in whole with others, or maintained with their sense of
community heightened by the retention of as many boundaries as
possible. Allied to this was the question of the representation to be
given the district centers. The population of each center has been
swollen by the large number of persons attracted for employment
either with the government or private businesses servicing the
latter’s needs. These are the areas which are most familiar with
American-sponsored political institutions and where the greatest
political acculturation has taken place. Except possibly for Ko-
ror in Palau, which in some ways tends to emphasize the status
quo more than parts of Babelthuap, the district centers are also
the areas which are most progressive and most desirous of po-
litical change. The high commissioner had to resolve whether to
preserve their identity by keeping them as separate Assembly dis-
tricts or to dilute their voting strength by joining them with areas
holding to more traditional values. Complicating this decision was
the uneven distribution of the Territory’s population and the pos-
sibility of structuring a district so that one heavily populated area
could outvote the other smaller units included in the same con-
stituency. The opposite result could be achieved by putting two
heavily populated municipalities within the same district, so that
neither would receive an advantage from its voting strength.
The high commissioner’s solution for Truk was to designate
Moen, the municipality embracing the district headquarters, as
11 Communication of DistAd Truk to Assistant Commissioner for Public Af-
fairs, Nov. 9, 1964.
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a separate constituency (Truk District B),12 withdrawing it from
the traditional Namoneas portion of the Truk lagoon, which be-
came District C. He similarly spun off the distant Upper and Lower
Mortlocks to form yet a third constituency, Truk District A. The
Faichuk area of the Truk lagoon was designated as District E, and
the outlying Halls, Namonuito, and the Western Islands were com-
bined into a fifth, D. Except for the removal of Moen, the Faichuk
and Namoneas areas, each with its distinguishing dialectical dif-
ference, were kept intact. Of necessity, municipalities had to be
grouped, but the high commissioner successfully avoided splitting
any and, in linking them, preserved the traditional zones of the
Truk lagoon. He also prevented the Truk atoll from outvoting the
outlying islands, but in doing so, he had to abandon the principle
of equal representation by population.
While the Truk district sought to group municipalities in a way
which would preserve customary associations, the Palau district
legislature advocated the dismemberment of the municipality of
12 By Public Law No. 2–16, Assembly (House of Representatives) districts are
now numbered; for the first election each bore a letter designation.
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Koror ostensibly for the same reason. The Palau plan divided Ko-
ror into eleven villages, five of which it would combine with islands
south of Koror from Peleliu to Tobi and the remainder join with one
or the other districts cleaving Babelthuap. Again the high commis-
sioner sympathized but demurred:
I can appreciate the fact that one of the underlying reasons may have
been an attempt to follow traditional linkage of parts of Koror with parts
of Babelthuap. However, the premise of a single member election dis-
trict is not well served by such extreme fragmentation. Further, Koror
Municipality now operates as an integral unit in the local municipal gov-
ernment scheme and also serves as a single electoral precinct, electing
on the basis of its population, five members of the District Legislature. In
population size, in geographic arrangement, it is one of the logical single
member election districts….13
With the exception of the Koror villages of Meyungs and Nger-
beched, whose inhabitants’ common ties with the southern islands
counseled continuance of their joinder in Palau Assembly Dis-
13 Communication of HiCom to DistAd Palau, Nov. 30, 1964.
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trict A to swell the size of that Assembly district’s population,
Koror’s identity as a municipality was maintained under the appor-
tionment plan issued by the high commissioner. Other than for
allocating Airrai to Palau Assembly District B (and, of course, sep-
arating Koror as Assembly District C), the high commissioner’s
apportionment of Palau into Districts A and B faithfully followed
the boundaries of the old Koror and Melekeok Confederations.14
It was in the Marianas that the high commissioner faced de-
feat and had to divide a single municipality among the three
Assembly constituencies assigned to this district. The Mariana dis-
trict administration understood clearly the significance of such a
decision, for the Secretary’s creation of the congress had already
caused opposition among the Saipanese advocating separation
from the Trust Territory and union with Guam. In advancing three
alternative plans, each of which bifurcated Saipan, the district
administrator advised the high commissioner that “to go further
in splitting the Municipality will add more to this tension.”15
14 Arthur J. Vidich, Political Factionalism in Palau, CIMA Final Report No. 23
([Massachusetts]: 1949), p. 21.
15 Communication from DistAd Mariana Islands to HiCom, Oct. 14, 1964.
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MARIANA DISTRICT APPORTIONMENT PROPOSALS
PROPOSAL I PROPOSAL II PROPOSAL III
1 district with 2 assem-
blymen. Saipan and
Northern Islands—pop.:
8,672 (mean: 4,336).
1 district with 2
assemblymen. Two-
thirds of Chalan
Kanoa Village, re-
mainder of northern
Saipan, and Northern
Islands—pop.: 6,836
(mean: 3,418).
1 district with 2 assem-
blymen. All
Saipan—pop.: 8,404
(mean: 4,202).
1 district with 1 assem-
blyman. Rota and
Tinian—pop.: 1,603.
1 district with 1
assemblyman. One-
third of Chalan Kanoa
Village, southern
Saipan, Tinian, and
Rota—pop. 3,437.
1 district with 1 assem-
blyman. Rota, Tinian,
and Northern Is-
lands—pop.: 1,871.
Undaunted, the high commissioner resolved the problem
frontally by dividing the municipality of Saipan into three, link-
ing the southern portion with the islands of Tinian and Rota
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and the northernmost part with the small northern islands of
the Mariana archipelago. Even more significantly, he split the
most populous village on Saipan, Chalan Kanoa, with 52 per
cent of the total island population, in a manner which might
benefit one of the Mariana district’s political parties. The fact
that the average variation of the population of these three
Assembly districts was but 1.2 per cent from the theoretical
mean implies that, in the high commissioner’s apportionment
of the Mariana district, very careful attention was given to the
problem of establishing districts of “approximately equal pop-
ulation.”
Along with concern for the separate identity of local political
units, there was evident interest in securing a degree of compact-
ness, in giving due weight to geographical contiguity, and in pre-
serving cultural and traditional groupings. All of this had to be
tempered by the sheer realities of the Territory’s dispersed char-
acter and the attendant inadequacies of communication and
transportation. Ignoring fixed patterns for field trips not only
would unnecessarily stifle any developing sense of commonality
233
fostered by repeated inclusion within a single field trip but also
would unduly complicate the technical conduct of what promised
to be an unusually taxing election.
In the Marshalls, the geographical as well as traditional
separation between the Radak and Ralik chains was acknowl-
edged in the district’s high-commissioner-approved second plan
which had a line running north and south between the two; the re-
gion was then further divided “traditionally”16 into four compact
quadrants by a second bisecting line that cut horizontally roughly
across its middle. The Marshall’s field trips supported the logic
of the district’s quartering, but concealed was the fact that the
plan allowed low population areas to dominate in a majority of
constituencies, resulting in great disparities between the four
16 When queried as to what was “traditional” in the bisecting, east-west line
which played such a prominent part in the district’s second plan, an informant
replied that the four resulting quadrants roughly approximated the areas which
customarily would fight with each other. Chave noted that “the geographical di-
vision of the Marshall Islands is on north and south lines; the cultural division
on east and west lines.” Margaret E. Chave, The Changing Position of the Mixed
Bloods in the Marshall Islands, CIMA Final Report No. 7 (Honolulu: 1949), p. 25.
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Assembly districts. The Marianas’ districting also took physical con-
tiguity into account and, in addition, reflected that Rota and Tinian
have more in common with each other than with Saipan. The di-
vision adopted for the Yap administrative district placed all of the
Outer Islands visited by field-trip ship in a single congressional con-
stituency, far flung as the old Yap empire might be (see map, p.
233). For Truk it is harder to justify the combination of the Namonu-
ito atoll to the northwest, the Hall Group to the northeast, and the
Western Islands within the same Assembly district, constituting as
they do distinct cultural sub-areas.17 The only rationale is that they
jointly share differences from the high islands within the Truk la-
goon and each is dependent upon periodic field-trip contact.
Of necessity many factors relevant to districting had to be ac-
commodated, and in the process the criterion of population could
easily be compromised. The dimensions of the decision which had
to be made are well sketched by the Ponape proposal approved by
the high commissioner, which took into account “population; geo-
graphic proximity of municipalities within each election district;
common interests among municipalities such as the low islands;
and past and present cultural and traditional affiliations.”18
EVALUATING THE APPORTIONMENT
With the districting of the Territory complete, so that it could
be assayed in its entirety, the conclusion to be drawn is manifest:
at the 1965 elections some voters were more “equal” than others,
and the western half of the Trust Territory received the more
favorable representation. Also, the apportionment was not politi-
cally neutral, and in some districts it pointed the pace and direc-
tion of future political change. In the Palau and Mariana districts,
the fate of the parties at the polls could be partially attributed to
the manner in which the Assembly constituency boundaries were
drawn by the high commissioner.
None of the six administrative districts could receive delega-
tions exactly proportionate to its share of the total Territorial
population, so inevitably the voters were assured a degree of
unequal representation in the General Assembly. When, in the
designating of the Assembly constituencies within the boundaries
of each administrative district, some constituencies were favored
17 See John L. Fischer and Ann M. Fischer, The Eastern Carolines (New Haven:
Human Relations Area Files, 1957), pp. 7–8.
18 Communication from DistAd Ponape to HiCom, Oct. 8, 1964.
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over others, this only compounded the disparity. The variance from
equality of representation based upon population permitted by the
United States Supreme Court within the states was far exceeded
in the districting of the General Assembly.19 If the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution were automatically to apply to the
Trust Territory, there is little question but that the Assembly’s ap-
portionment would not meet with judicial confirmation.
VARIATION FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT’S
MEAN FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS
District
Popula-
tion
Number
of
Assem-
blymen
Mean Dis-
trict Size
Range in
Variation
From Mean20
Average
Variation21
Marshalls 18,205 4 4551 –44.0% to +43.1% 37.6%
Truk 24,521 5 4904 –53.4% +34.3% 27.8%
Yap 6,293 2 3146 –20.5% +20.5% 20.5%
Ponape 18,293 4 4573 – 9.2% + 3.5% 6.8%
Palau 10,628 3 3543 – 1.7% + 2.1% 1.4%
Mariana 10,275 3 3425 – 1.8% + 1.5% 1.2%
Mean range, all districts, is – 1.4% to + 37.6%.
Average variation, all districts, is 15.9%.
Using the David and Eisenberg Index22 of “the relative value of
the right to vote,” the vote of a person in an “under-represented”
area, such as Truk District E, counts for less in the General Assem-
bly than that of a voter in any “over-represented” area, such as
Truk District D. To be precise, in this particularly extreme com-
parison, the “vote value” of the former is only about one-third that
of the latter.23 Assuming that the ideal apportionment will yield a
19 See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1966); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120
(1967).
20 The range is obtained by computing the variation in population of each
Assembly district from the mean in the administrative district as a whole. E.g.,
District C in Truk has a population of 6,185, 126.1% of the mean district of 4,904
in the Truk district.
21 The average is computed by totalling the percentage variations from the
mean Assembly district and dividing this value by the number of Assembly dis-
tricts in each administrative district.
22 The David and Eisenberg Index is Pc = M/X, with M the mean population
for all constituencies in the chamber and X the population of a particular con-
stituency. See Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban and
Suburban Vote (Charlottesville, Va.: Bureau of Public Administration, University
of Virginia, Vol. 1:1961 and Vol. 2: 1962).
23 63.8 ÷ 183.8 or 34.1% (“vote value” from table).
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“vote value” of 100, the disparity in districting the Trust Territory
is shown in the following table.
“VOTE VALUE” OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS
Area-District Population “Vote Value”
Truk D 2,286 183.8
Yap B 2,501 168.0
Marshall C 2,901 144.8
Marshall A 3,010 139.6
Mariana B 3,362 125.0
Mariana A 3,437 122.2
Mariana C 3,476 120.8
Palau C 3,481 120.7
Palau B 3,531 119.0
Palau A 3,616 116.2
Yap A 3,792 110.8
Truk B 4,115 102.1
Ponape A 4,153 101.1
Ponape C 4,431 94.8
Ponape B 4,520 92.9
Ponape D 5,189 81.0
Truk A 5,350 78.5
Marshall D 5,779 72.7
Truk C 6,185 67.9
Marshall B 6,515 64.5
Truk E 6,585 63.8
Yap District A occupies the median position on the table with
a “vote value” of 110.8. Voters in all constituencies with indices
below this figure enjoyed less than average voting effectiveness.
Arrangement of the twenty-one constituencies in relation to the
median Assembly district reveals a geographical dispersion of
representatives to the detriment of the eastern portion of the
Trust Territory and, correspondingly, to the benefit of the western
administrative districts. All constituencies in Yap, the Marianas,
and Palau are either at or above the median.
Final evidence that the Territory’s apportionment favored the
western administrative districts is provided by applying the David
and Eisenberg “vote value” index to both houses of the congress.
This finding, of course, reflects the original structuring of the two
houses, which granted equal representation in the House of Dele-
gates to all administrative districts, regardless of population, and
did not too carefully check on the mathematics of apportionment
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when the size of each administrative district’s delegation in the
General Assembly was determined. While the high commissioner
is accountable for any imbalance which may be demonstrated
within an administrative district, inequalities between districts
had already been assured before he took up the chore of drawing
Assembly-constituency boundaries for the Trust Territory.24
GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS IN RELATION TO THE
MEDIAN “VOTE VALUE” DISTRICT
At or Above Median Below MedianAdministrative
District
Number of
Assembly
Districts
Number Per cent Number Per cent
Yap 2 2 100 0 0
Mariana 3 3 100 0 0
Palau 3 3 100 0 0
Marshall 4 2 50 2 50
Truk 5 1 20 4 80
Ponape 4 0 0 4 100
“VOTE VALUE” OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT REPRESENTA-
TION IN HOUSE OF DELEGATES AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
It is difficult to prove that this skewing of representation to
the western districts exerted any influence upon the organization
District Population Delegate
“Vote Value”25
Assembly
“Vote Value”26
Yap 6,293 233.6 133.5
Mariana 10,275 143.9 122.6
Palau 10,628 138.3 118.6
Marshall 18,205 80.6 92.3
Ponape 18,293 80.4 91.9
Truk 24,521 60.0 85.7
24 In defense of the apportionment plan as applied to both houses, it should
be noted that it scored as highly “rational” (rank correlation of .97) under Justice
Clark’s proposal that the apportionment for both houses, taken together, should
be considered “rational” if they demonstrate a high rank correlation between
population and the number of representatives enjoyed in both houses. The Clark
index for each administrative district is X21 + 1.75 (
Y
12) where X = number of as-
semblymen and Y = number of delegates for the district. See concurring opinion
of Justice Clark in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), p. 251. It should be added
that the rank correlation would not have been adversely affected if another as-
semblyman had been assigned to the Truk administrative district at the expense
of the Mariana delegation.
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or the legislative product of the first congress. Looking solely to
the Assembly, and utilizing the Dauer-Kelsay27 approach which
identifies the smaller constituencies that collectively comprise a
majority—a process which simultaneously determines the mini-
mal percentage of the population whose elected representatives
comprise a legislative majority—the eleven smaller constituencies
in the General Assembly enjoying majority strength (in fact, 52.4
per cent) are found to represent but two-fifths of the total pop-
ulation of the Territory (35,393). But this presupposes that the
smaller Assembly constituencies will hold together and vote as a
bloc, irrespective of their district identity. Neither general empiri-
cal data28 nor observation of the Congress of Micronesia in action
sustains the assumption. Upon organizing the General Assembly,
all three elected officers were chosen from the eastern area of
the Trust Territory (and so were the officers of the House of Del-
egates). Measures introduced by only legislators from the three
eastern districts had a little greater success than those sponsored
by congressmen from the West,29 but this is inconclusive. If any-
thing, during the session assemblymen tended more to vote with
the other members of their administrative district than to choose
sides along lines of constituency size.
Attention to intra-district apportionment, as distinct from cross-
district comparisons, reveals that the boundaries drawn resulted
in a number of extreme population disparities. Reference has
already been made to the grossest of these in Truk. For the
most part, the disproportions arose from the attempt to take
topographical distinctions, geographical distances, economic in-
25 The mean Delegate district is 7,351 (88,215 ÷ 12). The mean is mul-
tiplied by 2 (the number of delegates per administrative district), and the product
(14,702) is divided by the population of the administrative district to obtain the
“vote value.”
26 The mean Assembly district is 4,200.7. “Vote value” is Pe = MD/X where
M represents the mean population for all constituencies, D the number of As-
sembly seats allocated to an administrative district, and X the population of
that district.
27 See Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, “Unrepresented States,” Na-
tional Municipal Review, 44:11 (Dec., 1955), 571.
28 See Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, “Measuring Malapportionment,”
American Political Science Review, 58:2 (June, 1964), p. 305, n6.
29 Excluding administration-proposed measures (see Chapter 14), 35.8 per
cent of East-sponsored legislative measures were successful as compared with
24.8 per cent of the measures introduced solely by congressmen from the West.
Measures cross-sponsored by members from the two regions had a success ratio
of 36.4 per cent.
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terests, and cultural diversities into account. Sometimes these
differences could be reconciled with population equivalency. In the
Ponape administrative district, where an average variation of but
6.8 per cent from the mean was achieved for all four Assembly
constituencies, Mokil was joined with the Sokehs areas on Pon-
ape Island. The Mortlock, Pingelap, and other low island people
who resettled in Sokehs just before World War I, after the German
administration exiled the lattet’s original rebellious inhabitants to
Palau and Yap, feel close to the Outer Islanders, while the Mokil
homesteaders on Ponape Island utilize Sokehs as their headquar-
ters. Similarly, the islands of Kusaie and Pingelap were combined
into a single Assembly district, because people move readily be-
tween those two outlying areas and Kusaieans “interact” more
easily with Pingelapese than with Ponapeans.
These same delineations of Assembly constituencies also poten-
tially channel the course for future political change. Kusaieans
have long expressed dissatisfaction with their inclusion within
the Ponape administrative district and have desired separate, co-
equal district status. The symbolism latent in the identification of
their island as the principal component of Assembly Ponape Dis-
trict A could easily be seized upon as the first concrete move in
the separatist movement. The constituency’s assemblyman-elect,
although himself from the small island of Pingelap, raised the
question of separation at the workshop preceding the convening
of the first congress and later offered a joint resolution seeking
severance of Kusaie from the Ponape administrative district (AJR
16 of 1965).
The division of the Yap administrative district into two Assembly
constituencies, one of which comprises the Outer Islands, clearly
evinces the administration’s conviction that the old Yapese empire
lacks any continuing political viability. The Yap Islands chiefs were
not to be afforded the opportunity of replacing the sanctions of
their magicians with the maneuverings of politicians. The inhabi-
tants of Ulithi, Woleai, and islands farther east, for the first time
jointly exercising the franchise, did so without any direction from
the chiefs of Gagil and stood as politically independent of the
Yapese.30 In contrast, on the Yap Islands, with both high and low
caste villages in a single Assembly constituency, chiefly influence
affected the electoral results.
30 For fuller consideration of relation between the Yap Islands and Outer Is-
lands, see Chapter 6.
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By far the most immediate consequences of the high commis-
sioner’s apportionment efforts were their impact on the election
contests in the two administrative districts with active political
parties.31 In both Palau and the Marianas, political parties stand-
ing for slower, evolutionary change were benefited in the General
Assembly contests. In Palau, this occurred because the high com-
missioner proposed an essentially neutral apportionment plan, in
contrast to the locally favored one, which would have aided the
more “liberal” party. In the Marianas, the manner in which Gen-
eral Assembly constituency lines were drawn split the strength of
the majority party on Saipan.
The original apportionment plan enacted by the Palau legisla-
ture, although premised upon Koror inhabitants’ identification with
their “home” villages, in fact constituted an outright gerrymander
by splintering Koror’s Progressive Party strength. The Palau legisla-
ture submitted its recommendations in the form of a bill (15–10–64),
but this action was outside its legislative authority and was vetoed
by the high commissioner.32 If the Palau administrative district had
been apportioned according to this bill, with a distribution of vote
identical to that cast in the first congressional elections, the Liberal
Party would have gained one more Palauan seat. What is more, the
rival Progressive Party would have been unable to elect a single
member to the General Assembly. The high commissioner’s neu-
trality in refusing to concur in such an apportionment proposal is
unquestionably defensible, but in nullifying the political advantage
of the Liberal Party, he was securing for the administration a poten-
tially more cooperative legislative delegation.
PALAU PARTY VICTORIES UNDER TWO APPORTIONMENT PLANS
Liberal Vote Cast Progressive Vote Cast Independent Vote Cast
Legisla-
ture’s
Plan
High Com-
missioner’s
Plan
Legisla-
ture’s
Plan
High Com-
missioner’s
Plan
Legisla-
ture’s
Plan
High Com-
missioner’s
Plan
District A 668 813 495 439 100 0
District B 603 284 441 373 83 643
District C 287 461 388 512 630 170
Underlining indicates winning candidate.
31 See Chapter 10 for fuller treatment of political parties in both the Marianas
and Palau administrative districts.
32 Letter of HiCom to DistAd Palau, Nov. 30, 1964.
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In the Mariana administrative district, the Popular Party has as-
sumed a bellicose stand in its drive toward splitting the Northern
Marianas from the Trust Territory and joining it with Guam. The
larger component of the Popular Party is Chamorro, and the seat
of its strength is found in Chalan Kanoa on Saipan. The Territorial
Party, by advocating Trust Territory development and deferral of
Territorial dissolution, has attracted the support of many Chamor-
ros and the larger component of the minority Carolinian population
long resident on the island. The division of Saipan among three As-
sembly constituencies left the center of Chalan Kanoa comprising
one Assembly district, which voted Popular Party, while the Ter-
ritorial Party won the other two contests. As illustration of what
may happen when Saipan is otherwise apportioned, in the Saipan
municipal elections held a year later, the Popular Party captured
all seven seats in the municipal council—an at-large contest—and
nine out of eleven district commissioner posts. Since the United
Nations opposes splitting the Trust Territory, as does the United
States, it would have been poor judgment for the high commissioner
to have sought amendment to the Secretarial Order creating the
congress so as to have allowed a multi-member constituency for
the Marianas, even though he would have had strong support for
repudiating single-member electorates from at least half of the dis-
trict administrators. Instead, trifurcating Saipan so as to place the
bulk of Chalan Kanoa in separate Mariana District B gave pro-Ter-
ritorial Rota and more evenly-divided Tinian a chance to tip the
scales against the Popular Party in Mariana District A. The same
opportunity occurred in Assembly District C. Keeping part of the
pro-Territorial and heavily Carolinian precinct 4 within Mariana Dis-
trict B narrowed the Popular Party’s predominance there. Under the
circumstances, it is difficult for the impartial observer to conclude
other than that the political impact of apportionment was a major
factor taken into account when delineating the boundaries of the
constituencies in the Marianas.33
In Palau and the Marianas, the standard of “approximately
equal population” was applied, although an Assembly apportion-
ment producing political consequences favorable to the adminis-
tration was still forthcoming. In the Ponape district, population
variation was held within the 10 per cent range while at the same
33 This is denied by Trust Territory personnel who defend their decision as
neutral, dividing as it did Saipan’s Carolinian population (a major segment of the
Territorial Party strength) among all three Assembly election districts.
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time weight was given to geographical and cultural ties; neverthe-
less, identifying Kusaie as a separate constituency may contribute
to the future dismemberment of this administrative district. In the
remaining districts, so many other factors clamored for accommo-
dation that the population criterion could not be observed. It
would have been far more realistic if the Secretarial Order had ex-
pressly taken cognizance of this.34 The logic of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s effort to fit the entire nation within the Procrustean one-
man-one-vote criterion has been challenged, and that criterion’s
application to as geographically and culturally diverse an area
as Micronesia is even more questionable. Physical and cultural
environment placed limitations upon assigning primacy to any ap-
portionment standard, and it was only to be expected that the
political environment would be manipulated for administrative
and partisan ends.
34 As illustrative of this realistic approach, see Section 41 (ii) of the “Report of
the British Guiana Constitutional Conference” held in March, 1960: “… electoral
districts to be of approximately equal population except where, in the Commis-
sioner’s opinion, it is desirable to disregard equality of numbers on account of
special considerations such as natural community of interest, local government
areas, physical features, transport facilities and the practicability of elected mem-
bers maintaining contact with electors in sparsely populated areas.” White Paper
Command 998.
243
CHAPTER 10
The Congressional Elections
For years we have paused at the threshold of a new epoch, unable for a
moment to open that door, but aware that we must advance if we are to
secure our own identity. That door is now ready for opening and that mo-
ment is approaching….
As of now we can not really tell the mood of the people toward this elec-
tion. However, the wind is somehow changing. People, not everyone by
a long way, but enough to disturb the prevailing mood, are optimistic of
the new developments. At this point we are still uncertain but expectant.
This period between now [November 13, 1964] and January 19 is one
of a tremendous importance. It is a period of reckoning. Like a lull be-
fore a storm, every precautions must be taken. It is an odd and baffled
moment in our history. It is a moment of suspense and anticipation. One
thing, however, is certain—the success of that first election and every sub-
sequent ones will depend primarily on how well we conduct their initial
preparations. This much we know, but only time will tell the eventual out-
come of our efforts.1
THE INITIAL ELECTION for the Congress of Micronesia may be
viewed from many aspects. The educated elite and the politically
sophisticated, among whom would be counted the author of the
quoted extract, saw the election as the opening wedge for the trans-
fer of ever greater self-government to the Micronesians. Some
transliterated this into an opportunity for immediate benefit in
the form of higher Micronesian salaries and preferences for
Micronesian enterprise. To most of the voters of the Territory it
was akin to a sacred mystery, important but for exactly what rea-
son they could not articulate other than in borrowed clichés. Some
among them were taking part solely because of the bidding of the
administration, reinforced by their traditional leaders. Not the least
important of the many facets of the election was the position of the
district administrator confronted with a behemoth task, certain in
the knowledge that if a creditable showing were not forthcoming it
would reflect adversely upon the two decades of American prepara-
tion of the indigenes for their own governance, and probably, as
1 Palau Post, Nov. 13, 1964, p. 1.
well, upon his own capacity for undertaking a complex assignment.
The Administering Authority faced a number of technical prob-
lems, such as how to reconcile the need for uniformity with the
flexibility essential for an election system designed to apply to an
area as large as the United States. Failure to comply with those
standards considered essential to free elections, or even the omis-
sion of minor details as the constructing of secure ballot boxes,
would be sure to draw the attention of the Trusteeship Coun-
cil and the censure of those members alert for an opportunity
to challenge American sincerity. The dispersal of peoples, limited
communications, and inadequate transportation facilities had to
be overcome. The Secretarial Order specified that the congres-
sional elections were to be held throughout the Territory on one
day, January 19, 1965. This would require the elections to be struc-
tured in a manner never before attempted2 and the secret ballot
to be introduced to some areas yet following traditional ways of
selecting leaders. Nomination of candidates would have to be en-
couraged and methods evolved for facilitating the processing of
sponsored as well as self-nominations. The unfamiliarity of the
prospective voter with the new electoral provisions would have
to be rectified by a publicity campaign, and the sheer inertia of
the body politic would similarly have to be counteracted. Once the
rules were prescribed, a whole corps of election officers, speak-
ing almost a dozen languages, would have to be instructed in the
proper manner of running the election. And above all, these new
requirements would have to be compatible with the criteria held
by the Micronesians. Not to be forgotten was Yap’s past intran-
sigency and Palau’s previous refusal to accept the Trusteeship
Council’s suggested minimum voting age, holding that people un-
der the age of twenty-six were too immature to participate.
The solution for all of these problems was found in a general
election format established through special order of the high com-
missioner and delegating implementation to the field. Supplemen-
tation and oversight of field decisions could be maintained in a
number of ways. Opinions from the attorney general, and infor-
mal rulings from his offce, would supply interpretations of the high
commissioner’s order and the Secretarial Order upon which it was
2 The high commissioner had to foreclose the pattern of one or two balloting
teams visiting the Marshallese municipalities in turn, and of up to half a year be-
ing taken to elect members to the Council of Micronesia. See HiCom to DistAd
Marshalls, Nov. 3, 1964.
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premised. Opinions thus rendered would guide the entire Territory
uniformly, whether the question be that of permitting prisoners
to vote, prohibiting prospective candidates from running for two
seats simultaneously, or in other ways making more clear and spe-
cific, and filling the lacunae in, the general directions of the high
commissioner.
Suggestions and instructions from the high commissioner’s
staff to the field also served as a means by which administrative
oversight might be exercised as election planning progressed in
each of the six administrative districts. These instructions would
not be phrased in formal authority binding upon the administra-
tors, but they would be influential in meeting technical problems;
indirectly, they would assure a degree of comparability of meth-
ods in all administrative districts. The Political Affairs Office at
Headquarters well understood the importance of the election and
devoted long hours to counseling the districts. Over a period of time,
advice on sample ballots and techniques for sealing ballot boxes
and recommendations as to what ought to be provided by way of
instructions and equipment to the local election officers were all en-
compassed in communications from the high commissioner’s staff
on Saipan. Face-to-face consultation between the Headquarters’
and field personnel charged with the enforcement of the congres-
sional elections facilitated this flow of informal advice. Though
not required to do so, the districts sometimes cleared with the
high commissioner’s office procedures and instructions drafted
within the district. Serving as a controlling device which brought
all details into focus, frequently requested progress reports kept
the Trust Territory administration informed when deviations took
place or when possible complications developed which would re-
quire further regulations from the high commissioner. These re-
ports, the trips made by Saipan staff to the field, and the queries
by the districts regarding problems arising locally all channeled
to Headquarters a steady flow of information on the course of
arrangements being made for the congressional elections.
The guide lines for all field preparations were embodied in
Special Order No. 6 promulgated by the high commissioner.
Prior to its drafting, existing district election provisions were ex-
amined to ascertain whether they could be employed as the basis
for the congressional elections. The general survey revealed the
absence of a body of election law and practice which could be eas-
ily adapted for such use. Truk, for example, reported it had no
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district election law except that in the district legislative charter,
applicable only to elections for that body. The Marianas had used
the Saipan municipal ordinances for electing Saipan’s represen-
tatives to the Mariana Islands District Legislature. The chartered
municipalities throughout the Territory followed comparable elec-
tion procedures contained in their enabling grants, but in most
cases these outlined procedures were too brief to serve the pur-
pose of governing the congressional elections. District-to-district
variances and the hiatuses which needed to be filled necessitated
the preparation of a completely new election law which would ap-
ply uniformly throughout the Territory.
Early in the planning stage, the district administrators were
circularized for regulations their staff believed ought be ob-
served in holding the congressional elections. Once the draft of
the Territorial election regulations had been completed in rough
form by the Political Affairs Office, it was submitted to all dis-
trict administrators with the request that it be treated as a top
priority matter in order “to give prospective candidates and the
people ample time to acquaint themselves with the provisions
of … [the] proposed regulation prior to election day….”3 Mean-
while, the draft was sent to the legal office “for review and
polishing up,”4 and the whole process culminated in the high
commissioner’s issuance of Special Order No. 6 on November
5, 1964. Incorporating recommendations gathered from many
quarters, including some proposed by the Council of Microne-
sia when it debated the founding of a Territorial legislature, the
order called for the district administrators’ serving as district
election commissioners, the appointment of election boards and
tabulating committees, the nomination of candidates, the con-
duct of elections, and for recounts and appeals. Since time was
of the essence, as processed by the legal office the draft could
not be sent to each district for further review and comments
prior to its becoming effective. However, in accordance with the
guide lines expressed by the attorney general in a memorandum
stating that the broad terminology of the Secretarial Order and
Special Order No. 6 “… was intended to provide those who work
with the Orders the opportunity to interpret the Orders to meet
the complex situations existing in the vast Territory…,”5 wide
3 Memo of Deputy HiCom to all DistAds, Oct. 13, 1964.
4 Memo of Political Affairs Officer to Acting Assistant Commissioner for
Public Affairs, Oct. 27, 1964.
5 Memo from Acting Attorney General to Acting Commissioner for Public
Affairs, Dec. 11, 1964.
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latitude was allowed each district in the application of the high
commissioner’s election directions.
Once these regulations governing the congressional elections
were finalized and a second Special Order (No. 7) issued, desig-
nating the election districts within each of the six administrative
areas of the Territory, the work of the Political Affairs Office at
Headquarters was not reduced to merely reviewing and coordi-
nating field preparations. Rather it sought to assist these field
activities wherever possible. Radio programs on the new congress
were prepared at Headquarters for translation and release over
the district radio stations. The Liaison Office of the Trust Territory
on Guam was supplied instructions for registering absentee vot-
ers, with attention to students temporarily resident in that Amer-
ican territory. The administration recognized the need for prompt
attention, and every effort was made to expedite Saipan’s handling
of district election needs.
During a contest which followed the voting in the Marianas dis-
trict, one of the letters exchanged which was dispatched to the
Secretary of the Interior protested that “election procedure as set
up in this district was in direct opposition to former elections.”6
Because of this discrepancy, the regulations propounded by the
high commissioner, as supplemented by Saipan’s district admin-
istrator serving as election commissioner, were challenged as not
complying with Section 9 of the Secretarial Order creating the
Congress of Micronesia. The author of the protest was accurate in
his assessment that the regulations governing the congressional
elections were not duplicated by those for holding district or local
elections. Nevertheless, the protest was factually in error insofar
as it referred to “direct opposition to former elections (empha-
sis added),” for much of the procedure and implementing details
within the six administrative districts was based upon previous ex-
perience. Legally, the objection was unfounded as Section 27 of
the Secretarial Order directed that the first general elections be
held “in accordance with such regulations as may be promulgated
by the High Commissioner,” and for the most part every effort was
made throughout the Territory to comply with this requirement.
DISTRICT ELECTION MACHINERY
The high commissioner’s election regulations did not sharply
6 Letter from Attorney G. Wilbert Grover to Secretary of Interior Udall, circa
Feb., 1965.
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differentiate between those duties which were to be performed
by the district administrator as election commissioner and those
which were to be assigned to his appointed district election
boards. The setting up of voting precincts and of an appropriate
polling place within each precinct, the overseeing of the order of
names on the election ballot, and the ordering of recounts were a
few of the tasks assigned to the election commissioners. Similarly,
the election boards’ functions were delineated with respect to the
supervision and management of polling places, the actual conduct of
elections, and the consideration of irregularities arising during the
course of the election. Excluding these and a few other responsibil-
ities, the bulk of the preparations remained unallocated, and it was
within the discretion of each election commissioner to avail himself
of his election boards’ services. Most preferred to handle the elec-
tion through district personnel as a normal administrative matter
and, in fact, placed many of their permanent staff on the election
boards. It was as acts of regular district employees, rather than as
decisions of a separate board, that notices and publications con-
cerning the elections were issued. As one of the consequences,
the role played by the indigenous inhabitants in running their first
election for congressmen varied markedly from district to district,
with the major areas of comparability found in the staffing of the
polls and the tallying of the votes.
In some districts the district administrator early called upon
Micronesian political bodies to aid in preparing for the coming
election. Two weeks before Secretarial Order 2882 was officially
released by the Interior Department, the joint political develop-
ment committees of the Yap Islands Council and the Yap Islands
Congress began their deliberations on how the election might best
be administered within their district. Thereafter the political com-
mittees continued to meet from time to time, while the assistant
district administrator visited the Outer Islands in the Yap district
to confer with local leaders there on plans for the holding of the
election. The Marshall Islands District Congress and its Holdover
Committee, and the chairmen of the Ponape district legislature’s
standing committees in the ad hoc capacity of a Holdover Com-
mittee, played a parallel role in their respective administrative
districts. Consultations with political party leaders on Saipan and
in Palau were put to the same use.
In retrospect, the ability of the election commissioner to involve
his election boards in the details of election administration was
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closely related to their number, size, and the dispersion of their
members. The high commissioner’s order contemplated establish-
ing a separate board for each election district, but some adminis-
trators named but one election board to serve all districts. For the
most part these boards were too large or too scattered to func-
tion as single units administering the election. Section 5 of the
election order directed that each polling place be physically su-
pervised by at least one member of the district’s election board
during all hours of the election. This necessitated either the open-
ing of the polls on different days so as to spread the use of the
same personnel, if the board were to be kept small, or the cre-
ation of unwieldy, large election boards, possibly with members
resident throughout the district. Forty-six members were named
to the Marshallese election board; this board enjoyed a somewhat
unusual composition, as it was comprised of the Marshall Islands
district congressmen, each named for his respective atoll. The
13th Marshall Islands Congress was in session at Majuro when
the Congress of Micronesia was announced, and the election re-
quirements were first reviewed with the congressmen. After being
appointed to the election board, they underwent a three-day ori-
entation on the proposed election laws and procedures before
returning home. The district administrator of Ponape secured both
the advantage of collective advice and the service of enough mem-
bers to meet the requirements of the high commissioner’s Special
Order. He accomplished this through the device of initially ap-
pointing only twelve persons and naming an executive committee
of three on the election board to act in a liaison and advisory
capacity; three weeks later, he expanded the original board to
twenty-seven members, in time to enable the members of the en-
larged board personally to supervise voting at all of the polls.
Special Order No. 6 disqualified any election board member
from taking part in election campaigns after his appointment. The
order would thus appear to have contemplated the naming of the
politically neutral. Notwithstanding, in the Marshalls, where the
district legislators served on the board, some candidates received
active support from them. The members of the election boards in
the Marianas were not appointed until the district’s two political
parties had forwarded the names of their nominees to the district
administrator. In areas like the Marianas, where political tensions
run high, such political party involvement was probably inevitable
but, as a corollary, necessitated that favoritism be appropriately
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guarded against, as by requiring at least two persons of opposite
political affiliation to be present personally at each polling place
during the day of election.
In contrast to the generality of the high commissioner’s order
relative to political activity of election board members, it was spe-
cific in directing that board members be Trust Territory citizens
entitled to vote for congressmen. Illustrative of the continuous su-
pervision exercised by the high commissioner’s office, when two
Americans were added to the Marshallese election board by the
district administrator, he was requested to replace them with two
new appointments “at once to avoid any later challenge of [the]
election proceedings.”7 There was, of course, nothing preventing
American employees from serving as poll watchers along with the
election board members.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
The high commissioner’s Special Order No. 6 left to the discre-
tion of each election commissioner the procedures for the registra-
tion of qualified voters within his district. As no previous Territory-
wide registration had ever been undertaken, it was to be expected
that the systems developed in the various districts would differ, as
did even the registration forms. For the most part it was found im-
possible to insist upon advance registration as a precondition for
voting, and in Ponape there was no pre-voting registration what-
soever.
Many people in the Trust Territory have lived for years in one
area but regard another, possibly in a separate administrative
district, as their home. Strong ties of land, family, and personal
identification bind them to their “home” island. Registration was
ordered because of this confused residency, with the hope that
the evolving of machinery for recording residence would cause
the problem to resolve itself through the recording of the voter’s
choice. Section 8 of the Secretarial Order creating the congress
declares only that the franchise is to be vested in residents of
the Trust Territory. An advisory memorandum on this section by
the attorney general and on the “bona fide” district residence
required of candidates (Sec. 7) added little guidance when it dis-
tinguished between “‘residence‚’ which is generally defined as any
transient place of dwelling” and “‘bona fide residence’ [which]
7 Memo from HiCom to DistAd Marshalls, Dec. 28, 1964.
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means residence with domiciliary intent….”8 With advance reg-
istration, the voter would himself declare his residency, and all
voting arrangements could be made accordingly. To accomplish
this, the high commissioner’s order allowed the election commis-
sioners to set any procedure they preferred, so long as no one
was disenfranchised. Headquarters on Saipan found no occasion
to step in and reduce this grant of discretion.
In the Marianas, the services of the municipal government of-
ficers were enlisted in the registration drive, and both political
parties were also pressed into service. A field trip was sent to the
northern Marianas to register the several hundred potential vot-
ers residing there. In Palau, using the census as a basis, the staff
of the election commissioner practically went from house to house
registering the occupants. In most other areas, prospective voters
had to travel to the place of registration; the forms were seldom
brought to them for completion. Truk instructed its magistrates
to compile lists of persons eligible to vote within their respective
municipalities. The Marshalls provided for pre-election registra-
tion on only Majuro and Ebeye (the latter, part of Kwajalein atoll)
and not on the outlying atolls. Long distances and scattered homes
counterindicated advance registration on Ponape, so lists of voters
were drawn from local census records.9 Voters were to appear at
the polling places written opposite their names on these lists.
Cut-off dates for pre-registration were announced in a number
of districts and even formally extended in some, but in the end,
eligible but unregistered voters appearing at the polls were al-
lowed to cast their ballots. Except in those few places where
pre-registration was vigorously enforced, as on Majuro and Ebeye
in the Marshalls, registration was permitted concurrently with
voting.10 It was acknowledged by all that there had been insuffi-
cient time to institute an enforceable registration system for the
first congressional elections. However, except in the few larger
communities and in those between which movement is frequent,
8 Memo from Acting Attorney General to Political Affairs Officer, Dec. 10,
1964.
9 These records have a pseudo reliability, as persons changing their resi-
dences on Ponape are directed by law to notify the magistrate. In practice, not
infrequently this is ignored.
10 Early in November, the high commissioner authorized registration to be
carried out on the day of election, and prior to voting, “if advance registration [is]
impossible.” HiCom to DistAd Marshalls, Nov., 1964. In anticipation of the second
Congressional elections, advance registration was made mandatory. Sec. 8, Pub-
lic Law 2–16, Congress of Micronesia.
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any person coming to the polls is so well known that there was no
need for anything but a record of his having voted.
BALLOT FORMS, BALLOT BOXES, AND ABSENTEE BALLOTING
The Political Affairs staff at Headquarters understandably took
great interest in the technical arrangements for fixing the form
of the ballot and for safe-keeping the ballots after the voting. A
single, combined ballot was promoted for election districts with
relatively few candidates, and separate ballots for each of the
two house races when the choice was between a large number
of candidates. Sample ballots were sent to all election commis-
sioners. Headquarters also proposed that ballots be reproduced
both in English and in the local language of the election district.
This meant that administrative districts like Ponape would need
employ four Micronesian languages, namely, Ponapean, Kapinga-
marangese, Kusaiean, and Nukuoran. Palau interpreted these sug-
gestions in its own characteristic way by also including Japanese
kata kana and pictoral insignia so as to accommodate illiterates
and voters able to read only Japanese.
Special Order No. 6 (Sec. 1) directed the election commission-
ers to list all candidates in alphabetical order on the ballots for
each election district. To the surprise of the uninitiated American,
this had the unexpected consequence of placing all candidates in
the order of their first names, rather than their last. Inferentially,
this precluded ballots on which party candidates were grouped,
so that it was impossible to structure the ballot to permit a single
vote cast for a party to be counted for the entire party ticket.
In former elections, Palau and Truk had both employed insignia
accompanying candidates’ names on district election ballots. Truk
decided to eliminate their use at the congressional election as it
was believed that such symbols influenced the election results,
apart from the candidate’s personal qualifications. As one inform-
ant commented on the choice of symbols, “Breadfruit is quite
appealing to the Trukese.” Although there was some discussion
on the part of the election staff on Palau regarding the fairness
of the insignia adopted by the candidates for congressional posts,
nothing obviously totemic was employed and none were ruled
improper. Some of the symbols may have carried references to
introduced institutions—the coconut to its user’s position on the
Territorial Copra Stabilization Board or the insignia of a fish to
the candidate’s being a Christian. In the main, the insignia served
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as intended, merely as a mechanism to enable illiterate voters to
identify their choices upon the ballot.
Each election commissioner had the authority to devise his
own absentee balloting procedures. As a degree of uniformity was
advisable, Headquarters at Saipan suggested that notice be sent
to residents away from their districts, advising them to apply for
absentee ballots and instructing them to furnish the data neces-
sary to prove voting eligibility. Temporary district residents were
to be similarly informed of their right to absentee ballots from their
home districts, and inter-district arrangements were to be made for
handling absentee voting. On its part, Headquarters instructed its
Liaison Office on Guam to facilitate the absentee voting of qualified
students there. The response was uneven. Some districts exerted
strenuous efforts to contact absent residents and to acquaint tempo-
rary residents within the district of their voting privilege in their
home district. By direct correspondence between Kusaie of Ponape
district and Ebeye in the Marshalls, arrangements were made to
assure the franchise of the large Kusaiean population working
on Ebeye. Sometimes special absentee ballots were printed. In
general, all election commissioners supplied absentee ballots to
persons temporarily outside their home districts for business or
educational purposes. In Truk the absentee voting procedure was
employed for prisoners and hospital patients unable to attend the
polling place. The Marianas reported sending absentee ballots to
persons who had obtained permanent-residence status on Guam.
The variety of absentee balloting procedures applied and the prob-
lem presented by the large number of people at district centers
who consider themselves to be permanent residents of other ar-
eas assured that a Territory-wide absentee-ballot law would be
enacted for future congressional elections.
Early in the preparations for the election, Headquarters sent
explicit instructions to all district administrators for the building
of tamper-proof ballot boxes. Not only did the blueprints detail
sturdy construction, but inner and outer locks were to be attached
to prevent access by unauthorized personnel. Even prescribed was
the manner in which the lid was to be sealed with masking tape
after it was closed and before the exterior padlock was placed on
the outside hasp. It was planned that each poll would have its own
ballot box, which would facilitate the tallying of votes when the
boxes were brought to a central place for counting. The durability
of the boxes is attested to by their continuing to survive the rigors
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of rough seas and perhaps even more punishing land roadways.
If for nothing else, the first congressional elections will long be
remembered by the over one hundred ballot boxes which remain
throughout the Trust Territory to serve local and district election
needs as well as future elections for the Congress of Micronesia.
NOMINATIONS AND CANDIDACY
Soliciting views from the districts preparatory to the high com-
missioner’s promulgation of Special Order No. 6 encouraged a
number of replies pertaining to the manner in which nomination
ought be processed. Given the time available and the level of elec-
tion technology in the Territory, some of them were impractical,
such as the suggestion from Palau for the institution of primary elec-
tions to reduce the number of candidates to three for each office.
Underlying all these proposals was the joint need, on the one hand,
to encourage nominations and, on the other, to incorporate some
way to narrow the field of aspirants for office so that a success-
ful candidate would represent a sizeable plurality of the voters.
Other than in the provision made for party nominations, the high
commissioner, in effect, ignored all district recommendations and
issued election regulations based on the views expressed in the
Council of Micronesia, which favored the use of nominating pe-
titions. Nevertheless, in a number of contests, district-sponsored
screening mechanisms were employed within the framework of
the procedures laid down in the high commissioner’s regulations.
In outlining the nomination process to be followed, Special Or-
der No. 6 stated that nominations might be self-proposed, made by
sponsors, or by political party. For the office of delegate, the five
sponsors initiating the petition had to be joined by no less than
fifty additional citizens all declaring that they were residents of
the district and entitled to vote and that their candidate met the
legal qualifications to run.
For office of assemblyman, the number of supplemental sponsors
was twenty-five. Although a candidate could be self-nominated, few
such nominations were filed. In the Marianas the political parties
nominated all candidates, in the Palaus the bulk of the candidates
were similarly proposed, and in the remaining districts most candi-
dates’ names were placed in nomination by sponsors.
The Trust Territory had experimented with a variety of pro-
cedures in choosing delegates for the Council of Micronesia,
but central to most processes was the district legislature. The
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Marianas were atypical, with municipal bodies nominating five
candidates who were voted upon on all islands but Rota for one
of the Mariana district’s council seats; the other council seat
was allocated outright to Rota. In the Marshalls, the district
congress selected ten candidates who ran at large, and the
two highest vote-getters were declared elected. The Truk proce-
dure was identical, except that a ticket of only five candidates
was nominated. Palau, too, observed the five-candidate limit but
consolidated the election for council delegate with the spring
municipal elections. In Ponape the whole process was short-
circuited by its congress’ directly choosing the district’s two
council delegates. As was to be expected, some of the comments
early forwarded to the high commissioner would have had the
district legislatures continue to nominate the candidates to be
voted upon.11
For the Congress of Micronesia elections, Ponape established
committees composed of representatives chosen by the municipal
councils within an Assembly district. For Assembly District B,
which encompassed Mokil and other outer islands, names were
forwarded to a Mokilese resident on Ponape who took part in
the deliberations of the committee. Each committee made nomi-
nations for both assemblymen and delegates, and for the latter,
were not restricted to candidates residing within its Assembly dis-
trict. The adoption of this procedure did not discourage a few
self-nominations, but at least one of these candidates later with-
drew, and none was elected. In the Yap district, both the chiefs
on the Yap Islands and the Outer Islands hereditary chiefs took
an active part in designating candidates. Initially on the Yap Is-
lands, nominees were chosen by “primary election meetings” in
the ten unchartered municipalities, and their number was reduced
by the Yap Islands Congress and Yap Islands Council. Signature
of a chief as a sponsor on a nomination petition constituted the
chief’s commitment to aid the candidate, and this carried consid-
erable importance in Yap.
The high commissioner’s election regulations authorized po-
litical parties registered with the election commissioners to
nominate candidates for office. No criteria were stated for
qualifying as a party. In Palau, the election commissioner ac-
11 There is the suspicion that nominations made by district legislatures
would have permitted dominant factions within them to favor their own candi-
dates and rule out those of their opponents.
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cepted the request for registration tendered by the chairman of
the Progressive Party as prima facie proof of party existence.
The president of Palau’s Liberal Party accompanied his request
for registration with a copy of the party’s tentative charter and
by-laws and reference to the fact that the party had run candi-
dates during the previous district legislative election. Saipan’s
election commissioner served notice on the chairmen of both
the Popular and Democratic (name later changed to Territorial)
Parties that as recognized political organizations they should
provide him with the names of party officers and, if possible,
their by-laws. Parties had to be registered at least a week be-
fore the closing date for filing nominations in order for their
candidates to be accepted. Not more than one candidate for
each political office could be sponsored by a party. Both in the
Marianas and Palau the parties mustered full slates for all con-
gressional offices to be filled.
The party meetings in Palau to nominate candidates consisted
primarily of caucuses of party leaders. In the Progressive Party,
when some of the aspirants for office were not included on the
ticket prepared by the party’s policy committee, they walked out
of the caucus and later ran as independents. Organization in the
Marianas was more ceremonious, and delegates from the ten mu-
nicipal districts (precincts) on Saipan and from Rota and Tinian
assembled in formal convention to select their parties’ nominees.
The Popular Party is reputed to have been more democratic than
its rival in allowing greater popular participation in the choosing
of candidates for the party slate. As the conventions in the Mar-
ianas appeared to do little more than ratify designations already
prearranged, there was more difference in form than in substance
in the manner in which the parties of the two districts went about
choosing their standard bearers. Only party candidates were on
the Mariana district ballot; in Palau, independents stood and one
succeeded in winning election.
One of the last modifications in drafting Secretarial Order No.
2882 waived the disqualification of Micronesians holding top level
government posts for the first two congressional elections. The
Ponape district administrator, in a memorandum sent to all district
administrators, proposed that the conflict of interest inherent in
the position of those executive and judicial officers also serving
as congressmen, and the possible hampering effect this conflict
might have on relationships between congressmen, be discussed
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with potential candidates “and their candidacy not encouraged—if
not actively discouraged.”12 A memorandum from Headquarters
responded to this, arguing that the benefits to be gained from hav-
ing senior government employees with training and experience in
local government take part in the formative years of the congress
outweighed the disadvantages. Although not foreclosing informal
discussions with such individuals, the memorandum stressed that
the district administrators should neither prevent nor discourage
their candidacy. The number of persons holding high administra-
tive positions who filed as candidates evidences that little covert
sabotage of the Secretarial Order resulted.
Around district centers, no difficulty was encountered in dis-
tributing nomination forms and returning the petitions to the
election commissioner for verification of the signatures affixed. In
distant islands, particularly those reached at infrequent intervals
by field trip, there was insufficient time to follow this procedure.
In a few instances, as in the Hall Islands of the Truk district, res-
idents were instructed to transmit their nominating petitions by
radio. For the most part, when residents from distant places were
nominated, petitions would be signed by persons from their areas
present at the district headquarters.13 A nominee for the General
Assembly had to qualify only as a bona fide resident of the ad-
ministrative district, but most candidates for the lower house had
at least nominal claims to residency in their putative Assembly
districts. The new procedure of nomination by petition worked to
the advantage of the Micronesians stationed close to the district
headquarters. In defense of this procedure, given the movement
to these centers of the outer-island persons most qualified to deal
with Americans and their political institutions, any other nomina-
tion system would most likely have placed the names of the same
candidates upon the ballot.
While nomination petitions were being circulated, the Attorney
General’s Office ruled that a citizen could subscribe to more than
one nomination paper. This eliminated time-consuming cross-
checking by the election commissioners’ staffs as they verified the
names on each petition. Post-election examination of a number of
12 Memo of DistAd Ponape to all DistAds, Oct. 26, 1964.
13 In the Marshalls, all candidates were nominated by action either on Ebeye
or Majuro. A radio broadcast from the latter listed the nominees and advised the
voters that, if dissatisfied, write-ins were permissible. This explains the 5 per cent
write-in of all recorded votes for delegate and 4 per cent for assemblymen in this
district.
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the petitions on file, some listing only subscribers’ given names and
with more than one obviously written by the same hand, leads to
the conclusion that many names must have been accepted on faith.
Given the level of political sophistication of Island life, such action
was probably not ill advised and, in any event, in many cases was
compensated for by multiple nominations for the same candidate.
Popular Dwight Heine of the Marshalls received nine separate nom-
inations for the Assembly and two for the House of Delegates!
Scrutiny by the election commissioner’s staff also ran to the
qualifications of the candidates. Residency within the administra-
tive district had to be confirmed. The determination that the nom-
ination of Jose Cruz should not be denied because of a felony
conviction was to be the basis for a court contest and, later, for a
challenge in the House of Delegates. In the Marshalls, Dr. John Ka-
man was disqualified as a candidate because he failed to meet the
five-year Trust Territory citizenship requirement. If a candidate re-
ceived nominations for both the House and the General Assembly,
or for two different seats in the latter, he had to elect which to run
for, which necessitated the election commissioner’s communicating
with the candidate. As petitions could be presented without the con-
sent of the nominee, the election commissioners published notices
of the deadline within which nominations could be refused and
also tried to contact all nominees, seeking assurance that they de-
sired to stand for election. The nomination of people absent from
the Territory raised additional complications; one, in response to a
radiogram inquiring if he accepted nomination, replied, “What will
my people say if I refuse their nomination. What kind of a leader
would I be?” The message was construed as an acceptance.14
Originally, it had been recommended that a deadline of around
November 30 be set for filing candidates’ petitions, which would
have left ample time to the administration for printing the ballots
and making other necessary preparations, and to the candidates
for campaigning. With the high commissioner’s order fixing the
boundaries of the Assembly districts delayed until November 30,
this time-table had to be abandoned. All that Headquarters at Sai-
pan could do was to remind the election commissioners of their
responsibility for establishing the filing date for nominations and
withdrawals. Palau named December 15 as its deadline for filing
and the 31st of the month for withdrawals; the Marshalls used
14 HiCom to DistAd Ponape, Dec., 1964. The candidate lost the election.
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the latter day as the filing and (presumably) withdrawal deadline;
Truk settled on December 19 as the last filing date for nomina-
tions within the Truk lagoon, and the 25th for the outlying islands.
Given district disparities, the need of uniformity for deadlines
throughout the Territory may be questioned. Given those same dif-
ferences, the relatively short time available for the circulation of
nomination petitions, after the Assembly district boundaries were
officially declared, supplies grounds for criticism.
With all the nominations complete and qualified, within the six
administrative districts there was an average of about three can-
didates for each post to be filled. Of the twenty General Assembly
races in which there were contests, almost half (9) were between
only two contenders. Four of the six delegate elections also had
only double the number of candidates for the two at-large seats. To
Ponape and Truk went the dubious distinction of having so many
aspirants for office as to allow each only a statistically low chance
of success. Three districts, D of the Marshalls and Districts A for
Ponape and Truk, registered six candidates for but one legislative
seat. In contrast, in one of Ponape’s Assembly districts, a single
candidate qualified.
STATISTICAL CHANCES OF CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION
(in percentages of 100)
Assembly House Both
AVERAGE 31.3 42.8 34.7
Marianas 50.0 50.0 50.0
Yap 40.0 50.0 44.4
Palau 37.5 33.3 35.7
Marshalls 30.8 50.0 35.3
Truk 27.8 50.0 31.8
Ponape 23.5 33.3 26.1
Relatively early in the planning for the congressional elec-
tions, Truk district was advised that it was necessary for all nom-
inated candidates, whose names were not subsequently with-
drawn, to be placed on the ballot and voted upon, even if un-
opposed. The reasons underlying this were that the Secretarial
Order stipulated the members of congress were to be chosen by
secret ballot, and in addition, the first congressional elections
were regarded as an appropriate vehicle for developing an under-
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standing of proper voting procedures. Somehow, this instruction
was not communicated widely, and Bethwel Henry of Ponape was
later declared elected as an unopposed Assembly candidate. The
series of events which led up to this well illustrates the workings
of the nomination system on Ponape. The nominating committee
proposed five candidates for Ponape General Assembly District B.
One nominee quickly declined, the papers for two others did not
receive the requisite number of sponsors’ signatures, and on the
last day for filing nominations, the fourth nominee withdrew. As
Ponapeans look upon those who nominate themselves as “push-
ing” and few self-initiated nominations were submitted—and none
for this district seat—the late withdrawal left only one candidate
in the race. The election-district board met and declared Henry
elected. It was not discovered that the Ponape ballot had omitted
any provision for voting in District B until after the high commis-
sioner had issued his certificate of election.
THE CAMPAIGNS
Sweeping generalizations purporting to encompass the whole
of the Trust Territory are gross at best and, when relating to po-
litical activity, are highly suspect. This is due to many factors:
the heterogeneity of permissible conduct within even a single
administrative district, the awakening of interest in the introduced
American institutions joined with a rise in political expectations,
and the gradual adoption of Western forms of political action by
the younger office seekers. There is good reason for believing
that in some of the districts such Western-type political activity by
candidates may have more harmed than aided their cause at the
congressional elections, but each year the number of such candi-
dates grows, and it is only a matter of time before the new ways
are grudgingly tolerated and then become an integral part of the
political mores. The Interior Department’s report that “it would
be a violation of traditional modesty and self-depreciation to seek
support actively for public office in almost all islands of the Terri-
tory”15 may have described the politics of 1958, but it did not as
neatly fit campaigning for congressional posts on “almost all is-
15 11th Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations, 1958, p.
33. As early as 1958, at a public meeting in Ponape, the first instance of active
campaigning was recorded, a far cry from the Ponapean exaggerated modesty
and fear of criticism for pretentiousness commented upon little more than a
decade previously. See William R. Bascom, Ponape: A Pacific Economy in Transi-
tion, USCC Economic Survey No. 8 (Honolulu: 1946), pp. 27–31.
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lands” in 1964. At succeeding congressional elections it will be
even less applicable.
An additional note of caution must be sounded. Inquiries ad-
dressed to all candidates brought replies from many denying that
they had engaged in campaigning. They were responding with the
stereotype concept of American electioneering in mind, or as one
phrased it, there were “no rallies, public debates, public addresses,
luncheons, buzz sessions, campaign literature and entertain-
ments.” But this same candidate appreciated that he had actively
campaigned: “My campaign was based entirely [upon] the grass-
roots of Marshallese politics, i.e., ‘smoke-filled room’ politics.”
In the Trust Territory, traditional political maneuvering, at times
highly involved, meets the function filled elsewhere by political par-
ties and platforms, parades and billboards, and other aspects of
aggressive electioneering. This engrafting of old processes to the
new political forms is explained by the introduction of copied insti-
tutions’ not always being accompanied by the processes normally
associated with them in situ; customary processes then fill the
hiatus so as to assure viability to the borrowed. Thus it becomes
necessary to differentiate between “electioneering,” or “overt cam-
paigning” as another Marshallese candidate phrased it, and the
mustering of support to influence voters in more subdued and tradi-
tional ways, the “campaigning” which is encountered in most parts
of the Trust Territory. The change in political activity which is oc-
curring in Micronesia is best epitomized as a movement from covert
campaigning to overt electioneering. Of course all this confusion of
terminology does not rule out the fact that some candidates for the
first Congress of Micronesia did not campaign in any manner. Re-
ported one: “I did not campaign. I did not even know that my name
was on the nomination ticket but heard it over the radio. I just let
it go and let the people decide for themselves who they want to
elect.” This Trukese candidate was elected.
The Mariana and Palau districts, each with recognized political
parties and organized electioneering, polarize apart from the
other four administrative districts which know no parties and in
which, at most, congressional candidates engaged in individual
campaigning. When the press release from the Information Office
at Saipan Headquarters reported active campaigning beginning
early in December and continuing to election day, “complete with
rallies, motorcades, posters, handbills, speeches and hand shaking
… carried out with the same enthusiasm and vigor of any commu-
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nity in the United States,”16 it was mainly referring to these two
districts on the western fringes of the Trust Territory.
The formation of Palau’s political parties in 1963 represented
no movement of protest against objectionable practices of the
administration, nor even a spontaneous coalescing of Palau’s
power figures to seek common cause for personal gain through the
facade of party structure. Rather, the instituting of political parties
nicely satisfied traditional American political norms and neatly co-
incided with the parallel structuring of competition traditional to
Palauan life.17 The district administrator suggested the time was
ripe for the formation of parties to further self-government, and
the leaders of Palau’s new political elite obligingly divided them-
selves into the Liberal and the Progressive Parties.
At the formative meeting, the persons attending found them-
selves agreed on almost everything, so that their cleavage into two
parties represented no ideological split but, if anything, identifica-
tion of birthplace, the old Koror or Melekeok Confederation. The
voters, too, favored one or the other party not so much upon the
basis of platform as on their political leaders. The parties thus con-
stituted but loose configurations around a number of individuals,
without institutionalized structures or party treasuries. Expenses
were met personally by the candidates and their supporters. As a
consequence, the two parties’ policy positions were not sharply dis-
tinguished. Both supported greater self-government, but the Liberal
Party was more inclined to move faster while preserving the Palau
identity from being lost in that of the Trust Territory. The Progres-
sive Party was considered more pro-business; the Liberal Party,
more critical of the administration and inclined toward restricting
American entry into the Palauan economy. Progressive candidates
ambiguously referred to a closer relationship with the United States
in a tie resembling a British commonwealth, while Liberal Party as-
pirants mentioned independence for Micronesia “sometime in the
future.” The platform planks of the Liberal Party did not aid in erect-
ing a distinctive party position,18 and the Progressive Party adopted
no platform for the congressional elections. The stand of each was
disclosed by the tenor of party leaders’ speeches and their respec-
tive stances before the public.
16 Press Release, Information Office, Jan. 19, 1965.
17 See Robert Kellogg McKnight, “Competition in Palau” (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio
State University: 1960), pp. 98–99.
18 “Our Pledge, Our Aim, Our Hope,” 1965 Platform of the Liberal Party of Palau,
circa Dec., 1964.
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Between the Palau party candidates and independents, most
campaign techniques used in the United States were duplicated
short of television shows and skywriting. Because of limited re-
sources, the campaigns were modest, but the effort was no less
ambitious. The administration printing facilities were made avail-
able to candidates for publishing leaflets. Posters, pamphlets, pub-
lic rallies complete with entertainment and refreshments, radio
speeches, house-to-house electioneering—all were employed.
Party candidates campaigned both in teams and as individuals.
On the day of the election, they arranged transportation to the
polls for the voters. The administration had allocated radio time
on Wednesday and Sunday mornings for electioneering, with each
candidate entitled to a maximum of ten minutes a day and the
parties fifty minutes. While voting was on-going, the district radio
maintained an all-day election schedule. Some of the campaigning
was in English, most in Palauan, and even Japanese was employed
for candidates’ names. Candidates tended toward the “soft-sell,”
stressing the abilities of their party’s team rather than emphasiz-
ing their own qualifications for congressional posts.
All party candidates received party assistance in their cam-
paigning. In other administrative districts, candidates stated
clubs, cooperatives, and religious groups had aided, but reference
to such groups was absent in questionnaire replies from Palau.
However, one candidate did indicate he had received the support
of the Modekgnie, which urged its members to vote for him. The
Modekgnie movement in Palau had its origins in Japanese times
when it was a religious protest group, remains nativistic in appeal,
and bears a vague resemblance to cargo cults found in other parts
of Oceania.19 This unsuccessful candidate was a nominee of the
Liberal Party, which fact lent confirmation to the rumor that the
Modekgnie movement was backing Liberal Party candidates.
Almost all that has been described about Palau in the way
of party action at the congressional elections was duplicated in
the Marianas, except that the Palauan endeavors appear both
subdued and amateurish in comparison. The Palau congressional
elections could be followed by a post-election day celebration,
complete with parade, floats, and addresses by the successful can-
19 For consideration of Modekgnie, see Arthur J. Vidich, “The Political Impact
of Colonial Administration” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University: 1952), Chap. 10.
The use of the dove insignia for the identification of candidates was undoubtedly
tied to the movement.
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didates, with the chairmen of Palau’s two parties jointly serving
as masters of ceremony for the occasion. It is improbable that this
could have been replicated on Saipan. Politics in the Marianas are
highly charged emotionally and as a consequence are taken seri-
ously. Bodily damage and injury to property as a result of political
quarrels are not unknown on Saipan.
As Guam has been “the center of the Chamorro’s world,”20
the Northern Mariana parties and their tendencies to political
histrionics have been cast in the model of Guam’s two parties. In
December, 1960, when only the Popular Party existed on Guam,
the Popular Party of Saipan was organized. Two months later the
Northern Mariana’s Progressive Party came into being, but de-
spite its title, it had no tie with the identically named party in
Palau. Later it assumed the name “Democratic Party” but never
became affiliated with the Democratic Party of the United States.
Finally, it called itself the “Territorial Party” because it had “the
greatest respect and admiration for the Territorial Party of Guam”
and also shared the same “ultimate goal” of “the highest interests
of all peoples and not just those of certain partisan groups and fac-
tions….”21 All this is a far cry from a 1944 evaluation that there
was no evidence “the moderate degree of political self-conscious-
ness” developed among the Chamorros of Guam had ever spread
to their cousins in the other Marianas.22
By 1964, the deep policy rift between the Northern Mariana
parties over merger with Guam, and subsidiary differences such
as free transportation on Saipan, distinguished the Mariana po-
litical organizations from the personal coterie parties of Palau.
The Popular Party threatened to boycott the congressional elec-
tions in the Marianas as a protest against the founding of the
Congress of Micronesia and its purpose of furthering Territor-
ial unity. Later, it amended this position, for that course would
have meant defaulting all posts to the opposition; instead, if suc-
cessful, its candidates would withdraw from the congress. (Only
20 Alexander Spoehr, Saipan: The Ethnology of a War-Devastated Island, Fiel-
diana: Anthropology, Vol. 41 (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum, 1954),
p. 181.
21 Resolution adopted by the Democratic Party, Feb., 1965. It was imperative
that the name be changed as the Northern Marianas’ Popular Party was openly
co-operating with Guam’s Democratic Party (formerly the Popular Party) in seek-
ing union of the whole Marianas.
22 U.S. Navy, Civil Affairs Handbook (Mandated Marianas Islands), OPNAV
P22-8 (formerly OPNAV 50E-8) (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, 1944), p. 79.
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one Popular Party member was elected and, without incident, he
accepted and retained his seat.) The candidates of both parties
electioneered long and hard. There had not been organized elec-
tioneering on Rota until the first congressional elections, and
both parties copied there and on Tinian the ticket appearances
at public mass meetings, the posting of placards, the distribution
of pamphlets, and the face-to-face campaigning which has be-
come standard on Saipan. Only the islands north of Saipan were
not visited by the candidates, and if limited transportation had
not precluded, they too undoubtedly would have been engulfed
in the torrent of extemporaneous political speech-making which
nearly submerged the entire Marianas district.23
Two delegates from Ponape and the Marshalls were elected
while they were in Hawaii; other successful candidates for con-
gressional office in these two administrative districts and in Truk
were absent from their electoral districts for the entire length of
the campaign. It was not essential that they be present, for in Yap
and the three eastern districts of the Territory electioneering was
just becoming institutionalized. Because knowledge of the candi-
dates was widely shared, it was possible for them to be elected
on their reputations, aided by covert campaigning on their be-
half. As expressed by one informant, “Everyone in the Marshalls
knows the exact number of crimes and sins each has committed.
Everyone also knows what one stands for and what one is against.
Before I left for Saipan, I expressed my desire to run for the Lower
House, [and] when I returned I was in.”
In Truk, candidates were allotted fifteen-minute periods to
broadcast over the district radio station; practically all responded
with subdued, modest statements. Only two candidates complied
with the request that they prepare statements to be printed in the
Truk Tide, the district administration’s weekly bulletin, “on how
they feel qualified to help their fellow Micronesians.”24 Neither
was successful at the polls. The experience in Ponape was com-
parable; several who gave “fighting speeches” on the radio and
engaged in overt electioneering were defeated. It was the consen-
sus that their approach offended and that it was believed “they
thought too well of themselves.” However, a “humble plea” over
23 One informant estimates candidates’ average public speech lasted at
least thirty minutes! Their conduct was a far cry from Spoehr’s statement,
circa 1950, that for a man to campaign publicly on Saipan in his own behalf
would be an unthinkable breech of modesty. Spoehr, op. cit.‚ p. 179.
24 Truk Tide, Jan. 15, 1964, p. 1.
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the radio was favorably received. Even in conservative Yap, sev-
eral candidates distributed printed leaflets, and five candidates
appeared at a rally before high school students (many of voting
age), introduced themselves, and stated their platforms. All of
this evidences that low key electioneering is not necessarily pro-
scribed by traditional mores, and it may be anticipated that at
future congressional elections there will be additional formulation
and presentation of candidates’ programs, broadcasting of lauda-
tory statements, and use of printed materials to reach those voters
who cannot be spoken to in person and to reinforce the impact of
contact on those who are.
This does not mean that customary campaigning, through se-
curing the endorsement of traditional chiefs and clan leaders who
in turn influence their followers, will not still continue, or that
family and friends will not discreetly champion the cause of candi-
dates. Political aspirants will seek employment that permits them
to be of assistance to potential voters and allows their capac-
ities to become well known. Presence on field trips will bring
the candidates to the attention of the inhabitants of the outer is-
lands, even if the candidates engage in no formal electioneering.
Letter writing to key friends and opinion leaders, to the latter
possibly through intermediaries in the absence of close personal
friendship, will enlist support in those situations where face-to-
face visits are not feasible. All of these techniques played a part in
shaping the vote at the first congressional elections in those more
traditional areas of the Trust Territory where there was “no cam-
paigning.” As greater interest in expanding governmental services
develops among the voters, and as they come to understand how
their vote helps determine this, the same electioneering which is
now encountered in Palau and the Marianas will gradually spread
to the rest of the districts, whether or not accompanied with the
formation of parties.
CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS
The election commissioners, through the district weekly news
bulletins, radio broadcasts, and community meetings, alerted the
electorate to the importance of the congressional elections and
the need for compliance with election registration and voting
regulations. Election board members stationed near the district
headquarters were instructed in the procedures to be followed in
opening and closing the polls, confirming the right of each voter
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to cast a ballot, rendering assistance to illiterates, safe-keeping
marked ballots, and accounting for unused and spoiled ballots.
The applicable directions received from Headquarter’s staff on
Saipan and the district election regulations were mimeographed
as a supplement to this training and as preparation for the board
personnel and poll watchers who could not be reached in person.
Early in the election planning, voting dates were correlated with
field trip schedules, and the polling places were located within
the voting precincts. For each, arrangements had to be completed
for providing voting booths, tables, chairs, ballot boxes, and voter
registers, ballots, and necessary supplies. Licensed sellers of alco-
hol were warned not to furnish beverages during balloting and
the police were put on notice should their protection at the polls
be required. With all these preparations completed, the actual
conduct of the elections fell to Micronesians scattered across the
breadth of the Territory, in the main under the supervision of dis-
trict personnel. As was to be expected, there were modifications
and improvisations, and the polling did not always follow the letter
of the regulations. But from all accounts received, the elections
were administered without disturbance and accurately recorded
the electorate’s free choice of candidates.
Recognizing it was impossible for the elections to be held on
the one day named in the Secretarial Order—January 19—given the
Territory’s inadequate transportation facilities and the limited time
available for completing election preparations, the high commis-
sioner expressly authorized advance elections in “romote areas”25
and countenanced variances for others. In the Truk district, vot-
ing occurred at different places in the Hall Islands between
December 28 and December 30, followed by the Mortlock and West-
ern Islands from January 4 to January 14, while the elections within
the Truk lagoon commenced on January 11, and only the balloting
on Moen, seat of the district headquarters, took place on January
19. Palau, Ponape, and the Marianas started polling outlying areas
early in January, as did the Marshalls. The Marshalls were unable
to retrieve all of the ballot boxes and return them to Majuro for
tallying until a week after the official election date had passed.26
25 Memo from Acting Assistant Commissioner for Public Affairs to all DistAds,
Nov. 10, 1964.
26 In the Marshalls, district legislators returned to their home atolls on the out-
bound leg of the field trip which also brought the ballots and ballot boxes, supervised
the elections, and delivered the sealed ballot boxes to the field-trip ship on its in-
bound voyage.
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The elections in the Outer Islands of the Yap district did not begin
until January 27, a week later than the official election date, and
were concluded twelve days thereafter. In short, the bulk of the
Territory’s population did not cast their ballots on the election date
prescribed in the Secretarial Order. Nevertheless, the completion of
the entire voting within the span of a little over a month represents
an administrative achievement for the Trust Territory.
The same discretionary adjustments characterized application
of the election regulations of the high commissioner and the dis-
trict administrators. In most places, despite advance registration,
any voter coming to the polls could register immediately preced-
ing voting. The 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M. polling times had to be
adjusted to fit field-trip sailing schedules. Absentee voters were
accommodated in numerous ways, even to setting up a special
polling booth for Kusaieans on Ebeye in the Marshalls, where over
a hundred qualified voters from the Ponapean district were work-
ing. Except in the Marianas district, the voters took all variations
in stride without filing any formal complaints of irregularities.
In the more populated areas, voters came to fixed polling
places; in some of the smaller areas, the election officials took the
election boxes around from village to village, and house to house
if necessary. The Palaus had little need for assisting voters at the
polls due to the use of the candidates’ insignia on posters and bal-
lots, and to extensive advance voter instruction. It was reported that
literacy in the local vernacular is so high in the Marshalls that it
obviated the need for any voter assistance there because of inabil-
ity to read the ballot; however, there is reason to discount this. In
the other four districts, over an estimated 1,200 voters were aided,
with “whisper” votes extensively employed in the islands between
Truk atoll and the Yap Islands. However, voters no longer believed
it appropriate etiquette to crawl the last thirty feet or so on all
fours to whisper their preference to the administration’s repre-
sentative,27 thereby exhibiting traditional deference, as occurred
in some early elections under the Americans. Trust Territory em-
ployees could take temporary absences from work to ballot, and
in district headquarters, where lines of voters queued before the
polling booths, a goodly part of the normal three-hour maximum
leave from work allowed may have been consumed in waiting.
27 See memo of John L. Fischer, “Report of Special Investigation of Political
Situation on Puluwat, May 24 to May 31, 1950” (University of Hawaii, Sinclair Li-
brary, Micro. 594), p. 5.
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The Palau district reported it was impossible to land a boat on
Merir Island due to rough seas, and thus the consequent disen-
franchisement of eleven eligible voters. The Marianas district ex-
perienced the same difficulty on Alamagan, Sarigan, and Anata-
han, all north of Saipan, and an estimated thirty-two potential
voters were unable to cast ballots. On the other hand, when the
Marshalls’ field-trip ship could not send a boat in to pick up
the ballot box from Kili, the former Bikini residents there swam
the box with its load of marked ballots through the surf. The
votes were later counted on Majuro, even though the registration
records had to be left behind and the number of ballots in the box
could not be checked against the recorded voters.
In most administrative districts the election returns were tallied
at district headquarters, with the ballot boxes from the outer
areas brought in and opened by the special Counting and Tallying
Committees of Micronesians appointed for that purpose. In the
Marianas, separate committees on Rota and Tinian counted the
ballots cast in their respective areas, and the results were then
added to the tallies made for Saipan. Yap had two committees, and
the one named for the Outer Islands traveled with the field-trip
ship carrying the ballot boxes back to Colonia and there tallied
the vote.28 At least five hundred absentee ballots29 were included
within the count of their appropriate districts. No ballot boxes
were opened until January 19, so that despite the advance ballot-
ing in some areas, there was no chance for a bandwagon effect
to sway the course of the voting. Final tallies were announced by
January 20 in all but the Marshalls and Yap districts; in both of
the latter, partial returns were released, but the final count of bal-
lots was not completed at Majuro until January 31 and in Yap until
February 10. Candidates or their representatives and numerous
spectators watched the canvass of the ballots, and the district ra-
dio stations broadcast running commentaries on the contests. The
final returns were both broadcast and published for distribution
throughout the districts.
The conduct of the polling was uneventful, with the only
28 In effect, Yap had two election commissions, and the one for the Outer Is-
lands also served as their Counting and Tallying Committee.
29 This figure of absentee ballots represents the total reported by all districts.
As Ponape listed only 6 absentee ballots and had a large Kusaiean population
eligible to vote absentee, the total is questionable and revised would probably
approximate 600, or about 3 per cent of the vote cast at the 1965 congressional
elections.
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untoward incident noted being in Palau, where two candidates
made an attempt to instruct voters inside a polling place. An-
other candidate was dissuaded from campaigning with a tape
recorder just outside the 100-foot neutral zone surrounding a poll.
The Marshalls had to decide the right of several voters to cast
ballots on Majuro, when record of their registration could not be lo-
cated; this was one of the few areas in the Trust Territory where
advance registration was enforced. When votes were tallied, the
Marshalls also had to deal with a ballot box containing substantially
more ballots than there were registration slips.
All of these incidents were minor and brought no formal objec-
tions such as the three lodged in the Marianas. One of these
concerned duplication of registrations on Saipan; a bipartisan
committee of four members appointed by the election commis-
sioner investigated and found only one instance of double registra-
tion and voting, and that, in fact, had already been rectified. The
protest over failure to have returns from the northernmost islands
included in the final tabulations, due to rough seas preventing a
landing, was rejected on a technicality turning on improper filing.
The final protest concerned the qualifications of Delegate-elect
Jose Cruz, and although it brought in collateral charges of alleged
election irregularities on Rota, the latter protest was regarded
as untimely. The basic issue could finally be resolved only by the
House of Delegates itself.
THE ELECTION RESULTS30
In the words of President Johnson’s congratulatory message to
the Congress of Micronesia, “The … elections to the first Congress
of Micronesia, with their surprisingly heavy voter turnout were
an impressive demonstration of the maturity …” of the Microne-
sians.31 A total of 25,062 persons went to the polls and cast ballots
in the first congressional elections. This constituted an estimated
60.4 per cent of the eligible voters, far exceeding the turnout of
“off-year” congressional elections in the United States and com-
paring well with that country’s quadrennial presidential elections.
Generally, the larger the administrative district’s eligible popula-
30 The data in this section are based upon the election reports submitted
by all six district administrators and the report of the high commissioner to the
Office of Territories, dated March 11, 1965. In some cases, internal inconsisten-
cies had to be resolved, but this will not materially affect any of the conclusions
drawn.
31 The Rai Review, July 14, 1965, p. 1.
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tion, the lower its percentage of voting (negative rank correlation
of .94). The voters close to district headquarters turned out in no
greater numbers than in the remaining election districts and, in a
majority of cases, made a poorer showing.
VOTER TURNOUT, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Estimated
Eligibles
Persons
Voting Percentage
Headquarters
Turnout*
Yap 3,290 2,767 84.1% 75.7%
Mariana 4,104 3,356 81.8% 76.3%
Palau 4,654 3,711 79.7% 76.4%
Marshalls 8,000 4,218 52.7% 37.7%
Ponape 9,200 5,637 61.3% 61.7%
Truk 12,255 5,373 43.8% 45.7%
Total 41,503 25,062 60.4%
* Based on estimated voters in General Assembly district encompassing district
headquarters; on Saipan, District B.
Voting data for the Outer Islands in the Yap district show
the phenomenally high return of 96.5 per cent of estimated eligi-
bles. In the Truk district, the Mortlocks (64.1%) and the Halls and
Western Islands (74.3%) also demonstrate that the peoples in the
outlying islands went to the polls in heavier numbers than those
living adjacent to the district headquarters. This finding diametri-
cally conflicts with the commonly reported phenomena of lower
voter turnout ratios for rural than for urban regions.32 Although
district headquarters areas hardly approximate an urban metrop-
olis, it might have been expected that for somewhat comparable
reasons they would have had higher voter participation among
their populations. The explanation for the divergence lies mainly
in two complementary factors. The smaller islands received almost
hamlet by hamlet servicing, while in the more populated island
groups (which include the district headquarters), voting booths
were not placed in each village and as a consequence it required
greater effort on the part of the voter to cast his ballot. Secondly,
the relative level of political acculturation undoubtedly played a
part, and in some of the outlying areas, when the district admin-
32 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., 1960), p. 182; Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1959), p. 48.
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istration’s election team appeared on the scene and the polling
places were set up with the sanction of the traditional leaders,
all eligible persons automatically trooped to the polls to vote.
In short, the composition of the Trusteeship’s peoples and the
manner in which elections were conducted makes summary gen-
eralizations applicable to elections elsewhere somewhat suspect
when applied to the Trust Territory.
Practically all ballots cast at the congressional elections were
tallied; only 172 ballots were invalidated because of improper
markings. A candidate usually received the support of the area with
which he or his family were identified by birth. However, the fail-
ure of several to carry their own municipalities may have been due
to the tenuousness of these ties. Some candidates had been living
at district headquarters for very long periods of time without any
visitations “home” to renew traditional bonds. As the level of po-
litical involvement grows in the Trust Territory, accompanied with
a diminution of its ethnocentricity, short of artificial cultivation of
“home-town” support through electioneering, the happenstance of
birthplace may be expected to decrease in importance.
Election competition in the Marianas was confined solely to
party candidates; in the Palaus, beside the party nominees, two
Independents ran for delegate and two for assemblyman. The al-
most clean-sweep of the Territorial Party in the Marianas, taking
both delegate posts and two of the three Assembly seats, was
not matched in the Palaus where an Independent was elected and
the two parties split honors in the remaining pair of contests for
each house. All but fourteen of the Territory’s ninety-four candi-
dates demonstrated creditable voting strength, arbitrarily defined
as being above 10 per cent of the ballots polled. Of the twenty win-
ning candidates in the Assembly, slightly over half (11) received
majority support of their constituents, and sixteen, greater than
two-fifths of the vote tallied. It was in the contests where five and
six candidates ran that the vote was badly proliferated, and in
Truk District A, a candidate was declared elected even though he
amassed only a little over a fourth of the entire vote cast.33 None
of the Palau delegates was elected by outright majorities in the
six-sided race, and in Ponape one of the two successful delegates
also failed to obtain a majority tally. On the whole, though, most
elected candidates represented sizable pluralities, and only four
33 The winning candidate received 28.7 per cent; the second highest tally was
25.4 per cent.
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out of the total thirty-two elected candidates received less than 44
per cent of the tallied vote.34
Everything considered, the first congressional elections ought
to be judged a success. The turnout at the polls was very re-
spectable, given the limited time available to prepare for the
elections and the acknowledged need for greater community ed-
ucation regarding the new congress and its role in Territorial
self-government. The nomination procedures which were followed
favored those Micronesians living adjacent to district headquar-
ters, but as they constituted a good part of the eligible educated
elite, it is reasonable to conclude that the same names would have
been brought forward under other possible nomination systems.
The campaigns as waged in the districts ranged widely from active
electioneering to covert seeking of office, but this only revealed
differences in the stages and rates of the Territory’s political ac-
culturation. The elections were carried off efficiently and with
little untoward incident, primarily because district headquarters
personnel played a large part once administration was decen-
tralized from Saipan to the district centers. The candidates who
took their seats in the first Congress of Micronesia did so in the
confidence that they were fairly chosen and represented, if not
majorities, at least sizeable pluralities of their constituents.
34 Computed as to delegates by doubling their share of votes, because an elec-
tor cast ballots for two candidates, so no candidate could receive more than 50
per cent of the total.
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CHAPTER 11
The Victors and the Vanquished1
WHERE FREE CHOICE by balloting prevails, barring the bizarre
situation of sheer random voting, no legislature constitutes a cross-
section of its body politic. From the candidates brought to the
attention of the electorate are selected those persons who, in the
voters’ opinion, best embody the qualities the electors desire in a
representative. This does not posit the universality of any single or
combination of attributes, but only that the voters are motivated
by more than duplicating their composite self when casting ballots.
Given a large enough field of candidates presenting a range of
choices, the defeated candidates will be more a reflection of the
electorate than those sent to the legislative halls. Thus one can iden-
tify those factors most attractive to the voter. The first elections
for the Congress of Micronesia and the resultant composition of
the congress only reinforce the compass of these generalizations.
For their congressmen, the voters elected individuals markedly dif-
fering from the average adult inhabitant of the Trust Territory; a
comparison of the victors with the vanquished demonstrates that
in the main these distinctive qualities of the successful candidates
were shared less widely by the defeated.
The Trust Territory voters went to the polls appreciating full
well that they were taking part in an event important to the politi-
cal development of the Trust Territory, regardless of how much
they understood about the nature of the new governmental body.
The previous Council of Micronesia and the legislatures function-
ing at the district level were the closest parallels with which voters
were familiar, and they frequently chose as their representatives
persons who had served in these American-sponsored legislative
1 This chapter is based upon extensive background questionnaires completed
by candidates (29 of 33 elected, 41 of 62 defeated) and is supplemented by data
supplied by informants and biographical material published by the Trust Terri-
tory. Incomplete data for categories are indicated by showing the number of
members to which a generalization applies; if full data were available, the dis-
parities between elected and defeated would probably be heightened. Because
of the tenuousness of some data, statistical manipulations have not been at-
tempted.
bodies. But they were also seeking other qualities, and the returns
pointed up their preference for those more educated, those more
widely-traveled, and those experienced in the affairs of Trust Ter-
ritory government at the district and Territorial levels. Traditional
status also attracted the voters’ tally when it was coupled with
ability to deal with Americans and a perception of the linkage be-
tween introduced and indigenous political institutions.
No women ran for the congress, although a few have been
elected to district legislatures and leroij (female paramount chiefs)
have sat as a matter of right in the Marshall Islands Congress. This
lack of contests between male and female candidates foreclosed any
opportunity to determine whether sex would be tied to success at
the polls. The absence of women candidates may suggest that both
sponsors and potential aspirants for congressional posts concluded
that the new legislative body was basically male oriented in its re-
quirements of absence from home. It is also likely that, because the
power wielded by women in the Micronesian cultures is frequently
covert and their qualification through education and participation in
American-sponsored political institutions has lagged, the male prej-
udice in both American and Micronesian societies against women’s
overt leadership remained dominant.
The range of choice available to the voters was limited in ways
other than the absence of women candidates, so that, in some re-
gards, there was little or no opportunity to express a preference
between alternatives. This observation applies especially to lan-
guage skills. Practically all candidates spoke English,2 as compe-
tence in English was accepted as almost a sine qua non for nomi-
nation. The few defeated candidates without English language
abilities fared poorly, either garnering the least number of votes
cast in their particular contests or placing toward the bottom of
the tally. In his campaigning, one of the unsuccessful candidates in
Palau attempted to offset his language deficiency by calling atten-
tion to the provisions of the Secretarial Order which would assure
him an interpreter, if elected to the congress. Both of the non-
English-speaking members elected hold high chiefly status and
have otherwise prominently distinguished themselves in both the
traditional and introduced political systems of their districts. With
respect to Japanese-language-speaking skills, there is likewise lit-
2 In comparison with 26.6 per cent of the population over twenty-five years of
age speaking English, and 36.9 per cent over fifteen years. 17th Annual Report of
the United States to the United Nations, 1964, p. 205.
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tle to separate the successful from the defeated candidates, for the
districts vary in the percentages of their adult populations with
Japanese language aptitude.3 The findings on candidates speaking
a second Micronesian language are almost equally inconclusive
for similar reasons. However, in future elections this will bear fur-
ther scrutiny, for in the Assembly districts where languages are
different from those used at district headquarters (as District A
of Ponape, encompassing Kusaie and Pingelap), voters, when they
had a choice, showed that they preferred House candidates with
these “secondary” Micronesian language skills.
LANGUAGE-SPEAKING ABILITIES OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES, 19654
Defeated (62) Elected (33)
English 93.5% 93.9%
Japanese 66.1% 72.7%
Second Micronesian 29.0% 21.2%
Education played an important part in attracting support for
candidates. In specific contests, other factors sometimes took
precedence, but on the whole the respect which is afforded an
educated man in the Trust Territory stood the elected candidates
in good stead. Collectively, the candidates represented a level of
schooling far higher than that attained by their constituents.5 In
the eight contests where candidates who had attended college lost
to others with lower educational achievements, three graduates
were defeated by candidates who had not completed matricula-
tion, as was a fourth who tallied fewer votes than a candidate
who had never been enrolled in a collegiate level institution; in
the other four races, candidates with some college attendance to
3 However these data do support the hypothesis that in areas adopting a new
language, the legislature will evidence a larger proportion of members qualified
in that language than the body politic, and also will have a larger proportion of
persons skilled in the language being lost. See Norman Meller, “Bilingualism in
Island Legislatures of the Pacific as an Index of Acculturation,” Sociology and So-
cial Research, 43:6 (July–Aug., 1959), 408.
4 Compare the Japanese language skill of congressional candidates with that
of the Trust Territory’s population, with 59.8 per cent Japanese-speaking in the
25–44 years age bracket and 48.5 per cent for ages 25 and over. Ibid.
5 Less than 20 per cent of the adult population has completed six years of
schooling.
The same respect for education was revealed within the congress, for of the
fourteen officers and standing committee chairmen, twelve had attended college or
medical school; three of the four college graduates were accommodated with posts.
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their credit lost to others who had none. Significantly, the two non-
English-speaking chiefs from Ponape and Truk and two candidates
from royal families (iroij) running in the Marshalls defeated more
highly educated opponents. Further revealing the importance of
chiefly status, in Yap a college graduate lost to a candidate with
only two years of college education but with strong chiefly back-
ing.6 Two of the remaining three cases may be traced to the heavy
ticket voting in the Marianas, and the last may also be due to the
influence of organized political activity in Palau, although party
loyalty there was not as persuasive as in the Marianas.
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES, 1965
Defeated (62) Elected (33)
High school or equivalent7 *71.9% 87.9%
Some college 50.0% 66.7%
Medical/dental school 9.7% 12.1%
College graduation 6.4% 12.1%
* n = 57
The candidates were collectively more widely traveled than
their constituents, and elected candidates reported more broaden-
ing experience outside their home environment than the defeated.
Much of this travel was closely tied to educational achievement,
for the indigenous inhabitants of the Trust Territory must leave
the region to obtain education above the secondary level.
TRAVEL REPORTED FOR CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES, 1965
Defeated (62) Elected (33)
Guam *91.8% 100.0%
Hawaii 41.9% 72.7%
U.S. mainland 19.3% 48.5%
Other Pacific Basin Islands †19.3% 27.3%
Japan †14.0% 27.3%
Elsewhere †28.1% 30.3%
* n = 61
† n = 57
6 Compare with actions of chiefs in Outer Islands of Yap who “nominated can-
didates for both houses who had the most schooling and experience under the
American Administration.” Questionnaire response from a defeated Outer Islands
candidate.
7 As used in the table, a candidate attending a college or university, even
though he did not have a diploma from a high school, was classified as high
school “equivalent.” Similarly, for dental and medical school graduates.
278 The Victors and the Vanquished
When asked by a reporter “what are the best qualifications
for candidates to [the] new Congress?” Andon Amaraich, who was
running for the House, replied that experience in the district leg-
islature stands “first in importance,” followed by several years
in public service, which helps one to know how the government
works.8 Within his first category he might also have included mem-
bership in the Council of Micronesia and the preceding Territory-
wide advisory conferences, for the voters plainly registered their
preference for candidates with both forms of legislative train-
ing. Except in the Marshalls, it appeared to be of little moment
whether or not a candidate was an incumbent district legislator at
the time he ran for the congress; in the Marshall administrative
district, only incumbents were elected to the congress. Despite its
importance, prior service in a legislature per se represented but
one factor taken into account by the voter, and in one-quarter of
the contests,9 candidates without legislative experience defeated
opponents who had been members of district legislatures.
PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES, 1965
Defeated (62) Elected (33)
Seat in district legislature *60.3% †75.0%
Seat at time of election *31.0% †34.4%
Ever presiding officer, district legislature ‡13.5% †34.4%
Member Territory-wide conference 17.7% 51.5%
* n = 58, as Yap Outer Islands not in Yap Islands Congress
† n = 32, as Yap Outer Islands not in Yap Islands Congress
‡ n = 56
Candidate Amaraich’s stress on the importance of non-legisla-
tive government experience also proved prescient. However, the
voters valued some forms of governmental service and discounted
others. Municipal office holding, teaching in the public schools,
and association with educational administration bore no relation
to victory at the polls; if anything, they were tied inversely. But
candidates currently in the service of the government at district
or Territorial levels, or having such past experience to their credit,
were favored. Interestingly, the vehicle for personal advancement
8 Truk Tide, Jan. 15, 1964, p. 8.
9 Of the 27 contests (21 Assembly, 6 House), legislatively experienced candi-
dates were victorious in 12, lost in 7, in 5 all candidates had served in district
legislatures, and in the remaining 3 contests this factor was not pertinent.
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of many of the successful candidates had been through teaching,
but their immediate political saliency obtained through more dis-
tinctive forms of activity.
NON–LEGISLATIVE GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES, 1965
Defeated (62) Elected (33)
PRESENT EMPLOYMENT
Territory or district
(excluding education) 38.9% 54.5%
Teaching only 21.0% a 9.1%
Education (including teaching) 30.6% a 21.2%
PRESENT OR PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT
Territory and district
(excluding education) 54.8% 75.7%
Previous only 46.8% 72.7%
Present and previous education
(including teaching) 50.0% a 51.5%
Teaching only 50.0% a 48.5%
MUNICIPAL OFFICE
Present or previous †63.0% *46.9%
Within last five years ‡47.0% *40.6%
* n = 32, excluding Outer Islands, Yap† n = 54‡ n = 52a Does not include two teachers in parochial schools
A candidate’s religious affiliation may have influenced his
chances for election in some of the contests. About an equal num-
ber of Catholics (47) and Protestants (48) ran, but the 41.7 per
cent success for Protestants outshadowed the smaller 27.7 per
cent for Catholics. Here, cumulative data are misleading, for in the
Marianas and Yap, whose inhabitants are almost all Catholic, only
Catholic candidates filed nomination papers.10 On the other hand,
Catholics comprise a small part of the population in the Marshalls,
but a disproportionately large number ran for the congress and all
were defeated. In the remaining districts,11 the field of candidates
10 There is a small Protestant population in the Marianas, and in the Yap dis-
trict a part of the population yet observes the indigenous religion. One candidate
practices Catholicism when at home, for it is the only religion represented there,
but observes another religion when outside the Trust Territory.
11 A 1948 Navy study considered Truk and Ponape Island about divided be-
tween the two Christian religions and considered Kusaie Protestant. At that time,
almost half of Palau was not identified with either religion. Stanford School of
Naval Administration, Handbook of the Trust Territory (Washington: Office of
Naval Operations, 1948), p. 197.
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more closely reflected the religious composition of the electorate,
and those of the Catholic faith in these contests fared relatively
poorly.
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES, 1965
Total Defeated Elected
District
Cath-
olic
Protes-
tant
Cath-
olic
Protes-
tant
Cath-
olic
Protes-
tant
Marianas, Yap 19 0 10 0 9 0
Marshalls 4 13 4 7 0 6
Palau, Ponape,
Truk
24 35 20 21 4 14
The group that stood for election was remarkably young in a
region which customarily allots, at best, a limited political role to
youth and which normally associates traditional leadership with
at least middle-age maturity, if not old age. To qualify, candidates
had to have reached a minimum age of twenty-five; a number did
barely that. About one-fourth of the adult population over twenty-
five12 falls into the 25–34 age bracket; in contrast, four-sevenths
of the defeated and an even larger two-thirds of the elected fitted
into this category. The median ages of both the victors and the
vanquished were only about thirty-three years, emphasizing the
first congressional elections’ accent on youth.
The congressional elections marked the emergence of a new
political elite, young, American educated and trained, and in good
part dependent upon government employment for a livelihood.
This movement of an administrative bureaucracy into the political
decision-making axis of the Territory’s central government repre-
sents a process that has repetitively occurred elsewhere in the
island areas of the South Seas. Writing over two decades ago, Fe-
lix Keesing noted that “practically everywhere [then excluding Mi-
cronesia], the native representative is at the same time a govern-
ment employee.”13 The Trust Territory may differ in that within a
few years Micronesians at the higher levels of the administrative
bureaucracy must decide between their two roles, and district leg-
islators will also be separated from Territorial solons, suggesting
an institutionalizing of a path for personal political advancement
12 17th Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 204.
13 Felix M. Keesing, The South Seas in the Modern World (rev. ed.; New York:
John Day Co., 1945), p. 165.
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from regional to Territorial post.14 From all this there will emerge
a politician type, distinct from the bureaucratic, who “love poli-
tics,”15 and the beginnings of this elite may already be detected in
both the membership of the new congress and within the body of
unsuccessful candidates.
THE TWO HOUSES DISTINGUISHED
On first appearances there is little to separate the members
elected to the House of Delegates from those in the General As-
sembly. The membership of both houses derived their political
prominence through acquired characteristics which prepared
them for a part in the new institution patterned after the
typical American legislature. Roughly three-quarters of the
members of each house lived close to the district headquarters,
irrespective of the legislative constituencies from which they
stood, and public funds provided the major source of these
legislators’ incomes. Both houses were young; the median age
of each was identical—thirty-three years. But closer examina-
tion reveals that the two bodies did vary in composition, and
cumulatively these differences accorded the Assembly a more
conservative cast.
Although the members of the two houses shared identical me-
dian ages, the mean age of the Assembly was older—35.3 years
compared with 34.6 for the House. More important, the assembly-
men’s age distribution was wider (26–62 compared with only
29–45 for the House), and six of the lower house’s number were
forty years of age or older. This provided a strong leavening of
members for the Assembly who had reached their majority during
the era of the Japanese administration, while only one delegate
from the House fell into this “elderly” group. Practically all the
House members had grown up under the American administra-
tion, were consequently more familiar with American ways, and,
incidentally, were a little more aware of the leverage afforded the
14 See letter of Delegate John Ngiraked to Secretary of Interior Udall, Nov.
19, 1965, protesting that the high proportion of district legislators and govern-
mental servants in the first congress constituted “a very serious abrogation of the
fundamental principles which divide the three branches [and] … functions in a
democratic government” and requesting amendment of Secretarial Order 2882 to
make these disqualifications immediately operative.
15 The reply of one candidate to the questionnaire: “I ran for a number of
reasons…. First, I ran for the Unity of Micronesia…. Second, I ran for a political-
economic policy…. Third, I ran for an educational policy…. Finally, I ran for office
not by default but by choice. I love politics!”
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legislature under the American political system. In contrast to the
Assembly, the House membership enjoyed the advantages of su-
perior education, wider travel—Hawaii, mainland United States,
Japan, and elsewhere—and a greater command of English and
Japanese, two languages which offered members the opportunity
to expand their comprehension of Micronesia. All this led the dele-
gates to be more critical of Trust Territory inadequacies and of the
Administering Authority for failing to ameliorate them. The House,
more so than the Assembly, was conditioned by the prior socializa-
tion of its members to propose innovations for Micronesia, and the
Assembly to be more cautious in concurring with them.
A greater proportion of the House had obtained political prom-
inence through prior membership in Territorial legislative bodies
rather than through service in district legislatures or municipal
offices. They were more familiar with Territory-wide political insti-
tutions and their potential policy-making and public-opinion-form-
ing functions. This induced the delegates to seek a faster pace
of change through action of the congress than the Assembly was
prepared to countenance. Helping to give force to delegate action
was their broader experience in running private businesses and
their dependence upon private income either as sole source of
support or as a supplement to their governmental salaries. They,
more so than the assemblymen, personally knew the difficulties
under which Micronesian business was laboring and could appre-
ciate the advantages which would flow from building the economic
infra-structure of the Territory and assuring Micronesians a larger
role in the region’s development. All of these factors made the
House of Delegates the more radical of the two chambers.
At the convening of the first congress, the petition filed by the
Popular Party of Saipan challenging the seating of Delegate-elect
Jose R. Cruz had a Japanese copy attached to the English ver-
sion so that “the individuals, if any, who may have some doubts as
to the exact meaning of this petition may be able to refer to the
Japanese text….” Not only were the petitioners ill-advised in im-
plying the members of the congress might be more at ease with a
petition drafted in Japanese, but for a contest in the House of Del-
egates, this was particularly inappropriate. Of the two chambers,
it was the more prepared to undertake its new tasks in English,
and with a fuller understanding of the nuances of American politi-
cal practices.
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DIFFERENCES IN COMPOSITION OF TWO CHAMBERS,
FIRST CONGRESS
House (12) Assembly (21)
Some college education 75.0% 61.9%
Language ability
English 100.0% 90.5%
Japanese 83.3% 66.7%
Travel
Hawaii 91.7% 66.7%
U.S. mainland 66.7% 42.8%
Japan 41.7% 19.0%
Elsewhere 66.7% 9.5%
Previous government experience
Territorial legislative bodies 66.7% 42.8%
District legislative bodies 66.7% 76.2%
Municipal office 33.3% 52.4%
Private business activity 75.0% 33.3%
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE
Addressing the students of Mindszenty School on Palau before
the Congress of Micronesia was convened, Assemblyman-elect
Lazarus Salii phrased the classic dilemma faced by all elected leg-
islators:
If I know what a majority of the people think on a particular subject to be
considered by the Congress, I shall be bound to act in accordance with
that thinking; if I do not know what a majority of the people think on
that particular subject, I shall be bound by my conscience and my best
judgement as to what would be best for these people. That, after all, was
the trust that was given to me on election day. If what I know to be the
thinking of a majority of the people on a particular subject is contrary to
what I think is good for them or is contrary to the dictates of my con-
science—then I’m in a tough spot. In that case I can try to convince the
people that they are wrong, although this is very difficult sometimes; if
this does not work I can proceed in the following fashion: if the difference
between the people and myself is on something basic and I would violate
my conscience if I were to follow their thinking, then I shall follow my con-
science and take my chances come next election day. But if the difference
is not on something basic but represents simply a difference of opinion,
then I shall be duty-bound to follow the people. It is, of course, a lot easier
to say this than to always have the courage to follow it in practice.16
A seminal study of legislative roles in four American state
16 Reproduced in Saipan District Panorama, March 19, 1965, p. 2.
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legislatures17 subjected to empirical investigation styles followed
by representatives and disclosed three major role types, the “Dele-
gate” who is the spokesman for his constituents, the “Trustee” who
represents them as he, personally, believes best, and the “Politico.”
The last embodies an overlap of the other two, so representative
types can be conceived of as occupying a continuum, with the
Politico placed toward the mid-point between the two more polar
positions. In numerical frequency, the Trustee type was found to
dominate in each of the four states, followed by the Politico, and the
fewest number of representatives interviewed said they observed
the role classed as Delegate.
Responses received from the candidates elected to the Con-
gress of Micronesia demonstrate that these representational roles
apply equally as well to beginning as to established legislatures,
and in the same rank order of importance, prompting the hypoth-
esis that the roles derive from the very nature of the legislative
process. At the workshop preceding the convening of the con-
gress, the congressmen-elect were queried concerning their own
and their constituents’ views on representational roles. All but
one assemblyman also commented upon whether role concep-
tions would be effected by personal or party-program promises to
support a particular issue.18 Congressmen-elect proved to be, if
anything, more Trustee-and less Delegate-oriented than the aver-
age in the four state legislatures surveyed.
DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS
IN CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA
Representational
Role
As Sees
Own Role
(32 members)*
Constituents’
View of Role
(29 members)
4 State
Legislatures
Trustee 68.7% 55.2% 63%
Politico 25.0% 13.8% 23%
Delegate 6.2% 31.0% 14%
* Does not round to 100 per cent
In seeking an explanation for the three different role ori-
17 Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System (New
York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 267 ff.; also see “The Role of the Representative: Some
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke‚” American Political
Science Review, 53:3 (Sept., 1959), 742.
18 However, in a few cases, replies were unresponsive to the questions asked
and had to be eliminated from the analyses.
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entations and their numerical distribution, the four-state study
suggested “it is likely … that the representative has become less
and less a Delegate and more and more a Trustee as the business
of government has become more and more intricate and technical
as well as less locally centered.”19 Nothing was found to substanti-
ate this assumption that the Trustee representational role evolves
with novelty or complexity of government.20 Within the perspec-
tive of cultural relativism, quite accurately to the Micronesians,
the Trust Territory government and its problems appear highly in-
tricate and technical, simple as they may seem to an American
observer. The expanding government in the Trust Territory will
continue to be relatively complex, so although with greater polit-
ical sophistication the Trustee’s role may partially shift to that of
the Politico, it is difficult to conceive of a material expansion in
the number of congressmen observing a Delegate’s role at the ex-
pense of the Trustee’s.
The largest single group of Micronesian congressmen saw the
representational role of Trustee, which they themselves follow,
paralleling that expected of them by their constituents (13). This
coincides with the political reality encountered in many parts of
the far-flung Trust Territory where representatives tend to be cho-
sen for their ability to face problems beyond their constituents’
comprehension. Only one member viewed both his own role and
that projected by his constituents as being that of a Delegate. Sig-
nificantly, half of the Micronesian legislators (15 of 29) noted that
their conceptualization of representation did not accord with that
of their constituents. In part, this was because some congress-
men adopted the role of Trustee while stating their constituents
considered them a Politico or Delegate. But other congressmen
voluntarily limited the scope of their own roles, taking for them-
selves that of Politico or even Delegate, while recognizing that
their constituents expected Trustee performance from them. As
reported by one Delegate:
(legislator’s view of role—Delegate) “I feel that such matter should be
put into full … [consideration before the Congress] since it is the desire
19 Wahlke and others, op. cit., p. 281.
20 Even the State Legislative Research Project’s findings on Tennessee
did not bear it out, and to explain this the authors added, “it may be that
‘complexity’ is a function of perception, regardless of the real situation.”
Ibid., p. 282.
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of the people—the majority—for such law to be passed. I therefore will
do my best … [to introduce and support the measure].”
(constituents’ view of role—Trustee) “The voters in my district place the
responsibility on me to make the wise decision…. they expect me to put
every effort to help the people …”
(effect of personal or party promise) “There is no difference…. the voters
of my district choose their representatives from those that they put their
entire trust upon as their leaders.”
Half of the congressmen-elect (16) concurred with the
Delegate-type quoted above that neither a personal promise on
their part, when they ran for office, nor a party-program pledge
makes any difference in how they ought conduct themselves. How-
ever, an equal number disagreed or entirely avoided the issue by
supplying non-responsive replies—it is believed deliberately. All
representational role types were found divided over the moral is-
sue inherent in the question.21
Throughout the coding of responses, it proved difficult to fit
members’ replies neatly within the trichotomous categories
posited. Befitting the consensus societies of the Trust Territory,
reference was made frequently to the judgement of fellow legis-
lators as helping to resolve the dilemma of representation. Given
the sense of solidarity usually engendered by membership in a
legislative body and the strength of legislative norms in guiding in-
dividual action, this repeated mention of peer judgement suggests
as the three major referents for the legislator his personal values,
legislative norms, and constituent instructions. “Politico” thus be-
comes a catch-all type for the lawmaker who refuses to commit
himself to observing any one of these three referents, so that he
follows no single representational role.
THE TWO HOUSES TOGETHER
The members of the Congress of Micronesia stand out in bold
relief against the back drop of the body politic. In an area where
the overwhelming majority of the population is still engaged in
subsistence economic activities and less than 7,000 people are
employed for wages,22 the congressmen form a prominent part
21 In view of the number of congressmen who were also district legisla-
tors, it is significant that some who felt bound by their constituents’ directions
specifically disclaimed similar restraint as a result of directives by their district’s
legislative body.
22 17th Annual Report …, op. cit., p. 264.
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of an emerging middle class. The legislators rank among the
most highly educated and the most broadly traveled in the Trust
Territory. Their experience gained through service in previous
legislative bodies and their knowledge of American-introduced po-
litical institutions mark them as probably the best qualified group
which could have been selected, given the vagaries of the election
process, to launch the most prestigeful and potentially most pow-
erful agency staffed by indigenes in the Trust Territory.
The fact that the new congressmen were differentiated from
most of their constituents by a wide array of acquired characteris-
tics, bespeaking the acculturation occurring in the Trust Territory
as the result of Western contact, did not mean they were out of
touch with the traditional mores of their people. Of the seven
congressmen forty years of age or older, six held chiefly titles or
were senior heads of their clans. Excluding the Marianas’ Cha-
morro members, as chiefly titles and lineage ties no longer exist
in that area, almost half of the remaining membership (at least
thirteen—46.4 per cent) encompassing all of the five other admin-
istrative districts had well-recognized traditional status. Holders
of chiefly titles and those in line for titles or possessing high
clan status were considered good representatives, just so long as
they were distinguished by more than merely ascribed criteria.
In Riggs’ terminology, they revealed “clect-like” characteristics,23
sharing a geographic communalism with their constituencies, with
many laying claim to traditional sources of power, but also closely
identified with the processes of change taking place in the Trust
Territory. In a prismatic society becoming increasingly diffracted,
many congressmen, through their occupations, were introducers
of change and all were essentially committed to furthering the
Territorial development which was already underway. They were
primarily an “institutional interest group”24 concerned with law
and order as well as modernity25 in the articulation of political
interests. However, the presence in congress of members with
traditional status also meant that the congress would be kept cog-
nizant of the customary relationships and prescribed practices
23 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 164.
24 See Gabriel A. Almond, “A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics‚”
in Almond and Coleman, ed., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3–64.
25 James S. Coleman, “The Political Systems of the Developing Areas,” in Al-
mond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 548.
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which still regulate life in the Territory and assured a continuation
of legislative concern for traditional matters affected by legislation.
The new members brought to the congress an element almost
unique to the Trust Territory’s ethnocentrism. Seventeen had been
educated at the Pacific Islands Teachers Training School (PITTS)
or the Pacific Islands Central School (PICS), and an additional four
had attended the medical school formerly conducted by the Navy
on Guam. Thus two-thirds had lived closely for protracted peri-
ods of time with Micronesians from all areas of the Territory, an
experience which was to give each a sense of commonality with
persons from ethnic groups besides his own. The nature of this
experience and its life-long effect was well expressed by a young
Yapese student a number of years ago:
When I was a child, I used to think that my father and mother were
the best in the whole world. Not the world really, but Yap, for Yap was
the only place I knew about…. Even when I came to Intermediate, I still
thought that my people were the best of all. I disliked everybody but the
Yapese.
When I went to PICS I still disliked the Palauans, Trukese, Saipanese,
Ponapeans, and Marshallese. I always think that they are people, yes,
but not as good as us Yapese. As we live and worked and played together
I began to feel something in my mind. I began to forget what I have been
thinking all my long life. I learned to like other people beside my own.
Going to PICS cause me to get rid of that silly idea being think that my
own people are the best of all. I might said that PICS changed me com-
pletely.26
The same breaking of Micronesian cultural boundaries was experi-
enced by an additional three congressmen who attended the Uni-
versity of Hawaii without previous education at a central school
in the Trust Territory, and who, through their association with
students in Honolulu, developed cross-ethnic ties and a sense of
kinship with other Micronesians. For many of the PITTS and PICS
graduates, their further schooling in Hawaii only reinforced the
feelings of unity formed earlier in the Territory. In part, this ed-
ucation laid the foundation for the nascent Micronesian identity,
transcending the diverse cultures and peoples of the Trust Terri-
tory, which was to reveal itself at the first congress.
The members-elect attended the convening of the new congress
uncertain in their powers and unfamiliar with their newly acquired
26 Micronesian Monthly, July, 1952, p. 11.
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status. Some thought the congress long overdue, while at least
one believed it premature and that only frustration would be its
result.27 Most approached their posts expecting to formulate their
own policy decisions, doing what they honestly thought best for
their constituents; as a reflection of this, two-thirds categorized
themselves as Trustees in their representational roles. It was ac-
curately written of them that “they are men who almost without
exception regard the future good of the Territory as more impor-
tant than the immediate good of their local constituents. They are
more concerned with the impression they are making on the world
and on the future of their people than with the impression they
make on the voters they [will] face…. They show a statesmanship
rare in politicians anywhere, and almost incredible in people who
have emerged within their own memory from a stone-age soci-
ety.”28
27 Truk Tide, Jan. 15, 1964, p. 6.
28 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Aug. 18, 1966, p. A-8. Written at the close of the
second, 1966, congressional session, it applies equally as well to the same men’s
performance after they were first sworn in as congressmen.
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CHAPTER 12
Organizing the Congress
DESPITE THE SEEMING presumptuousness of the endeavor,
no lesser task than that of training the congressmen-elect to run
their own legislature, and incidentally sensitizing the Adminis-
tering Authority’s staff to the significance of the Territory’s new
power configuration, was undertaken during the span of the two
weeks immediately preceding the convening of the first Congress
of Micronesia. The high commissioner originally contemplated
calling a special session in the spring of the year, shortly after
the January elections, to enable the members to organize them-
selves as a congress. In lieu of this, under the auspices of the
Institute for Technical Interchange of the University of Hawaii’s
East-West Center, a three-man team1 journeyed to Saipan late in
June of 1965 to equip the freshman legislators with the parliamen-
tary knowledge and skills necessary for the functioning of the new
legislative body.
Far more than the mere imparting of factual data and the fur-
nishing of technical assistance in the drafting of legislative rules
was to be attempted by the two-week workshop. The training team
proposed to encourage a sense of identity sufficient to permit
the congressmen to manage their own affairs. The workshop pe-
riod would also afford ample opportunity for the members-elect
to assay the competence, articulateness, and interest of potential
officers and committee chairmen, as well as occasion for them
to meet in informal caucus. These multiple objectives emphasized
the importance of methodology as well as attention to content, and
the necessity for in-built flexibility in both planning and day-to-day
guidance of the workshop. Hindsight indicates that membership
in the Council of Micronesia had already familiarized a number
of the congressmen with members’ strengths and weaknesses
and that the training team may have underestimated the politi-
1 The training team for the workshop consisted of Tom Dinell, then Director
of the Hawaii Legislative Reference Bureau, former U.S. Congressman Thomas P.
Gill, and the author.
cal sophistication many had gained through academia and district
legislative service. For the most part, however, the pre-planning
proved sound, and the success of the workshop is measured by
the Congress of Micronesia’s convening as scheduled on July 12,
1965, structured to undertake its historic mission.
The personality differences which typify the various cultural
groups in the Trust Territory were brought into focus by the new
congress. Throughout the Territory, the Palauan is viewed as ag-
gressive, particularly when compared to Marshallese reticence
which requires that one deny personal ability and publicly ac-
cept responsibility only most reluctantly. The volatile tendencies
of the Chamorros from the Marianas likewise juxtapose against
the gentleness of the Outer Islanders from the Yap district, just
as the former’s rapid acculturation contrasts with the latter’s
continued respect for custom. Although the individuals elected
to the congress might each be somewhat atypical of the group
from which he came, the workshop design had to make provi-
sion for building the confidence of the psychologically diffident
so as to encourage their involvement in the congress on a par
with their peers.
Parallel problems of timidity arising from Administering Author-
ity–administered relationships also had to be anticipated. Having
been governed by four nations, the Micronesians have become
past masters of indirection, outwaiting disliked orders and
furthering their own ends in ways not apparent to the adminis-
tering metropolitan country. Frontal confrontation has tended to
be abjured, and verbal agreement by the Micronesian may cloak
a subtle negation unobserved by the administrator. Instead of be-
ing initiators, the Micronesians have found it far safer as well
as culturally compatible to sit back and await the orders of the
Administering Authority, for what they approve, they can accept,
and the balance is silently ignored. Now, with a body created to
exercise extensive legislating power, comprised of and serving the
welfare of Micronesians, all raison d’être for indirect action be-
came not just unnecessary but, together with apathy, subversive
to the success of the congress itself. Active participation, indeed
open challenge if that should prove to be necessary, had to be-
come the order of the day if the new legislature, conceived of in
the American concept of equality with the executive and judicial
branches, was to become a viable entity. There could be no place
for either personal or institutional diffidence, and the workshop
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took for one of its purposes the preparing of the members-elect for
their new roles.
Fortunately, there existed a number of conditions peculiarly ad-
vantageous to the workshop. The English-speaking ability of all
but two of the congressmen-elect enabled training to be directed
at a fairly rapid pace and to encompass much more material than
would have been feasible if delays for direct, multiple transla-
tion were a requisite. Several of the college graduates among the
members had taken their degrees in political science, and a ma-
jority had some college education, frequently at the University of
Hawaii. With the workshop staff recruited under the aegis of the
university, this strengthened personal rapport and assured an in-
formal source of feedback should the instruction fall short of its
desired mark.
Also easing the burden of the workshop was the knowledge that
neither legislative process nor parliamentary procedure was to be
introduced into Micronesia by the Congress of Micronesia. Never-
theless, advance inquiry revealed there was no single common
body of process or practice which could be lifted en bloc to the
Territorial level and adopted as a unit to meet the requirements
of the Secretarial Order creating the congress. The procedures of
the district legislatures incline to informality and often reflect the
idiosyncracies of the presiding officers. Useful as this prior condi-
tioning to the legislative role was, it furnished at best a glimpse of
the vistas of power now open to the congressmen-elect, and it had
not prepared them fully to assume their new authority or to exer-
cise it with appropriate finesse.
To fill these lacunae, in a short span the training would need
cover not only how a full-fledged legislature formally functions, with
all the attendant pitfalls of parliamentary maneuver, but also the
rough and tumble practicalities accompanying decision-making by
the legislature in action—in brief, the meaning and use of power.
Somehow this had to be compressed into but a week of intensive
drill and presented in a manner which would be comprehensible to
persons living in a society where debate leading to a consensus is
sometimes more important and far more personally satisfying than
recourse to voting and tallying a majority viewpoint.
How to relate meaningfully the experience of Western-style leg-
islatures to the cultures of Micronesia, how to do so in a manner
that would help imbue the members with a sense of joint compre-
hension and thus contribute to the success of the congress, and
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how to conduct the workshop primarily through the spoken word,
for this is a region whose people cannot be expected to read
extensively in the English language or, indeed, any printed media?
These were the problems confronted when working up the train-
ing design.
DESIGN FOR PARTICIPATION
Early in the planning, it was decided that the members-
elect should be encouraged to consider themselves as integrally
associated with all aspects of the training sessions, rather than
just be passive objects. As a technique, involvement would spark
interest and further learning. More basic, what better way to
expose these solons to the full dimensions of their congress, a
legislature for which they will be expected to furnish the mo-
tive force, than to place the workshop in their hands? This might
have been best accomplished by allowing the training to take
shape spontaneously, once underway on Saipan, as the queries
and proposals of the individual legislators gradually lent it form.
The length of time available for the workshop precluded such
an approach; even with the tightest of pre-scheduling, it was
already evident that whole areas of substance and procedure
important to the successful launching of the congress would
have to be sharply elided if not omitted. The nominating by
the congressmen of a committee to which might be delegated
pre-session planning chores ran afoul of the twin realities of
inadequate time and spatial dispersion of the members-elect.
The compromise solution of naming a few members working
on Saipan for the Administering Authority to such a committee
would have included a delegate from Palau and an assemblyman
from Yap. This might have lent the imprimatur of congressional
sanction, but it also would have entailed the risk of discrediting
the whole enterprise if the committee came to be regarded as
mere window-dressing.
To avoid all suspicion, it was decided to question all members-
elect by mail, listing logical subject areas tentatively to be cov-
ered and soliciting replies on the priorities to be assigned, items
to be dropped, and further matters to be added. The questionnaire
was accompanied by a letter from the high commissioner am-
plifying the information earlier conveyed on the holding of the
pre-session workshop and advising that the training team would
rely upon the replies to the questionnaire in its planning and as-
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sembling of necessary materials.2 The gratifying response went
far to reassure the training team that its preliminary proposals
would meet with the participants’ satisfaction.
The questionnaire identified nine potential topics and left
spaces for others to be written in. In addition to stating his priority
of choices in rank order, the congressman-elect could under each
topic note any special interest which he desired to have treated.
About two-thirds of the replies (19) approved of all of the topics
as contained in the questionnaire, and six of these volunteered ad-
ditional matters. While in no case did any of the remaining ten
questionnaires direct the elimination of a topic, they failed to rank
all of them, thus implying lack of interest in those not marked.3
The members-elect wanted the workshop to give major attention
to subject-matter jurisdiction of the new congress; legislative orga-
nization; legislative rules and parliamentary procedure; and Trust
Territory organization, policies, income, expenditures, and funds.
Subjects of less concern were education in the Trust Territory and
members’ qualifications and privileges. The wide scattering of ad-
ditional topics which were suggested provided little further dimen-
sion for the training design; most prominent was mention of the
Trust Territory’s future status. On the opening day of the workshop,
the training team pointedly acquainted the assembled legislators of
the manner in which the questionnaire had contributed to fixing the
scope and emphasis of the training program.
It was also decided that upon convening, the workshop would
name a steering group for the training period. To avoid weighted
representation, it was arbitrarily determined to have the steering
committee composed of one member-elect from each of the six ad-
ministrative districts of the Trust Territory. To this group, on the
opening of the workshop, would be submitted the proposed train-
ing plan, and with its approval the workshop would then proceed.
At any time the committee was to be free to modify the program.
Concomitantly, this group offered a vehicle for ready feedback,
enabling the training team to gain some measure of its success
2 Letter of HiCom to all congressmen-elect, May 7, 1965, supplementing let-
ter of Feb. 8, 1965.
3 Two members from each house did not return their questionnaires. As some
congressmen-elect did not receive their forms until after the deadline for remail-
ing them had expired and commented upon this when returning them late, this
may furnish the explanation for the four members’ failure to reply. During the en-
suing workshop, all four took an active part and expressed satisfaction with its
conduct and content.
295
or failure in communicating concepts and techniques. The high
commissioner’s letter which carried the questionnaire to all of the
congressmen-elect alerted them to the fact that such a steering
group would set the content of the training program.
Finally, it was concluded that the training team’s role should
basically be one of prompter, providing relevant facts and positing
alternatives for action, and that the congressmen-elect should be
encouraged to discuss the alternatives and reach their own inde-
pendent judgements. As there were bound to be some who would
be culturally conditioned to refrain from expressing a viewpoint,
the legislators would be divided into three discussion sections
whose composition would be varied so that the membership would
be rotated. Each section’s deliberations would be reported to the
whole assembly either by a spokesman from its ranks or by one
of the team sitting with the group. Fundamental to the decision to
employ sections was the hope of encouraging everyone to take an
active part, so the manner of reporting conclusions and the selec-
tion of the rapporteur were of secondary importance.
The test of all this planning would come at the end of the first
week when, utilizing the gamut of legislative organization and
procedure sketched during the training session, two drafting com-
mittees would be chosen from their respective houses to oversee
the preparation of the Rules of Procedure. Given reasonable prog-
ress, after a long weekend for drafting and two half-day sessions
in the second week of the workshop for the houses to review the
tentative drafts of their rules, the Congress of Micronesia would
end the training session with comprehensive sets of procedural
rules drawn to each house’s specifications. It was crucial, then,
that the drafting committees be comprised of individuals knowl-
edgeable of legislative procedure and sensitive to the nuances of
the English language. While the steering committee might serve
its purpose best if its members were named because of their
standing within their respective district delegations, so that the
committee’s satisfaction with the training design and its mod-
ification would lend endorsement, it would prove dysfunctional
should status per se be the sole requisite for membership on
the drafting committees. Although the training team directed that
each district delegation select one of its members for the steering
group, it refrained from announcing any method for determining
the composition of the drafting committees. Instead, both formally
and in casual conversation during the first week of the workshop,
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the importance of these committees’ work was stressed, and the
members-elect approached the formation of the drafting commit-
tees in a wholly unstructured way.
THE RESPONSE
Immediately upon the conclusion of the workshop’s opening
ceremonies, a recess was called so each delegation could desig-
nate its representative to the steering committee. The Marshalls
caucused for about ten minutes, revealing the cleavage within
its ranks between two rival factions, while the others quickly an-
nounced their choices. All six members named to the committee
were delegates,4 and all but one had served in the Council of Mi-
cronesia—the first sign that the congressmen-elect accepted the
guiding role of the steering committee in the spirit intended. The
agenda for the first day was then presented to the steering com-
mittee for its concurrence, and later the balance of the program
was similarly reviewed. Although the training team was prepared
to incorporate major modifications, the steering committee di-
rected only minor adjustments to be made.
Each day, prior to the opening of the morning session, the train-
ing team met with the committee for feedback on the previous
day’s work. These sessions also offered the opportunity for clearing
administrative details: hours for the commencing and closing of
the daily work sessions; selection of an evening for a full-length
movie; rotation of discussion group assignments; solicitation of fac-
tual questions to be answered by the administration during the
second week of the workshop; and revision of the entertainment
schedule originally arranged to break the rigor of the conference at
a time when the plethora of social events tendered the congressmen
by the people of Saipan could not be foreseen. Later, the Trust Ter-
ritory administration finalized its plans for the opening day’s joint
session of the Congress of Micronesia, and the steering committee
as spokesman for the congress met with the representative of the
administration. This last was an unintended function of the commit-
tee and bridged the awkward alternative of unilateral action by the
administration without consultation with the congress.
The general attitude reported was one of satisfaction with the
workshop, and few responses of negative or corrective nature
4 Andon Amaraich, Truk; Olympio T. Borja, Marianas; Amata Kabua,
Marshalls; Francis Nuuan, Yap; Bailey Olter, Ponape; Roman Tmetuchl,
Palau.
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were forthcoming. The steering committee probably best served
as a device by which formal communications to the whole con-
gress from many sources could be informally supplemented so as
to aid members-elect in understanding them. The committee never
developed a distinct group identity, and there was always a fair
chance that the recommendations it relayed to the training team
were those from an individual member rather than the consen-
sus of the committee, and that they may not even have emanated
from the member’s delegation. None of this discounts the fact that
the training team’s meeting with the steering committee symbol-
ized that the workshop was the legislators’ and that the team was
merely assisting. Above all, the committee’s existence served to
forestall any possibility of the sessions’ taking a direction not de-
sired by the congress; the committee was accepted as a constraint
even though it had no occasion to exercise its power.
Toward the end of the first week, each house named its
drafting committee. The choice of the congress revealed a sen-
sitivity to the significant role to be played by these formative
groups. For the Assembly, each district’s delegation selected
a well-qualified member, six in all;5 the smaller House of Del-
egates renamed only one of the members from the steering
committee to serve and substituted a new member from both
Palau and Truk.6
The drafting committees applied themselves diligently to their
tasks. To each committee was assigned a member of the training
team staff who served as a resource person and who explained
the essential elements of the legislative rules, helped narrow down
provisions to the point where the committee could make a meanin-
gful choice, and then prepared the draft for committee inspection.
This was no rubber stamp process. The rules which emerged re-
vealed some sharp differences between the two committees; each
mirrored the views of its respective house regarding the leader-
ship role of its presiding officer and the independence of action to
be allotted individual members. Combing through the details, the
committee members carefully evaluated the possible results which
5 Mitaro Danis, Truk; Dwight Heine, Marshalls; Bethwel Henry, Ponape;
Juan A. Sablan, Marianas; Lazarus Salii, Palau; Luke M. Tman, Yap. The
group included all four members later placed in nomination for the office of
Speaker.
6 Olympio T. Borja, Marianas; Tosiwo Nakayama, Truk; John O. Ngiraked,
Palau. The last two were to be the major contestants for the office of Presi-
dent.
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might flow from various approaches and then trimmed the final
product to make it accord with what they judged to be the senti-
ment of their parent bodies. They did their work well, for each
house accepted the bulk of its committee’s original draft and, after
rephrasing by the training team to secure greater technical accu-
racy and ease of comprehension, approved the completed work.
The later caucusing of each house, and the naming of its officers-
elect, served to reinforce the adoption of its rules.
THE FIRST WEEK’S TRAINING
The tentative outline of subjects for the initial week, as agreed
to by the steering committee, covered:
Monday: morning introduction to workshop
afternoon subject-matter jurisdiction of congress
Tuesday: morning organization (structure) of a legislature
afternoon committees and their use
Wednesday: morning processing of legislative measures
afternoon members: qualifications, rights, limita-
tions
Thursday: morning decision-making in legislative bodies
afternoon parliamentary procedure and legislative
order
Friday: morning legislative staff and assistance
afternoon separate meetings of houses to instruct
drafting of rules
The basic format normally followed for each half-day session
called for an oral presentation by the training team, followed by
small-group problem-solving intended to reinforce the introduc-
tory session by reiteration, to amplify through focusing attention
on the running of the Congress of Micronesia, or merely to af-
ford the opportunity for congressmen-elect to obtain explanation
of matters which they had not understood but had hesitated to
query in the plenary sessions. Outlines of general session presen-
tations and small-group assignments had been sketched in detail
before the team left Hawaii but were modified during the course
of the week, due to insufficient time’s necessitating deletions and
more appropriate problems’ spontaneously arising once the work-
shop was underway.
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Both the styles and occasionally the views of the three members
of the training team varied. To the training session all three
brought extensive practical experience in working intimately with
legislative bodies, and the easy camaraderie developed early in
the workshop allowed inclusion of the teams’ personal experi-
ences as illustrations to breathe life into what too easily could
have lapsed into a series of academic lectures. This lack of for-
mality also permitted the trainers to disagree publicly, as when
they were not in accord on the efficacy of Hawaii’s “short form”
bill as a device to ease the legislative burden. Differences of views
were intentionally not concealed, for it was believed that airing
them helped further the objectives of encouraging congressmen-
elect to avoid rote copying of other jurisdictions’ practices and
discouraging uncritical acceptance of “textbook” solutions. Inci-
dentally, this approach also assured that the gamut of trainers’
personal idiosyncracies to which the members-elect would be ex-
posed would range from the activist to the detached and from the
constitutionally suspicious to the more complacently accepting,
and that the attitudes expressed regarding legislative-executive
relations, legislative leadership, and comparable other matters
would reflect these variances.
The opening morning of the first week’s training differed
slightly in approach from that of the balance of the week. It was
deliberately designed for psychological impact rather than the
content knowledge to be transmitted. High Commissioner God-
ing’s remarks of welcome publicly signified not only the admin-
istration’s general endorsement but also its willingness to accept
the burden of the second week’s training covering Trust Territory
governmental structure, activities, and problems. Next, appoint-
ment of the steering committee reinforced the “working-session”
formality surrounding the opening ceremonies. The congressmen-
elect were then immediately assigned a workshop problem as an
ice breaker, one based upon the dilemma of the representative
hung on the horns of express directions of his constituents and the
dictates of his own judgment. In later sessions, the small-group
problem or discussion was always preceded by a general session
preparation; on the first day, however, it was believed the trauma
of being forced, individually, to formulate one’s thoughts on rep-
resentation, and then to defend them in a small group whose
members were in many cases still little more than acquaintances,
would start the workshop off on a level of expectancy regarding
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other things to come which would help carry it through some of its
duller moments. It was also hoped this would early encourage all
congressmen-elect to actively engage in small-group discussions.
The reaction was as expected: the members’ interest was cap-
tured by the setting forth of a problem which in a vague manner
had disturbed most of them. All could grasp its pertinency and
grapple with its resolution. Within each of the three sections,
participation was widespread and, for a Trust Territory group,
spirited. When the three sections reported back, the members
were informed that their problem was that of all legislators, who
faced the same paradox, and that their conclusions (favoring the
Trustee-Statesmen, as opposed to the Spokesman-Delegate posi-
tion) in general coincided with comparable findings made in state
legislatures of the United States.7 From all appearances, this psy-
chological emersion, the novelty for some of the “buzz” session de-
vice, and the exposure to the universality of the legislative process
had the desired effect, and by the time the workshop recessed
for lunch, it was obvious that it had “taken.” Thereafter, despite
inclement weather, distressing humidity, and at times disturbing
accoustics, almost perfect attendance of the congressmen-elect
served as measure of their interest in the workshop and, if not
their satisfaction, at least the high anticipation8 with which they
approached each day’s session.
Monday’s afternoon meeting, devoted to the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Congress of Micronesia, by its very nature
emphasized the limitations placed upon the powers of the con-
gress. The Office of the Attorney General undertook to answer
the questions raised, a majority of which were directed to the fi-
nancial powers of the congress, its control over the budget, and
the division of authority between the Territorial, district, and lo-
cal levels of government. In a number of instances, members-elect
differed with the interpretation placed on the applicable clauses
of the Secretarial Order, in their disagreement sometimes being
oblivious to the distinction between disapproval of policy and the
7 See pp. 284–287.
8 Undoubtedly, interest had been whetted by the advance series of communi-
cations, and this had spread to others than the members-elect. On May 11, 1965,
the Ponape District Legislature’s Clerk dispatched a letter to the other districts
proposing that all district legislative secretaries and clerks also participate in the
forthcoming congressional workshop. This bid to take part was denied on the ba-
sis that their presence might detract from building the esprit de corps desired for
the training.
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accuracy of the legal opinion being rendered. The general im-
pression left by this session reinforced the suspicions of those
members who were inclined to question the motives of the Admin-
istering Authority. As the staff from the attorney general’s office
gave most attention to restrictions on legislative action, while the
training team’s thrust was toward aiding the congress in proceed-
ing both legally and extra-legally in accomplishing its objectives,
the unintentional net effect of this session for many members
was probably to align the training team “with” the congress and
“against” the administration.
The outline of the first week’s training, as previously sketched,
fairly adequately conveys the scope of the subject matter covered
each day. Insofar as possible, matters placed before the groups
were oriented toward practicalities, and an effort was made to
keep everything relevant to the future course of the congress.
Thus Tuesday morning’s discussions turned attention to a poten-
tial plan for the initial organizing of the congress, possible func-
tions which could be undertaken during the interim between the
annual legislative sessions of the congress, and the range of items
which might be included in a legislative budget. On Wednesday
morning, members in their small groups explored the complexities
of legislative drafting and the proper usage of bills and resolu-
tions, after the general session had considered the elements of
each, the distinction between them, and the normal course of their
preparation and adoption.
A full-length Hollywood movie built around the theme of moral-
ity in politics9 was shown on Wednesday night. In addition to
constituting enjoyable entertainment, it portrayed in detail the
decorum and practices of the United States Senate. On Thursday
morning there was a standard educational film depicting a state
legislature in session10 and a more sophisticated television print
highlighting the difficulties which beset a state legislator.11 All
furnished a backdrop for the afternoon’s treatment of parliamen-
tary procedure and legislative order, and the workshop team at-
tempted to make it meaningful through a series of role-playing
presentations. As a training tool these films fully proved their
worth: to the less sophisticated, the sheer pictorialization of a
number of American legislatures in session and the step-by-step
9 Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.
10 Legislative Process.
11 The Man in the Middle.
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portrayal of their procedures helped clarify matters examined
orally, and for the others, the films touched upon a variety of mat-
ters for which the training week literally had insufficient time. The
commendatory remarks volunteered long after the original impact
should have worn off testified to the favorable impression left by
the films.
By Friday afternoon, when the two houses met in separate ses-
sion to instruct their drafting committees, most of the major areas
applicable to parliamentary practices had been at least briefly
mentioned. At this last session of the first week, a five-page check
list, noting the major areas to which attention ought be given in
determining the content of the rules, was distributed for the use
of the members-elect. The training team carefully refrained from
indicating its preferences. A team member guided each house
through its consideration of the check list, served as resource
person as it moved to specific decisions, and later undertook the
chore of drafting that body’s rules under the direction of its draft-
ing committee. The weekend over the July 4 holiday was consumed
in a series of informal meetings with the training team and the
drafting committees and in the painstaking task of converting col-
lective decisions to unambiguous, internally consistent detail.
THE SECOND WEEK’S TRAINING
Most of the burden for the second week’s training fell to the
staff of the Trust Territory administration. Assistant commission-
ers and department heads, aided by their subordinates, offered
brief summaries of the administrative organization and duties of
their units and answered questions put to them by the congress-
men-elect. After consulting with the steering committee, the train-
ing team proposed the general format and pace for these sessions;
later it arranged for revision of schedules to accommodate admin-
istrators for whom inadequate time had been allotted. Throughout
the week, the team served as communication channel between
members and administrators by relaying the formers’ questions
formulated in expectation of the latters’ appearance. When not
otherwise occupied, the team’s rule drafting chores continued.
Tuesday morning opened with a general introduction to the ad-
ministrative structure and functions of the Trust Territory and to
the relation of Trust Territory Headquarters to the district ad-
ministrations, followed by a visit to the offices at Headquarters
303
and other governmental sites to familiarize all members with their
location. The afternoon was devoted to financial matters. For Wed-
nesday morning, all of community services were scheduled for
treatment, but the lead-off discussion on education preempted
almost the entire period, so that public health and community de-
velopment had to be postponed until Friday. After an interlude on
Wednesday afternoon devoted to review of the tentative rules, the
plenary session on Thursday morning returned to its examination
of the Trust Territory government with a session on resources and
development. Here, there was only sufficient time for agriculture
and fisheries, and land management and cooperatives were reas-
signed to the last day. On Thursday afternoon the various phases
of staff services and technical administration came before the ple-
nary session, and Trust Territory personnel policy, transportation,
communications, and public works all were subjected to intensive
inquiry.
Friday, the last day of the workshop, turned out to be a hodge-
podge of bits and pieces, with subjects deferred from earlier in
the week fitted in. On Friday morning, the attorney general was
recalled to answer to a wide range of questions, replies to which
impinged upon the legal limitations to the congress’ jurisdiction.
The administration’s presentation of information on the current
and proposed legislative budgets similarly waited until the last
day. No time remained on Friday afternoon for confirmation of
each house’s legislative rules. However, this had been foreseen
early in the week, so after its Wednesday afternoon session, the
House of Delegates had assigned its drafting committee authority
to review and ratify the final form of the House rules, while the
General Assembly made arrangements to meet in caucus early on
Saturday morning for the same purpose.
At the request of the administration, during the first week of
the workshop the steering committee solicited the members-elect
for written questions on facets of policy and administrative ac-
tion which they wanted included in the general program topics
suggested by the training team for the second week. Questions
were delivered as they continued to trickle in during the latter
half of the period. Unfortunately, some of the administration per-
sonnel appearing at the plenary sessions did not fully comprehend
the nature of the new executive-legislative relationships emerging
from the creation of the congress and phrased their remarks in
generalities unresponsive to the specificity of the congressmen’s
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inquiries. Similarly dysfunctionally, some of the latter did not ap-
preciate that the workshop’s design sought to elicit information
and was not intended to make the plenary training sessions a
forum for debating the wisdom of administration policy or chal-
lenging individual administrator’s motives.
As early as April 8, the high commissioner instituted a review of
district and municipal taxes throughout the Trust Territory to de-
termine the effect of Secretarial Order No. 2882 reserving import
duties to the Congress of Micronesia. On April 15 he circularized
all district administrators, soliciting proposals for possible inclu-
sion in the administration’s legislative program to be submitted
to the new congress. A number of measures adopted by district
legislatures had previously been disapproved by the high commis-
sioner upon the grounds that they embraced subjects which were
to be placed before the congress.12 Nevertheless, the administra-
tion failed to utilize the opportunity afforded by the workshop to
give advance notice of its legislative program, and at the plenary
sessions, in replying to the questioning on future plans, some of
the staff members refused to commit themselves in any way. The
same hiatus applied to much of the explanation on Territorial fi-
nances furnished the workshop. When it became manifest that
the administration was unprepared or unwilling to discuss its leg-
islative program, several of the members-elect stepped into the
policy vacuum by endeavoring through statements from the floor
to induce the workshop to support the positions they themselves
advocated.
Although the second week of the workshop succeeded in pre-
senting a balanced coverage of the many functions performed by
the Trust Territory government and the major difficulties encoun-
tered, it lacked the sense of immediacy which had distinguished
the first week’s proceedings. The Trust Territory staff and the con-
gressmen were experiencing their first exposure to the emergence
of a new power center in the Trust Territory, and both were yet
adjusting to unaccustomed roles. The administration, in which full
legislating power once resided, was still not attuned to the new
relationship which presumes a degree of conflict and lack of mu-
tuality of interest between the two branches of government. The
dialogue between executive and legislature which is the hallmark
of democratic government had just commenced.
12 For example, Act 17–65 of the Tenth Session of the Truk District Legisla-
ture, disapproved in HiCom’s letter to DistAd Truk, July 22, 1965.
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THE RULES OF THE TWO HOUSES13
The decision to use the workshop as a vehicle for formulating
standing rules of each house and, when the drafting committees had
finished their work, to caucus for the selection of the officers and
committee members called for by those rules, supplied an unusu-
ally effective unifying force for binding together the bifurcated two
weeks of training. A singular goal was set, one which was real and
understandable in its personal impact on all the members-elect. The
congress could begin to function on its very first day, an absolute
necessity if it were to complete its work within its limited 30-day
session. Around this basic objective it was possible to weave an ex-
tensive body of data and opinion on legislative practices, and the
coverage of topical matters during the second week only reempha-
sized the urgency of completing the organization of each house so
as to be able to tackle substantive problems with dispatch.
Before work on drafting the rules commenced, a number of
matters had to be clarified. For one thing, the Secretarial Order
was ambiguous as to whether the United States congressional
practice of continuing measures from the calendar of the first to
the second session could be copied by the Congress of Micronesia.
An opinion from the attorney general of the Trust Territory was
obtained declaring that each regular session is intended to be dis-
tinct and that, except for measures reconsidered after veto, bills
do not carry over from one session to another.14 Other comparable
matters similarly had to be resolved in order that the new con-
gress’ scope of discretion could be ascertained before the compass
of its own rules was fixed. Of course, large areas of uncertainty
will remain until judicial decisions and further rulings slowly build
a corpus of law applicable to the Congress of Micronesia.
In the absence of any extensive body of parliamentary proce-
dure followed by either the district legislatures or the Council of
Micronesia, it was necessary to improvise. The training team’s
background prompted use of the rules of Hawaii’s state legislature
as a preliminary matrix. Hawaii in its Monarchial and Territorial
past modeled its procedural rules on those of legislatures func-
tioning on the mainland United States, which of course traced
13 The rules of both houses of the first Congress of Micronesia are repro-
duced in the “Manual of the Congress of Micronesia,” published by the Office of
the Legislative Counsel, Congress of Micronesia; also in U.S. Congress, House
Hearings before the Sub-committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs, Report on
Pacific Affairs, 1965, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. (1965), pp. 26–53.
14 However, see p. 350.
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back ulti mately to the British Mother of Parliaments. Now once
again, like the division of cellular bodies, the legislative genes
were carried forward to a brand new assembly. But following a
model did not constitute rote copying, for all of the directions of
the Secretarial Order had to be observed, and the Trust Territory’s
uniqueness also prompted many novel questions. As an example,
the oath of the Micronesian legislator had to be shaped to his sui
generis nature. As finally composed, the oath reads:
Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you have been duly elected and
properly hold office as a member of the … [House of Delegates/General
Assembly] of the Congress of Micronesia, that you do freely, willingly
and without reservation accept the responsibilities and obligations of this
high office, that you will discharge these obligations and responsibilities
in a manner that will bring honor to this high body and to the people of
Micronesia, that you will never use your offiice for personal pecuniary
gain or aggrandizement, and that you will loyally defend the laws of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and promote the well-being of all the
people of Micronesia, so help you God?
For many years to come freshmen members elected to the
Congress of Micronesia will probably not be conversant with the
complexities of parliamentary action, so the rules were made
as inclusive as possible to obviate need for reliance upon other
sources. In the main, the rules of both the General Assembly and
the House of Delegates read identically for processing legisla-
tive measures. This was intentional, so that legislators would have
to familiarize themselves with but a single series of procedures.
The variances reflect the distinctive differences of the two houses.
Both sets of rules cover the organization of the respective body,
officers and their duties, standing committees and special com-
mittees, methods of voting and the requisite number of votes for
taking various forms of action, and the steps to be followed in
the adoption of bills and resolutions. Provision is also made for
the administration of each house’s business affairs, the keeping of
a journal, issuance of warrants and subpoenas, and the adminis-
trating of oaths to witnesses. Unlike in many jurisdictions, a wide
arc of general parliamentary matters was also incorporated, and
it was deemed best to include much of the detail which is usually
found in manuals of legislative bodies but not reproduced in their
standing orders. Thus, contained in the rules are sections specify-
ing the format of bills, the order of contents for committee reports,
the numbering system for measures designed to carry automati-
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cally reference to each amendment, and comparable other items.
In lieu of joint standing orders, the rules of each chamber were
dovetailed, with identical procedures governing conference com-
mittees, the setting up of joint committees by resolution or statute,
and the handling of communications between the two bodies.
Both houses decided on a minimal number of officers. The presi-
dent and vice-president in the House of Delegates have as their
counterparts the speaker and vice-speaker in the General Assem-
bly. Similarly, the non-member secretary and sergeant-at-arms of
the House are duplicated by the General Assembly’s clerk and
sergeant-at-arms. The Assembly added an extra officer, the legisla-
tive secretary, whose functions closely resemble those of a floor
leader, and whose name was so changed at the second session of
the Congress of Micronesia in 1966. This extra office owes its gen-
esis to the recommendations of the original working committee of
the Council of Micronesia, probably influenced by the practices of
the Guam legislature, and owes its advocacy at the workshop to
the Mariana assemblymen who were familiar with its use in the
Saipan Municipal Congress.
Approximately the same provision is made in both houses for
standing committees. The General Assembly divided money func-
tions between two committees, calling one the Appropriations
Committee and the other the Ways and Means Committee, while
the House of Delegates assigned all financial duties to its Ways
and Means Committee. The antecedents of the remaining three
standing committees may be traced to the old economics, social,
and political development committees of the Council of Micronesia
and the district legislatures. The rules of each house prescribe
that members of standing committees are appointed by the pre-
siding officer after consultation with the members. Both houses
took pains to fix the size of their committees so as to involve all
members, spread the posts on key committees, and restrict the
number of assignments which any one member could receive, all
with a view to achieving wide district representation and preclud-
ing concentration of power in the hands of a few. Joint meetings
of two committees of the same house, or of different houses, are
countenanced, but final action must be taken separately by each
committee. The creation of joint committees must await the enact-
ment of a statute or the passage of an appropriate joint resolution.
The rules of both houses require that before the second (final)
reading, a bill must be “experted” by the legislative counsel.
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Should substantive floor amendments be adopted, the measure
must be reprinted in the General Assembly or in the House of
Delegates if the amendments are extensive. This requirement,
though meritorious in preventing ill-considered legislation, places
an onerous burden upon the legislative staff, and toward the end
of the first session it was found necessary to suspend this feature
of the rules in order to expedite the work of the congress.
The congressional rules contain a number of novel features
which might have utility for other legislatures. Except at convening
and adjournment, when a temporary chaplain is appointed, the daily
sessions open in the General Assembly with the members standing
for a moment of silent prayer; this practice was also followed in the
House, although not mandated by the rules. To forestall the high
commissioner’s calling a special session under circumstances which
do not allow sufficient time for all administrative districts to be rep-
resented, the rules require on the opening day of a special session
a quorum of at least one member from each of the six districts. The
only exception recognized is when adequate notice has been given
for all members to be present, so that the absence of a delegation
may be attributed to willful abstention.
It is normal to require an extraordinary majority to amend the
compromises engrafted into legislative rules. As there was rela-
tively little political maneuvering attendant on the drafting of the
rules for the Congress of Micronesia, there was no felt need for
such protection, and as a consequence they may be modified by
mere majority vote. But the rules do contain an unusual self-lim-
iting feature which strikes a rare note of self-discipline in the
enacting of legislation. Following the practice of the Congress of
the United States, the Secretarial Order allows the adoption of
legislation by a majority of a quorum. Conceivably, then, legisla-
tion could be enacted upon receiving the affirmative vote of four
delegates and seven assemblymen out of a total membership of
thirty-three! Neither house believed this would afford adequate
expression of the legislative will and, by their respective rules,
prohibited a bill from passing unless it receives an absolute major-
ity vote in each house.15
The members-elect desired their rules to cover conflicts of in-
terest but did not wish to offer an easy excuse for members
endeavoring to escape casting a ballot on highly controversial is-
15 Subsequently, Secretarial Order No. 2882 was amended to require final
passage by a majority vote.
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sues. The language finally adopted declares a member is not to
vote when he has a “distinct, individual pecuniary interest” or
when it will affect his right to a legislative seat, or in matters in
which his individual conduct is involved. It remains to be seen
whether this formalization of morality will be any more successful
in the Congress of Micronesia than are comparable attempts in
American legislatures.
Since the Monarchial period, the Hawaiian legislature has al-
lowed the novel practice of kanalua (undecided) voting. A member,
instead of voicing aye or no, may respond kanalua on a roll call or
may refrain from replying to his name. Upon the completion of the
roll call, his name is then recalled, and should he kanalua twice,
the clerk records him as having voted in the affirmative. Half in
jest, this procedure was described to the congressmen-elect dur-
ing the workshop, and mention was made of its having once been
followed by the old Marshallese bicameral congress. The mem-
bers found the general idea attractive and wrote into the rules of
each house the requirement that an affirmative vote be recorded
when a member is present and fails to vote upon his name’s being
reached twice on a roll call. During the first session of the Con-
gress of Micronesia, the House of Delegates amended its rules to
have the Journal expressly state that an aye vote had been placed
after such non-responding member’s name.
The drafting committees of the two houses undertook their
tasks attuned to the differences in the makeup of their principals.
To begin with, size favored greater stratification in the Assembly,
for the smaller the legislative body the more “equal” are its mem-
bers. More to the point, two-thirds of the delegates had served in
the Council of Micronesia and were familiar with the absence of
strong leadership in that body and the attendant equality of sta-
tus its members had enjoyed. This carried over into their attitude
toward the House of Delegates. On the other hand, the General
Assembly was of a temper to grant effective powers to its officers
and to trim the rights of the individual member as necessary to
bulwark such authority. Collectively, the variances in the detail of
the rules corroborate this distinctive nature of the two chambers.
Whenever the House is dissatisfied with its officers, by majority
vote it can remove them; in the Assembly, dismissal of an officer
takes sixteen votes, the highest number required for any action of
the General Assembly. A mere majority of the quorum in the House
of Delegates may overturn a parliamentary ruling of its president,
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while the same action requires a two-thirds vote in the Assem-
bly. In both houses the presiding officer may not be chairman of a
standing committee, but only in the House is there a prohibition
against its officers serving as chairmen of special or conference
committees. Even to get the work of the House underway requires
a larger percentage of members present (two-thirds) than in the
Assembly (majority).
To the extent that the House has recognized a need for concen-
trating power, it has localized it in the standing committees and,
more particularly, their chairmen. In the General Assembly the
rules call for the presiding officer to name the chairman of each
of the standing committees; in the House of Delegates, the mem-
bership of each committee chooses its own presiding officer. De-
spite this method for selecting committee chairmen in the House,
once serving, these officers cannot be removed except by a major-
ity vote of the total membership of the House of Delegates. When
a measure is referred to committee, the House of Delegates re-
serves but a limited right of recall, and this to be exercised only
in the latter part of the session. In contrast, in the General Assem-
bly a measure may be removed from committee at any time and
brought onto the floor with a two-thirds vote of a quorum. Finally,
in any Assembly committee a majority of the members may require
the chairman “to exercise his powers in the manner in which they
direct”; the House rules merely allow a majority to compel the
committee’s presiding officer to place a measure on the agenda
for committee consideration and decision.
All twelve delegates in the House are made members of the
Ways and Means Committee—a device for allowing the House to
have executive meetings and reach consensus without a public
record being kept. (The Secretarial Order forbids closed meetings
by either house in plenary session or when sitting in Committee of
the Whole.) This membership of the Ways and Means Committee
also assures that each delegate will take part in all decisions on
taxes and governmental finances, matters pertaining to the inter-
nal organization and management of the House, and the relations
of the people of Micronesia to the United States, the United Na-
tions, and foreign countries. It avoided the risk of setting up a
committee which could dominate the House and neatly disposed
of the knotty problem of how to determine membership on the key
committee of such a small body.
Further confirming this tendency to treat all delegates as
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equals, House rules declare that delegates may actively engage
in the public meetings of standing committees of which they are
not members, but without right of vote. On the floor of the House,
each delegate has the right to speak at least once on every motion,
and not even adoption of the “previous question” can deny him
this opportunity. In the Assembly, cloture can be moved after one
member from each of the six delegations has had an opportunity to
express his views, so that Assembly discussion may be truncated
by will of the majority. Probably the zenith in this attempt to as-
sure parity was reached in the House rules’ prescription that at
the beginning of each session the order for calling of the roll is to
be fixed by lot, emphasizing the insignificance of even alphabeti-
cal priority.
CHOOSING UP SIDES
Size—both of chamber and of delegation—caused difficulties
for the House of Delegates. The smaller the legislative body is, the
less the psychological compulsion for an hierarchical organization
to order its affairs. The more comparable the size of delega-
tions, the fewer are the practical opportunities for manipulating
a successful power combination. These factors, coupled with the
House’s lack of leaders so outstanding that support would natu-
rally polarize in support or opposition, resulted in the delegates’
being hung for a number of days before final agreement could be
reached on the naming of officers. The General Assembly, larger,
with delegations varying in size, and favored with a helmsman ac-
knowledged to be competent, easily completed its organization in
half a day before the congress was convened.
Long before the Saipan workshop, politicking for congressional
office got underway. It mattered little that the congress was yet
an amorphous body, for this vagueness fitted the leisurely, super-
ficially indecisive maneuvering which accompanies much of the
political action within the Trust Territory. Most bids for promin-
ence, but not all, were made covertly. Starting in March of 1965,
Delegate-elect John Ngiraked from Palau commenced a series of
letters to all members-elect from both houses. The initial commu-
nication concerned the selection of a legislative counsel for the
congress. Later letters dealt with the congress’ limited budget
powers and the need for funding to enable members-elect to visit
their constituents. At first it looked as if this early campaign was
to culminate in Ngiraked’s securing the presidental post, but be-
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tween the Saturday afternoon caucus which agreed upon him as
president-elect and the convening of the congress the following
Monday morning, enough votes had defected so as to place him
in a tie with another delegate for whom a less openly aggressive
campaign had been waged in a manner more in harmony with
most of the Territory’s political folkways. The latter was to win.
Many diverse factors influenced the members’ choice between
the candidates for congressional office. District representation
was an element; so was personal friendship, often founded on
attendance at the Pacific Islands Central School years before. Of-
fers to trade support were tendered, and sometimes political back-
ing turned on unexpected conditions. A prominent assemblyman-
elect reported being approached on Guam, before the workshop
had commenced, by Saipanese and Guamanian politicians with
a promise of assistance if he would commit himself in favor of
joining the Trust Territory to Guam. Another element material
to decision-making proved to be the caucus rules suggested by
the workshop team which narrowed opportunity for clandestine
moves to gain technical advantage.
DIVISION OF OFFICER AND CHAIRMANSHIP
POSTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
EAST
Truk President Vice-Speaker
Marshalls Speaker H. Ways & Means
Ponape Vice-President Leg. Sec. A. Education, Health,
& Social Matters
WEST
Marianas H. Resources & Devel-
opment
H. Judiciary & Gov-
ernmental
Relations
A. Ways & Means
Palau H. Education, Health,
& Social Matters
A. Appropriations A. Resources & Devel-
opment
Yap A. Judiciary & Govern-
mental Relations
When both houses were finally organized, the three admin-
istrative districts in the Eastern portion of the Trust Territory
had control of all five congressional offices. The committee chair-
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manships were divided more evenly between the Eastern and
Western regions, with the latter enjoying a numerical majority.
The explanation for this distribution does not lie in the population
predominance of the Eastern districts, for each district enjoys
equal representation in in the House of Delegates. Any leverage
in the House which could have been obtained from the Assembly’s
composition was lost by the Assembly’s early organization during
its Saturday half-day caucus.
The rules followed by the members of the General Assembly
gathered in caucus, and later by the House, called for nominations
to be made for each office seriatim, and then a vote by secret bal-
lot. If no member received an absolute majority of ballots cast, the
name of the candidate receiving the fewest votes was to be struck
and the process continued. The General Assembly caucus also fol-
lowed this in selecting the chairmen for all five Assembly standing
committees. These caucus rules forestalled the common practice
in the Trust Territory of election by plurality. As one of the Palau
assemblymen did not attend the Saturday meeting due to religious
convictions,16 to secure finality of decision it was tacitly under-
stood in the General Assembly caucus that the requisite vote for
election would need be a majority of the total membership.
Neither the General Assembly nor the House of Delegates had
a slate-maker who put together a “package” of posts in an effort to
secure majority support. Perhaps this is a function of more sophis-
ticated legislatures in which positions of power are more prized;
the lack of any Territory-wide party or organized political faction
undoubtedly contributed; the caucus rules calling for one election
at a time and requiring all decisions to go to majority vote may
have discouraged “ticket” formation—all of these explanations
suggest hypotheses for further exploration in other developing ar-
eas of the world just beginning to experiment with the legislative
process. If any of the members played the role of “king-maker” it
was Truk’s Assemblyman Petrus Mailo who helped engineer the
selection of Tosiwo Nakayama from Truk as the president of the
House of Delegates.
The Assembly caucus from the start assured fairness in its de-
liberations by having its temporary chairman drawn by lot. The
16 The absence of this member from the Assembly caucus and of his co-reli-
gionist from the delegates’ caucus was later to start the erroneous rumor in Palau
that this failure to attend caused the Palauan candidates for presiding officer in
both houses to lose the nomination.
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honor of opening the caucus fell to Mitaro Danis of Truk; upon
the election of Dwight Heine as speaker-elect, Danis surren-
dered the chair to him. Auspicious as this beginning was for
Danis, it was to be his only post, for though his name was later
placed in nomination for three different offices, he was not suc-
cessful in any of the contests. Initially the House of Delegates’
caucus proceeded informally without a chairman and little ev-
ident leadership. When on Saturday afternoon John Ngiraked
was finally chosen as president-elect, he assumed the chair for
the balance of the day. Thereafter, while the stalemate over the
presidential election dragged on, Amata Kabua of the Marshalls
by mutual agreement served as chairman of the caucus until the
deadlock was broken.
Other than for the posts of speaker and vice-speaker there was
little to show pre-caucus negotiation for the purpose of muster-
ing support in the Assembly. Many nominations appeared to be
made on the spur of the moment, seemingly stimulated by the per-
son named having just previously placed another in nomination.
For the speakership, factions had coalesced behind Dwight Heine
of the Marshalls and Lazarus Salii from Palau. The former’s long
prominence in Territorial politics gave him a decided advantage,
and Salii’s first canvass of nine votes to Heine’s ten (the remaining
tally was cast for Bethwel Henry) was proof of Salii’s capacity as
a political campaigner. Upon the second balloting, Heine emerged
victorious with an absolute majority of twelve votes. Through-
out the balloting, while all were seated around the long table
of the conference room, in typical Marshallese modesty, Heine
remained with his head in his hands and kept his head bowed
through the spontaneous applause which signaled his win and the
recount of ballots taken to assure the accuracy of the tally. Only
after a further pause did he finally admit his election and accept
congratulations.
There was a tacit agreement among a number of delegations
to support Chief Petrus Mailo for the vice-speakership, because
of his sagacity as an elder statesman and acknowledged status
among the Carolinians. After he and Juan Sablan of the Marianas
were nominated, Salii’s name was added, to all appearance with-
out any prior commitment to this course of action. The count of
votes showed Petrus leading with nine ballots, Salii with six, and
Sablan, four. (Heine, as chairman, did not vote.) When Sablan’s
name was removed from the run-off pursuant to the caucus rules,
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Salii announced his desire to withdraw so that the vote for Mailo
would be unanimous. The rules made no provision for this alter-
native, and it was only after lengthy discussion that the caucus
authorized this innovation.
The choice of Bethwel Henry from Ponape for legislative secre-
tary of the Assembly was by an absolute majority of thirteen votes,
as was Salii’s election to the chairmanship of the Assembly’s
Ways and Means Committee. Juan Sablan’s designation as chair-
man of the Appropriations Committee next followed by acclaim,
as everyone present was in accord that his previous long expe-
rience with Territorial accounting practices made him the logical
occupant of the post. When Jacob Sawaichi of Palau received only
ten ballots for chairmanship of the Resources and Development
Committee, there was an unexpected problem as the two lowest
candidates were tied; Heine, as chairman, then broke the impasse
by publicly casting his vote in Sawaichi’s favor. The run-off tally
for chairmanship of the Assembly’s Education, Health, and So-
cial Matters Committee found Drs. Henry Samuel of the Marshalls
and Olter Paul from Ponape with ten and nine votes, respectively;
the split in the Marshalls’ delegation was possibly revealed when
Heine, a Marshallese, then cast his vote for Dr. Paul. Heine’s vote
could also be explained as a desire to register the priority of
Territory-wide solidarity over district loyalty. The resulting draw
was broken by the pulling of lots, which Dr. Paul won. The bal-
loting for chairmanship of the remaining Assembly Judiciary and
Governmental Relations Committe gave a majority of twelve votes
to Luke Tman from the Yap district.
The caucus rules called for each member, before the caucus
broke up, to submit the names of the two committees on which
he desired to serve, and the speaker-elect would later attempt
to work out committee assignments satisfactory to all. In lieu of
this, and after a short recess for the delegations to meet, com-
mittee preferences were delivered to the speaker-elect and all
names were written down. It was discovered that the choices
closely fitted the billets to be filled, and few members had to be
reassigned. Committee posts were thus quickly and amicably dis-
tributed. Yap’s delegation held the chairmanship of the Judiciary
and Governmental Relations Committee, but a waiver of the prohi-
bition against a chairman’s sitting on another committee allowed
that district to also have seats on both the Appropriations and the
Ways and Means Committees. The standing rules adopted for the
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Assembly made provision for such a contingency, so it was only
necessary to refer to them. Finally, following the lead of the House
of Delegates’ caucus, ascertained by a phone call to the latter, the
General Assembly caucus decided to hire a temporary clerk and
employ a policeman as temporary sergeant-at-arms. Its work com-
pleted, the caucus disbanded.
In all, during the course of the Assembly caucus, twenty-three
nominations were made for the eight Assembly posts. One-third of
the assemblymen (7) were not placed in nomination for any office;
roughly another third of the assemblymen (8) received only a sin-
gle nomination, and of their number Heine, Mailo, and Tman were
elected; the remaining six amassed a total of fifteen multiple nomi-
nations, and all of them but one succeeded in gaining some office.
On several occasions two assemblymen from a single delegation
were nominated for the same post, but the final run-off elections
in all contests were between assemblymen from different districts.
Based on the number of members in a delegation, Palau’s assem-
blymen garnered the most nominations and the largest number
of Assembly posts. Although Truk and the Marshalls captured the
two highest Assembly offices, in relation to the size of its delega-
tion, Truk fared poorly, and this fact may have added impetus to
the drive to unseat Palau’s John Ngiraked as president-elect of
the House of Delegates and replace him with Tosiwo Nakayama of
Truk.
The House caucus devoted all of Saturday morning to exploring
ways of staffing the body with a secretary and sergeant-at-arms.
The compromise finally reached was to appoint a temporary secre-
tary from the Headquarters’ Political Affairs Office and detail
a policeman as sergeant-at-arms until advertisements could be
placed for permanent staff. When on Saturday afternoon the cau-
cus settled down to the task of balloting for the post of president,
each delegate secretly wrote his nomination on a slip of paper.
On the slips being counted, it was found that Ngiraked led, fol-
lowed by Bailey Olter of Ponape and Tosiwo Nakayama, in that
order. The exact tally each received was not announced, but the
spread of nomination ballots was five for Ngiraked, four for Olter
and two for Nakayama. The record remains unclear as to what
happened next, but upon the elimination of Nakayama as “low
man,” balloting apparently gave six votes to Ngiraked and five to
Olter. Although this was only a majority of the caucus, the sup-
port of the absent Palau delegate when the House of Delegates
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organized the following Monday would presumably assure fellow
Palauan Ngiraked an absolute majority. A comparable contest for
the vice-presidency eliminated Amata Kabua on the first round
and resulted in the election of Tosiwo Nakayama with six votes
to the five received by Olympio Borja of the Marianas. As at this
time the Marianas district reputedly was aligned with Palau, the
vice-presidential vote revealed a configuration of forces distinct
from that which had elected Ngiraked. The final ballot was for
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, on which all
delegates sit, and after Borja’s name was dropped on the first
round, Kabua was elected with seven votes to Olter’s four. This
tally for Marshallese Delegate Kabua represented the largest vote
gained during the entire balloting. Under the rules of the House,
each of the other three committees elects its own chairman.
Once the delegates had noted their committee preferences, it
was necessary for Ngiraked to obtain their concurrence to shift
them into secondary and tertiary choices in order to comply with
the House rules prohibiting more than one member from the same
district on any but the Ways and Means Committee. The distribu-
tion of members among the committees was accomplished without
rancor, and on voice vote all but the House Judiciary and Gov-
ernmental Relations Committee agreed upon their chairmen. A
series of secret ballots showed this four-member committee di-
vided between Olter, Andon Amaraich of Truk, and Jose Cruz of
the Marianas, the latter with two tallies. Pursuant to the House
rules, this left the decision to Ngiraked as president, who also was
a member of the committee, and he deferred his selection until
Monday when it was assumed his election would become official.
He was never to announce his choice, for over the weekend his
coalition of backers for the presidency broke.
Stories differ on who shifted loyalties. The popularly accredited
account is that alignments were originally along an East-West axis
and that the Marianas delegation split, and the defector joined the
three Eastern districts—the Marshalls, Ponape, and Truk—in re-
fusing to name Ngiraked as president. As all balloting was secret,
it is neither possible to confirm nor refute this. There is probably
some credence to the widely circulated rumor that the delegations
from the Eastern districts took umbrage at the boasting by some
members from the smaller districts of the West—the Marianas,
Yap, and Palau—about how they “had put it all over” the former.
Another factor may have been the unpopularity of Palauans in the
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Territory. The Carolinian residents on Saipan have close ties with
the Truk district, and reputedly this large component of the Mari-
anas Territorial Party put strong pressure on their two delegates
to shift support from Ngiraked to Nakayama. Chief Petrus Mailo
from the Assembly was reported to have urged delegates to back
his fellow Truk congressman, Nakayama. Whatever the cause and
whatever the means employed, when the House of Delegates con-
vened on Monday and disqualified Jose R. Cruz, the motion to
name Ngiraked as president was defeated by a vote of six to five.
The forces opposed to Ngiraked had agreed on no substitute
candidate, so except for the hearing on the challenge to seating
Delegate Cruz, the House marked time. When the caucus resumed
on Tuesday, with Cruz now seated, balloting for the presidency
gave Nakayama seven votes to Ngiraked’s five. The most credit-
able interpretation of this final tally is that the Mariana delegation
divided its allegiance and one of its members joined the Eastern
districts, now voting as a bloc.
The following day, when the House of Delegates convened,
Borja of the Marianas moved both that Nakayama be elected
president and later that Olter be chosen as vice-president. The
first motion carried by a secret vote of seven to five and the latter
by an even larger tally of nine to three. Committee assignments
and chairmen posts apparently stood as agreed to on Saturday,
and no one voiced the objection that the entire caucus agreement
might be void. The next day’s Journal carried a listing of commit-
tee chairmen; Borja was named as chairman of the Resources and
Development Committee as agreed to at the Saturday caucus, and
the contested chairmanship for the Judiciary and Governmental
Relations Committee was shown as being held by Jose Cruz, also
of the Marianas. Election of Olter to the vice-presidency disquali-
fied him for the chairmanship of the latter committee, so that Cruz
was next in line.
Only half of the total membership were nominated as potential
candidates for the three elected offices filled by House vote, and
the contests mainly turned around but four congressmen from
as many districts. With the House finally organized, five districts
shared the six officer and chairmanship posts, with the Marianas
gaining two and Yap none.
In retrospect, a review of both houses in caucus points up their
similarity in delaying coming to grips with and resolving the hard
decisions inherent in choosing officers. Characteristically, deferral
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was achieved by turning attention elsewhere. The members of the
General Assembly debated long and earnestly over the question of
whether, in Saipan’s humid climate, just shirt and tie, or also coat,
were the appropriate garb for Monday morning’s opening session
and the afternoon’s joint meeting. The House of Delegates’ caucus
consumed even more time on the question of obtaining a staff for
the House. Both may have merely been forms of preliminary spar-
ring, but in the light of the attention given to the style of address
and to the legislative staff when the rules of the two houses were
drafted, there is the suspicion that formality and patronage were
of more immediate importance for some congressmen-elect than
the business of organizing the two chambers.
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CHAPTER 13
The First Congress at Work
A BEGINNING LEGISLATURE is usually characterized by for-
malism, in good part to compensate for its members’ lack of expe-
rience with the legislative process and with the wielding of power.
This equally applied to the new Congress of Micronesia, for from
the opening days of the workshop, the members-elect displayed
keen interest in how the congress could be run in a “proper” way
and prestigeful manner. Formalism was equated with the mani-
festation of the recently granted legislative authority, just as it
probably was unconsciously associated with important traditional
events within the Micronesian cultures.
The importance of the new body required that it be equipped
with all the trappings appropriate to its dignity. Long before its
convening, the administration devoted arduous hours to ordering
all of the furbishings which would help convey the impression to
member and spectator alike that here was a legislature properly
prepared to undertake its responsibilities. Absent was comparable
attention to the structuring of those services essential for running
a legislative body or articulating the executive with the legislative
branches in a manner which would facilitate the exercise of power
by the freshman congressmen. The preparatory efforts of the exec-
utive only further illustrated that the ceremonial life of a new
legislature tends to be external to much of its process, and the
first Congress of Micronesia proved to be no exception.
During the caucuses which marked the termination of the work-
shop, and on a number of occasions subsequently, the matter of
fitting garb occupied the concern of the congressmen. It repre-
sented a matter particularly pertinent to a people going through
rapid acculturation and identifying Western dress—including
coats, white shirts, and ties—with that culture’s institutions. The
joint session of the opening day, the taking of group pictures,
and the later meetings with the high commissioner on official and
social occasions caused protracted debate about dress. As one
member remarked, if a group picture of the congress were taken
with the members shown in shirt sleeves, the constituents would
not think of the congress as “amounting to much.” Another side
of formalism, nicely combining Micronesian patterns with Western
modes of expression, was to be found in the holding of banquets.
The ceremonial furnishing of food constitutes an integral part of
Micronesian life. During the course of the workshop and the ensu-
ing session of congress, the banquets at the club at Trust Territory
Headquarters and those given by the various communities on Sai-
pan had in common the elements of traditional “feasts,” as indeed
they were referred to in the appreciative remarks entered in the
journals.
The members of both houses approached the first session unfa-
miliar with the limitations within which they were operating, as
fixed both by the restrictions of Secretarial Order No. 2882 and by
the rules they had adopted governing their own conduct. Their ac-
tions during caucuses demonstrated their individual abilities in the
rudiments of parliamentary maneuver, mainly gained through ser-
vice with district legislatures and the Council of Micronesia, and
this experience was their mainstay throughout the session. The lack
of a sufficiently trained and numerous staff made impossible the
observance of the safeguards built into the rules to protect the
members against the mounting legislative pressures. The absence
of strong leadership from within or without, complicated by the
members’ lack of comprehension of their own powers and concomi-
tant duties, all contributed to an inevitable drift, ending in a log
jam with unfinished business piled up as adjournment neared. The
slowness of the administration in submitting its desired legislation
and in presenting the Territorial budget for review only further com-
pounded confusion. The wonder is that the congress succeeded as
well as it did in winnowing out the pork barrel measures premised
upon campaign promises made solely to attract voters and the idio-
syncratic proposals reflecting political naïveté, and in producing a
record sound enough to permit its becoming the foundation for fur-
ther congressional sessions.
Literally the whole congress was learning: the clerks, how to
keep track of measures; the duplicating staff, how to develop sys-
tems for coping with the mountain of paper engendered by a
legislature in action; the committee chairmen, how to order their
committees’ work loads and bring matters to decision; the mem-
bers, how to cooperate with their colleagues from other districts
in moving favorable measures to passage and defeating those they
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opposed; and the officers, the hard lesson of adapting Microne-
sian indirection to the more demanding style of the new political
institution. The American administration was also learning a new
role of working with a co-equal, composed solely of Micronesians,
which now had the destiny of the Territory within its grasp.
CONVENING
Opening day went off much as scheduled, with a little of the
awkwardness which accompanies the first night of a play and the
members sometimes stumbling over their script and missing cues.
The high commissioner called the House of Delegates to order;
the deputy high commissioner performed the same function in
the General Assembly. After the provisional adoption of the rules
drafted during the workshop, the presiding officers named at the
Saturday caucuses were elected temporarily to chair their houses.
The Assembly’s Committee on Credentials found the high com-
missioner’s certification of assemblymen’s elections in order, and
after a roll call of all members, the Mariana district judge, desig-
nated by the chief justice, administered the oath prescribed by
the rules. This was followed by the rules’ being made permanent
and, upon motion, election of the slate of officers agreed upon at
the caucus. So well coordinated were these actions in the Assem-
bly that an incipient attempt to put other officers in nomination
had no chance of materializing. (These dissident members later
claimed that they misunderstood the caucus procedure and that
the agreement applied only to the naming of temporary officers.)
After the offering of prayer, the General Assembly by commit-
tee advised the high commissioner and the House of Delegates
it was organized, passed four resolutions of appreciation, and re-
ceived the Speaker’s announcement of committee appointments,
here again ratifying caucus action. The General Assembly then re-
cessed, to reconvene in joint session with the House of Delegates
to hear the high commissioner’s “State of the Territory” address
and the speeches of visiting dignitaries from Washington.
The organizing of the House of Delegates did not take place
with the despatch of the General Assembly. The filing of a formal
protest by the Popular Party of Saipan against the seating of Dele-
gate-elect Jose R. Cruz, after both the Mariana district court and
the high court of the Trust Territory ruled they lacked jurisdiction
to consider it, caused the House Credentials Committee to recom-
mend that his seating be deferred until his credentials could be
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further examined. After the swearing in of the remaining mem-
bers and the drawing of lots to start staggering each delegation’s
terms of office, the House was unable to agree on its permanent
organization.1 The temporary chairman continued to preside un-
til the election contest was resolved on the second legislative day
and permanent officers elected on the third.
Challenge to the seating of an elected member is a “sordid busi-
ness”2 at best, but this contest in the House was especially taxing
as it turned on both legal technicalities and broader moral issues.
Section 7 of Secretarial Order No. 2882 disqualifies any person
convicted of a felony from sitting as a congressman, unless he is
pardoned and his civil rights restored. This was interpreted in the
Trust Territory and by the Interior Department as not applying to
convictions in state courts of the United States, and by an amend-
ment to the order promulgated after the congressional elections,
the section was modified so as expressly to limit its span to convic-
tions before U.S. Federal and Trust Territory courts. The contest
proffered proof of Mr. Cruz’s felony conviction by a state court,
alleged his lack of moral qualifications to sit, and also claimed
election irregularities in the Marianas, although no evidence was
submitted on the latter. Throughout, the committee handled the
contest as a quasi-judicial hearing, allowing the attorneys for both
the petitioners and Mr. Cruz to present arguments and take excep-
tions to each other’s positions and ruling with judicial mien. In
recommending the seating of Delegate-elect Cruz, the commit-
tee reported it “was reluctant, although sufficient evidence might
exist for doing so, to go behind the wishes of a majority of the
electorate and refuse to seat the member-elect in question.” It
emphasized that the disposition of the case in no way denied the
authority of the House of Delegates to be the sole judge of the
qualifications of its members. “The Committee’s recommendation
is based, in large measure upon the urgent need to get the House
of Delegates organized and at work, and to promote cooperation
and harmony at the outset of the convening of the First Session of
the Congress of Micronesia.”3
At this juncture the Administering Authority had reason to
question the nature of this “cooperation and harmony,” for the
1 See p. 318 ff.
2 Robert R. Robbins, “‘Be it Enacted’: The New Legislative Branch,” Microne-
sian Reporter, 13:2 (July–Aug., 1965), 19.
3 Journal of House of Delegates, First Session, Congress of Micronesia, July
13, 1965, p. 1.
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first working day in each house saw the cumulative introduction
of twelve bills and four joint resolutions, practically all aimed at
restricting the administration’s jurisdiction or obtaining greater
benefits for Micronesians at the expense of the Administering
Authority. Later events were to show that only two of these mea-
sures would be enacted, and one was an innocuous resolution of
appreciation to the University of Hawaii.4
PHYSICAL AND STAFF ARRANGEMENTS
Saipan is declared to be only the Provisional Headquarters of
the Trust Territory, and it was to be expected that the new con-
gress would meet in “provisional” quarters. The community club
at the top of Capitol Hill on Mount Tagpochau was borrowed for
the purpose. This represented the best that could be arranged
under the circumstances but meant the two dining areas of the
club, separated by movable wall panels, would be pressed into ser-
vice as the legislative chambers, and that the “back-room staff”
of eight to ten persons would be crowded into a workroom of
but sixteen by twenty-four feet, there to compete for space with
mimeograph machines, collating tables, desks, stacked supplies,
and an embryonic “bill room” holding copies of all measures and
reports duplicated for the congress. The congress itself shared the
use of these facilities with the Toppa-Tappi Club5 (which during
the month-long session continued to serve dinners several times
a week), just as the congress’ legislative counsel jointly occupied
the office of the club’s manager with the latter. All this bears re-
lation to the total administration of the Trust Territory, for the
Territory has become so used to temporizing with makeshift facil-
ities that, rather than caviling, the congressmen accepted these
quarters as the administration sincerely intended them, the best
of those available for the new Congress of Micronesia.6
The high commissioner’s staff ordered the fittings for each
chamber many months in advance so that they could be shipped
to Saipan and be ready for the convening of the congress. Each
member enjoyed the luxury of a padded swivel chair, a small table
4 Joint Resolution 1–38, Laws and Resolutions, Congress of Micronesia.
5 The name “Toppa-Tappi” appears in no congressional publication, as this
corruption of a Saipanese geographical designation (top of Mt. Tagpochau) car-
ries a highly immoral connotation in Marshallese.
6 Separate quarters were erected for the second session of the congress, uti-
lizing prefabricated structures formerly used by the Naval Technical Training
Unit.
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serving as his desk, and an individual microphone which not
only amplified his remarks for his colleagues’ benefit but also
fed into a tape recording system. Later these same tapes could
be edited and spliced and then played over district radio sta-
tions for the edification of the people of the Trust Territory. Each
presiding officer sat on a raised dais, flanked by Trust Territory
and United States flags, and a rostrum was available for the
use of guests addressing the chamber. An individual name plate
mounted on a block of Palauan ironwood adorned each desk, as
gifts of the high commissioner. Each desk was also bedecked
with a small Trust Territory flag. Personnel from the Headquar-
ter’s staff worked long hours setting up all of the equipment and
laying the temporary wiring for the sound system, preparatory
to the convening of the congress.
The responsibility for staffing the congress was never as well
defined as that for handling the physical arrangements to accom-
modate it. This may be partly attributed to the lack of success in
both houses’ quest for staff aids; contributing to it was the am-
biguity of the position of the legislative counsel. The caucuses
assumed their respective houses’ ability to hire a “permanent”
secretary or clerk and sergeant-at-arms and enlisted the aid of
temporary staff from the Political Affairs Office of the high com-
missioner, the six districts’ political affairs officers brought to
Saipan to assist the new congress, and the Mariana Islands Dis-
trict Police Department. What started as a stop-gap arrangement
was perpetuated for the balance of the session, and as secretary
of the House, clerk of the Assembly, and assistants to both, all re-
mained on in the service of the two houses. Competent staff in the
Territory is hard to come by, and without resolution of whether the
posts were to be filled on a year-round basis and whether their
occupants were to be on the Micronesian pay plan and enjoy the
benefits associated with that status, it proved impossible to attract
qualified local applicants. In addition, the posts could become pa-
tronage plums for Saipan, given the shortage of housing on the
island, which would discourage any non-Saipanese from apply-
ing. Under the circumstances, the easiest way out of the dilemma
was to continue with the temporary staff and to recognize the
sergeant-at-arms as “permanent”—for the duration of the session.
During the pre-session workshop, five high school trainees
aided in typing and errand running, and this group became the
core of the congress’ “work-room” crew. Besides their typing,
326 The First Congress at Work
proof-reading, duplicating, and collating chores, they doubled as
bill clerks and congressional pages. One secretary was placed in
charge of this group and of the typists (their number sometimes
down to one) borrowed from the administration. This total work
crew, which never exceeded ten at any one time, kept five loaned
typewriters, two mimeograph machines, and one spirit duplicator
busy while consuming 377 reams of paper, fifty dozen stencils, and
425 file folders. Despite their yeoman work, duplication remained
bottle-necked throughout the whole session.
Pursuant to Section 23 of Secretarial Order No. 2882, the high
commissioner appointed Dr. Robert R. Robbins, Professor of Gov-
ernment and Chairman of the Department of Government at Tufts
University, as legislative counsel of the first session of the con-
gress. The structuring of the Guam Congress under its Organic
Act had shown the value of a trained counsel to assist that neo-
phyte legislative body. Although neither the Secretarial Order nor
the rules of either house so specified, the work of the House
secretary and Assembly clerk gradually came to fall within his
purview, and in addition he assumed over-all supervision of the
work-room and its duplicating crew. The district political affairs of-
ficers assisting the congress also received guidance from him. By
sheer necessity, a unified staff under the direction of the legisla-
tive counsel gradually emerged.
The Secretarial Order also called for the congress by joint
resolution during the course of the first session to nominate a
legislative counsel of its own choosing to serve for the second ses-
sion of the congress and the interim. Long before the convening
of the congress, attorneys practicing on Guam and Saipan were
promoted for the post, and in weighing the merits of the conten-
ders, the new congress underwent its baptizement in the exercise
of patronage power. A special committee of the General Assem-
bly and the Ways and Means Committee of the House turned back
a drive spearheaded by the Mariana delegation for a candidate it
sponsored and selected Kaleb Udui, the first (and, at that time,
only) Micronesian from the Trust Territory to have received a law
degree. With this symbolic nomination of one of the Trust Terri-
tory’s own for the congress’ first permanent officer, and given the
problems of recruiting personnel for a thirty-day legislative ses-
sion, the odds favor institutionalizing the staffing pattern set by
the 1965 congress. This will see a year-round nuclear staff main-
tained under the legislative counsel filling the key posts of both
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houses during the congressional session, with their numbers sup-
plemented by temporary employees hired just for the period the
congressmen meet on Saipan.
Indirectly, the congress is mandated by the Secretarial Order to
provide interpreters for members lacking fluency in English (Sec.
17 (f)). At the first session, the two assemblymen requiring this
assistance chose their own interpreters, and these aides accom-
panied them to Saipan at governmental expense. This personal re-
lationship facilitated the interpreting process as well as speeding
legislative action. Simultaneous translation was not undertaken;
rather, the interpreters reviewed legislation with their principals
before each daily session and kept them advised of the gist of
action as it took place on the floor. Should these members wish
to speak, they communicated their views to the interpreters who
then rephrased them for the Assembly, elaborating as necessary.
With increase of facility in English, there will be less need of
personal interpreters. However, as the congress grows in promi-
nence, with the consequence that more Micronesians give evi-
dence before congressional committees, staff personnel who can
translate written materials and interpret for witnesses in all of the
Micronesian languages may become a necessity. The first session
saw the beginning of this need, when the testimony of Chamorro-
speakers from Saipan had to be translated by delegates from
the Marianas who, incidentally, held positions hostile to that sup-
ported by the witnesses.
The session opened with no advance preparation for record
keeping or for the mechanical handling of congressional materi-
als. Through trial and error, as the session progressed the staff
learned to systematize its work. Check-off sheets for noting both
congressional and staff action on each bill and resolution, and
attendance and roll-call lists early appeared. Before the session
closed, a legislative style manual had been developed which set
forth both forms and procedures guiding the drafting, reproduc-
tion, numbering, transmittal, and final disposition of congressional
measures. Needed was a status table or history, periodically reis-
sued, to keep congressmen, administration, and interested citi-
zens informed of each measure’s progress. Efforts in this direction
toward the close of the session were abandoned under the pres-
sure of competing congressional work, and even the records main-
tained by the secretariats of the two houses became out of date
as posting fell behind. Out of the somewhat traumatic experience
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of learning-by-doing, a background of expertise was shaped which
was to stand future congresses in good stead.
By their contents, the journals of each house disclose the diffi-
culties encountered when attempting to maintain, with untrained
personnel, a record of the actions of a congress. Neither staff nor
members were prepared to speed the administrative machinery
of running the houses; the journals disclose a lapse of as much
as four days from the adoption of a measure in one house until
its delivery to the second. But most of the time the journals did
not consistently report this or any other data except for the votes
taken on questions before each house. Passage of measures on
first and second readings as well as voting on motions was care-
fully noted, although lost sight of was the raison d’être for the dis-
tinctive forms of voting. Voice-votes recorded in the Journal might
be accompanied with numerical tallies, while roll calls, whether
required by the Secretarial Order or pursuant to the standing
rules, appear only as summary counts without indication of how
each member cast his vote. Early in the session, members care-
fully scanned each day’s Journal, correcting its contents to insure
accuracy. As the work of the session grew more congested, they
willingly deferred the reading of the Journal, and by the end of the
session the preparation of the Journal fell too far behind for even
the gesture of formal waiver. Reference to these journals, partic-
ularly those for the closing days of the session, at times leaves
one puzzled as to exactly what did occur, but this may only reflect
the last days’ confusion.7 The wonder is that the journals of both
houses, being only summary accounts of action taken and not ver-
batim records, managed to preserve as much detail as they did.
COMMITTEES
The first congress made use of standing committees, special
committees, conference committees, and even assigned measures
to interim committees. Special committees treated administrative
problems associated with staffing, amendment of the rules, and
substantive matters. A number of the Assembly standing commit-
tees divided themselves into subcommittees along subject-matter
lines, each reporting informally to the full committee and the lat-
7 See exchange of letters between Delegate Ngiraked and HiCom, turning in
part on the House Journal’s failure to register legislative intent regarding the
use of funds appropriated for interim purposes. Letter of HiCom to Delegate Ngi-
raked, Feb. 7, 1966; letter of Ngiraked to HiCom, Feb. 14, 1966.
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ter then deliberating and preparing a report. The House Ways and
Means Committee, consisting as it did of all twelve delegates, also
bifurcated itself into two subcommittees, but in the main, action
was by the whole committee, which adversely affected the abil-
ity of the House to dispose of the variety of legislative business
before it. The composition of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee allowed executive sessions in which all delegates could
participate, circumventing the Secretarial Order which prohibited
closed meetings of the houses; otherwise, the committee’s un-
wieldy size was dysfunctional. Not only were all appropriation and
tax measures referred to this committee but also many of the time-
consuming “hot” issues, and this volume of work so bogged down
the House that on a number of important measures it had no al-
ternative other than to respond to Assembly initiative by either
accepting or rejecting the latter’s position in toto. The General
Assembly’s division of money matters between its Appropriations
and Ways and Means Committees proved to be far more efficient.
The standing committees were slow in organizing and setting
to work, in part evidencing the need for their members to estab-
lish operating procedures and their chairmen to arrange com-
mittee calendars. Contributing was the delay in drafting and
duplicating measures for the membership of both houses and
the administration’s being unprepared to offer its legislative
program at the opening of the congress. Working sessions of
standing committees commenced about the fifth official day, the
first public hearing waited until the beginning of the session’s
second week, and for the whole of the first two weeks relatively
little committee work was undertaken. At the end of this period
it was obvious that an intensive series of committee meetings
would need be instituted if the work mounting in committee was
to be disposed of before adjournment. Starting in August, the
General Assembly commenced sitting at night, reserving the full
day for committee sessions; the House, with its smaller size and
lack of overlapping committee membership, could recess for its
Ways and Means Committee to meet or to divide up into its three
other standing committees.
Practically all bills and resolutions received committee scrutiny
in at least one house. A few, upon introduction, were allocated ini-
tially to two committees. Following the same pattern, a petition
by members of the district medical staffs alleging “serious griev-
ance” was assigned to a House standing committee for investiga-
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tion and report. The petition was finally disposed of by reference
to an interim committee for further study.
Handicapping the committees was the paucity of staff to
help them in their chores. The district political affairs officers,
when not engaged in session work, aided as best they could,
but sorely needed was continuous assistance in maintaining
committee records, scheduling meetings and contacting
prospective witnesses, keeping notes of decisions reached at
committee session, writing reports, and in comparable other
ways facilitating the committees’ deliberations. Practically all
responsibility fell upon the committee chairmen; in some com-
mittees the load was too heavy, and measures died due to
inability to find time to consider them. The legislative counsel
and the Attorney General’s Office drafted committee reports on
the more technical subjects and prepared committee amend-
ments, but their services, too, were thinly spread, and com-
mittee chairmen frequently were dependent upon their own
efforts. It ought also be added that a few chairmen entertained
exaggerated ideas of their roles and the assistance to which
they were entitled, out of all proportion to the resources of the
Territory, and failed to apply themselves fully to their tasks, so
that the quality of committee review and the caliber of commit-
tee reports suffered accordingly.
Normally the chairmen of committees orally announced the
scheduled meeting of their committees prior to the adjournment
of each day’s general session. Hearings designed to encourage
public presentation of viewpoints were announced over the Saipan
district radio. Written notices might be distributed to all members
of a chamber notifying of forthcoming committee sessions, be they
public, regular, or sometimes even executive meetings. Conflict in
the timing of Assembly committee meetings quickly materialized,
and an attempt was made to divide each working day among the
committees so as to eliminate overlapping. Rationality of the plan-
ning notwithstanding, the work load of the committees fitted no
preconceived scheme, and in the absence of strong leadership to
enforce it, the master scheduling soon was ignored.
Committee chairmen approached their tasks as mere amanu-
enses of their respective houses and by progress reports compiled
a journal of their committees’ actions. They soon discovered that
each house was interested primarily in committee recommenda-
tion on the matters before it and not in accounts of how each
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committee was ordering its own affairs. The nature of reports
tabled changed accordingly. A summary review of all reports re-
veals their marked unevenness: some are complete with state-
ments of pertinent facts, the nature of the “urgency” if the bill
happened to be so classified, the legislative purpose to be ac-
complished, and the committee recommendations; others consist
of little more than a statement that the committee approves of
the enactment of the proposed measure. The committees were
normally lax in noting their reasons for favoring a measure, so
that they failed to acquaint their parent body with an understand-
ing of the issues inherent in adopting or rejecting the legislation
before it. The reports are of even less aid in enabling an admin-
istrator or judge to ascertain the probable congressional intent.
The House of Delegates was more inclined to abbreviate reports
than was the Assembly. Committees usually returned a number
of measures to their chamber in one report, with no necessary
subject-matter relation between the measures so joined together.
Frequently, committees suggested amendments for greater clarity
and consistency, to correct grammatical inadequacies, and to in-
clude technical detail but very rarely added major substantive
changes or made massive revisions in the drafts before them.
These written committee reports were almost always accompa-
nied with revised drafts incorporating the amendments recom-
mended, so that until the later days of the session the members
had a completely redrafted measure before them when voting to
accept the committee’s report. At first both did not identify their
reports through a numbering system, but they later corrected this
failure.
The committees were unsure of their powers and of their appro-
priate role. As committees they tended to regard themselves as
arbiters, with their non-involved members serving in quasi-judicial
capacity, and not as parties to the process of instituting change.
They hesitated to apply their screening powers rigorously. Meas-
ures were returned to their sponsors with the request to submit
improved versions at the next session of congress or to consult
further with the administration. The committees badly needed
background information and technical advice, but lacking expe-
rience to develop such knowledge or unwilling to call upon the
administration, they were swayed by the advocacy of one or sev-
eral members presumably informed upon the subject. At meetings
to which the public was invited, the lack of procedural format for
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giving testimony led proponents of a measure to harangue the au-
dience on the need for the desired legislation, so that legislative
shaping of public opinion loomed large in the functions of such
meetings even though not intended by the majority of the commit-
tee or its chairman.
The members appeared to share a sense of guilt if they
failed to examine extensively all measures assigned to their
committee, some on the premise that the adequacy of the
committee was to be measured by the number of measures
returned for floor consideration. Reporting a bill out demon-
strated the committee’s efficiency, but allowing a “bad” bill to
slip through questioned the competency of the committee’s en-
tire membership. Unless consensus developed quickly within
the committee, the typical reaction was to procrastinate, hesi-
tating to choose either alternative. When it became necessary
to act, the members fell to arguing among themselves, so that
decisions tended to be unduly delayed. In part because of this,
only one-third of the House measures received written reports
of any kind from the committees to which they were assigned,
and toward the end of the session, the House of Delegates dis-
charged a number of measures from committee so that they
might receive floor debate. Comparable action in the General
Assembly was quashed by one member’s objecting to another’s
motion to bring out a measure from committee by threatening
to follow suit, and thus to throw everything onto the floor. The
Assembly was more willing than the House to accept its com-
mittees’ determinations to “ice box” measures.
Neither by training nor staffing were the committees of the first
congress equipped to cope with the diverse questions confronting
them. Many of the problems had baffled the administration for
years; some required expenditures of larger sums than the con-
gress had access to, which meant that at best congress could
only request the administration to give the problems heed when
shaping the next year’s Federal budget. The legislators eliminated
the patently impractical and suspiciously examined all measures
affording limited local advantage. Referral to the administration or
to an interim committee for study and report served the purpose
of side-tracking without offending the sponsors. The committees
thus in fact served as cathartic agents, both for the general pub-
lic and the congress’ own membership. On occasion they helped
structure the Territory’s limited opinion through committee hear-
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ings and reports which received radio and multi-district coverage
in the districts’ weekly bulletins. Little was proposed in commit-
tee; committees mainly sought to dispose, and their parent body
felt no compunction in refusing to follow their recommendations.
Just as the committees were mastering their new roles, so both
chambers were adjusting to their relations with them.
ACTION ON THE FLOOR
As was to be expected, both the members and the staff of
the new legislature had to learn to cope with the orderly legisla-
tive business as contemplated by the rules. Sometimes measures
received erroneous numbers, so that duplications had to be cor-
rected and measures redesignated. Several times members from
one house signed measures intended for the other, making it
necessary for the clerks or the backroom staff to correct the er-
ror before duplication. A few members took umbrage when their
names were omitted or placed in incorrect order as sponsors, be-
ing fearful that the corrected version would not be reported on
the radio and they would not receive credit back home. Finally,
the clerks had to warn the members about the necessity of signing
bills carefully so as to preclude further repetition of this type of
objection.
Members adopted forms of debate which they had found suc-
cessful in district legislatures or the Council of Micronesia, or
possibly on the stump while electioneering. The response of their
fellow members tested the transferability. During the session it
was noticeable that some members adapted well to the require-
ments of the physical and human dimensions of the new environ-
ment, while others, sometimes to their own detriment, retained
their previously learned styles of deportment.
This was not a legislature ignorant of parliamentary methods.
However, experience in the Council of Micronesia or district legis-
lature was not sufficient preparation for the complex procedures
and measures now faced, and each day of the congress was liter-
ally a training session in the intricacies of a full-fledged legislature
at work. Thus, each house had to develop systems for handling
measures passed by the other and transferred to it for enactment.
The house of origin had to learn how to take in stride the amend-
ments attached by the second house and, if it did not concur, how
to use the device of a conference committee to iron out the areas
of disagreement. Unfamiliarity of the members with the courtesies
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associated with bicameralism resulted in the enactment of single-
house resolutions applicable to both houses of the congress. It also
manifested itself in failure to honor the priority of a measure al-
ready passed by the other house and now awaiting action along
with its companion measure in the latter’s house of origin.
The development of chamber solidarity was early disclosed by
the members of the House of Delegates’ voting unanimously for
the seating of Delegate Cruz, even though his disqualification
might have resulted in a different presiding officer’s being cho-
sen. Toward the latter part of the session, when Cruz, as pub-
lisher of the Micronesian Times, editorially attacked the compe-
tency of the congressional staff, both houses rose en masse to
its defense in the form of privileged statements delivered on the
floor.
The officers of both houses appreciated that some of the mem-
bers would encounter trouble in the application of the rules and
took pains to make sure all understood the procedures being fol-
lowed. Thus, in the General Assembly, when for the first time an
amendment was offered to an amendment on the floor, the speaker
stopped the proceedings, asked “Does everyone understand what
we are doing?” and then allowed a few minutes for the members
to recall that the series of motions would have to be voted on in re-
verse order until the original measure was before them. Gradually,
the members became adept in applying the house rules and just
as skilled in suspending them. They early grasped the necessity
for specifying the rule to be waived and found that it was normally
easy to obtain concurrence, just so long as the measure concerned
was not highly controversial. Due to the lag in duplication, the re-
quirement that a measure be reprinted after amendment on the
floor and prior to final passage was often laid aside. Usually, nei-
ther the procedure in the House of Delegates nor that observed
in the General Assembly was overly technical, and rarely was ob-
jection raised on some minor point of the rules. Towards the end
of the session, various rules were suspended to speed the process
of final enactment, and sometimes action was taken without such
waiver or any complaint about the violation. At the conclusion
of the general session, measures were being passed through two
readings in one house on the same day, on the questionable infor-
mal ruling of the attorney general that Secretarial Order No. 2882
only mandated a two days’ lapse in the passage of a bill through
both houses.
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Members of both houses became proficient in referring mea-
sures to committee to gain time or hoping to dispose of them. The
journals also record that some measures were killed on their first
reading, voted down on their second reading, or despatched more
delicately but just as effectively by being tabled indefinitely. Even
sending a measure back to its house of origin as a means to de-
feat it is recorded in the Journal.8 The versatility of some of the
members in maneuvering within the rules of their chamber, and
the gullibility of their colleagues, is well illustrated by the by-play
on Delegate Resolution No. 31 which originally favored a 50 per
cent increase in the Micronesian pay plan. As this large an incre-
ment would have cost over $1,650,000, or close to 10 per cent of
the total Federal budget for the Trust Territory, the resolution was
recommitted to committee in an effort to defeat it. Notwithstand-
ing, it later was withdrawn from committee and again placed upon
the calendar, whereupon the same delegate who had moved to
re-refer it then sponsored an amendment materially jumping the
benefits. The authors of the resolution supported the revision as
being in line with their purpose, only then to find that the resolu-
tion as amended was soundly defeated on the floor. Later, the
opponents relented, reconsidered the vote, reduced the rate of in-
crease to a figure considered to be more within reason, and then
allowed the resolution to pass. The whole operation was consum-
mated with great finesse and revealed the ease with which some
members were able to outflank their colleagues.
The manner in which a committee report should be han-
dled upon being submitted to its respective house caused
difficulty both in the General Assembly and in the House of
Delegates. Finally it was determined that the committee re-
port could be accepted without thereby signifying approval of
its contents. Also, reports could be amended on the floor of
the chamber so as to incorporate the language approved by
the membership, even though the amendment did not neces-
sarily express the views of the committee. It was not unusual
in the House of Delegates for a committee to offer its re-
port and the House then to reject its recommendations. The
receipt of a report only placed a measure before the body,
and as each delegate appeared to consider that he, and not
the House committees, should chart the course of action, far
8 D.B. 11, Journal of the General Assembly, First Session, Congress of Mi-
cronesia, Aug. 10, 1965.
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more discussion and modification of measures occurred in the
House than in the Assembly.
The amendments presented in both houses indicate that the
members were troubled by language problems and, in the desire
to be overly careful in the expression of their ideas in English,
would quibble over the appropriate wordage, even when there
was no legally significant difference. The rules directed review of
all measures by the legislative counsel before final passage, and
this would have obviated all inadequacies caused by members’ un-
familiarity with the nuances of the English language. Earlier in the
session this review was enforced, but the rule was gradually aban-
doned as work piled up on his desk, and toward the last of the
session it became a dead letter.
The rules of both houses prohibited members’ voting when
there was a conflict of interest. During the contest over the
seating of Delegate-elect Cruz, he was excused as an interested
party. The vote on Delegate Resolution No. 20 caused some
members to claim conflict of interest as the grounds for abstain-
ing, but so large was their number that the president directed
the secretary to call upon all members to record their votes.9
Assembly Bill No. 3, when before the General Assembly, was
amended so as to allow the congressmen, in addition to the dis-
trict legislators already specified in the bill, to be consulted on
the district budgets before they are sent to the high commis-
sioner. An amendment to delete congressional participation was
offered by a delegate from Palau who also served as speaker for
that district’s legislature. His position was supported by another
assemblyman who was the speaker of the Truk district legis-
lature, and by others. A solon who was not a member of any
district legislature pointed out the possible conflict of interest
and recommended that all assemblymen who were also mem-
bers of district legislatures should refrain from voting on the
amendment. His objection was held ill-founded upon the premise
that those congressmen who happened to be members of the
district legislatures had no personal interest or benefit to be
gained from the motion before the General Assembly and there-
fore were not within the prohibition of the conflict rule.
Throughout the whole session of the congress, there was a no-
ticeable tendency for the members to suggest what ought to be
9 Journal of the House of Delegates, op. cit., Aug. 4, 1965. D.R. 20 called
for the suspension of the charter for the Micronesian Hotel Corporation.
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done by way of procedure without taking the appropriate steps to
put their proposals into motion. The fact that neither house for-
mally selected a member as majority floor leader encouraged such
inconclusive volunteering to continue. The legislative secretary of
the General Assembly performed many of the duties of a floor-
man in keeping the action of the Assembly moving but without
policy responsibility for the body’s adoption of any set program.
The chairman of each committee bore the burden of presenting his
committee’s reports, and either he or the lead-off sponsor of the
measure reported upon would likewise carry the brunt of work-
ing toward achieving a measure’s final passage. In this situation,
the role of the legislative secretary was limited to eliminating par-
liamentary snags, aiding the presiding officer in assuring that the
rules were followed (as by noting that a motion died for want of
a second or that the request for a roll call had to be supported
by three members), and raising questions when amendments from
the floor were ambiguous or did not appear to be responsive to
the matter at issue. Because of the inclusion of the legislative sec-
retary within the structure of the General Assembly, and in part
because of the distinctive nature of the two houses’ membership,
the floor leadership was more efficient in the Assembly than in the
House, where several members attempted unofficially to assist the
House president.
It was to be expected that in a first session some defensible
measures would be “lost” and never pass second reading. Also, in
the excitement of the fast-paced floor action, the incongruity of
directing the clerks to redesignate one measure as another (as a
Delegate Resolution’s becoming a Delegate Joint Resolution) was
apt to be ignored. Finally, with the seemingly inevitable pressure
that builds up in every legislature before adjournment, it could
be anticipated that the presiding officers of both houses would
come to wink at minor violations of the rules in order to com-
plete as much of the unfinished work as possible before the end of
the thirty-day session. But despite all of the flaws to be found in
the records, and the members’ inadequacies which they mirrored,
the total impression is one of invaluable experience gained for the
conducting of future sessions of the congress. Despite the occa-
sional awkwardness of floor action, the haggling over minescule
points, and the reluctance of the House of Delegates to surrender
discretion to a body smaller than its total membership, the mem-
bers in both House and Assembly mastered their house rules and
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learned effectively to support or oppose the legislation in which
they were interested, a good measure of success.10
Throughout the session there was a slight note of play acting.
In other legislatures, this arises out of the members’ being so in-
volved in the machinations of the legislative body that the game
for the game’s sake becomes more important than the substantive
issue around which the play takes place. In the Congress of Mi-
cronesia the element of unreality mainly stemmed from the mem-
bers’ still being unaccustomed to their newly granted powers and
to their chambers’ procedures. Some adopted distinctive roles ap-
propriate to the ploys of gamesmanship which set them apart from
their colleagues. When the congress came to a close, in the last
minutes of the one-day special session extension, the president
of the House of Delegates specifically singled out several mem-
bers to whom he wished to extend his appreciation. With tongue
in cheek, he commended one for his constant abstaining when
a measure was put before the House to a vote, another for his
consistent putting of points of information at the very time the
vote was being taken, a third for his ability to utilize the House
rules and his determination to uphold them when they were not
being religiously followed, and a fourth for his outstanding perfor-
mance on the floor in making the House laugh when debate grew
heated. The Congress of Micronesia in its floor action thus takes
its place alongside American legislative bodies where the same
idiosyncratic practices may also be observed.
LEADERSHIP STYLES
Many of the members elected to the Congress of Micronesia
were or had previously been officers of district legislatures. Rel-
atively few of them sought to obtain comparable position in the
Congress of Micronesia, nor did they push themselves to the fore-
front during the flow of debate upon the legislative floor. To the
extent their leadership was expressed, it probably was most po-
tent in influencing the decisions of their own delegation. Members
from the same administrative district in the Assembly were in-
clined toward voting en bloc. This was less evident in the House of
10 This contrasts with the experience of the indigenous members of
Papua–New Guinea’s House of Assembly, a legislative body established for the
other remaining Trusteeship one year earlier than the Congress of Microne-
sia. See Norman Meller, Papers on the Papua–New Guinea House of Assembly,
New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 22 (Canberra: Australia National Univer-
sity, 1968).
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Delegates, where the two members from Palau would openly dis-
agree in debate over the merits of legislation as, less often, would
members in some of the other delegations.
The delegates to the Council of Micronesia had learned the
efficacy of “talk under the coconut trees,” and this practice of
discussion outside of the legislative halls was carried over to
the congress. All during the two weeks of the pre-session work-
shop, informal cross-district meetings and delegation caucuses oc-
curred. Conferences of the Mariana Islands delegation preceded
the workshop and continued throughout the month-long congres-
sional session. Some members of a delegation might not take part
in its caucus, as when party cleavages or personal cliques ex-
cluded a member. The Mariana Islands delegation imposed upon
itself a “gag” rule which required both its assemblymen and del-
egates to work in their respective bodies for the measures ap-
proved by caucus majority. The Palau delegation, though meeting
frequently in informal sessions, found variances in the views of its
members so strong that it could seldom agree upon a united stand.
In that delegation, the wounds opened by the election campaign
had yet to heal, in contrast to the Marianas delegation, where all
but one member bore the endorsement of the same political party.
In the Truk delegation, the policies followed were shaped by an
exchange of views in which many of the younger members played
prominent roles. Chief Petrus served as spokesman of the consen-
sus. In the meetings of the Marshall Islands congressmen, Amata
Kabua is reported to have played a key role in setting the course
followed by many of its members. The Yap solons seemed reluctant
to commit themselves individually on major issues until after the
delegation had a chance to meet; Delegate Francis Nuuan proba-
bly was its dominant figure. Finally, it becomes more tenuous to
identify Ponape’s most influential member. Delegate Olter and As-
semblyman Henry worked closely together and in the main divided
the leadership of the Ponape group between them. Because of
Chief Petrus’ role as nominal leader of the Truk delegation in the
Assembly, the members from Palau and Yap paid close attention
to his comments. Truk’s five-man bloc in the Assembly constituted
almost half of the majority vote necessary for that body to take fi-
nal action, and small delegations like Yap or Palau could maneuver
with assurance only with foreknowledge of the way in which the
Truk members proposed to move.
The discussions outside of the chambers lessened the need for
340 The First Congress at Work
clarifying explanation upon the floor when a measure was called
for consideration upon its merits. The fact that the House of Dele-
gates had greater floor debate in part revealed an inability to
reach agreements in these extracurricular meetings. However,
much of the final disposition of measures before the House was
arranged outside of that body by its elected officers’ meeting with
a few other key delegates, so that a measure’s chances of success
or failure were fairly well known before it came to a final vote.
The Marianas House delegation never fully appreciated this, and
its members would argue at length on the floor, only to have the
House vote down its measures.
Many of the members in the House of Delegates were personally
acquainted with each other through education at the Pacific Islands
Central School or in Hawaii, and a number had served together
in the Council of Micronesia.11 This affected their behavior toward
each other in the House and facilitated their overcoming district
cleavages. The two delegates from the Marianas were not members
of the “club,” and this could be sensed in the conduct of the House.
To a lesser degree the same inner clique existed in the General As-
sembly, and personal friendship, common intellectual interest, and
mutual prior participation in Territorial activity brought members
together across district delegation boundaries. However, leadership
shifted with the subject matter, and the same individuals might not
occupy similarly dominant positions irrespective of the measures
debated. The officers of the General Assembly supplied a degree of
direction in keeping the Assembly administration functioning, the
rules observed, and the calendar of work cleared. There was little
in the way of binding commitment reached outside of the legislative
halls to limit the free-wheeling nature of the debate in which most
members engaged within the chamber.
The cultures of Micronesia do not adapt readily to authoritative
forms of leadership, and it was not to be expected that these would
be encountered in the congress. Rather, leadership as exercised
by the officers of the two houses was subdued in style and indirect
in nature. Generally, the direction they gave was pointed more
toward furthering the work of the chambers than to favoring or
opposing the policy inherent in the matters before their bodies.
11 Delegate Nuuan from Yap reported, “Almost every member of Congress knew
and had worked with as many as half of the total Congress members. In the House
of Delegates I knew and had either worked with or went to school with ten of the
members.” The Rai Review, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 8.
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The House, consisting as it did of members who distrusted power
exerted by others and who regarded each delegate as equal, had
as its president a person of gentle mannerisms who fitted the role
expected of him. Tosiwo Nakayama was willing to serve as one of a
peer group and issued few commands channeling the course of the
House’s deliberation. When, about half-way through the session,
the need to expedite the business of the congress was voiced, his
reaction was typically to announce he would meet with the com-
mittee chairmen to see whether some way to speed the work of
the House could be achieved. But all this cloaked both competency
and resiliency, and when it appeared that points of order were be-
ing made to break the train of a speaker’s argument and to disturb
him in his delivery on the floor, he firmly gave short shrift to such
dilatory tactics.
In comparison with the House, Dwight Heine as the speaker
of the General Assembly played a more dominant part, although
his actions were as unobtrusive as those of the president of the
House of Delegates. He diplomatically refrained from forcing his
decisions on the Assembly and hesitated to rule in ways that
would give offense. He would almost invite floor discussion before
putting a matter to a vote, and the awkward silences separating
the comments of members on the floor encouraged others to rise
and fill the gap. At the beginning of the session, after suggesting
the manner in which the Assembly might meet, he recessed the
body to enable the members “to think it over.” He was not pan-
icked by objections from the floor, but, rather than abruptly trun-
cating them, took advantage of distracting elements to achieve his
ends. Thus, when an assemblyman protested the referral of a mea-
sure to one committee and proposed that it be sent to another,
the comment by a second member that the measure was of a na-
ture that would permit its being sent to either was allowed by the
speaker to pass as an adequate reply, and he proceeded to ask for
“any other announcement.”
The speaker’s greatest strength probably lay in his ability to
work behind the scenes in reconciling disagreements. Two mem-
bers who were not speaking to each other found themselves to-
gether to their mutual surprise drinking soda pop during a recess;
the speaker had asked each to join him without knowledge of the
other. Committee chairmen were requested to agree upon com-
mittee schedules so they would not conflict, and if necessary the
speaker met with the chairmen to accomplish that purpose. When
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measures on second reading ran into objections which could be re-
solved by informal discussion, he would call a recess so that the
parties could get together. A member slowing Assembly action by
taking an inordinate amount of time upon the floor in seemingly
needless detail was admonished indirectly through the speaker’s re-
questing the leading man in that member’s constituency to bring
pressure to bear upon the assemblyman to curtail his “enthusiasm.”
Probably the best example of the speaker’s style of leadership
was his handling of the joint resolution designed to stampede
the congress into accepting one of the candidates for legislative
counsel. “Somehow,” after the joint resolution nominating that
candidate was introduced, it never was sent to printing. By the
time this was finally discovered and another copy had been dupli-
cated (A.J.R. 15), the speaker had carefully planted the seed for
assigning the matter to a special committee. When it was sug-
gested from the floor that the choice of a legislative counsel be
made the responsibility of a select committee, the speaker imme-
diately treated this as a motion and asked for a show of hands
for its adoption. At this time, at least one member on each dele-
gation favored the particular candidate. The speaker side-tracked
a supplemental proposal for the delegations to name members to
the special committee, on the ground that the motion had already
been agreed to, and then appointed six uncommitted individuals.
Upon the report of the special commitee, another candidate was
selected for the post of legislative counsel.
Vice-Speaker Petrus of the General Assembly assumed the chair
toward the last days of the session and demonstrated the contrast
in the degree to which a show of direction may be exercised by
the presiding officer. The illness of the speaker was feigned, unbe-
known to the membership, and had been arranged between the
speaker and the vice-speaker to expedite the flow of work on the
Assembly floor. Chief Petrus had led the Truk legislature as its
first speaker, and his knowledge of parliamentary procedure dated
back to the chartering of Moen municipality when, as magistrate,
he received private briefing sessions prior to the administration’s
granting of the charter.12 His mannerisms while presiding were
businesslike, and members were reluctant to stand up and request
12 Chief Petrus is “aggressively intelligent in a culture wherein it is a virtue
to be dull and stupid—although protesting the while his own stupidity.” From
Thomas Gladwin, “Petrus Mailo, Chief of Moen,” in Joseph B. Casagrande, ed.,
In the Company of Man (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 56. See also pp.
121–122, supra.
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the floor for prolonged debate. In no way did he stop any member
from discussing the merits of a measure, but he led the members
to understand, as one later expressed it, that “no funny business”
would be tolerated.
Chief Petrus does not speak English, but this was no great
obstacle as prior to the sitting he had been briefed on the back-
log outstanding by the legislative secretary, the legislative clerk,
and his interpreter. The smooth working relationship with the
legislative secretary and the clerk of the Assembly which had
been established by the speaker for handling floor action as-
sisted the vice-speaker. On the few times he required prompting
on parliamentary rulings, these were supplied by the legislative
secretary, sometimes by signal rather than by the latter taking
the floor to make a statement. The vice-speaker might also ask
the clerk to check on a matter in question, which would give
the legislative secretary time to advise the chair. If a measure
seemed to be engendering unnecessary floor discussion, Chief
Petrus would call a recess and walk among the members, re-
marking that they ought to wind up the debate; in this way he
projected himself into the course of legislative floor action more
directly than was the wont of the speaker. Because comments in
English from the floor had to be translated, the vice-speaker’s
remarks were sometimes not exactly apropos to the course of
debate, but when it came to matters of parliamentary procedure,
his rulings were proper.
One onlooker, recalling this situation commented, “I sort of
wondered why the members acted passively when the chief was
presiding.” One of the contributing reasons was respect for Chief
Petrus’ age, his sagacity, and his acknowledged status. Another
was apprehension that assemblymen by their actions might em-
barrass him before the American and Guamanian visitors present.
It was almost as if a tacit understanding had been reached that no
complicated parliamentary maneuvers would be undertaken while
the chief was presiding.
With the work of the General Assembly speeded and a number
of measures disposed of, the speaker recovered from his indisposi-
tion and returned to the chamber. His more diplomatic and soft-
spoken style on the podium differed from that of the more brusque
vice-speaker, just as it did from that of the more permissive presi-
dent of the House of Delegates. In a non-Micronesian assemblage,
any of the three styles of leadership might have led to chaos; given
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the roles of the respective presiding officers, their actions were
highly appropriate for a Micronesian legislature for which indirec-
tion and inoffensiveness are the hallmarks of competence.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION
The convening of the first Congress of Micronesia offered the
administration an unequaled opportunity to aid the congress in
coming to grips with the many policy problems facing it. The rela-
tionship would have to be treated delicately, for many members
regarded the powers granted to the congress as niggardly, due
to the congress’ limited control over finances and the restriction
to a thirty-day, annual session. Congressmen would be suspicious
of anything that could be interpreted as an effort to control their
decisions. But the first congress was woefully deficient in policy
leadership, and the assistance of the administration, diplomati-
cally tendered, could have gone far to help fill the vacuum. The
sincerest of intentions on the part of the congressmen could not
compensate for their lack of expertise in the range of subjects with
which they had to grapple nor substitute for the skill of the trained
legislator in handling matters beyond his immediate ken of under-
standing. Unfortunately, these very inadequacies helped to widen
the gulf between legislator and administrator, rather than bring
the two closer together.
The administration had long adopted a defensive stance in its
presentations before the United Nations and the United States
Congress. The best picture possible was always painted of Trust
Territory conditions and deficiencies were only grudgingly con-
ceded. Now power was being turned over to the Micronesians, and
the administration was committed to transferring even more. In
the offing was a general challenge to the administration’s stew-
ardship and a more immediate threat to every insecure American
on the high commissioner’s staff. Each time a Micronesian con-
gressman posed a question or scored a point, it exacerbated the
defensiveness. The Congress of Micronesia was occasion for the
administration’s first real exposure to searching legislative over-
sight by indigenes, far more intensive and extensive than that at
the hands of the Council of Micronesia. Just as the Micronesian
legislator looked suspiciously upon the administration’s dealings
with the congress, so did the high commissioner’s staff cautiously
examine all inquiries pertinent to congressional affairs. This was
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the normal irritation between the governed and the governors, but
compounded by the friction endemic to American executive-leg-
islative relations.
The Secretarial Order reserved to the high commissioner the
right to submit legislation and, if labeled “urgent,” empowered him
to put it into effect unilaterally should the congress not concur. The
prospective termination of import and export taxes decreed by the
Secretarial Order, and the obvious need for delineating the juris-
diction and responsibilities of the three levels of government in the
Trust Territory, assured the high commissioner’s recommending a
series of major legislative measures to the first congress. As early
as the opening of the pre-congress workshop, congress voiced its
request for advance information on Territorial income and expendi-
ture, the moneys available for running the first congress, and the
prospective Territorial budget. Had the administration announced
its legislative program in advance of the convening of the congress,
or even revealed it on the opening day, the congress could have had
major matters before it from the start, and this would have gone far
toward filling the vacuum the first congress faced and have set the
committees briskly off on their assignments. Instead, the “State of
the Territory” address delivered at the joint session marking the be-
ginning of the congress contained only the most general references
to the administration’s plans. Almost a third of the session elapsed
before the high commissioner at joint session delivered the budget
for review and the essential tax legislation to support his financial
proposals. Measures were still being introduced at the request of
the administration when the three-quarter point of the session had
been reached.
As member-initiated legislative measures poured in, many of
them impliedly if not openly critical of the administration, the de-
fensive sensitivity of the staff at Headquarters heightened. They
tried to ascertain what action was being taken on these and other
measures before the committees, only to find that the congress
had little information on committee plans for calling up the mea-
sures assigned to them. The ambiguity of the first legislative
counsel’s position became apparent as the staff officers at Head-
quarters looked to him to keep them advised of committee meet-
ings and hearings on measures affecting their agencies. Of course
it was an impossible chore, and to those persons who wished to
believe the worst of the congress, the absence of advance schedul-
ing only proved the body’s ineptitude, if not scheming obfuscation.
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The committees, on their part, early indicated selectivity in their
hearings, requesting the presence of some administration person-
nel and pointedly omitting to ask others. The Assembly Appropria-
tions Committee, in reviewing the Territorial budget, announced
a week-long schedule of “conferences” with named department
heads, adding that “all such conferences will be by invitation” and
that upon completion of the conferences, invitations for summary
statements would be issued to the assistant commissioners to whom
these department heads reported. To the administration, here was
proof that the committees were seizing the opportunity to settle
grudges and show up the failings of American personnel. When
some administrative departments communicated to the congres-
sional leadership through the legislative counsel that it was the high
commissioner who would name the persons to represent the various
departments, the leadership made it clear that the decision rested
with the congress. The tempest blew over, but the gulf between
the congress and the executive departments remained, resembling
more the civic textbook’s account of classical separation of powers
than the close working relationship which develops between an
executive and legislature knowledgeable that the work of govern-
ment can be furthered only by the effective cooperation of the two
branches of government.
The members of the congress had to learn the dimensions of
their legislative roles, including those which dealt with the execu-
tive branch. The speaker, at the beginning of the second week of the
congress, gently admonished the assemblymen that they should ten-
der the high commissioner the courtesy of giving him notice before
calling on him, just as the Assembly was extended the same treat-
ment by the high commissioner. The executive branch may have
been just as inexperienced in working with a legislature, but at
least it was so organized as to have permitted it to take the ini-
tiative in bringing the two major branches of government closer
together. Instead, as the session approached, the administration
found itself unprepared, without final agreement on budget or leg-
islative program. Unable to ease the anticipated problems of the
new congress by such cooperative action as advance notice of
the high commissioner’s legislative program, the executive branch
held the congress at arm’s length while the proposed legislation
was being finalized. The aloofness of the administration allowed it
to declare to the world that it exerted no undue influence on the
deliberations of the congress. What is omitted in such a statement
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is that thereby the actions of the congress were hindered and the
necessary adaptation of the members to their new roles slowed.
END-OF-THE-SESSION LOG JAM
The last minute rush attendant upon adjournment is a common
phenomenon in many legislative bodies. Sheer volume of work, out-
side pressures impinging upon the legislature, one house jockeying
for advantage against the other so as to tie the fate of a measure
in its possession with that of a measure reposing in the custody of
the other house, and comparable trading within a single chamber
all contribute to the building of a log jam as the end of the session
draws near. Finding the “key log” to break the impasse, and hur-
riedly opening the channels of action before the mounting desire of
the fatigued members to have done with it all and return to their
homes stampedes them to adjournment, constitute a major task of
the legislative leadership. The same last minute rush accompanied
the concluding days of the first session of the Congress of Micro-
nesia but, except for the delay in the budget measures, primarily
for different reasons. There was little outside of the congress in the
way of demand for passage or defeat of measures, and there were
few “tying” maneuvers within or between the chambers. Most of
the administration-sponsored bills would have been enacted if the
congress could have called them up for passage. The explanation
for the rush lay more in inexperience and human deficiencies than
in political machinations. The staff was unable to duplicate materi-
als with enough despatch, the committees were slow to complete
the scrutiny and refinement of the measures referred to them, and
the formal leadership was unprepared to assign priorities and con-
centrate upon those issues which it believed most warranted the
congress’ attention. As the time for adjournment approached, the
volume of business on the floor of each house mounted while the
members attempted to bring even more measures out from commit-
tee. Not only did there remain insufficient time to dispose of it all,
but not until long after adjournment was it possible to determine
with precision exactly what had transpired during the last hectic
hours preceding the congress’ close.
One-third of the session passed before the first Assembly bill
(A.B. 3) cleared the Assembly, and over half the session before
any measure originating in the House of Delegates reached the
Assembly. Some of the assemblymen quickly appreciated that at
its first session the congress would be hard put to dispose of
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even a small work load and, as early as the twelfth day of the
general session, advocated the adoption of a cut-off date for the
introduction of new measures. Nothing came of this effort. The
House established the unrealistic terminal date of August 5 for
all but urgent matters, and even this was sometimes ignored.
As ever more measures were sponsored and the committees
gradually filtered them out, the need for pre-planning the flow of
legislative business became apparent with the end of the session
drawing near. The last few days found on the floor of each house a
large number of complex measures demanding careful study, and
the members were unwilling to rely upon their committees’ recom-
mendations and hesitant to commit themselves without possessing
the knowledge adequate for personal decision-making. Neither
the leadership nor any informal groupings were so organized as
to be able to pull all the threads of policy together to prevent
the threatening debacle. With the last day upon them, chairmen
of committees and sponsors of individual measures vied for the
floor to push measures to a vote. Spokesmen for the administra-
tion lobbied to save administration-sponsored bills from defeat. In
the resulting confusion, the limited time available to the congress
was dissipated in a number of unproductive ways, such as bills’
being put to a first reading in their house of origin. The secretary
of the House and the clerk of the Assembly attempted to keep ac-
count of the action on the floor, but most members lost track of
what had been passed and what was still pending.
It was only after adjournment that the staff could trace down all
of the measures and separate out the adopted floor amendments
from those which had been defeated. The pressure of that last day
is revealed in the legislative history which reported the fate of
each measure. The Congress of Micronesia is recorded as having
passed on the final day of the general session a majority of all the
bills and a third of all joint resolutions enacted during the entire
first general session.
THE SPECIAL SESSION AND THE BUDGET
In view of the congress’ inability to agree on the Territorial
budget and failure to make provision for its own expenses, the
high commissioner had little alternative but to allow the congress
to remain in session; this he did through his power to summon the
congress into special session. The high commissioner’s call was
for but one extra day, and the congress resumed where it had left
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off the previous day in the consideration of the money measures
before it. When the conference committee reached a compro-
mise, the houses quickly adjourned after concurring in the
passage of two appropriation measures and a joint resolution,
the latter extending the life of the election regulations pro-
mulgated by the high commissioner for the first congressional
elections. From this special session was derived a precedent
which may see the congress treated as a continuing body, at
least for the period between biennial elections, for in fact the
special session consisted of nothing more than a prolongation
of the first general session. The length of one day for a spe-
cial session did not allow for the minimum two-day reading of
bills mandated for the passage of laws by Secretarial Order No.
2882, so the measures enacted were those which had already
received a first reading at the general session. The actions of
the congress, of the high commissioner in signing the bills, and
of the administration’s staff in countenancing the expenditures
authorized by the legislation, all demonstrate that no measures
died on midnight of the thirtieth day of the general session.
This prolonged life cannot be justified unless the congress is ac-
corded the status of a continuing body.
Another precedent also emerged out of this special session, for
the Congress of Micronesia refused to appropriate the Territor-
ial funds to be realized from the taxes it had just enacted and in
effect also repudiated the high commissioner’s budget proposals.
In accordance with Secretarial Order No. 2882, the high commis-
sioner had, before sending it to the Department of the Interior,
submitted to the Congress of Micronesia his preliminary Federal
budget for fiscal year 1967, drawn within the $17,500,000 ceiling
set by the United States Congress. Also presented to the Microne-
sian legislators were budget plans for the appropriation by them
of the revenues to be raised from Territorial taxes, estimated at
$480,000 for fiscal year 1967 but a much smaller sum for the
then current fiscal year 1966. The high commissioner also stated
at the joint session on July 20 that he would request the Federal
Congress to increase the Trust Territory’s appropriation ceiling,
so as to step up the pace of Territorial capital improvements and
expand governmental services. The members had no objection to
such augmentation of Federal appropriations, but they were not
inclined to concur with the high commissioner on the manner in
which local revenues ought be expended, nor could the two houses
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agree on the modifications to be recommended for the Federal
budget for fiscal year 1967.
From the days of the pre-session workshop, the members-elect
had disputed the high commissioner’s interpretation that Secre-
tarial Order No. 2882 did not transfer to the congress control
over the approximately $1,000,000 received annually from air
transportation fares and other Territorial service fees which he
was placing in a revolving fund managed by the administration.
When he presented the Federal budget for fiscal 1967 to the con-
gress in the form of summary departmental requests, without jus-
tifications or monetary breakdowns, the members, bent on care-
fully scrutinizing the budgetary details, were further antagonized.
After consultations with the Territorial Director of Budget and Fi-
nance and other members of the administration, the Assembly
Appropriations Committee did amass enough “back up materials”
to make a report on the fiscal year 1967 budget, adding that
$410,000 more ought to be expended to supplement the funds to
be appropriated in the Federal budget. Before making these rec-
ommendations, the committee had solicited the suggestions of all
assemblymen and incorporated many of them in its report. The
House Ways and Means Committee also turned to studying the
fiscal 1967 budget but, unlike the Assembly, did not prepare spe-
cific probes, and its analysis ran to more general principles of
administrative philosophy and stressed the inadequacy of the bud-
get estimates in meeting Territorial requirements. The two houses
were never able to narrow the gap between their separate ap-
proaches, and the resulting impasse over the budgeting of Federal
and Territorial funds necessitated the special session.
For almost four hours during the one-day extra session the ten-
member conference committee debated the high commissioner’s
budgets, devoting most of its time to his estimates for Federal
expenditures. Personality conflicts exacerbated the differences of
the positions taken by the two houses. Allocation of funds for local
capital improvements among the six administrative districts was
proposed as a means of ending the stalemate, but this “pork bar-
rel” solution failed to break the deadlock. When the conference
was completely bogged down, a legal opinion was obtained that
the congress could refuse to appropriate any local revenues be-
yond those necessary to meet its own costs. This furnished a viable
compromise between the poles of “all or nothing,” and the con-
ference committee agreed upon a $96,562 supplement for the
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current year’s legislative budget (FY 1966) and a fiscal year 1967
appropriation of $145,000 to run the congress. No report was ever
made by the conference committee on the high commissioner’s
estimates for the Federal fiscal 1967 budget, so although the con-
ference committee was satisfied with the House Ways and Means
Committee’s general statement of principles, it never was adopted
as the formal recommendation of the congress to the high com-
missioner and the Secretary of the Interior.
The rationale offered by the conference committee for only ap-
propriating its own expenses was that the congress should wait
until the productivity of the new tax bills was established before
prospectively allocating any other local revenues. It was also ob-
vious that this tactic would enable the Congress of Micronesia
to supplement funds made available by the Federal government,
rather than having the Federal appropriations premised partially
upon the already determined apportionment of local revenues. To
a congress already annoyed by the high commissioner’s delay in
communicating his budget estimates and further irritated by the
manner of their presentation when they were submitted,13 this
prospect of turning the tables on the administration was readily
accepted. No real harm would be done, for at the next regular
session in 1966 the revenues already collected as well as those an-
ticipated for fiscal year 1967 could always be appropriated. Here
was a vista of power, and in a quarter where the members thought
of themselves as weakest. In rejecting the administration’s budget
proposals, the congress had flaunted its independence, and also
flirted delightedly with irresponsibility, knowing that it was leav-
ing financial matters in a state of confusion just to see how the
administration would respond. In doing so, the congress paradox-
ically had come of age as a co-equal branch of the Territorial
government.
13 Still remaining is “… the difficult problem of devising some procedure by
which the Congress of Micronesia can participate more directly and more influ-
entially in formation of the annual budgets and allocation of funds made available
by the Congress of the United States.” Closing Statement of HiCom to United Na-
tions Trusteeship Council, June 15, 1967, Trust Territory Press Release, 129:67
[undated], p. 5.
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CHAPTER 14
The Congressional Effort
and Its Impact
ANY METROPOLITAN POWER today must regard with a de-
gree of trepidation that period in the planned development of its
colonies when political power is being transferred from the hands
of its own personnel to those of the administered. The past was
within its control, the future is a promise of maturing expecta-
tions, but the present is fraught only with uncertainty. The popular
selection of local officials may elevate the demogogue, the unqual-
ified, the irresponsible. Full authority is not yet the colony’s, so
the mother country remains responsible for the course of normal
government and is blamed for not complying with every voiced
demand. So, too, might the first elections to the Congress of
Micronesia have brought to the fore totally incompetent indige-
nous leaders or those bent upon obtaining the impossible, and
with the session concluded, the United States might have found
itself confronted with chaos in the Territorial government and dis-
credited before the world. The high commissioner and his staff
must have felt immeasurably relieved when the Congress of Mi-
cronesia adjourned on August 11, 1965, and they had their first
chance to view the totality of the congressional product.
LEGISLATIVE INPUT
In all, 204 bills, joint resolutions, and single house resolutions
were sponsored at the first congress. Almost two-thirds of these
measures were resolutions—70 joint and 57 single house resolu-
tions. A number of reasons contributed to the employment of the
resolution form, in addition to its use as an expression of the con-
gress’ appreciation, commendation, and felicitation. The members
understood that they had no ability to allocate Federal funds, and
Territorial moneys which could finance administrative action had
yet to be collected and, in any event, would be limited in amount.
Recognizing that they did not grasp all the ramifications surround-
ing most programmatic changes they sought and lacking effective
fiscal powers, many of the members deliberately introduced reso-
lutions rather than bills. They were political realists and sensed
that, even though a resolution might not have the force of law,
the administration would give heed to these expressions of legisla-
tive views and aspirations. A resolution could not be vetoed and
would appear permanently upon the record as an accomplishment
of the first congress. Besides, members were familiar with reso-
lutions from service in the predecessor Council of Micronesia and
also in district legislatures, and some were not yet too sure about
the distinction between the different legal forms.1 For all of these
reasons, an analysis of the first congress’ input must treat resolu-
tions right along with bills.
The congressmen were far more inclined to obtain advantages
for their constituents than to place burdens upon them. Four times
as many measures proposed benefits or services from government
for residents of the Trust Territory as imposed greater obligations
on them. Tax legislation figured prominently among the latter. This
ratio is reduced to three to one if those measures with which the
government must also comply are included, such as displaying the
Trust Territory flag in an approved manner. Half of this legislation
classed as more “onerous” owes its origin to the request of the ad-
ministration!
As was to be expected, the expanded governmental services and
benefits desired ranged widely, from setting up a procedure for
claims against the Trust Territory to granting more scholarships.
Some measures, such as the bill proclaiming Micronesia Day which
impliedly promised a holiday for governmental employees or over-
time pay for working, furnished indirect advantages. Nineteen mea-
sures requested public works expenditures, some specific, others
for classes of projects. Thirteen would have lent greater support
to Micronesian endeavor, as by Micronesian preferences in govern-
mental bidding or easier access to Guam. An almost equal number
of measures sought reclassification, raises in classification, or gen-
erally higher compensation for governmental employees.
Practically all members approached their new roles imbued
with the purpose of legislating for the Territory as a whole. As
a consequence, there was relatively little effort to single out an
administrative district or a local area for congressional attention.
In all, only ten measures carry reference to named districts or part
of a district in a way pertinent to future action of government, and
1 See p. 94 ff.
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of these, two were administration measures applying to Kwajalein.
Five of the ten refer to the Marianas, with four calling for capital
improvements. More fitting to the climate of the congress was the
equal treatment accorded all districts by eleven measures, such as
those calling for representation of each district on congressional
committees or Territorial boards and establishing a named office
or a service in all districts. Consonant with this were the several
measures setting Territorial standards or authorization but allowing
local option for their application. The bill empowering each district
to opt for a jury system nicely balanced congressional interest in
Territory-wide matters with allowance for local variances.
A number of measures were oriented toward the congress,
the administration of its affairs, expansion of its powers, and
enhancement of its status. The largest component of this group
was concerned with the running of the congress, its annual appro-
priations, the election of its members, the acquiring of a meeting
site, and the selection of its legislative counsel. Eight measures
proposed the creation of interim committees or called special ses-
sions to conduct studies or undertake designated work. If the two
resolutions requesting the high commissioner to negotiate with
the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii to facilitate train-
ing of congressmen in Hawaii are added, the total is increased to
ten. Almost equal in number (11) were the measures which would
enlarge the scope of the congress, be it through amendments to
the Organic Act so as to permit semi-annual sessions, requirement
of congressional confirmation of appointments to top Trust Ter-
ritory posts, attendance of congressmen at the meetings of the
Trusteeship Council of the United Nations and budget hearings of
the United States Congress, or mere consultation of the high com-
missioner with the Territorial congress before foreign business
might be undertaken in the Trust Territory. The remaining por-
tion of this group directly or indirectly contributed to the status
of the congress through commemorating the date of its conven-
ing by a national holiday, changing the names of the houses so as
to coincide with those of the Federal Congress, or issuing special
identification for congressmen.
Examples of measures revealing development of a greater Trust
Territory identity, if not nascent nationalism, abound: adopting a
Territorial flag to be called “the national emblem of Micronesia”;2
2 Assembly Committee Report No. 1, July 20, 1965.
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making July 12, Micronesia Day, a “national” holiday; proposing
that two Micronesians be chosen by the congress to “represent
the Congress at the annual meeting of the Trusteeship Council”;
requesting diplomatic passports for congressmen; seeking a Ju-
nior College of Micronesia as a single educational center for the
Territory to compensate for that lost when the Pacific Islands
Central School was replaced by separate district high schools;
founding a Territory-wide agricultural exhibit; directing vessels
bringing cargo for the Trust Territory to bypass Guam; and re-
quiring all Trust Territory vessels to fly the Territorial flag. The
enactment of an Organic Act, as advocated by a delegate reso-
lution, also would have afforded an acknowledged status to the
Territory.
Allied to these measures were a plethora of resolutions giving
Micronesians preference in bidding for or handling Trust Territory
business (5), restricting the entry of non-Micronesian businesses
or employees (6), and otherwise favoring the activities of Terri-
torial citizens. Several resolutions requested cancellation of the
charter granted to a non-Micronesian-owned company. Bills which
would have required congressional confirmation for Trust Ter-
ritory department heads and district legislative advice on local
appointments may have had as their hidden purpose the securing
of governmental posts for Micronesians, an objective more openly
revealed in another measure. Of course not all measures were
compatible with the development of Trust Territory “nationalism”
or greater self-identity, but those that were not were greatly in the
minority and their authors may not have even recognized the in-
compatibility.
A few of the measures contained an undercurrent of anti-Amer-
ican sentiment, such as those calling for a more restricted leave
policy and mandatory rotation of United States personnel or for a
tax on non-Micronesian salaries. However, most of these can also
be explained as reflecting anti-administration feeling, which tended
to be more manifest in measures criticizing on-going programs and
advancing proposals for their modification. At least nine measures
were expressly aimed at greater Micronesian control over the high
commissioner’s administration of the Trust Territory, for the most
part by requiring his prior consultation with the congress, district
legislatures, or both. Given the long period that the people of Mi-
cronesia have been governed by outsiders, undoubtedly there were
other measures covertly calculated to reduce the administration’s
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discretion or to afford Micronesians greater powers of control, but
this was not patent from their reading.
SPONSORSHIP OF NON-ADMINISTRATION MEASURES,
BY DISTRICT
District Measures Sponsored* Initial Sponsor Percentage
Mariana 117 107 91.1
Marshalls 23 15 65.2
Palau 31 18 58.1
Ponape 23 15 65.2
Truk 11 4 36.4
Yap 31 12 38.7
* Totals more than 171 due to multi-district sponsorship.
A review of the sponsorship of measures at the first congress
reveals the political dynamism of the Mariana delegation.3 The
Mariana members not only came to the congress with a partial
program already prepared in draft form, but they also obviously
attempted to capitalize on the potential momentum to be gained
by the early introduction of measures in a legislative body unsure
of its procedures and consisting of many members who by cultural
conditioning were reluctant to play an overt role in initiating
or leading action. During the first half of the session, Mariana
legislators affixed their names to four-fifths of all the measures
which they were to author at the first congress. By the time of
adjournment, they stood accountable for over two-thirds of all the
non-administration measures and, of these, were the first-named
sponsor, normally signifying initiator, on almost all. The magnitude
of the Mariana delegation’s role was so great that the members of
no other single delegation signed their names to even one-fifth of
the measures. This predominance was generally manifested what-
ever the form of the legislative measure and whichever the house
of congress.
Another demonstration of the Mariana Islands members’ po-
litical sophistication is supplied by their complementary activity
across legislative chamber lines. Among different measures initi-
3 This analysis of sponsorship data is computed upon the 171 measures re-
maining after there were excluded the twelve organizing resolutions for which
a procedure was prearranged and the twenty-one administration bills which by
convention received introduction by a single, designated member.
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SPONSORSHIP OF NON-ADMINISTRATION MEASURES,
BY FORM AND DISTRICT
District 22 H.B. 34 A.B. 21 H.J.R. 49 A.J.R. 35 H.R. 10 A.R.
Mariana 17 18 9 34 35 4
Marshalls 0 5 5 6 2 5
Palau 4 10 5 7 4 1
Ponape 3 4 7 6 3 0
Truk 0 3 5 3 0 0
Yap 2 4 10 4 11 0
ated by congressmen themselves, there were fourteen House of
Delegate bills with companion measures in the General Assembly
and eight joint resolutions found in both houses.4 This total should
also be augmented by another fifteen comparable resolutions
corresponding in content but varying in form. In this latter group,
failure to concur exactly often reflects originally inadequate draft-
ing; as presented to the secretary of the House or clerk of the
Assembly they were identical, but from their form it was impos-
sible to ascertain whether they were intended to be single house
or joint resolutions. Corrective drafting by the staff in conforming
these resolutions to both the requirements of the standing rules
and the hurriedly ascertained intent of the lead author resulted
in their taking diverse final forms. Of this total of thirty-seven
companion measures, twenty-two received sponsorship from del-
egations of the same district in both houses. In another ten, the
single district sponsorship found in one chamber was included
within the multi-district authorship for the companion measure in
the other chamber. For all but three of these thirty-two companion
measures, the first persons named in both houses were from the
same administrative district, proof that a mechanism existed for
delegation cooperation between the two legislative chambers. In
most cases5 this statement can be more appropriately rephrased
so as to limit its application to the Mariana delegation, for Mari-
4 Note that this does not include the ten administration-sponsored proposals
for which companion bills were introduced in both houses. An eleventh adminis-
tration bill in the Assembly had no duplicate in the House.
5 Not only in the Marianas, as see the sponsors of Delegate Joint Resolu-
tion No. 7, as printed, including the incongruous signature of Assemblyman Olter
Paul, in addition to those of the two Ponapean delegates; subsequently, Assembly-
man Paul was leadoff sponsor on companion Assembly Joint Resolution No. 34.
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anas’ sponsorship on one or both of each companion set accounted
for 92 per cent and 81 per cent, respectively, of these thirty-seven
non-administration bills and resolutions.
At the pre-session workshop, the question of joint versus sin-
gle authorship of measures was discussed, but the drafting com-
mittees did not propose that any limitation on multi-member spon-
sorship be incorporated into either house’s rules. The congress
quickly adopted multiple authorship of measures into its unwritten
procedures; less than a third of all non-administration measures
bore the signature of only one member, and this proportion
roughly applies as well to bills, joint resolutions, and single house
resolutions when each is considered separately. The delegates
proved to be twice as willing as the assemblymen to sign another
member’s measures and also more ready to cross delegation lines.
However, the various combinations revealed by the multiple spon-
sorship suggest the existence of divisions within congressional
delegations, sheer legislative inexperience, and most likely, a com-
bination of both.
SINGLE-AND MULTIPLE-MEMBER SPONSORSHIP OF
NON-ADMINISTRATION MEASURES
H.B. A.B. H.J.R. A.J.R. H.R. A.R.
Single sponsors 3 12 6 20 6 8
Two or more sponsors, same
district
15 17 4 22 16 2
Two or more sponsors, dif-
ferent districts
4 5 11 7 13 0
In the Assembly, not one bill or resolution was introduced by
all members of an administrative district; the House of Delegate’s
tally of thirty-five measures bearing the signatures of both members
of a district’s delegation is almost wholly attributable to the joint
action of the Mariana delegates on thirty-three. The most convinc-
ing explanation for this lack of intra-delegation cooperation (other
than the contribution of party cleavages in the Mariana Assembly
delegation and in the Palau delegations of both houses) lies in the
members’ inexperience with the process of the new congress as
well as their unfamiliarity with the various dimensions of their new
legislative role. As a result, cooperative activity within each admin-
istrative district’s delegation developed on an ad hoc basis.
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In addition to inexperience, the paucity of inter-district cospon-
sorship serves as an indicator of the cultural variances which divide
the Trust Territory. Less than one-fourth of all measures and barely
a third (40) of the multi-sponsored measures bore the signatures
of members from two or more districts. With the atypical Mariana
district delegation excluded, this number further shrinks to but ten
measures jointly offered in either house by members from delega-
tions of at least two districts.6 The Congress of Micronesia was too
new and its powers still too untried to allay the mutual uneasiness
latent in the dealings of the people from one island group with those
of another. Such display of overt cooperation awaited proof that
the stratagem of joint authorship is so associated with the greater
possibility of a measure’s success in the congress that legislators
will actively enlist others’ open support, and thus evidence early
endorsement for their proposals. The Mariana delegation obviously
gave some credence to the efficacy of cross-district sponsorship,
and to a degree the new congress proved it right.
NON-ADMINISTRATION MEASURES INTRODUCED AND
ENACTED, BY NUMBER OF SPONSORS & DISTRICT
Upon adjournment and the resolution of the confusion atten-
dant on the last few days of the congress, it was found that a
greater proportion of measures of multi-district authorship suc-
6 Cooperative sponsorship by members from three or more delegations, even
with the Marianas included, accounted for a minuscule 10 per cent of the 171
legislator-initiated measures.
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ceeded in passage (35.0 per cent) than those of one or more
members from a single district (26.0 per cent).7 Although it cannot
be determined whether the attractiveness of a measure secured it
cross-district support or the reverse, one or both explanations ap-
pear related to its more favorable treatment by the congress. Less
significance can be assigned to the fact that single-member initia-
tion of measures enjoyed a little more success (30.9 per cent) than
multi-member sponsorship (26.7 per cent), regardless of whether
the latter was from one or more districts.
The Mariana members were the first-named authors, as well
as co-sponsors, on more adopted measures than the members of
any other delegation, but this constitutes a somewhat dubious ac-
colade. Under relative standards of effectiveness, the Marianas’
performance was not outstanding; the degree of success varies
with the specific comparison employed.
The Mariana delegation, particularly in the House of
Delegates, approached the congress with more political so-
phistication than the rest and tended to equate this with a
personal responsibility for the political tutelage of the mem-
bers from the other districts. As Chamorros, they came from
a relatively more acculturated ethnic group whose mores now
encourage aggressive conduct and thus facilitated their ac-
tive role in the new congress. Despite their joint sponsorship
of some measures with the members of other delegations,
they mainly tried to push measures through to passage with-
out the bargaining necessary to reaching agreement in a
collegial body unhindered in its decision-making processes.
The resultant statistics mirror all this, both in the volume of
measures introduced by the Mariana members and their rel-
ative degree of success.
Contrasting with the Chamorros of the Mariana district are the
self-effacing Trukese, who characteristically display traits of de-
pendence and submission rather than aggressiveness, certain that
show of initiative and public attention may lead to trouble. A pri-
ori it would be expected that the Truk delegation’s performance
in the first congress would be muted, at least in the authorship
of legislative measures, and this is confirmed by the data previ-
ously recounted. Despite being the largest delegation, congress-
men from Truk proposed the fewest number of measures—either
7 Two-district and three-or-more-district sponsored measures had identical ra-
tios of success.
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by themselves, with others, or as initiator—and on those few occa-
sions when they did join with others, they enjoyed a higher index
of effectiveness. Here, again, delegation sponsorship of legislation
correlates with district political acculturation.
The mores of the Marshall and of the Ponape districts also do not
take kindly to the extrovert political type, nor to formally organized
and arrogant political behavior. The pattern of legislative sponsor-
ship observed by the delegations from these two districts corresponds
fairly closely with that of Truk, in sharp contradistinction to the Mar-
iana congressmen, again suggesting the potential utility of quantify-
ing legislative sponsorship for distinguishing differences of political
acculturation. From all this it would be expected that Yapese conser-
vatism would have been revealed by a smaller number of measures
sponsored than even that of Truk, but this did not prove to be the case;
rather, the Yapese congressmen affixed their signatures to measures
on a scale comparable to the members from the Marshalls and Pon-
ape. Even more perplexing is the Palau delegation, for the competitive
nature of both Palauan personality and society, and the adjustment
of the Paluan culture to Western political institutions and processes,
should have been evidenced by a volume of sponsorship somewhere
midway between the extremes of the Mariana and Truk delegations.
Instead, the conduct of the Palauan congressmen was not distinguish-
able from that of the other delegations which bunch toward the “Truk
pole.” The explanation for this lies in the conscious tactic of the Palau
congressmen to refrain from publicly authoring many measures at the
first congress, a decision quite in conformity with Palauan traditional
ways of adopting guiding strategies in advance of embarking upon a
political course of action.8 Thus only the sponsorship of measures by
the Yap delegation remains incongruous with what might have been
anticipated a priori from each district’s general cultural attitude to-
ward political participation.
THE LEGISLATIVE OUTPUT
Behavioral studies of American legislatures identify at least
five major factors shaping the legislative process and product: the
structural composition of the legislature itself, executive-legisla-
tive relationships, the individualized contribution of the legislator,
8 Robert Kellogg McKnight, “Competition in Palau” (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State Uni-
versity: 1960), pp. 86–96.
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group pressure, and constituency forces.9 Each of these really
is but a convenient designation for a bundle of many “sub-
factors” encompassed under a single appropriate heading, as
“group” includes political party and pressure activities of orga-
nized congeries as well as other less formal groupings. Usually
it is difficult to pinpoint the effect of a single factor, and re-
course is frequently made to statistical analysis of legislative
roll calls in the effort to apply precision measurements. The fail-
ure of the Micronesian congressional journals to record each
member’s vote forecloses their use for this purpose. By way of
compensation, there is less need to rely upon roll call statistics,
for fewer factors molded the actions of the congress, and the
impact of most was patently evident.
No Territory-wide party exists in Micronesia, so the control ex-
erted by any organized party activity could at most be observed
only in the actions of the Mariana and Palau delegations. Some
legislative measures representing party stands were introduced
by members from Palau, and the inability of the delegation in ei-
ther house to present a unified front was partly because of the
party schism which split it. However, this division also partially
corresponded with the differences in personality and political so-
cialization of some of the delegation’s members and, given the
weakness of the party movement in Palau, may more safely be
attributed to them. On the other hand, the cohesion displayed
by the Mariana Territorial Party members during the whole of
the congress surmounted personal idiosyncrasies, and this party’s
influence was manifest in the many Marianas measures embody-
ing its platform pledges, the joint sponsorship of measures in the
same house, and the initiation of companion measures in both
houses by the Mariana district congressmen. The failure of all
three of the assemblymen in the Mariana delegation to join in
the initiation of a single measure may be traced to the cleavage
between parties.10 With regard to party pressure exerted from
outside the chambers, the necessity for extra police protection
arising from a massing of Mariana Popular Party supporters in the
back of the House of Delegates, during the party’s protest to the
9 See Norman Meller, “Legislative Behavior Research,” Western Political
Quarterly, 13:1 (March, 1960), 131, and “‘Legislative Behavior Research’ Revis-
ited,” Western Political Quarterly, 18:4 (Dec., 1965), 776.
10 Only one measure, A.B. No. 40, was sponsored across Mariana political
party lines, but not even this by all three assemblymen from the Mariana Islands
district.
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seating of Delegate Cruz, forcefully brought home to the congress
the relation of party position to the organizing of the House. There
is nothing to indicate that this show of party strength swayed the
findings and recommendations of the Credentials Committee or
the confirming action of the House, but it most certainly made
everyone involved more careful in observance of all the technical-
ities. Less material results flowed from the effort of Saipan’s local
officials affiliated with the Popular Party in supporting the high
commissioner’s awarding of a charter for hotel building over the
objections of the Territorial Party; their stand notwithstanding, the
position of the Territorial Party members in the House triumphed
and the House adopted Delegate Resolution No. 20 (R. 1–26) re-
questing the high commissioner to suspend the charter and solicit
public bids for the undertaking.
Organized group activity was also just developing in the Trust
Territory, and for all practical purposes any effective pressure
placed on the congress came from congressmen who were leading
members of such incipient groups, rather than from outsiders forc-
ing their views upon the congress.11 As school teachers, health
personnel, and government employees, the congressmen could be-
speak their fellow workers’ needs as their own. Under the circum-
stances, a lobbyist for an organization of Trust Territory employees
asking for revision of the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan would
have been superfluous. Spokesmen for a few Saipanese economic
organizations testified at committee meetings; this had an aura of
window dressing, providing a backdrop to show the other congress-
men that the Mariana members were supported in their positions
by their constituents. If the Carolinians living on Saipan are treated
in the category of a pressure group, it should be noted that, through
informal contacts with members, they lobbied for organizing the
House of Delegates in a manner which would favor the Trukese
delegate as president. This cannot very well be classified as constit-
uency pressure, for none of the residents on Saipan were electors
of any of the delegates from the other districts whom they were im-
portuning. But by far the most observable and effective lobbying, if
such it be called, was that of the administration.
The relationship between the congress and the Administering
Authority’s staff was the second most important factor in shaping
11 Expressing this in more technical terms, with practically no interest aggrega-
tion in the body politic, the congress assumed the representative function of such
interest articulation and aggregation as occurred.
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final congressional action—sometimes because the position of the
administration was accepted in toto; occasionally because the con-
gress consciously took a tack opposite to that outlined by the
administration, so that the latter remained potent in a negative
way by inversely suggesting the course of congressional conduct;
and most significantly, because the administration’s background
data supplied the members with material upon which many of the
congressional decisions were premised. The administration staff
came before committees both in open and closed meetings and
was repeatedly contacted less formally for advice and required
information. The high commissioner submitted twenty-one of the
seventy-seven bills introduced in the first congress, and his staff
worked arduously for their passage. Some of administration mea-
sures adopted were only delivered to the congress within the last
week before adjournment. Nine of the fifteen bills enacted were
administration measures; excluding those measures which had
companions, only two separate bills favored by the administration
were killed by the congress. Although the Territorial legislature
also failed to follow the high commissioner’s recommendations
on appropriating local revenues, the record of success for the
administration is impressive.12
The Council of Micronesia advocated bicameralism upon the
premise that the House of Delegates would be more concerned
than the General Assembly with the protection of the traditional
elements of Micronesian life. Once the congress was in session
however, it was quickly evident that the House looked upon
itself neither as a conserver of custom nor as a bastion of
conservatism. It revealed itself as the more flamboyant of the
two chambers, the one more willing to countenance major in-
novations. The Assembly proved to be the more cautious body,
inclined more to ask for Administration studies upon which laws
could be based in the future than to push for the immediate
enactment of measures. The words of Assemblyman Tman in
the closing day’s Journal, “It is better that we chart our course
carefully…. We must not make hasty decisions,”13 could more
fittingly have been uttered on the convening of the General As-
sembly as the guiding principle for the session.
12 As only two bills bore “urgent” designations, the administration’s success
cannot be attributed to the congress’ truckling to the inevitable.
13 Journal of the General Assembly, First Session, Congress of Micronesia,
Aug. 10, 1965.
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The one case of protection for traditional ways recorded in the
first congress was instigated by the Assembly and not the House of
Delegates. Assembly Bill No. 23, an “urgent” measure, in delineat-
ing the responsibilities of the various levels of government would
have repealed Section 44 of the Code of the Trust Territory. This
section in part allows the continuation of “local political institu-
tions, systems, or customs insofar as they are in consonance with
the Trusteeship Agreement and the laws of the Trust Territory.”
The Assembly Judiciary and Governmental Relations Committee
to which the bill was referred reported that “the committee does
not feel sufficiently certain that the traditional and customary
forms of political institutions and organizations in Micronesia are
adequately protected under the provisions of the proposed meas-
ure.”14 It therefore recommended that the section be retained, and
the Assembly adopted the amendment. The House followed the
lead of the Assembly.
The most potent factor in shaping the congress’ legislative
output was the congressman himself—his preconditioning as he
grew to his present estate and its contribution to the attitudes
and opinions he currently held on the rate and direction of advis-
able change for the Territory, his familiarity with parliamentary
procedure and the intricacies of the legislative process, and his
abilities to interact with his colleagues in ways conducive to ar-
riving at decisions. With minimal political party and group pres-
sures upon the congress and with the bulk of their constituents
little informed of what they were doing during the course of
the congressional session, let alone what the congress could ac-
complish, the members functioned mainly as free agents, acting
in ways they considered best for the Territory, and incidentally
sometimes for themselves.
The congressmen understood the contribution of education to
personal advancement, for most owed their own political prom-
inence to educational achievement. From their governmental ser-
vice, they knew intimately the strengths and weaknesses of the
administration. They were in accord that Micronesians should as-
sume responsibility for their own governance but disagreed on
when and the manner in which this was to occur. In their igno-
rance of the complex supportive data necessary for resolving the
issues before them, and in the absence of countervailing assis-
14 Assembly Committee Report No. 6, July 30, 1965.
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tance from outside sources, they had no recourse but to rely upon
the administration for counsel. In those areas in which they could
depend upon personal knowledge, they felt competent to act and
did not hesitate to do so. The cautious among them remained hes-
itant; those who were hypercritical of the administration pushed
for major changes. As the session advanced, both compromised
their positions, but the cautious had the advantage, for without
their concurrence the status quo would be maintained. The con-
sensus reached normally leaned toward the conservative and, at
least for the first session, showed a willingness to hold with the ad-
ministration and obtain further grounding before supporting any
major revision directed against it. The actions of the first con-
gress were mainly the expressions of the members themselves,
reflecting the hopes and fears and futures of the citizens of the
Trust Territory, tempered by the reality of decision-making under
conditions of inadequate knowledge and in a strange and new en-
vironment.
The Congress of Micronesia adopted one-third (69) of all meas-
ures considered at the first general session and its one day exten-
sion; eliminating the more or less routine resolutions of apprecia-
tion and those addressed to organizing the congress, this fraction
reduces to less than one-fourth (47). In this final tally, only two
measures15 patently proposed to extend greater Micronesian con-
trol over the Americans’ administration of the Trust Territory, and
for the moment the effort came to nought. Assembly Bill No. 2,
which would have required district administrators to present their
preliminary budgets to their district legislatures for review and
recommendation prior to submission to the high commissioner,
was vetoed on the technicality that at this stage “of the United
States budgetary process as it applies to the Trust Territory … [it]
is still wholly an administrative matter and that budget materi-
als are privileged information for use of the Executive Branch.”16
This bill hardly constituted a call for revolutionary change, far
reaching as its effects might prove to be, for the members knew
15 Resolutions 1–24 (D.R. 4) and 1–33 (A.J.R. 11)—the former requesting
the high commissioner to place one member from each district on the Copra
Stabilization Board and the latter asking the high commissioner to study the
feasibility of establishing a Civil Service Commission—may have had the same
intent.
16 Robert R. Robbins, “‘Be it Enacted’: The New Legislative Branch,” Microne-
sian Reporter, 13:2 (July–Aug., 1965), p. 22.
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that district budget review had already been practiced in the Truk
district and its institution in the Marianas had been halted only
at the direction of the high commissioner. The other bill which
did not receive the high commissioner’s approval, Delegate Bill
No. 14, would have had immediate impact upon the entry of non-
Micronesian economic interests into the Trust Territory, requiring
prior consultation with both congress and concerned district leg-
islatures before chartering, and would have insured indigenous
participation in foreign economic enterprise in Micronesia. The
high commissioner held that this exceeded the congress’ authority
and, moreover, that chartering was by nature executive.17 Debat-
able as these grounds for disapproval may be, it was accepted by
all that the latter bill would have cut deeply into the high com-
missioner’s discretion in charting the economic development of
the Territory. Both of these “executive control” measures which
succeeded of passage, only to be vetoed, would have permitted
Micronesians to slow up innovation and opt for retention of the
status quo, a type of legislation which the cautiously inclined con-
gressmen could support.
The administration encountered more difficulty in working
with the House of Delegates than with the General Assembly.
Of the eight adopted companion measures which were intro-
duced at administration request, five originated in the Assem-
bly, while only three of the delegate bills passed. The Assembly
trial by jury bill had no mate in the House; the latter body
followed the Assembly’s lead in enacting this executive-pro-
posed measure. Subsequent to the Assembly’s adoption of the
administration bills for regulating hotel operations (A.B. 27)
and for keeping the peace (A.B. 30), the House killed both
the Assembly’s and its own duplicate measures. The refusal to
enact these bills and the amendments made to three of the
other bills which were passed reveal the congress was not just
“rubber-stamping” the administration’s requests. In those ar-
eas in which it felt competent, the congress did not hesitate to
adopt its own views in preference to those of the administra-
tion. Import rates were modified (D.B. 18); customary political
institutions were protected, unilateral power to charter dis-
trict governments was withheld from the high commissioner,
and disqualifications for holding district legislative office were
17 Ibid.
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lightened (A.B. 23); and the qualifications for jury service were
varied from those the high commissioner supported (A.B. 44).18
Some of the amendments, such as that precluding the high
commissioner from chartering districts until he informs the
congress of the procedural legislation he proposes to submit
for effectuating this development, represented maneuvering
for power. The first congress was willing to concur in most
of the administration-favored legislation; as the congress be-
comes more knowledgeable about the legislation before it and
more secure in its own judgment, the administration is certain
to experience far more critical scrutiny of its legislation and
greater restraint in its acceptance.
The largest component of the legislative output sought more “ex-
tensive and rapid economic and social betterment for the people
of the Trust Territory….”19 Through resolutions the houses went
on record as requesting expansion of the public health services (R.
1–41), speeding up the Homestead Program (R. 1–22), increasing
electric power and water services (Rs. 1–30 and 1–34), developing
roads (R. 1–32), improving harbors and channels (R. 1–40), consid-
ering the hard-surfacing of airfields (R. 1–35), and bringing shipping
directly into the Trust Territory, eliminating transshipment at Guam
(Rs. 1–15, 1–27, 1–29, and 1–43). The review and updating of the
Micronesian Title and Pay Plan requested in Resolution No. 1–39
presumably would be followed by raises such as those detailed in
Resolution No. 1–48. The expansion of the outlet for Micronesian
products on Guam (R. 1–49) and the awarding of future contracts
for copra exporting to Micronesian companies (R. 1–42) spoke even
more pointedly to economic development than did the resolutions
looking to the improvement of the Territory’s economic infra-struc-
ture. Some of these were repetitions of resolutions adopted at ses-
sions of the Council of Micronesia and were calculated to warm the
hearts of the congressmen’s constituents.
As was to be expected, the congressmen did not ignore their
own needs or their own status. Resolutions passed by the House
of Delegates requested the high commissioner to provide mem-
bers of congress with special personal and vehicular identification
(R. 1–47) and diplomatic passports (R. 1–46). The high commis-
18 The item veto of Public Law No. 1–3 of 1965 represents no executive
disagreement with an amendment incorporated into an administration bill,
but correction of a technical error contained in the original draft.
19 Robbins, op. cit.
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sioner concurred in the congress’ selection of a legislative counsel
and also signed the bill appropriating the lump sum of $145,000
for the operational costs of the congress during fiscal year 1967.
The high commissioner vetoed a $900 item for subsistence to
Saipanese congressmen but otherwise approved the $96,562 sup-
plement to the congress’ fiscal year 1966 budget. Besides making
a modest sum available for interim travel allowances, the bill allo-
cated “not to exceed $400” to each member for “office expenses,”
$97.50 for “land transportation,” and $25 for “official represen-
tation,” excepting in the last that the presiding officer of each
house could draw up to $500. The balance of the supplemental
budget was for meeting the costs of the congress’ first session
not covered by the money earmarked in the Territory’s Federal
budget and for committee expenses and a possible special session
during the legislative interim. The high commissioner declared
the subsistence allowance for Saipanese congressmen violative of
Secretarial Order No. 2882 because it would have supplied per
diem to congressmen who were not in a travel status.
The high commissioner found Resolution No. 1–31 (D.R. 5) inef-
fective in that it neglected to furnish funds to finance its request for
him to send congressmen to Hawaii to observe that state’s legisla-
ture in session. Resolution No. 1–51 adopted by the Assembly (A.R.
10) attempted to avoid this fatal hiatus by appropriating $10,000
when it authorized the speaker to appoint a six-member interim
committee “to make decisions on administrative and staffing prob-
lems and other matters as described by the Speaker.” The admin-
istration took the position that a resolution alone was insufficient
to make a valid appropriation, but funds were considered appropri-
ated for the purpose by the supplemental budget bill.
New legislatures tend toward the ceremonial in procedure as
well as in product, and the Congress of Micronesia proved no ex-
ception. As the legislators are still unfamiliar with the scope and
application of their recently acquired powers, their attention turns
to matters of a formalistic nature, and political symbolism ranks
high in legislative activity. The first bill (Public Law 1–1) and the
first joint resolution (R. 1–18) to be enacted by the congress well
illustrate this phenomenon.
Resolution No. 4 adopted at the 1961 session of the Council
of Micronesia promoted a flag contest. The following year, from
each district’s two best designs the council chose as the official
flag of the Territory the entry drawn by Gonzalo Santos of the
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Mariana Islands. The decision of the council was approved by
the high commissioner on October 4, 1962, and the flag was put
into use throughout the Territory. As his last unilateral legisla-
tive act prior to the transfer of lawmaking power to the Congress
of Micronesia, the high commissioner by Executive Order 100
amended the Code of the Trust Territory to require all locally
registered vessels to fly the Trust Territory flag. Disregarding
this long history of almost three years’ acceptance, the Con-
gress of Micronesia enacted Public Law 1–1 describing the flag
and specifying its display. In the words of the Assembly Com-
mittee on Judiciary and Governmental Relations, “… it would be
more desirable and appropriate for this body, the Congress of
Micronesia, to validate by its legislative action the decision of
the former Council of Micronesia [which had advisory powers]
by officially adopting the described flag as the national emblem
of Micronesia.”20 The flag bill was the first to pass the General
Assembly, then the House of Delegates, and to be sent to the
high commissioner for signature. Assembly Joint Resolution No.
14 became the first resolution to be enacted by both houses.
This, too, was formalistic in nature, requesting the Secretary of
the Interior to amend his Order No. 2882 so that the House of
Delegates would be designated the “Senate” and the General
Assembly the “House of Representatives,” analogous to the Con-
gress of the United States. The contents of neither measure
extend or adjust governmental services, add or reduce sanctions,
vary relationships between private persons, or otherwise achieve
a substantive purpose; both point to formal and not power ends.
Their greatest immediate achievement was as acts of political
symbolism to contribute to the status of the congress.
THE LEGISLATIVE IMPACT
The enactment of legislation may be the most salient legisla-
tive activity, but hardly measures its sum total. This particularly
holds true for the initial session of the Congress of Micronesia, for
although the bills that it passed and resolutions it adopted have,
like stones thrown into a pond commenced stirring ever-expand-
ing circles of impact, the other functions served by the congress
cumulatively will have an even greater influence on the course of
Territorial political development.
Institution building is a slow process, one that cannot be
20 Assembly Committee Report No. 1, July 20, 1965.
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encompassed within a single meeting of a legislative body. To be
sure, organizing the congress and keeping it running was a cred-
itable feat and greatly eased the operations of the next, and of
all future, sessions. But the establishment of the congress as a
viable institution will not be assured until it is part of the warp
and woof of a Trust Territory political system, and it is in form-
ing such an all-Territory system that the congress promises to
make its major contribution. District legislatures have come to
be part of their respective districts’ political life while, concomi-
tantly, they have given previously dispersed islands and groups of
islands a sense of unity. When the initial session of the congress
was successfully concluded, it had been demonstrated that repre-
sentatives from every administrative district of the Territory could
meet together and collectively direct the application of legislative
authority uniformly throughout Micronesia.21 In this, the Congress
of Micronesia has given promise of realizing for the Territory what
the district legislatures are bringing about in their more restricted
spheres.
The role of the legislature as a vehicle for building political
integration is lost sight of in those countries whose legislatures
have long since been merged into a single tapestry of government.
In the Trust Territory, whose capacity as a separate polity has
yet to be determined, the Congress of Micronesia represents the
sole all-Micronesian agency for achieving that purpose. This, then,
highlights the significance of the convening of the first congress
and of its product. As phrased by Assemblyman Tman, “If we had
passed but only one good piece of legislation for the people of Mi-
cronesia, we have accomplished something unprecedented in our
history.”22 By allowing members from all districts of the Territory
to work in consort toward a common end, the congress helped
to dispel interdistrict suspicion, something which the Council of
Micronesia never succeeded in doing. The mere presence of the
congress had a cohesive effect by bringing effectively to the at-
tention of the Chamorros on Saipan the facts that the people of
other districts are not “savages” and that the Saipanese politician
is not necessarily superior. In individual terms, out of this meet-
ing grew a personal sense of solidarity: “There are individual as
21 In anticipation of the convening of the congress, the high commissioner
vetoed a number of district legislative proposals which would have provided
piecemeal solutions to Territory-wide problems.
22 Journal of the General Assembly, op. cit.
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well as district differences, that is true, but that is not enough to
offset the prevailing feeling of brotherhood.”23 In collective terms,
from the congress there emerged the beginning of a Micronesian
“self.” Just as the British Parliament helped foster and form a pub-
lic opinion which ended the dissociation of that country’s parts, so
the Congress of Micronesia, by bringing together the people from
the districts, helped blend distinctions in common political action.
The effort to secure Micronesian unity was embodied in many
forms of congressional action. It was manifest in the attempt to
restrict the entry of non-Micronesian businesses into the Trust
Territory. Interest in the founding of a Junior College of Micro-
nesia, the designation of Micronesia Day, and the adoption of a
Territorial flag all serve as expressions of this groping toward a
Micronesian “identity.”
Viewed against the backdrop of history, the flag bill already
referred to takes on added significance, for it would not have re-
ceived unanimous approval fifteen years previously. Under Navy
administration, a contest in the Trust Territory for the design of
a Micronesian flag ended in a tie vote, and the matter then was
allowed to die quietly. The Marshallese had not submitted an en-
try, and their Flag Committee reluctantly agreed to participate in
the judging, and this only after questioning the value of adopting a
Territorial flag. In its statement registering disapproval, the com-
mittee added, “It is our desire and we believe their [the people
of the Marshall Islands] desire that no ‘third’ flag should ever be
displayed beside the old Glory and the flag of the United Nations.
To unify the Trust Territory, it is their belief that a nation, such
as the United States should ‘embrace’ it altogether. The difference
is a great barrier toward unification. Without something greater,
something stronger, something that each cultural group looks up
to, a mere flag won’t unify the people of the Trust Territory.”24
Much has transpired in the intervening period, and it was
summed up in the Congress of Micronesia. In the congress all of
the people of the Trust Territory could now find a unifying pur-
pose, and the flag was but its symbol. A second DC-4 airplane was
23 Delegate Nuuan, “Impressions of the Congress of Micronesia,” The Rai Re-
view, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 8.
24 Quoted in Dorothy E. Richard, U.S. Naval Administration in the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
1957), III, 380–382. Similarly, the first petition received by a U.N. Visiting Mission
was from the people of Rota who protested the use of a Trust Territory flag. 1951
U.N. Visiting Mission Report, par. 15.
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acquired by the Trust Territory at the end of 1965, and it was
only fitting that it be named the “Congress of Micronesia” and be
welcomed ceremoniously by each district’s congressional delega-
tion as it traversed the flight routes across the Territory. When
the plane reached the last district headquarters, on Palau, appro-
priately it was met with the Micronesian “national anthem,” “’Tis
Here We Are Pledging.”25
Another valuable contribution made by the Congress of Micro-
nesia was as an information conduit between the high commis-
sioner and the people of the Trust Territory. The Council of Micro-
nesia had its greatest utility as a communication medium, short
circuiting the customary administrative channels. This function
continued to be served by the congress, and through the very
formal means of printing legislative measures and publishing com-
mittee reports, the more personal questioning at committee hear-
ings and members’ statements of views, and the highly informal
contact of business and social occasions, there was transferred to
the staff at the provisional Headquarters on Saipan much of the
background data essential for its administration of the affairs of
Territorial government. Previous to the congress’ convening, the
election of the congressmen and the issues of their campaigns had
already alerted the administration to modifications desired in gov-
ernmental policies and the reasons advanced for wanting them. In
turn, the high commissioner and his staff could use their access
to the congress as a means for conveying to the members’ elec-
torates the plans of the administration and the steps necessary for
effecting them.
The congressmen fully understood the role of the new congress
in facilitating communications. In a public address given before
coming to Saipan, Assemblyman Salii stated, “Probably the most
important function of the Congress is that it creates a forum for
discussion between the people of Micronesia and the Administer-
ing Authority, a forum through which the thinking and desires of
the Micronesians can be made known to the High Commissioner,
the Department of the Interior, and, ultimately, to the Congress
and President of the United States.”26 A number of delegations
held meetings at their district headquarters to allow constituents
an opportunity to offer suggestions on what should be consid-
ered at the forthcoming congress. In Palau a special session of the
25 Press Release, Information Office, March 14, 1966.
26 Reproduced in Saipan District Panorama, March 19, 1965, p. 1.
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Palau district legislature was called for this purpose. Congressmen
also individually encouraged citizens to contact them, and when the
legislators arrived in Saipan for the workshop prior to the conven-
ing of the congress, they were primed with matters to bring up
before the appropriate administrative departments or embody in a
bill or resolution for more formal presentation to the administration.
Much of what transpired on Saipan during the month-long con-
gressional session was transmitted back to the districts by word
of mouth. Taped records of the daily sessions were edited and
played over the district radio stations, but this could only convey a
fraction of all that transpired. The Marshallese “roving reporter”
who brought back interviews with Marshallese congressmen and
his own transcribed comments to broadcast over the district ed-
ucation department’s station on Majuro added a note of color,
and his explanations furthered comprehension. The press releases
from Headquarters, which were reproduced in the weekly bul-
letins published in each district, also helped to highlight the major
activities of the congress as well as the addresses of the high com-
missioner and the positions the administration expressed in its
contacts with the congress. But the bulk of informal communica-
tions remained unreported, and it was only as the congressmen
themselves spoke with people in their districts after returning
home that some of these informal transactions and discussions
gradually filtered in garbled fashion throughout the areas.
A related function served by the congress was the exercise of
supervision over the high commissioner’s administration of the
Territorial government. Armed with legislating power, the con-
gress could direct the course of the Territory’s conduct, although
admittedly the limitations on its fiscal powers severely curtailed
the scope of this congressional activity. Its first formal step in
the direction of controlling non-Micronesian investment policy
was met with a veto, and the House of Delegate’s request to
halt the Micronesian Hotel Corporation’s operations on Saipan
came to nought, but the administration is now sure to observe
extreme caution in admitting further non-Micronesian economic
enterprise into the Trust Territory. The letter of the House com-
mittee chairman requesting the high commissioner to suspend
hotel operations pending congressional hearings27 undoubtedly
will have a reverse counterpart in future sessions, when clearance
27 Micronesian Times, Aug. 12, 1965, p. 1.
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is sought by the ad ministration in advance of the expression of a
formal congressional authorization. The Micronesian Medical Of-
ficers’ petition to the congress brought the medical program of
the Trust Territory before congressional review and subjected it
to potential interim scrutiny. In demarking the various levels of
government in the Trust Territory and their respective responsibil-
ities, the congress served notice on the high commissioner he was
not to be afforded carte blanche power in the chartering of district
governments. The Assembly Appropriations Committee examined
the operations of all Headquarters’ agencies in its review of the
fiscal year 1967 budget, and this form of administrative inquiry by
congress may lead to congressional direction over executive ac-
tion, a covert direction which may never have written embodiment
in either committee report or legislative bill. Even less visible will
be that type of supervision which subtly occurs through individ-
ual contact between congressman and executive when the former
protests a policy or objects to inefficiency of administrative per-
sonnel. At the very first session of the congress, members from
at least two district delegations called on the high commissioner
to request removal of allegedly incompetent American adminis-
trators in their districts. Armed with legislating power, the new
congress is now able to exercise administrative oversight in ways
never before attempted by Micronesians in the Trust Territory.
Already the impact of the first congress is being manifest in di-
verse ways throughout the Trust Territory. The establishment of
the congress and its attendant elections have encouraged wider
political involvement of the Territory’s residents and stimulated
greater interest in government at district and local levels. Political
party activity was spurred to new heights in the Marianas and
Palau districts for the congressional elections, and this has contin-
ued to grow. The municipal elections held in Metalanim on Ponape
shortly after the conclusion of the congressional contests saw ag-
gressive electioneering for municipal posts and the largest voter
turnout ever recorded. The Outer Island effort to instigate the
formation of a Yap district legislature stems from their people’s
participation in the congressional elections28 and their chiefs’
realization that Outer Island isolation is no longer feasible as the
Trust Territory becomes a closely knit unit.
It is probably at the district legislative level that the immediate
28 See Chap. 6.
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effects of the congress have been most pronounced. In the Trust
Territory, political sophistication normally has been introduced
downward, so that the methods and techniques employed in the
district government have spilled over to the conduct of municipal
government, rather than the reverse. Now it is the procedures of
the new congress which are beginning to shape the operations
of the district legislatures. Coming back to their districts with
wider horizons and having experienced the utility of following a
full set of parliamentary rules, district legislators who served in
the congress have instituted revision in their district legislative
procedures, and at least one has closely used the congressional
rules as a model. After the promulgation of Secretarial Order No.
2882, the Mariana district legislature amended its charter also to
provide for the appointment of a legislative counsel. Some return-
ing congressmen have been overheard instructing their district
colleagues in the wider conception of the role and duties of a
representative which they gained from attendance at the first con-
gress. Both at regular and special sessions of district legislatures
throughout the Territory, change of district tax laws has taken
place as necessitated by the revenue measures passed by the con-
gress, and the addition of the jury to each district’s judicial system
has been debated and in some cases already approved. Facing all
of the district legislatures is the date of December 31, 1968, when,
pursuant to the decision of the Congress of Micronesia in enacting
Public Law 1–6, some of their members may no longer be eligible
for legislative posts.
Administration at the Territorial level of government also re-
flects the influence of congressional activity. Upon the expiration
of the current contract, prompted by Resolution No. 1–42, the
Copra Stabilization Board awarded the marketing of the Terri-
tory’s copra for the first time to a Micronesian firm formed by
representatives from all six administrative districts.29 A complete
restudy of the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan was instituted, fol-
lowed by the appointment of a five-member task force to develop
proposals for a Micronesian Civil Service Act, all in line with
resolutions adopted at the first session of the congress. Direct
shipment of cargo to Trust Territory ports was found feasible by
the high commissioner, “and every possible effort consistent with
29 The comparable Micronesian bid for the Territory’s petroleum needs was
unsuccessful, but later, in consort with an American airline, a contract was en-
tered into to operate the Trust Territory’s air transportation.
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port capabilities [has been directed by the high commissioner to]
be extended to carry …” out the applicable congressional reso-
lutions.30 The appointment of a sanitary engineer on the public
health staff of the Trust Territory was a partial answer to Res-
olution No. 1–41 calling for improvement and expansion of the
public health services. The wide use of the resolution form as the
means through which the congress spoke may have been legally
deficient to compel action, but the political implications were clear
and the administration responded accordingly. From the high com-
missioner level down to the farthest outlying municipality, the first
congress of Micronesia has left an indelible mark, a base point
from which the course of the Trust Territory’s political future will
be measured.
30 Letter of Assistant Commissioner Public Affairs to Legislative Counsel, Oc-
tober 26, 1965.
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CHAPTER 15
The Political Future
FOUR METROPOLITAN COUNTRIES have governed the region
encompassed within the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and
until recently, the island peoples have had little part in determin-
ing the nature of that governance. During this period of colonial
status they have suffered, through no choice of their own, the
devastation of total war and the dangers of atomic testing.1 Mi-
cronesia Day, commemorating the convening of the first Congress
of Micronesia, signifies the opening of a new era and that the peo-
ple of the Trust Territory, through their congress, now possess
the means by which to begin shaping their own political future.
What this will be yet remains problematical, but the alternatives
are relatively few and the range of decision promises to narrow as
economic ties with the United States continue to strengthen.
The exploitation of Micronesia’s resources has furnished none of
its four colonial powers with great wealth. The Japanese did show
a profit from the phosphate on Angaur, bauxite on Ponape, com-
mercial fisheries, and copra, but hidden subsidies and the expenses
of administration probably turned it into a net loss. The islands
have been an economic liability to the United States since American
armed forces occupied them during World War II. The cost has been
modest, however, compared to the worth of the advantages which
the United States has enjoyed. Greater parity between benefit and
burden is promised in the immediate years ahead.
From the period of Navy administration, when many Territorial
expenses were not itemized and reported separately from those
incurred for naval operations, until 1963, annual Federal appro-
priations ranged from $4.3 to $6.3 million. This was barely suffi-
cient to provide minimal basic services. The “niggardly” nature2
of this financial outlay may be measured against the estimate
1 Early in the Trusteeship, the Trukese petitioned the United Nations
to have the next war somewhere other than Truk, and the Marshallese re-
quested the United States to test its atomic might some place other than the
Marshalls.
2 Harold J. Wiens, Pacific Island Bastions of the United States (Princeton: D.
van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 105.
made at about the time the Interior Department assumed jurisdic-
tion of the Trust Territory that it would cost this amount just
to maintain adequate surface and air transportation for the Ter-
ritory, excluding capital investment and depreciation.3 When in
July, 1962, the ceiling for Federal appropriations was increased to
$17.5 million, in the words of President Kennedy, “the Congress
… [of the United States had] taken the first step toward providing
the means whereby a new and vital phase of development may be
instituted.”4 The accelerated social and economic programs which
were instituted with these moneys, supplemented by the impact of
opening up of the area for American capital investments, promise
to be dwarfed by the next stage of development, when the greatly
augmented funds under the new $35 million ceilings authorized
by the Congress are appropriated annually.
The larger the expenditures of Federal funds within the Trust
Territory, the more its peoples become dependent upon the United
States for their increased standard of living and governmental ser-
vices which the Territory’s limited resources cannot support. As
the process continues, it becomes ever more probable that upon
the termination of the Trusteeship, the people of Micronesia will
opt for ties of some form with the United States. However, if this
does not occur in the immediate future, the choice may prove em-
barrassing to the United States. The advent of the Congress of
Micronesia has added a new element to the scene, a capacity to
posit and weigh the advantages of alternatives, and the people
of the Trust Territory, under the guidance of their congress, may
choose a political status which the United States is unprepared to
honor.
COLONIAL POLICY VACUUM
The United States does not regard itself as a colonial power
and, consistently, has neither a colonial service nor a colonial
policy. This of course has not prevented it from acquiring vast pos-
sessions on the North American continent and widely scattered
island holdings overseas. For the former, territorial status was
but a temporary stage to statehood, which appropriately matched
the outward movement of America’s people. This promise of even-
tual integration into the Union was abandoned by the twentieth
3 See James B. Shahan, “American Colonial Administration in the Western Pa-
cific” (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University: 1950), p. 273.
4 Annual Report of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior,
1963, p. 1.
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century with the acquisition of the island areas in the Pacific and
Caribbean after the war with Spain. The granting of statehood
to Hawaii and Alaska despite their lack of continental contiguity
has not revived the former doctrine, and the attitude of “apathetic
paternalism with strategic considerations,”5 which Congress has
assumed toward most of the nation’s insular possessions, has not
contributed any indication of what the United States policy is to be
for the smaller dependent islands in the Pacific. This hiatus might
have been filled by a colonial corps adhering to some evolving plan
for political development dictated by a professional ethic, but this,
too, is lacking. The nearest the United States ever came to estab-
lishing a colonial office has been the Division of Territories and
Island Possessions (now Office of Territories) in the Department of
the Interior, and it has distinguished itself by contributing to a “pol-
icy vacuum.”6 As a result, the programmatic objectives of the United
States administration have been pragmatic, fostering adaptation to
life’s problems as they are, rather than setting final goals and then
moving in a planned, coherent way to their achievement. In the
Trust Territory this meant that the administrators followed neither
wholly “idealistic” nor wholly “realistic” objectives,7 but left the lo-
cal inhabitants to work out their own social and political destiny.
Traditionally, American political interest in the Pacific Basin
has surged and ebbed, with the rise in interest tied to war. The
Spanish-American conflict was the occasion for acquiring Hawaii
and Guam, the former on its own volition. The United States quar-
reled with Japan over the use of Yap at the end of World War
I. Okinawa and the bulk of Micronesia fell to the military con-
trol of the United States by the end of World War II. The value
for future strategic purposes of Micronesia’s deep water lagoons,
which allowed the building of logistic supply bases in forward ar-
eas, gave rise to the dispute between the Interior, Navy, and State
Departments over annexation, a disagreement which was partially
resolved by first placing the former Mandate under Trusteeship
and then the Trusteeship under civilian administration. Once the
poignancy of war abated and the islands no longer remained a
5 Garth N. Jones, “Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands”
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Utah: 1954), p. 62.
6 See Thomas R. Adam, Western Interests in the Pacific Realm (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1967), p. 169.
7 See G. P. Murdock, Social Organization and Government in Micronesia,
CIMA Final Report No. 19 [Washington: Office of Naval Research, 1949], Part
III, pp. 4, 5.
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storm center, the Pacific again slipped from public attention, and
in Oberdofer’s colorful language, the Trust Territory became “an
orphan child.”8
One of the advantages claimed for the imperialistic system of
holding colonies was that it did not cast them adrift, leaving them
dependent on uncertain world markets, but linked their economic
development to that of the mother country. Lacking any preten-
sions about such a system, the United States accordingly has not
moved to tie the economies of all its island possessions closely
with its own, and in the case of the Trust Territory has even failed
to afford the special custom arrangements for access of Territor-
ial products to the United States which apply to the other insular
possessions. For fiscal year 1967, only about 7 per cent of the re-
gion’s exports were destined for America.
The natural economic leanings of the Trust Territory are toward
Japan, the major purchaser of the islands’ copra and supplier of
many of the products the Micronesians consume. Japan, in turn,
has been desirous of reestablishing closer relations with the Trust
Territory severed by World War II, and here Japanese interest in
unrestricted economic access runs counter to the military-strategic
importance of the region to the United States. The Navy still retains
a veto over any foreign national visiting the Trust Territory and
disapproves of the institution of unrestricted tourist travel from
Japan. Unvoiced is the fear that allowing Japanese economic entry
would preclude raising a bar against similar Iron Curtain country
access because of Article 8 of the Trusteeship Agreement, requiring
“most favored nation” treatment to the nationals and companies
of all members of the United Nations. The Trust Territory thus
floats free of economic integration with the United States, although
it is dependent upon heavy Federal expenditures for everything
materially above a subsistence existence, and is unable to form as-
sociations with other nations to facilitate mutually advantageous
trade relations and exploit the Territory’s limited resources. Writing
two decades ago, John Embree foresaw accurately that Micronesia
faced two fundamental types of problems, one political and the
other economic, and that “before any real economic development
can take place political questions must be answered.”9
8 Don Oberdofer, “America’s Neglected Colonial Paradise,” Saturday Evening
Post, 237 (Feb. 29, 1964), 29.
9 John F. Embree, “Micronesia: The Navy and Democracy,” Far Eastern Survey,
15:11 (June 5, 1946), 164.
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With nothing but the vaguest of goals, namely, that the politi-
cal, economic, social, and educational advancement of the people
of the Trust Territory should be promoted, every short-run policy
in the Territory may be challenged upon the basis of disagreement
over long-run objectives. Investment policy in the Trust Territory
is intimately related to the possibility of the area’s swinging com-
pletely into the American or the Japanese economic orbit. Amer-
ican administrators cannot conduct themselves as conscientious
trainers, as counterparts preparing Micronesians for their new
roles, if the future remains unknown. It is of little assistance to
posit that the Micronesians are being made ready for “self-govern-
ment,” for of itself this carries no blueprint for action. During the
two decades of American administration, the Micronesians have
been gradually equipped with the education and the institutions
necessary for them to make their own political decisions. Other-
wise, the period has been mainly one of stasis, but this is shortly
coming to a close as the Trust Territory, under pressure from the
United Nations, prepares for a plebiscite to record its choice of
a political future. Inevitably this will force the Congress of the
United States to turn its attention from such relatively minor mat-
ters as whether the high commissioner and his deputy should be
called “Governor” and “Lieutenant Governor” to “make these of-
ficers’ titles commensurate with their authority as administering
agents”;10 the United States will have to declare more basic policy,
such as that the change of title signifies Congressional intent that
these officials are to serve as the chief administrative officers of a
Federal “territory,” with the latter term employed in its American
constitutional sense.
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE
The creation of the Congress of Micronesia reopened an old
quarrel in the United Nations. Was the United States prepared to
allow the Micronesians to choose independence, or were they to
be restricted to only greater self-governance? Would the United
States go on record declaring “that the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands would never, for any reason, be annexed to the
United States?”11 This challenge was prompted by the language
10 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report on
H.R. 17505 of the 89th Congress, 89th Congress, 2d Sess. (1966), p. 4.
11 TCOR, 32d Sess. 1248th meeting, June 3, 1965, pars. 78, 79; 1253rd meet-
ing, June 10, 1965, pars. 53, 54.
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contained in Secretarial Order No. 2882 setting up the Congress
of Micronesia, which referred only to the United States’ having
“undertaken to promote self-government in the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands,” without any mention of independence for the
Micronesians. However, the antecedents of the quarrel are old and
relate back to events of twenty years before, which still cause the
U.S.S.R. to distrust American intentions in Micronesia and which
will have particular pertinency as the time approaches for termi-
nating the Trusteeship.
In the Atlantic Charter, the United States pledged it would
“seek no aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise.” By the Cairo
Declaration issued by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek
in 1943, the signators declared they “coveted no gain for them-
selves and had no thought of territorial expansion.” In the summer
of 1945, President Roosevelt was still asserting that “there is not
one piece of territory or one thing of monetary value that we want
out of this war.”12 But at the Cairo meeting it was also stated that
Japan would be stripped of all the Pacific islands “which she had
seized and occupied since the beginning of the first World War in
1914,” and this was reiterated at Potsdam in July of 1945.13 The
United States viewed Japan as having lost legal sovereignty when
she fortified Micronesia in violation of the terms of the League of
Nations Agreement and had no intention of surrendering either
the physical or legal right to the control of these islands to Japan
or any other country.
With the United Nations treated as the successor to the League
of Nations, the subterfuge adopted was that of having the former
Japanese South Seas Mandate assigned to the United States under
terms which enabled the latter to maintain hegemony by military
force. Outright annexation as urged by the military was fore-
stalled by both the State Department and Interior’s championing
a trusteeship, and military control was further curtailed when
the House of Representatives’ Public Lands Committee forced a
transfer to civil government under the Department of Interior
after the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was formally es-
tablished. Nevertheless, by inventing the “strategic Trusteeship”
12 Roy E. James, “The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” in Rupert Emer-
son, et al., America’s Pacific Dependencies (New York: American Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1949), p. 119.
13 Dorothy E. Richard, U.S. Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), III, 3.
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and letting it be known that the Trusteeship Agreement would be
withdrawn if the Security Council of the United Nations did not ap-
prove its terms, the United States saved for its military services
the right to erect fortifications, to station armed forces in the for-
mer Japanese Mandate, and, most importantly, to close part or all
of the region for security reasons. The last safeguard allows the
United States unilaterally to decide the extent to which the gener-
ally applicable trusteeship functions can be exercised in Micronesia.
The Trusteeship Agreement also differed from those made for the
other ten original trusteeships by giving the United States prefer-
ential treatment in commercial and economic matters, a concession
dictated by the special considerations of the area. All of this has
led to the strategic Trusteeship’s being referred to as a “somewhat
bastard and contradictory” conception, and as a “union of doubtful
legitimacy between the ideal of colonial trusteeship and the prac-
tical needs and objectives of foreign policies of Great Powers….”14
“Great Powers” might be less charitably rephrased to read “the
United States,” as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands consti-
tutes the only strategic Trusteeship in the world.
At the San Francisco Conference, the U.S.S.R. and Nationalist
China strongly supported the goal of “full national independence”
for all dependent peoples, a position to which the United States
among other nations took exception as not necessarily being prac-
tical or desirable. The sections of the United Nations Charter con-
cerned with non-self-governing peoples, and with trusteeships in
particular, embody the compromise reached: Article 73, which ap-
plies to all such peoples, carries no reference to “independence”
but only to development of “self-government” for dependent peo-
ples; Article 76 specifically relates to trusteeships, and in it the
basic objectives of the trusteeship system are declared to include
“progressive development towards self-government or independ-
ence” (emphasis added). It was therefore to be expected that
exception would be taken when the United States submitted to the
United Nations’ Security Council a draft of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment for the former Japanese Mandate which only proposed the
goal of “self-government.” In line with the objection of the repre-
sentative of the U.S.S.R., to the phrase “promote the development
of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory toward self-government”
was added the words “or independence as may be appropriate to
14 Hugh McDonald, ed., Trusteeship in the Pacific (Sydney: Angus and Robert-
son, 1949), p. 54.
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the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples
and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” The
United States qualifiedly concurred with the amendment, accept-
ing the principle of independence but recording its opposition “to
the thought that it could possibly be achieved within any foresee-
able future in this case.”15
Another amendment to the original draft of the Trusteeship
Agreement also bears materially on the future political status
of the indigenous inhabitants of the Trust Territory. The United
States had proposed that as Administering Authority it should
have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction
over the Territory “as an integral part of the United States,” lan-
guage which found its antecedents in the provision made for class
“C” mandates of the League of Nations, under which Japan origi-
nally governed the area. According to United States Ambassador
Austin this did not imply sovereignty over the area. At the request
of the U.S.S.R., these words were deleted, but in agreeing to this
modification the United States representative “affirmed” for the
record that the United States’ authority was not to be considered
in any way lessened. The high commissioner later declared “that
the islands can be made, if the United States so desires, as much a
part of the U.S. territory as if they had been annexed outright.”16
All this supplied the background for the challenge raised twenty
years later by Mr. Fotin of the U.S.S.R. at the Trusteeship Council.
Was this failure to refer to “independence” in Secretarial Order No.
2882 establishing the Congress of Micronesia an oversight or a de-
liberate violation of the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship
Agreement? The reply of the United States representative assured
the Soviet Union that America was committed to the promotion of
self-government or independence for Micronesia and that there was
no hidden meaning behind the omission.17 But was this what is
known in the psychological novel as a Freudian slip?
The range of future political statuses theoretically open to the
Trust Territory may be graphically portrayed by a grid concen-
trating attention on two factors, geographic components and the
nature of the new political entity to be formed (see p. 388). Of
course, to delineate some of these alternatives is but to reject
15 See Richard, op. cit., pp. 41, 42.
16 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Basic Information (Honolulu: 1951),
pp. 43, 44.
17 TCOR, 1248th meeting, op. cit.
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them. Thus it is possible to conceive of the Trust Territory as inte-
grated into the United States by being combined with American
Samoa as a single possession, but all evaluations of this status would
stress its negative features and the absence of any compensatory
advantages. The same difficulties of administration would apply to
continued maintenance of the Trusteeship, but with an administrative
union established between the Trust Territory and American Samoa.
Limited resources, minuscule population, physical dispersion,
ethnic diversity, and almost insuperable communication and trans-
portation difficulties make contemplation of complete independence
for the Trust Territory as a sovereign nation something of an aca-
demic enterprise. Combination with the Gilbertese of the Gilbert
and Ellice Island Colony to the south of the Marshalls would to a
minor degree augment the area and population of the proposed en-
tity, but this would also compound the remaining difficulties which
would face the new nation. Joinder with Nauru, just below the equa-
tor and west of the Gilberts, would add essential resources, but
large as that tiny country’s annual income from phosphate will be,
it would be rapidly dissipated if spread across the entire area of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The British have intimated
they might welcome relinquishing the economic drain of adminis-
tering the Gilbert Islands, which are populated by Micronesians,
as is Nauru; there is no indication whatsoever that the Nauru-
ans, who only recently forced the termination of their Trusteeship,
would even discuss amalgamation under conditions which would
have them paying the costs of running the government but con-
stituting only a tiny fraction of the new entity’s population. Con-
ceivably, also, the Trust Territory could be split along major ethnic
lines to form a number of sovereign nations. The Carolines would
constitute one, presumably including Ponape, Truk, Yap, and the
Palaus; disregarding ethnic differences, Kusaie, the Marshalls, and
the Gilberts would be another. But if it is not feasible to treat the
Territory as a viable single polity, it becomes even more tenuous to
contemplate the area split into component parts, any or all of them
independent countries. All of this is probably moot, for long ago the
high commissioner gave notice that so long as the Trust Territory is
a strategic area, it is inappropriate to think in terms of complete in-
dependence.18
The South Pacific saw Western Samoa become a separate na-
18 TCOR, 14th Sess., 552nd meeting, July 8, 1954, par. 18.
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tion under the guidance of New Zealand in 1962, but termination
of this Trusteeship has been accompanied by massive financial
assistance, the seconding of key personnel, and the continuance
of military defense and foreign relations responsibilities for its for-
mer ward. Should some comparable status of “freely associated
state” be projected for the Trust Territory—whether with its pre-
sent geographical boundaries preserved intact, as an entity aug-
mented by other island groups, or divided into two or more parts
along ethnic lines—this would meet most of the disabilities of in-
dependence as a wholly sovereign nation. “As a freely associated
state, Micronesia could have unfettered control of its own affairs,
including whatever protection was desired for its land and cus-
toms, while ensuring the outside assistance without which it could
not exist.”19 Micronesia’s strategic position would make this
arrangement attractive to a major power and could be availed of
both in the form of permission for the maintenance of military
bases and in agreement to foreclose other nation’s access to the
area. Its major disadvantage lies in the uncertainties of interna-
tional relations; if the United States were to occupy a different
stance in the Pacific, such a “freely associated state” might find it-
self no longer courted and, as a result, unassisted by outside aid.
Strong separatist tendencies exist among the Chamorros, possi-
bly encouraged by the splitting of administration between the
Navy and Interior Departments, and placing Saipan and then all of
the Marianas under the former. More likely, as the most culturally
advanced in the Trust Territory, they have seen their economic fu-
ture as speeded by separating from the Territory and joining with
Guam. Whatever the cause, Saipanese and Guamanians through
resolutions of their respective legislative bodies have long gone
on record as favoring the reintegration of the Northern Mari-
anas with Guam. The logic of common language and religion,
traditions and customs, and intermarriage supports this union.
However, the United Nations’ response has been to disapprove
of the partial dismemberment of the Trust Territory and to favor
the resolution of its political future as a single unit. Meanwhile,
Mariana district lawmakers continue to visit Guam’s legislature,
and the latter’s solons, to travel to Saipan to meet with the Mari-
ana Islands District Legislature and the Saipan municipal council.
A Marianas Legislative Conference open to all Trust Territory
19 1964 U.N. Visiting Mission Report, par. 297.
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legislators, hopes “to show the lawmakers of the Trust Territory
what Guam has to offer as the center of social and economic
development.”20 Today, the political parties of the Marianas dis-
trict are divided over this issue, with the Popular Party supporting
immediate integration with Guam and the Territorial Party advo-
cating postponement of the question until further advancement
of the Trust Territory. On Guam, there is bipartisan support for
bringing the separated archipelago under one jurisdictional roof.
Guam’s political leaders have advocated the political consolida-
tion of the whole Trust Territory with Guam but, finding the first
Congress of Micronesia cool to the proposal, espouse Marianas’
reintegration as the first step. They see an expanded Guam even-
tually as part of a “commonwealth” of Micronesia and, someday,
the fifty-first state of the Union.
The non-Chamorro peoples of the Trust Territory as yet do not
look particularly favorably upon any form of union with Guam,
knowing that the Chamorros tend to regard the Carolinian resi-
dents on Saipan and the inhabitants in the rest of the Trust
Territory as “less civilized.” Palauans resident on Guam occupy a
position somewhat resembling that of Negroes in northern Ameri-
can cities, with little social interaction occurring between the two
ethnic groups. The Carolinians remember the favored positions
that the Chamorros held in Micronesia under the Germans and
Japanese and that the friction between the Chamorro minorities
and the local inhabitants in the Carolines caused the former to
welcome resettlement to the Northern Marianas after the Ameri-
cans took control and commenced ministering equally to every
ethnic group. Simultaneous with the consolidation of the Mari-
anas, the other major ethnic groups in Micronesia may opt for
joinder with the United States, but as a separate territory or pos-
session, or possibly as more than one with boundaries of each
coterminous with ethnic cleavages. The choice between territory
or possession status may turn on whether traditional rights, par-
ticularly to land, may be preserved as a territory or, following
Samoa’s precedent, only as a possession.
A decade ago, Emil Sady broached the federation of the Trust
Territory with Guam and the association of the entire region
with the United States as a commonwealth, like Puerto Rico.21
20 Guam Daily News, April 6, 1968, p. 1.
21 Emil J. Sady, The United Nations and Dependent Peoples (Washington:
Brookings, 1951), p. 201.
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This appears to provide an attractive alternative between state-
hood and independence, the historical terminal goals of United
States possessions. It would allow the continuation of a Microne-
sian identity, while keeping the region amenable to control of
the United States. Presumably, it would be associated with spe-
cial benefits, akin to the tax treatment now enjoyed by Puerto
Rico, so that economic, social, and political advancement could
continue at a pace compatible with the various cultures of Mi-
cronesia. It could even be accompanied with United States citi-
zenship and free access to the mainland of the United States for
all wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, in the example chosen,
Puerto Rico’s phenomenal development has carried with it only
the demonstration that commonwealth is a way station along
the path to determination of its final political status. Already
there are strong statehood and independence movements active
within that Caribbean island; withdraw its favorable Federal tax
exemptions and the issue would be immediately joined, and com-
monwealth would lose its current attraction to Puerto Ricans.
Eventually, if American constitutional history is observed, Puerto
Rico must become either free, in fulfillment of its Latin-American
heritage, or an equal state of the Union.
Short of statehood but “higher” than commonwealth, a status
might be evolved modeled on that of the Cook Islands, which enjoy
complete internal autonomy. No New Zealand law is applicable
within the Cooks unless made so by the Island government. The
Maoris of the Cook Islands continue to be citizens of New Zealand,
with the right of unlimited ingress and egress; once outside of the
Cooks, its residents observe New Zealand laws like other citizens
of that nation. This “higher” integrated status would go far to pro-
vide both the benefits and protections desired by Micronesians,
while satisfying the United States’ strategic interests in the Trust
Territory. Assuming that this “higher status” may be constitution-
ally erected, perhaps it is too much to expect that the Congress
of the United States would voluntarily commit itself to supplying
funds without conditions and enacting laws that could have no ef-
fect within the present Trust Territory without the consent of that
area’s peoples. This is one of the possibilities theoretically open to
the Micronesians which, should it be chosen, might prove embar-
rassingly difficult for the United States to deny.
From Hawaii comes the suggestion that all of the American-ad-
ministered islands of the Pacific be incorporated within the State
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of Hawaii to form a greater Pacific State. This would not only re-
solve the future of the Trust Territory but also that of American
Samoa and Guam. Just as tourism is becoming the mainstay of
Hawaii’s economy, so would it form the backbone of a more du-
rable economy for the others. The ties which would emerge would
indirectly contribute the means for resolving some of the problems
now facing the Pacific, as the lack of a logical base for air transpor-
tation. The main virtue of this suggestion lies in its integrating all
the regions into the United States, so that as constituent parts of a
state they would enjoy the full political participation denied them
as territories, possessions, or even as a Pacific commonwealth.
The administrative problems posed would be enormous, but not
insurmountable; the cultural and political difficulties would be less
amenable to resolution. The areas’ cultures are diverse, their rates
of development disparate, and for a long period of time such a
jointure would remain artificial. Local autonomy in forms as yet
unknown to state practices would need to be invented to accom-
modate the vast differences endemic to the areas encompassed
as well as permit the delegation of discretion essential to govern
such a far-flung region. The large Federal expenditures now made
in the Western Pacific would have to be continued in the form of
Federal subsidies, since Hawaii’s resources could not underwrite
the $75 to $100 million annual burden now borne by the national
government for all three island regions.
The enormity of this statehood proposal almost overwhelms its
plausibility, but the simplicity of a single solution to the futures of
all three American-controlled Pacific areas has already attracted
wide attention. Guam and the Trust Territory each have greater
population than the minimum requirement for statehood set forth
in the Northwest Ordinance; however, separate statehood for
them and Samoa, individually or combined, is ruled out by size if
not other factors. During the Spanish period, the Marianas and
nominally the rest of Micronesia under Spanish jurisdiction were
administered through the governor of the Philippines; the Ger-
mans during their era in the Pacific finally attached their Microne-
sian holdings to German New Guinea so that they were supervised
by way of the latter’s imperial governor. Tying the Trust Territory
to a larger political unit such as Hawaii would only constitute a
repetition of history, but this time with the material difference of
Micronesians as equals in their own governance.
From possession to statehood, all statuses are premised upon
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integration in some way with the United States. Such relationships
coincide with American policy, for it is believed that the United
States has “had a consistent goal from the start and that has not
gone beyond holding out self-government under the American flag
as a goal.”22 But what if the Micronesians should seek annex-
ation by a nation other than the United States? Under present
circumstances, this would be Japan, for in addition to symbiotic
economic ties, some Micronesians’ nostalgic memories of life un-
der the Mandate, before military preparations for World War II
destroyed civilian normalcy, might lead them to favor return to
Japan. Most expressions of Micronesians have not been so in-
clined, but should such feeling grow, it would probably evoke a
sympathetic irredentism in Japan. The United States would be
hard put to stop such a movement. Nevertheless, given the bitter
internecine quarrel between the Federal departments, which al-
most saw the Trust Territory annexed outright at the end of the
war, and the opinion which still holds that the neutrality of the
old Mandate remains essential to American national security, it
is unlikely that the United States would countenance any other
nation’s exercising jurisdiction over the Trust Territory. Palau is
too close to the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and the Malay
peninsula for American military planners to forego its future use
as a military staging zone, or to allow its occupancy by another
nation to neutralize Guam. The same outflanking problem holds
true for other areas in the Carolines and the Northern Marianas;
in addition the latter will probably be developed as a forward air
base when the United States withdraws from Okinawa, while the
Marshalls still remain central to development of American missile
defense, if no longer important for atomic testing. Given Microne-
sian choice of another nation, the United States would consider it
had no alternative other than to exercise its reserved power under
Article 15 of the Trusteeship Agreement, which allows it to veto
any alteration or termination of the agreement.
If permitted the opportunity to opt for continuing the Trustee-
ship, many Micronesians would accept it as a means for delaying
a definitive decision on the Territory’s future status. To some the
ideal solution would be for the United Nations itself to assume di-
rect administration, this premised upon the belief that pressure
22 Paper presented by Dr. Robert R. Robbins, “Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands—The Development of a Polity,” at the New England Political Science As-
sociation Meeting, April 1967, p.16.
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emanating from the U.N. to end the Trusteeship would abate once
the region was no longer under American jurisdiction. Continua-
tion of the Trusteeship for a reasonable period into the future, or
even some modification in the trusteeship relationship, is not an
impossibility in this world of realpolitik, but that such a change
will consist of the United Nations’ becoming the Administering
Authority appears highly improbable. More likely, although not
currently being seriously considered, would be the joining of the
Trust Territory in an administrative union.
Article 9 of the Trusteeship Agreement permits the United
States “to constitute the Trust Territory into a customs, fiscal,
or administrative union or federation with other territories under
United States jurisdiction and to establish common services be-
tween such territories and the Trust Territory where such mea-
sures are not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the In-
ternational Trusteeship System and with the terms of …” the
agreement. If America were to follow the example set by Australia
in its joint ministration of the Trusteeship of New Guinea with the
Australian Territory of Papua, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands could be brought together with Guam. Although the United
States would continue to remain accountable for the Territory’s
stewardship, such a joinder would grant the Micronesians greater
powers of self-governance and postpone any definitive step until
they are more politically acculturated. It presents no final solution,
primarily because Guam’s status as an unincorporated territory
of the United States places it in an uncertain position, but this
should make it all the more attractive to those opinion leaders
of the Trust Territory who incline toward a temporary solution
which can be reviewed in the future rather than a permanent
resolution that would force irrevocable action now. Safeguards
against exploiting the Trust Territory to the advantage of the
Guamanians and mechanisms by which Guamanians as United
States citizens23 and the inhabitants of the Trust Territory share
a joint “administrative federation” could be evolved. In view of
Guam’s relative internal autonomy, Australian experience in ad-
ministering Papua-New Guinea would provide limited parallels,
and many technical obstacles would have to be overcome for such
administrative union to be implemented. Greater administrative
23 Papuans are citizens of Australia; New Guineans are not. However, unlike
Guamanians who may freely travel to the United States, Papuans have no greater
access to Australia than do New Guineans.
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cooperation between Guam and the Trust Territory may be antici-
pated, and their chief executives have already taken steps to that
end, but it is unlikely that Carolinian and Marshallese attitudes
toward Guamanians would favor the closer ties requisite to admin-
istrative union. In any event, the pace of political change has so
quickened that the time for incremental steps such as administra-
tive union has now probably passed.
Political union with other Pacific areas under a loose form of
confederation, possibly with the South Pacific Commission re-
vamped to achieve this end, may be regarded as a supplement
to aid the viability of some of the alternative statuses discussed
for Micronesia. Geographically, climatically, and economically, as
well as in patterns of land use, forms of social demoralization due
to rapid acculturation, and the assumption of ever greater pow-
ers of control over their own political conduct, the South Pacific
presents a high degree of regional uniformity. The South Pacific
Commission was designed to facilitate collaboration in promoting
the indigenous peoples’ economic and social welfare among the
powers which have dependent territories in the Pacific. Presently,
Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Western Samoa are members of the commission. The
admission of Western Samoa and, prospectively, Tonga has modi-
fied the commission’s character from that of a body composed
solely of states administering dependent territories. The repre-
sentatives of the indigenous inhabitants who attend the South
Pacific Conferences of the commission have expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the commission’s concentration on consultation and re-
search limited to economic, health, and social matters, and there
is strong sentiment to expand its attention to include political ac-
tivities and to allow the Pacific territories a share in commission
decision-making. In light of their mutuality of interest, it may not
be too visionary to think of the smaller areas of the South Pa-
cific linked together in a common front on regional problems and
cooperating to utilize their limited resources to best advantage.
However, this is not to contemplate the formation of an indepen-
dent federation, with Micronesia as a component state. The same
lack of resources, compounded by commonality of economic en-
deavor, causes most of the South Pacific, like the Trust Territory, to
rely upon outside assistance, so that Micronesia’s ties with some
world power under any future status would not be obviated.
Trusteeship for Micronesia only postponed the reckoning which
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must eventually be made between the United Nations’ policies of
self-determination and the United States’ concern for its own se-
curity. As events are shaping up, the course finally followed by
the Micronesians may not be incompatible with either. However,
the growth of an articulate, educated, political elite in Micronesia
will cause this issue to be resolved to the Micronesians’ bene-
fit, any views of the United Nations or the United States to the
contrary. Already, through the Congress of Micronesia, they have
given notice that, for the “privilege” of being able to “declare all or
any part of the islands a closed area within which it can unilater-
ally determine the extent to which the general applicable activity
of a Trusteeship may be exercised,” the United States should be
prepared to provide adequate outlays of funds for Micronesian
development, and that the U.S. Congress has not met this oblig-
ation.24 This is no appeal to humanitarian principles, although it
was in their name that the United States undertook responsibil-
ity for the administration of the Trust Territory; rather, this is the
language of the political realist, and it is in these terms that the
Micronesians will resolve their political future.
STRAWS IN THE WIND
It is always hazardous to predict the future, but there are
many signs which intimate Micronesia’s retaining its American
ties when the Trusteeship is terminated. As epitomized in a press
interview by the first Speaker of the General Assembly of the Con-
gress of Micronesia, “We have American ideas…. All our education
is American; the tools of government with which we work are
American.”25 The form of the relationship between the two has yet
to be firmed, whether it be annexation as an American possession,
a commonwealth in conjunction with or separate from Guam, an
integral part of the State of Hawaii, or some new arrangement still
to be conceived. But the indications for this end to the Trusteeship
reach back into the early acceptance of American responsibility
for the ministration of the area.
In 1950 the first petition received by a United Nations Visiting
Mission to Micronesia stated that the people of Rota were “en-
tirely satisfied with the administration of the United States of
America and request[ed] that the flag of that nation continue to be
24 House of Delegates Committee Report No. 20, First Congress of Microne-
sia. Aug. 8, 1965.
25 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 17, 1965, p. B-1.
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flown on …” the island. The U.N. mission noted that the petition
reflected the disinclination encountered elsewhere in the Terri-
tory to weaken in any way the Micronesians’ relationship with the
United States.26 Similarly, an early petition delivered by the chiefs
of the Yap Islands to the Congressional party which visited them
in 1949 retains significance, although it must be evaluated against
the Yapese known trenchant to maneuver their administrators to
the end of preserving Yapese identity:
During Spanish came to this island our parents told us to see these people
and see what they had and what kind of living they had, something like
that. If they have good living and good things, we going change our sys-
tem and be friends with them. Soon they went away from this island, and
Germany come. Same thing our parents told us—you have to see these
people and if you think they are good people and do good things you
can be friends with them. Soon the Germans went home. Japanese came
in to get our islands. Our parents told us again. … This is a promise.
You work with these people and go to school with these people but do
not change our custom and be Japanese, because these people are poor
and we do not want to be people of Japan. We have to wait for another
country—England or America. Soon the World war Two began. Some of
us prayed for American people to get our island. Finally the American
came to our island. Now we are glad, because our parents told us and we
remember the promise we had with our parents. So now is the time to
change—to drop the bad customs and pick up the good customs and get
new customs and be friends with you people, and work with you. Even
today we pray in church or in another religion for you Americans to stay
with us forever.27
The Marshallese also as early as 1950, through their Flag
Committee, expressed the belief “that the people of the Marshall
Islands hope some day the Trust Territory will become a part of
the United States.”28 Although, in a petition to the visiting mis-
sion in 1953, the Marshallese voiced their fear of any attempt to
merge them “culturally or otherwise” with the other peoples of
the Trust Territory with the resultant loss of their own individual-
ity, these two positions of the Marshallese were not inconsistent.
26 1951 U.N. Visiting Mission Report, par. 15.
27 In 1952 Yap file, Political Affairs Office, Headquarters, Saipan. Following this
recital, the chiefs asked for “some things that we need to help us build our is-
land.” High on the list was a separate administrative status for Yap, which at the
time was being administered through Palau. Parenthetically, it may be added for
those who are familiar with Yapese stone money, the first request was: “We want
to know the way to get some money on this island. We know how to make and use
our own money, but it is difficult to know how to make American money. We don’t
want to use just the old custom. We want to build our island up.”
28 Richard, op. cit., p. 381.
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The Micronesians are becoming unified by reason of the United
States administration, and each ethnic group looks to America
as its protection against being indiscriminately “lumped together
with other groups of Micronesian peoples as one people.”29 In a
continued association with the United States lies protection.
The recent actions of the Yapese supply another illustration of
this desire for closer ties with the United States as a means of
forestalling undesired change. In November of 1965, the Ameri-
can Ambassador to the United Nations Trusteeship Council and a
Congressional group visiting Yap were presented with a petition
adopted by the Yap Islands Congress and endorsed by the Yap
Islands Council. The petition first stated that the political determi-
nation of the remaining three trusteeships is bound to be made in
the near future and “the people of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands may be forced by world pressure to make a decision, the
consequences of which we may not be ready to accept, and that
whatever that may be it is going to have permanent effect upon
the inhabitants of these islands.” It then requested “that the ques-
tion of the future political status of the Trust Territory …be set
aside until such time as the people of these islands feel ready to
make that decision, provided that:
1. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be released from the
United Nations Trusteeship Council supervision and be placed
under the direct supervision of the United States of America, pref-
erably under the Administration of the Department of the Interior.
2. That being placed under the United States supervision, a form
of political association with the United States shall be worked out
whereby we will retain our Congress with an executor appointed
by the President of the United States of America.
3. The United States of America shall agree to enlarge the present
annual Trust Territory budget and to fully develop the islands
economy with due consideration to the total development of politi-
cal and social welfare of these islands.”30
The Trukese were more specific than the Yapese in pointing
the direction of political development they desired. Resolution
9–64 of the 1964 Truk district legislature recommended to the
Council of Micronesia that it take the necessary action for the
Trust Territory to become a commonwealth of the United States.
29 1953 United Nations Visiting Mission Report, par. 23.
30 Transcript, Yap Islands Congress, Second Special Session, Nov. 19, 1965,
p.22.
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As originally introduced at the initiation of Chief Petrus and the
Moen Municipal Council, the resolution sought Federal territorial
status, but the Political Committee of the Truk legislature
amended it, and the whole legislature concurred in the change.
The people of the Marianas would move faster and farther in
cementing their ties with the United States than any of the other
Micronesians. In 1950, the Saipan legislature delivered a petition
to the United Nations Visiting Mission stating that the Northern
Marianas hoped to be incorporated into the United States either
as a possession or as a territory, “preferably as a territory,” and
to attain American citizenship.31 Fifteen years later the Mariana
Islands District Legislature was still memorializing the grant of
United States citizenship, but now for all the inhabitants of the
Trust Territory. The Chamorros are in the forefront in demanding
change of the Trust Territory’s political status, and for most of
them there can be no alternative but integration with the United
States.
STATUS COMMISSION AND THE CONGRESS
As a rule, the solons in the Congress of Micronesia are un-
willing to express themselves as unequivocally as the district
legislators from the Marianas or even from Truk or Yap. During
the congressional campaigns of 1965, a few of the candidates
advocated joining the United States as a territory, others
looked toward an eventual status suggesting commonwealth
or independence, and most neither publicly nor probably pri-
vately committed themselves on the issue. For one thing, it
fits Micronesian mores not to take an exposed position until
after first ascertaining the direction of the achievable con-
sensus. For another, many Micronesian leaders are admittedly
ambivalent. They favor political development of Micronesia yet
would prefer somehow to preserve the cultural identity of their
own and each of the region’s other ethnic groups. They recog-
nize that the emergence of a Micronesian “self” is facilitative
of the former and destructive of the latter and fully compre-
hend that the feasible alternatives open to them in setting
permanent political goals for the Trust Territory inevitably will
modify, if not destroy, their individual cultures. The leaders
were startled by the greatly accelerated development program
and the lightening of security restrictions in the Trust Territory
31 Richard, op. cit., pp. 1075–1076.
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adopted pursuant to the policy set by the National Security Coun-
cil in 1962, and they resent the apparent motive underlying the
Administering Authority’s actions since then, namely, to have the
Trusteeship terminated as quickly as possible to the advantage of
the United States. They are appreciative of the augmented flow of
Federal money into Micronesia and welcome the youthful enthu-
siasm of the Peace Corps volunteers, who are moving to outlying
islands on which American administrators have never resided. All
this they regard as pointing them along a single course, hurrying
them to permanent affiliation with the United States before they can
be confident in their choice.
Few if any of the Territorial legislators have seen the classified
portions of the Solomon Report of 1963, but it is no secret that
it recommends an early plebiscite. They know that the high com-
missioner told the Trusteeship Council in 1966 that “the point is
moving perceptibly closer when we [the Administering Authority]
will stand aside and say to the Micronesians, ‘Now where do you
want to go from here? The choice is yours’”32 What is feared is
that this will occur before each of the alternatives has been thor-
oughly explored and the people of the Trust Territory are able to
make a meaningful decision. All this was summed up before the
Trusteeship Council in 1965 by Delegate-elect Bailey Olter, as ad-
visor to the United States Delegation:
Three weeks ago I toured my district with my fellow Congressmen from
Ponape District. In every place we visited, we concluded our meetings by
asking the people their future political preference. Given several alter-
natives, the people invariably insisted that they wished to remain under
the present system until they are ready in terms of educational standards,
economic stability, political sophistication and social maturity and respon-
sibility. The Micronesians are cautious and are reluctant to gamble for the
price of uncertainty. When we are ready to accept the responsibilities and
are aware of the implications and consequences of committing ourselves
to whatever political status we prefer, we will ask for it.33
At the first session of the Congress of Micronesia, the House of
Delegates turned down a bid for organic legislation for the Trust
Territory, as it also did at its second session. Resolutions calling
for closer ties or special relations with the United States met sim-
ilar defeat at the latter session. However, in this 1966 term the
congress petitioned the President of the United States “to estab-
32 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, June 30, 1966, p. D-7.
33 Quoted from The Rai Revue, Aug. 4, 1965, p. 4; précised in TCOR, 32d
Sess., 1246th meeting, June 2, 1965, par. 18.
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lish a commission to consult the people of Micronesia to ascertain
their wishes and views, and to study and critically assess the po-
litical alternatives open to Micronesia….”34 A year passed while
the Departments of State, Defense, and Interior deliberated upon
the terms of the resolution to be introduced into the United States
Congress providing for setting up a status commission. Rumor has
it that underlying this delay was the State Department’s protest
against contemplating a tie of the Trust Territory with the United
States unless a concrete political change were offered, such as in-
corporated territorial status.
At its 1967 session, the Congress of Micronesia again took ac-
tion. Now it established its own status commission, composed of
six Micronesian congressmen, to study the future political alter-
natives of the Trust Territory and to help educate the people of
Micronesia to understand the significance of their choices.35 Here
was both protection against hasty resolution and recognition that
the basic economic and social decisions currently to be made
waited upon the shaping of the Territory’s political future. Shortly
after the Congress of Micronesia adjourned, the President of the
United States sent a communication to the U.S. Congress asking
for the adoption of a joint resolution setting up a Federal status
commission for the Trust Territory. This was in line with the orig-
inal petition of the Congress of Micronesia and not necessarily
antithetical to its subsequent action. However, in contradiction to
the Micronesians’ desire to frame the terms and then study the
various alternatives carefully, the draft of the joint resolution ac-
companying the President’s message called for the people of the
Trust Territory “freely to express their wishes as soon as possible,
and not later than June 30, 1972, on the future status of the Trust
Territory.”36 A date has now been proposed for the termination
of the Trusteeship, and regardless of whether the U.S. Congress
will approve, in the Trusteeship Council the United States will be
pressed to abide by this date set by the President.
34 House Joint Resolution No. 47, Laws and Resolutions, Congress of Microne-
sia, 1966.
35 Senate Joint Resolution No. 25, Laws and Resolutions, Congress of Mi-
cronesia, 1967.
36 President’s letter dated Aug. 21, 1967; Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, 3:34 (Aug. 28, 1967), 1190. For the President’s power to act unilater-
ally, see “Executive Authority Concerning the Future Political Status of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands,” Michigan Law Review, 66:6 (April, 1968), 1277.
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As this manuscript goes to press, the U.S. House of
Representatives has yet to act upon the President’s request, while
the Micronesian status commission has commenced studying the
range of alternatives open to the Trust Territory. To a sub-commit-
tee of the U.S. Senate visiting Saipan early in 1968, the Microne-
sian solons courteously rejected the proffer of seating Micronesian
legislators on the Federal study body but offered to cooperate
with it when created. The members of the Micronesian status
commission wanted no entanglements which might restrict their
freedom of maneuver. They know that there are three parties
to the termination of the Trusteeship, and that while the United
States may hold a veto, so does the United Nations. To convince
the members of the United Nations to ignore the precedent of all
previous nine trusteeships and to accept some form of integration
of Micronesia with the United States requires such overwhelm-
ing Micronesian support as to drown all criticism that the choice
was not freely made. This places the Micronesian in a central posi-
tion as to the alteration of the Trust Territory’s status, and at this
stage, it is the Micronesian solon who controls the political destiny
of the Trust Territory.
Traditionally the United States has relied upon the legislature
as the vehicle through which to develop the political capabilities of
the peoples in its territories. Long before they have been deemed
competent to choose their own chief executive or judges, they have
begun exercising legislative power through their locally elected
representatives. The legislature has been the forum in which to
debate each incremental step toward self-government and to acti-
vate public opinion in its support. Already in the Trust Territory, the
district legislatures have commenced shaping the course of politi-
cal development within their respective jurisdictions. The Congress
of Micronesia is now assuming this same role for the whole of
the Trust Territory. On the founding of the congress, the President
of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, Frank Corner of New
Zealand, prophetically forecast: ‘Through the establishment of the
Congress of Micronesia … the people of Micronesia will be able to
get to grips with the essential question of what sort of people they
wish to be and what sort of Micronesia they wish to create. Then
they will be able to go on to mark out an ordered path towards the
future political status which they alone can choose.”37
37 Quoted in Saipan District Panorama, Oct. 23, 1964, p. 1.
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Congress of Micronesia
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ORDER NO. 2882
Subject: Legislative Authority for the Congress of Micronesia, Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands.
Whereas, pursuant to the Trusteeship Agreement between the United
States and the Security Council of the United Nations, the United States
has undertaken to promote self-government in the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands; and
Whereas, in 1956 the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory cre-
ated an Inter-District Advisory Committee composed of Trust Territory
citizens to assist in the development of programs and policies for the
area; and
Whereas, the Inter-District Advisory Committee in 1961 was reconsti-
tuted as the Council of Micronesia, selecting its own chairman; and
Whereas, the deliberations of the Council of Micronesia have been of
a uniformly high order; and
Whereas, the Council of Micronesia has recommended the establish-
ment of a legislature for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to be
known as the Congress of Micronesia;
Now, therefore, there is hereby created the Congress of Micronesia,
as set forth in the following order:
Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to grant certain leg-
islative authority to the Congress of Micronesia in the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, to delimit its membership, duties, and procedures,
and to define its relationships to other branches of the Government of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Section 2. Organization. The Legislature of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands shall be known as the “Congress of Micronesia”
and shall consist of two Houses, the House of Delegates and the
General Assembly. The two Houses shall sit separately except as oth-
erwise provided herein.
When the Congress shall convene, each House shall organize by the
election of one of its number as presiding officer and such presiding
officer shall be designated by the title of “President of the House of Dele-
gates” or “Speaker of the General Assembly”, as the case may be. When
the Congress meets in joint session, the Speaker of the General Assem-
bly shall preside.
Section 3. Legislative Power. The legislative power of the Congress of
Micronesia shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, except that
no legislation may be inconsistent with
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(a) treaties or international agreements of the United States;
(b) laws of the United States applicable to the Trust Territory;
(c) Executive Orders of the President of the United States and orders
of the Secretary of the Interior; or
(d) sections 1 through 12 of the Code of the Trust Territory.
No law shall be passed by the Congress imposing any tax upon prop-
erty of the United States or property of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands; nor shall the property of non-residents be taxed at a higher rate
than the property of residents. No import or export levies shall be im-
posed on goods transported between or among the Districts of the Trust
Territory, as described in Section 39 of the Code of the Trust Territory,
or any political subdivision thereof, and the levy of duties on goods im-
ported into the Trust Territory is hereby reserved to the Congress of
Micronesia and the High Commissioner.
Section 4. Powers of the High Commissioner. At the opening of a
legislative session and at any time thereafter the High Commissioner
may submit to the Congress and recommend the enactment of legisla-
tion.
In the event that the High Commissioner has submitted to the Con-
gress proposed legislation which he has designated as urgent, and the
Congress has failed to pass the same in its original form or an amended
form acceptable to the High Commissioner at the session at which it was
submitted, the High Commissioner may himself, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, promulgate such legislation as law: Provided,
That such designation as urgent shall be made no later than seven days
prior to the end of the session.
Section 5. Budget. Prior to his final submission of the annual budget
of the Trust Territory to the Secretary of the Interior, the High Com-
missioner shall submit a preliminary budget plan to the Congress of
Micronesia in joint session for its review and recommendations. The
High Commissioner shall adopt such recommendations of the Congress
as he may deem appropriate, but he shall transmit to the Secretary of the
Interior all recommendations he has not adopted. Legislation enacted
by the Congress of Micronesia requiring the expenditure of funds other
than as budgeted shall include revenue measures to provide the needed
funds.
Section 6. Membership. For the purpose of representation in the Con-
gress, the Trust Territory is divided into six Districts as described in
Section 39 of the Code of the Trust Territory.
The House of Delegates shall consist of twelve members, who shall be
known as “Delegates,” of which each District shall elect two.
The General Assembly shall consist of twenty-one members, who shall
be known as “Assemblymen,” and who shall be elected from each District
as follows:
In the Mariana Islands District, three;
In the Marshall Islands District, four;
In the Palau District, three;
In the Ponape District, four;
In the Truk District, five;
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In the Yap District, two.
Each of the six Administrative Districts shall be subdivided initially
into single member election districts of approximately equal population,
in such manner as the High Commissioner shall determine, and each
such election district shall elect one of the Assemblymen to which the
Administrative District is entitled. Future subdivisions shall be estab-
lished by law.
Election districts shall be reapportioned every 10 years on the basis
of population, but each District (as described in Section 39 of the Trust
Territory Code), shall be entitled to at least two Assemblymen regard-
less of population. The first such reapportionment shall be made in
1971.
Section 7. Qualification of Legislators. In order to be eligible to elec-
tion as a member of the Congress a person shall:
(a) be a citizen of the Trust Territory for at least five years;
(b) have attained the age of twenty-five years at the time of his elec-
tion; and
(c) have been a bona fide resident of the District (as described in Sec-
tion 39 of the Code of the Trust Territory), from which he is elected for
at least one year next preceding his election.
No person who has been expelled from the Congress for giving or
receiving a bribe or for being an accessory thereto, and no person who
has been convicted of a felony, shall sit in the Congress, unless the
person so convicted has been pardoned and has had restored to him
his civil rights.
Section 8. Franchise. The franchise shall be vested in residents of
the Trust Territory who are citizens of the Trust Territory and eighteen
years of age or over. Additional qualifications may be prescribed by the
Congress: Provided, That no property, language, or income qualification
shall ever be imposed or required of any voter, nor shall any discrimina-
tion in qualification be made or based upon literacy, tribal custom, or
social position, nor upon difference in race, color, ancestry, sex, or reli-
gious belief.
Section 9. General elections. General elections shall be held bien-
nially in each even numbered year on the first Tuesday following the
first Monday in November. All elections shall be held in accordance with
such procedures as this order and the laws of the Trust Territory may
prescribe. Legislators shall be chosen by secret ballot of the qualified
electors of their respective districts.
Section 10. Term of office. Each Delegate shall hold office for a term
of four years: Provided, That of the Delegates elected at the first general
election, one from each District shall hold office for two years only, and
the determination of which Delegate shall serve the short term shall be
made by drawing lots.
Assemblymen shall each hold office for a term of two years.
The terms of all members of the Congress shall commence at noon
on the third day of January following their election, except as otherwise
provided by law.
Section 11. Disqualification of government officers and employees. No
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person holding a position as a Department Head or Assistant Depart-
ment Head in the Headquarters of the Trust Territory Government, as a
Department Head or Assistant Department Head in a District Adminis-
tration, as a District Administrator or Assistant District Administrator, or
as a Judge, and no person serving as a member of a District Legislature,
shall be eligible to serve as a member of the Congress while holding said
position: Provided, That this disqualification shall not become effective
until the third general election to the Congress.
The High Commissioner shall permit any employee of the Government
of the Trust Territory to be accorded leave without pay, for a period not
to exceed 30 days prior to and including the day of the general election,
for the purpose of seeking election to the Congress.
No member of the Congress shall, while on official legislative busi-
ness, receive any other compensation from the Government of the Trust
Territory or any political subdivision thereof.
Section 12. Legislative sessions. There shall be a regular session of
the Congress held in each year beginning on the second Monday of July
and continuing for not to exceed 30 consecutive calendar days. Each
such regular session shall be held at the seat of the Government of the
Trust Territory.
The High Commissioner may call special sessions for such period of
time and at such time and place, as in his opinion the public interest may
require. No legislation shall be considered at any special session other
than that specified in the call therefor or in any special message by the
High Commissioner to the Congress while in such session.
Section 13. Enacting clause. The enacting clause of all bills shall be:
“Be it enacted by the Congress of Micronesia,” and no law shall be en-
acted except by bill. Bills may originate in either House, and may be
amended or altered or rejected by the other.
Section 14. Veto by the High Commissioner. Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the High Com-
missioner. If the High Commissioner approves the bill, he shall sign it.
If the High Commissioner disapproves the bill, he shall, except as here-
inafter provided, return it, with his objections, to the Congress within
ten consecutive calendar days after it shall have been presented to him.
If the High Commissioner does not return the bill within such period,
it shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Con-
gress by adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall be a law
if signed by the High Commissioner within thirty days after it shall have
been presented to him; otherwise it shall not be a law.
Not later than 14 months after a bill has been vetoed by the High
Commissioner, it may be passed over his veto by a two-thirds majority
of the entire membership of each House but may not be so repassed at
the same session at which originally passed. A bill so repassed shall be
re-presented to the High Commissioner for his approval. If he does not
approve it within 20 days, he shall send it together with his comment
thereon to the Secretary of the Interior. Within 90 days after its receipt
by him, the Secretary of the Interior shall either approve or disapprove
the bill. If he approves it, it shall become a law; otherwise it shall not.
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If any bill presented to the High Commissioner shall contain several
items of appropriation of money, he may object to one or more of such
items, or any part or parts thereof, while approving the other items or
parts of the bill. In such case he shall append to the bill, at the time
of signing it, a statement of the item or items, part or parts thereof, to
which he objects, and the item or items, part or parts thereof, so objected
to shall have the effect of being vetoed.
Section 15. Adjournment. Neither House may adjourn for more than
two consecutive days nor may either House adjourn sine die without the
concurrence of the other House.
Section 16. Publication of laws. The High Commissioner shall make
provision for publishing laws and resolutions within 30 days after the
close of each session and for their distribution to public officials and sale
to the public.
Section 17. Procedure.
(a) Quorum. A majority of the members of each House shall consti-
tute a quorum of such House for the transaction of business. A smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each House
may provide.
(b) Reading of bills–Passage. A bill in order to become a law shall pass
two readings in each House, on separate days, the final passage of which
in each House shall be by a majority vote of all the members present and
voting, which vote shall be entered upon the journal.
(c) Title. Every legislative act shall embrace but one subject and mat-
ters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in
the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not
be expressed in the title, such an act shall be void only as to so much
thereof as shall not be embraced in the title.
(d) Certification of bills from one House to the other. Every bill when
passed by the House in which it originated, or in which amendments
thereto shall have originated, shall immediately be certified by the pre-
siding officer and sent to the other House for consideration.
(e) Amendment and revisions by reference. No law shall be amended
or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case the act, as
revised, or section or subsection as amended, shall be re-enacted and
published at full length.
(f) Language. All legislative proceedings shall be conducted in the
English language: Provided, That knowledge of the English language
shall not be a qualification for membership in the Congress. Nothing
herein shall limit the right of a member to use his native language if he
lacks fluency in English, and the Congress shall provide for interpreta-
tion into English in such cases.
(g) Journal. Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and
publish the same in English.
(h) Public sessions. The business of the Congress, and of the Commit-
tee of the Whole, shall be transacted openly and not in secret session.
(i) Procedural authority. The Congress shall be the sole judge of the
elections and qualifications of its members, shall have and exercise all
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the authority and attributes inherent in legislative assemblies, and shall
have the power to institute and conduct investigations, issue subpoenas
to witnesses and other parties concerned, and administer oaths.
Section 18. Immunity. No member of the Congress of Micronesia shall
be held to answer before any tribunal other than the Congress for any
speech or debate in the Congress, and the members shall in all cases,
except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress and in going to
and from the same.
Section 19. Compensation. Each member of the Congress shall be
paid $16 for each day the Congress is in session, regular or special. Each
member shall also be paid $16 for each day during which he is engaged
in official legislative business, when the Congress is not in session. Com-
pensation at this daily rate shall be paid for each day the member is in
a travel status to and from each session or while on other official leg-
islative business. Travel shall be performed by the most expeditious and
direct means. Compensation shall be paid for days when travel is delayed
for reasons beyond the control of the member. Travel shall be arranged
by the Trust Territory Government by the most direct and expeditious
means, and travel expenses and per diem at the standard Trust Territory
Government rates shall be allowed: Provided, That compensation, travel,
and per diem shall not be allowed in excess of such amount as may be
budgeted therefor.
Section 20. Appointment to new offices. No member of the Congress
shall, during the term for which he was elected or during the year
following the expiration of the term for which he was elected, be ap-
pointed to any office which was created by the Congress during such
term.
Section 21. Vacancies. Whenever, prior to six months before the date
of the next general election, a vacancy occurs, the High Commissioner
shall call a special election to fill such vacancy. In case of a vacancy
occurring within six months of the next general election, no special elec-
tion shall be held and the District Administrator of the District wherein
such vacancy arises may fill such vacancy by appointment.
Section 22. Conversion into a unicameral body. At its fifth regular
session following the effective date of this order, the Congress shall
convene in joint session to consider whether the bicameral legislature
should be continued, or whether the legislature should be converted
into a unicameral body. The final recommendation to the High
Commissioner shall be adopted by a majority vote, and the recommen-
dation shall be submitted to the High Commissioner and by him to the
Secretary of the Interior.
Section 23. Legislative Counsel. Prior to the first regular session of
the Congress of Micronesia, the High Commissioner shall designate a
legislative counsel to assist and advise the Congress during that ses-
sion. During the course of the first session, and biennially thereafter,
the Congress may by joint resolution nominate a legislative counsel of
its own choosing to serve the Congress during and between subsequent
sessions, subject only to the High Commissioner’s concurrence in the
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competency of the designated legislative counsel. Compensation for the
legislative counsel shall be budgeted by the High Commissioner at a
grade level equivalent to that of the highest grade Assistant Attorney
General of the Trust Territory. The High Commissioner shall also make
budgetary provision for such supporting staff for the legislative counsel
as the Congress may request by joint resolution, and as the High Com-
missioner may deem necessary.
Section 24. Amendment. This order may be amended only by further
order of the Secretary of the Interior. The Congress may, during any reg-
ular session, by a two-thirds majority vote of the membership of each
House, recommend to the High Commissioner the amendment of any
part of this order. The High Commissioner shall transmit such recom-
mendation, together with his own recommendations thereon, to the
Secretary of the Interior.
Section 25. Existing laws. All laws and regulations of the Trust Terri-
tory not inconsistent with the provisions of this order shall continue in
effect until modified or repealed by competent authority.
Section 26. Temporary extension of export and import duties. Not-
withstanding any other provision of this order, any District or municipal
import and export duties in effect upon signature of this order may con-
tinue in effect until July 1, 1965, unless sooner reduced or repealed by
the District Legislature or municipality concerned: Provided, That no
such District or municipal import or export duty may be increased above
its rate as of the date of signature of this order.
Section 27. Effective date. The provisions of this order shall become
effective upon signature, with the first general elections to the Congress
of Micronesia to be held on Tuesday, January 19, 1965, in accordance
with such regulations as may be promulgated by the High Commissioner
therefore: Provided, That subsequent general elections shall be held as
provided in Section 9 of this order: Provided, further, That the terms
of members elected to the first Congress of Micronesia shall commence
February 16, 1965.
Section 28. Prior orders. Section 3 of Order No. 2876 is superseded,
effective July 12, 1965, or effective on the date the Congress of Microne-
sia meets in special session, whichever first occurs. Provisions of other
prior orders of the Department of the Interior, insofar as they are incon-
sistent with the provisions of this order, are hereby superseded.
/s/ STEWART L. UDALL
Secretary of the Interior
September 28, 1964
AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO ORDER NO. 2882
Subject: Legislative Authority for the Congress of Micronesia, Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands.
Whereas, on September 28, 1964, the Secretary of the Interior pro-
mulgated Secretarial Order No. 2882 creating the Congress of Microne-
sia and granting legislative authority thereto; and
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Whereas, the said Order No. 2882 in Section 3 reserved to the Con-
gress of Micronesia and the High Commissioner the levy of duties on
goods imported into the Trust Territory; and
Whereas, Section 26 of the said Order No. 2882 temporarily extended
until July 1, 1965, District and municipal import and export duties in ef-
fect on September 28, 1964; and
Whereas, such date of July 1, 1965, will not afford the Congress of
Micronesia an opportunity to act prior to the expiration of District or mu-
nicipal import or export levies; and
Whereas, certain revisions in Sections 5, 6 and 7 are also desirable so
as to clarify the appropriation and legislative authority of the Congress
of Micronesia and the apportionment of members among the several
districts of the Trust Territory and the language relating to the qualifi-
cations of members;
Now, therefore, Secretarial Order No. 2882 is amended in the follow-
ing particulars, the amendments to become effective July 1, 1965:
1. Section 26 of the said Order No. 2882 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
“Section 26. Temporary extension of export and import duties. Not-
withstanding any other provision of this order, any District or municipal
import and export duties in effect upon signature of this order may con-
tinue in effect until October 1, 1965, unless sooner reduced or repealed
by the District Legislature or municipality concerned; Provided, That no
such District or municipal import or export duty may be increased above
its rate as of the date of signature of this order.”
2. Section 5 of the said Order No. 2882 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Section 5. Budget. Money bills enacted by the Congress of Microne-
sia shall not provide for the appropriation of funds in excess of such
amounts as are available from revenues raised pursuant to the tax
laws and other revenue laws of the Trust Territory. Prior to his final
submission to the Secretary of the Interior of requests for Federal funds
necessary for the support of governmental functions in the Trust Terri-
tory, the High Commissioner shall prepare a preliminary budget plan. He
shall submit such plan to the Congress of Micronesia in joint session for
its review and recommendations with respect to such portions as relate
to expenditures of funds proposed to be appropriated by the Congress of
the United States. With respect to such portions of the preliminary bud-
get plan, the High Commissioner shall adopt such recommendations of
the Congress as he may deem appropriate, but he shall transmit to the
Secretary of the Interior all recommendations he has not adopted.”
3. The final paragraph of Section 6 of the said Order No. 2882 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
“Election districts shall be reapportioned every 10 years on the basis
of population, but each District (as described in Section 39 of the Trust
Territory Code), shall be entitled to at least two Assemblymen. The first
such reapportionment shall be made in 1971.”
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4. The final paragraph of Section 7 of the said Order No. 2882 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
“No person who has been expelled from the Congress for giving or
receiving a bribe or for being an accessory thereto, and no person who
has been convicted of a felony by any court of the Trust Territory or any
court with the jurisdiction of a district court of the United States, shall
sit in the Congress unless the person so convicted has been pardoned
and has had restored to him his civil rights.”
/s/ JOHN A. CARVER, JR.
Acting Secretary of the Interior
June 10, 1965
AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO ORDER NO. 2882
Whereas, on September 28, 1964, the Secretary of the Interior pro-
mulgated Secretarial Order No. 2882 creating the Congress of Microne-
sia and granting legislative authority thereto; and
Whereas, Section 24 of the said Order No. 2882 provides that the
Congress may recommend amendments to the Secretary of the Interior
by a two-thirds majority vote of the membership of each House; and
Whereas, the Congress of Micronesia adopted Resolution No. 1–18 re-
questing that the “House of Delegates” be redesignated “Senate” and the
“General Assembly” be redesignated “House of Representatives”; and
Whereas, revision of section 23 of the said Order No. 2882 is also
desirable to clarify provisions relating to the compensation of the Legis-
lative Counsel;
Now, therefore, Secretarial Order No. 2882 is amended in the follow-
ing particulars, the amendments to become effective July 1, 1966:
1. Beginning July 1, 1966, the House of Delegates is redesignated the
Senate and the General Assembly is redesignated the House of Repre-
sentatives and wherever they appear in Order No. 2882 and Amendment
No. 1 to Order No. 2882, the words “House of Delegates” and “General
Assembly” shall be read as “Senate” and “House of Representatives,” re-
spectively, and the words “Delegates” and “Assemblymen” shall be read
as “Senators” and “Representatives,” respectively. This amendment shall
not be so construed as to affect the seniority of any member of the
Congress of Micronesia nor otherwise to affect the organization of the
Congress of Micronesia.
2. Section 23 of the said Order No. 2882, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 23. Legislative Counsel. The Congress of Micronesia may by
joint resolution nominate a legislative counsel of its own choosing to
serve the Congress during and between sessions, subject only to the
High Commissioner’s concurrence in the competency of the designated
legislative counsel. Salary for the legislative counsel shall be budgeted
by the High Commissioner at a level comparable to the United States GS
12 level including those periodic step increases which would be avail-
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able if the position were in fact a GS 12 position. Personnel benefits
for the legislative counsel, including, but not necessarily limited to, an-
nual and sick leave, shall be provided by the Congress of Micronesia:
Provided, That such personnel benefits do not exceed those provided
United States Government employees in the Trust Territory. The Con-
gress of Micronesia may make budgetary provision for such supporting
staff for the legislative counsel and the legislature as it may deem neces-
sary.
/s/ STEWART L. UDALL
Secretary of the Interior
June 28, 1966
AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO ORDER NO. 2882
Subject: Legislative authority for the Congress of Micronesia, Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands.
Whereas, on September 23, 1964, the Secretary of Interior promul-
gated Secretarial Order No. 2882 creating the Congress of Micronesia
and granting legislative authority thereto; and
Whereas, Section 24 of the said Order No. 2882 provides that the
Congress may recommend amendments to the Secretary of the Interior
by a two-thirds majority vote of the membership of each House; and
Whereas, the Congress of Micronesia adopted Senate Joint Resolution
No. 43 requesting that Order No. 2882 be amended so as to require the
passage of bills by the majority votes of all members of each House; and
Whereas, provision needs to be made for the conduct of biennial elec-
tions in the event a natural disaster or other Act of God should prevent
balloting on the appointed day; and
Whereas, a further clarification of the appropriation power of the
Congress appears to be desirable;
Now, therefore, Secretarial Order No. 2882 is amended in the follow-
ing particulars, the amendment to become effective immediately:
1. Section 17(b) of the said Order No. 2882 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
“Section 17(b). Reading of bills—Passage. A bill in order to become a
law shall pass two readings in each House, on separate days, the final
passage of which in each House shall be by a majority vote of all the
members of each House, which vote shall be entered upon the journal.”
2. Section 9 of said Order No. 2882 is hereby amended to read as fol-
lows:
“Section 9. General elections. General elections shall be held bienni-
ally in each even-numbered year on the first Tuesday following the first
Monday in November: Provided, That in the event of a natural disaster
or other Act of God, the effect of which precludes holding the election on
the foregoing date, the High Commissioner, with the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Interior, may proclaim a later election date in the affected
election district or districts. All elections shall be held in accordance
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with such procedures as this order and the laws of the Trust Territory
may prescribe. Legislators shall be chosen by secret ballot of the quali-
fied electors of their respective district.”
3. Section 5 of the said Order No. 2882 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Section 5. Budget. Money bills enacted by the Congress of Micro-
nesia shall not provide for the appropriation of funds in excess of such
amount as are available from revenues raised pursuant to the tax laws
and other revenue laws of the Trust Territory: Provided, That income
derive from the provision of air and sea transportation services; reim-
bursements from public works sales and services; and income from the
operation of water, power, sewerage and communications services shall
be applied against the costs of providing those services and shall not
be considered to be revenues within the meaning of this order. Prior to
his final submission to the Secretary of the Interior of requests for Fed-
eral funds necessary for the support of governmental functions in the
Trust Territory, the High Commissioner shall prepare a preliminary bud-
get plan. He shall submit such plan to the Congress of Micronesia in joint
session for its review and recommendations with respect to such por-
tions as relate to expenditures of funds proposed to be appropriated by
the Congress of the United States. With respect to such portions of the
preliminary budget plan, the High Commissioner shall adopt such rec-
ommendations of the Congress as he may deem appropriate, but he shall
transmit to the Secretary of the Interior all recommendations he has not
adopted.”
/s/ STEWART L. UDALL
Secretary of the Interior
July 29, 1967
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Charters of District Legislatures
CHARTER OF THE
MARIANA ISLANDS DISTRICT LEGISLATURE
1963
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the people of Mariana Islands District of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands have expressed their desire for representation in
the government of their district; and
Whereas, they selected and entrusted delegates to meet together in a
Legislative Convention to draft a Charter for the establishment of a Dis-
trict Legislature; and
Whereas, the Congress of the United States of America has agreed by
ratification on July 18, 1947, of the Trusteeship Agreement between the
United States and the United Nations Security Council to promote the
development of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands toward self-gov-
ernment;
Now, therefore, I, M. W. Goding, High Commissioner of the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands, do hereby charter the people of Mariana
Islands District to assemble a Legislature of their elected representa-
tives to be known as the Mariana Islands District Legislature to assist in
the government of the District in accordance with the laws of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the provisions of this Charter.
ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers of Mariana Islands District herein
granted by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands shall be vested in a unicameral house to be known as the Mariana
Islands District Legislature.
Section 2. The Mariana Islands District Legislature, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Legislature, shall be composed of sixteen (16) Represent-
atives chosen every three years by the electors of the Mariana Islands
District.
Section 3. There shall be four electoral precincts, as follows: The is-
land of Rota; the island of Tinian; the island of Saipan; the islands north
of Saipan. Apportionment of Representatives shall be as follows: Rota
shall have three (3) Representatives; Tinian shall have one (1) Repre-
sentative; Saipan shall have eleven (11) Representatives; the Northern
Mariana Islands shall have one (1) Representative. If new municipalities
are created the number of precincts and the apportionment of Represen-
tatives shall be changed by amendment to this Charter.
Section 4. Reapportionment on a population basis shall take place
every five years, beginning in 1965. Regardless of population change,
Rota shall have a minimum of three (3) Representatives; Tinian shall
have a minimum of one (1) Representative; and the islands north of
Saipan shall have a minimum of one (1) Representative.
417
Section 5. To be eligible for election or appointment, a person must
be a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, be a resident of
his electoral precinct for a period of not less than two years immediately
preceding his election, must be twenty-five (25) years of age or over;
and must not be a convicted felon currently serving a sentence for that
felony.
Section 6. No person may sit in the Legislature who holds an elective
office in a municipal government or who holds a judicial office.
Section 7. Where a Representative is unable to perform the duties of
his office due to physical or mental disability or death or who resigns or
is impeached by the Legislature, another shall be appointed to fill the re-
mainder of the term by the Chief Executive of his municipality. In the event
a representative-elect is unable to assume office, there shall be a special
election in his electoral precinct in order to choose another in his place.
Section 8. Election of Representatives shall be by secret ballot, and
the Legislature shall set the time of election by law. Municipalities shall
enact ordinances prescribing the manner and places of election, al-
though the Legislature may change them at any time by law.
Section 9. The Legislature alone shall determine the qualifications of
its members. The Legislature may by an affirmative three-fourths vote of
its members impeach any member.
Section 10. Election of Representatives to the first Legislature shall
be held within ninety (90) days of the approval of this Charter by the
High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Section 11. Communications and draft bills may be transmitted to the
Legislature by the District Administrator for consideration by it.
Section 12. Municipal Ordinances shall have the full force and effect
of law insofar as they are not in conflict with any law promulgated under
provisions of this Charter. District Laws shall have the full force and ef-
fect of law insofar as they are not in conflict with the Trust Territory
Code or Executive Orders of the High Commissioner.
Section 13. Qualifications of electors shall be as follows: Each
shall be eighteen (18) years of age or over; a citizen of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands; have been a resident of his electoral
precinct for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the
election; not be serving a criminal sentence at the time of the elec-
tion and be of sound mind.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. The Legislature shall convene twice a year in regular ses-
sion on the first Monday of February and the first Monday in August.
The first Legislature shall be convened at a date set by the District
Administrator. The District Administrator may convene the Legislature
into special session, whose proceedings shall be confined to the subjects
stated in the District Administrator’s convening call.
Section 2. The Legislature shall be considered as being continuously
in session from the date convened, but no session of the Legislature shall
exceed twenty (20) days. Sunday and holidays shall not be counted, oth-
erwise, each day of the week shall be counted as one.
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Section 3. At the first Legislature the District Administrator shall act
as chairman and examine the credentials of each Representative-elect
prior to convening the Legislature. Credentials shall be in the form of a
statement from the Chief Executive of the municipalities presenting and
authenticating the vote. There shall be an oath of office which the Chair-
man shall administer to each member individually. The Legislature shall
then elect from its members a chairman who shall be called President.
The Legislature may elect other officers as it desires.
Section 4. The Legislature, by a majority vote of its members, shall
establish rules of procedure.
Section 5. Each member of the Legislature shall have one vote. An af-
firmative vote of a majority of the members present and voting, shall be
required to pass a bill. Three-fourths of the members of the Legislature
shall constitute a quorum.
Section 6. Any member may introduce a bill. Each bill introduced shall
be read in its entirety before the Legislature two times on different days,
before a vote shall be taken.
Section 7. Upon passage of a bill by the Legislature it shall be signed
by the President of the Legislature and shall be called an Act of the Mar-
iana Islands District Legislature.
Section 8. Each bill shall have an enacting clause as follows: Be it en-
acted by the Legislature of the Mariana Islands District, that, etc.
Section 9. Each enrolled bill shall be submitted to the District Admin-
istrator for approval. If he approves, he shall sign the bill and transmit
it to the High Commissioner. If the High Commissioner takes no action
within thirty (30) days after receiving the bill, it shall become law. If a
bill is disapproved by the District Administrator, it must be done within
fifteen (15) days after he receives it, otherwise it shall be considered ap-
proved. Bills disapproved by the District Administrator shall be returned
to the Legislature with his objections. By a two-thirds affirmative vote
the Legislature may submit the vetoed bill directly to the High Commis-
sioner notifying the District Administrator of this action, and the High
Commissioner shall take action within thirty (30) days after receiving
the bill. If he does not, the bill shall be considered approved and shall
become law. All approved bills shall be known as District Laws of the
Mariana Islands District.
Section 10. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and
publish the same. Every enactment of the Legislature and the vote on
any question shall be entered in the journal.
Section 11. The Members of the Legislature shall, in all cases except
treason, felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the Legislature and going to and returning from the
same. No member shall be held to answer before any tribunal other than
the Legislature itself for any speech or debate in the Legislature.
ARTICLE III
Section 1. There shall be four standing committees—Hold-over, Polit-
ical, Social, and Economic. Chairmen and members of the Political,
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Social and Economic Committees shall be appointed by the President.
The Chairmen shall, with the President, Secretary and District Treasurer
constitute the Hold-over Committee. It shall meet as required when the
Legislature is not in session to handle necessary matters. It shall also
meet in advance of the regular sessions to plan an agenda for the Legis-
lature. Agenda items as well as individual bills of members shall be given
to the appropriate standing committee by the President for considera-
tion. Items shall be reported out by the committees to the Legislature in
written form as draft bills, resolutions, or recommendations.
Section 2. There shall be a Secretary who shall be appointed by the
President with the approval of the Legislature. The duties of this office
shall require that the Secretary be a full-time employee and he shall re-
ceive an annual salary with the amount to be decided by the Legislature.
The person serving as Secretary shall remain in the position as long as
his performance is satisfactory and shall not be subject to elections of
the Legislature.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. The Legislature shall have the power to levy and provide
for the collection of taxes and fees.
ARTICLE V
Section 1. Compensation of the members of the Legislature and its
employees shall be established by law.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. Appropriation and expenditure of revenues produced under
the authority of District Laws or whose allocation is the responsibility of
the Legislature, shall be in accordance with the budget of the Legisla-
ture which shall be established by law.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. Amendments to this Charter may be made upon an affirm-
ative vote of three-fourths (¾) of the members of the Legislature and
approved by the District Administrator and the High Commissioner, or
by the High Commissioner on his own initiative. No amendments shall
be made which shall deprive any municipality of its representation in the
Legislature.
Given under my hand and seal this 7th day of January 1963 at Saipan,
Mariana Islands.
/s/ M. W. GODING
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
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CONSTITUTION OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
(Kwelok eo Elap)
1949
United States Navy—Governor of the Marshall Islands
Proclamation No. 1–1949
To the people of the Marshall Islands:
I, Cecil B. Gill, Captain, United States Navy, and Governor of the Mar-
shall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, do hereby proclaim
as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Congress of the Marshall Islands is hereby established as an ad-
visory body to the Civil Administrator of the Marshall Islands District, to
express the will of the Marshallese people on matters affecting the laws
and government of the Marshall Islands.
ARTICLE II. COMPOSITION
Section 1. The Congress shall be composed of two Houses, designated
as the House of Iroij and the House of Assembly, respectively.
Section 2. The House of Iroij shall be composed of all persons hold-
ing the position of paramount chief in accordance with the traditions,
usages, and customs of the Marshallese people. The successor to a
deceased or incapacitated paramount chief, recognized as that chief’s
proper and legal successor in accordance with Marshallese custom and
tradition, shall automatically succeed to his predecessor’s seat in the
House of Iroij. In case of conflicting claims to paramount chieftainship,
the Congress shall establish procedure for investigating the claims and
for approving the proper succession.
Section 3. The House of Assembly shall be composed of a represen-
tative or representatives, of each municipality of the Marshall Islands
District, each duly selected by the people of his municipality in accord-
ance with established procedures. Each municipality shall have at least
one representative; larger municipalities shall have additional represent-
atives in proportion to their population, the exact number to be deter-
mined by a fixed ratio, to be set by the Congress from time to time and
approved by the Civil Administrator.
Section 4. In case a member of the House of Iroij is elected to sit in
the House of Assembly he shall be entitled to one vote only and that vote
shall be cast in the House of Assembly.
ARTICLE III. CONVENING AND ADJOURNING
Section 1. The Congress shall convene each year on the fourth day
of the month of July; unless the fourth day is a Sunday in which case
the Congress shall convene on the fifth day, at the Civil Administration
headquarters at Majuro, and at such other times and places as the Civil
Administrator of the Marshall Islands District or the Congress itself may
designate.
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Section 2. When convened, the Congress shall continue in session
until adjourned by common consent of both Houses. The Houses may re-
cess, but not adjourn, independently. The Congress shall inform the Civil
Administrator of the date of its adjournment.
ARTICLE IV. PROCEDURE
Section 1. Each House shall prescribe its own rules of procedure.
Section 2. At regular sessions of the Congress matters for considera-
tion may be presented by members of either House, and by the Civil
Administrator. A procedure shall be established whereby, insofar as pos-
sible, important items of the agenda shall be made known to members of
the Congress prior to the convening of the Congress, to enable members
to determine the consensus of their people on those matters.
Section 3. Upon calling the Congress into special session, the Civil
Administrator shall prepare and deliver to a joint session of both Houses
a written agenda of matters recommended for consideration. Additional
topics for consideration may be added to the agenda by members of ei-
ther House.
Section 4. The Congress may make recommendations in writing in the
form of Resolutions to the Civil Administrator of the Marshall Islands
District, passed by a majority of both Houses on any or all matters re-
lating to the administration of the Marshall Islands. These matters may
include, but are not limited to: local taxation, expenditure of local rev-
enues, civil and criminal law, and regulation of shipping and commerce.
ARTICLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Compensation, and allowances for travel and subsistence of
members of the Congress of the Marshall Islands during sessions of the
Congress, will be as provided for by a Resolution or Resolutions passed
by the Congress and approved by the Civil Administrator of the Marshall
Islands District.
ARTICLE VI. EFFECTIVE DATE
This proclamation will become operative in each island or part thereof
of the Marshall Islands on the date of its first publication.
Given under my hand at N.O.B. Kwajalein, M.I. this 17th day of Novem-
ber 1949.
/s/ CECIL B. GILL
Captain, United States Navy
Governor of the Marshall Islands
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
CONSTITUTION OF THE
MARSHALL ISLANDS CONGRESS
1958
Whereas, the Constitution which on the 17th of November 1949 es-
tablished the Congress of the Marshall Islands as a body advisory to
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Whereas, that Congress, which has functioned continuously in
accordance with its Constitution since that date, now expresses the de-
sire of the Marshallese People for a more effective Constitution and a
greater representation in their government;
Now, therefore, I, Delmas H. Nucker, High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, having full confidence in the abilities of
these people to exercise greater powers of government under our laws
and provisions of this Constitution do hereby grant the Congress of the
Marshall Islands those powers and authorities hereinafter set forth in ac-
cordance with the provisions hereof.
ARTICLE I. ORGANIZATION
Section 1. The Congress shall be constituted of a single assembly to
be known as the Congress of the Marshall Islands.
ARTICLE II. MEMBERSHIP
Section 1. The membership of the Congress shall be composed of
the Iroij Laplap and an elected Representative or Representatives from
each of the Municipalities of the Marshall Islands Districts, who shall be
known as Congressmen.
Section 2. Each Municipality shall be represented by at least one
Representative. Municipalities having a population of more than 250, as
determined by the last official census, shall elect one Representative for
each 250 residents and one for any excess in population over an even
multiple of 250.
Section 3. Representatives shall be elected to serve a term of two
years.
Section 4. In order to qualify for membership in the Congress a can-
didate must be a citizen of the Trust Territory, at least twenty-five years
of age and a resident of the Marshall Islands District for the five years
immediately preceding his election.
Section 5. At the first session after this Constitution becomes effec-
tive, the Congress shall determine by majority vote those who shall be
admitted to membership as Iroij Laplap who shall retain membership for
life. Upon the death of an Iroij Laplap member, his heir may be admitted
to membership upon majority vote of the Congress.
Section 6. Upon the election of a Representative, the Scribe of the
Municipality from which he is elected shall forward to the Congress
prior to the opening of the first session thereafter, a statement certi-
fying the election and eligibility of the Representative. Certification of
newly elected Representatives shall be reviewed by the Secretary of
the Congress at the first meeting of each session and a Representa-
tive may be denied membership if disapproved by majority vote of the
Congress, provided, that no duly elected and certified Representative
may be denied admission as a member except for failure to qualify. No
person may take the place of or be a substitute for a duly certified
Representative to the Congress.
Section 7. In the event of the death or incapacitating illness of an
elected Representative, the Council of the Municipality from which he
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was elected shall elect a successor to serve the remainder of his unex-
pired term and the successor shall be duly certified and admitted as
provided in Section 6 of this Article.
Section 8. Congressmen may receive compensation or allowances for
travel and subsistence involved in attending a session of Congress.
ARTICLE III. VOTING
Section 1. All duly qualified members of the Congress shall have equal
rights to cast their vote. A duly qualified member acting as chairman
shall not cast a vote except in the event of a tie vote of the voting mem-
bers.
Section 2. The Secretary shall maintain a record of all votes cast
which shall be made a part of the permanent records of the session.
ARTICLE IV. OFFICERS
Section 1. As the first order of business at each session, a duly admit-
ted member, thirty years of age or more, shall be elected as President of
the Congress to serve during that session and at the openings of the suc-
ceeding session until his successor is elected. In the event a President
is not returned to Congress, the Vice-President, Secretary, or an elected
Chairman, in that order, shall preside until a new President is elected.
It shall be the duty of the President to preside at all meetings, to ap-
point officers and committees as herein provided and as provided in duly
adopted rules of procedure, and to discharge such other duties as may
be required of him by action of Congress.
Section 2. A duly admitted member, thirty years of age or more shall
be elected at the first meeting of each session as Vice-President of the
Congress to serve during that session and until his successor is elected.
Section 3. A Secretary and a Treasurer shall be appointed by the
President with the approval of a majority vote of the Congress to serve
such term and under such conditions as may be provided by majority
vote of the Congress.
Section 4. A committee of twelve, to be known as the Hold-Over Com-
mittee, shall be appointed by the President at the close of each session to
act until the close of the next succeeding session, which committee shall
be empowered to complete the business of the past session of Congress
and to prepare for the business of the next succeeding session. The Hold-
Over Committee will not be empowered to initiate new issues except in
the event of emergency that may result in jeopardy or catastrophe to the
Marshallese people in which case they may act with the full authority
of the Congress except that they shall not appropriate funds or expend
funds except for the purpose for which they were duly appropriated by
Congress. Appointments to the Hold-Over Committee shall not become
effective until approved by the Congress.
ARTICLE V. MEETINGS
Section 1. The Congress shall convene during the month of August on
a date set by the Hold-Over Committee.
Section 2. The Congress shall be adjourned by majority vote of the
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members.
Section 3. A quorum of two-thirds of the members shall be required
to transact business.
ARTICLE VI. POWERS
Section 1. By Resolution, approved by the High Commissioner the
Congress shall have the power to enact laws for the Marshall Islands
District in accordance with Section 20, Trust Territory Code, amended,
except those which are directly related to matters affecting customary
rights on Land Tenure, or Land Rights, as between Iroij, Alab and Dri
Jerbal, such disputes to be the province of the High Court only.
Section 2. Resolutions approved by the High Commissioner shall be-
come effective when promulgated or as otherwise provided: Resolutions
not approved or disapproved or otherwise acted upon by the High Com-
missioner within 180 days of the acceptance of an English translation
thereof by the District Administrator shall become effective upon pro-
mulgation or as otherwise provided, except, that no act of the Congress
amending or abrogating any provision of the Code of the Trust Territory,
an Executive Order of the High Commissioner or a District Order shall
become effective until approved by the High Commissioner.
Section 3. By Resolution, the Congress shall have the power to levy
and collect taxes not in contravention to provisions of the Code of the
Trust Territory, as amended, and to maintain and disburse funds as
provided by Budget Resolution approved by the District Administrator,
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2 of this Article.
Section 4. The District Administrator shall cause each Resolution ac-
corded the force and effect of law as provided herein to be promulgated
as provided by law.
Section 5. Any Resolution accorded the force and effect of law shall
control over any municipal ordinance.
Section 6. The Congress shall establish its own rules of procedure ex-
cept as herein provided.
Section 7. The Treasurer shall maintain full records of all tax assess-
ments, collections, and the appropriation and disbursement of funds.
Fiscal and other records of the Congress shall be made available for au-
dit by order of the Congress or the District Administrator upon demand.
Funds shall be deposited with the Treasurer who shall be responsible for
their care and disbursement in accordance with law; no disbursements
shall be made except as authorized herein.
Section 8. Acts of Congress not having the force and effect of law
may be addressed to the District Administrator or other persons within
the District as Representations without reference to the High Commis-
sioner.
ARTICLE VII. AMENDMENTS
Section 1. All Provisions of this Constitution shall remain in effect un-
til amended by Resolution passed by two-third vote of the Congress or
by Order of the High Commissioner.
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ARTICLE VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE
Section 1. This Constitution of the Congress of the Marshall Islands
shall become effective when adopted by majority vote of the Congress
and approval of the High Commissioner.
Section 2. Upon approval of this Constitution by the High Commis-
sioner, all provisions of the Constitution of the Congress of the Marshall
Islands, otherwise known as Proclamation No. 1–49, given under the
hand of the Governor of the Marshall Islands on the 17th day of Novem-
ber 1949, are hereby abrogated and terminated.
The foregoing has been approved by the Marshall Islands Congress. This
Constitution will become effective at the next Session of the Congress.
Dated 1st day of November 1958, at Majuro, Marshall Islands.
/S/ ATLAN ANIEN /S/ AISEIA DAVID
/S/ ROBERT REIMERS /S/ REWA SAMUEL
/S/ AJIDRIK BIEN /S/ MIKE MADDISON
/S/ CARL DOMNICK /S/ ABIJAI JOKLUR
/S/ ISAAC K. LANWI /S/ KABUA KABUA
/S/ AMATA KABUA
Approved this 8th day of December 1958.
/S/ D. H. NUCKER
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
PALAU COUNCIL
1948
Palau District Order No. 3–48
To the people of the Palau Islands:
ARTICLE I. FUNCTIONS
On July 1, 1948, a Palau Administrative Council shall be formed with
the following functions:
Membership
(1) High Chief of the Southern Palaus.
(2) High Chief of the Northern Palaus.
(3) Advisor to the Political Department.
(4) Advisor for Legal.
(5) Advisor for Finance.
(6) Advisor for Public Safety.
(7) Advisor for Labor and Agriculture.
(8) Advisor for Education.
(9) Advisor for Statistics.
(10) Advisor for Commerce.
(11) Advisor for Public Works.
(12) Advisor for Public Health.
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(13) Advisor for Lands.
(14) Advisor for Administration.
(15) Such other members as the Civil Administrator may appoint.
The function of the Palau Council is purely advisory to the Civil Ad-
ministrator. They will submit conclusions and recommendations on any
matter submitted to them by the Civil Administrator. They are encour-
aged to originate and submit to the Civil Administrator any matters
relative to Civil Administration. In other words, the Council is to keep its
fingers on the pulse of the people and so inform the Civil Administrator
on public opinion. The council may originate desired legislation and sub-
mit to the Palau Congress via Civil Administrator.
Sessions. The Palau Council shall be subject to call of the Civil Ad-
ministrator. No dates for regular sessions will be set until such times as
the need for them is indicated. Any member of the Council may request
to the Civil Administrator that the Council be called into session, stating
their reasons thereof.
Given under my hand this 17th day of June 1948.
/S/ C. M. HARDISON
Commander, U.S. Navy
Civil Administrator, Palau District
PALAU CONGRESS
1948
Palau District Order No. 4–48
To the people of the Palau Islands:
The composition, function and duties of the Palau Congress are as fol-
lows:
ARTICLE I. COMPOSITION
The Palau Congress shall be composed of the magistrate of each mu-
nicipality and elected members from each municipality as follows:
One (1) member for 0 to 199 population.
Two (2) members for 200 to 499 population.
Three (3) members for 500 and over population.
The members must be indigenous to the municipality they represent,
and will be elected for a term of two (2) years. In case of vacancy brought
about by death or illness of a member, a special election will be held in
the municipality concerned to fill the vacancy.
ARTICLE II. SESSIONS
The Palau Congress shall meet once a year, on the first Monday in
April and shall remain in session until the business before it is finished
or a three-fourths majority vote adjourns it. The Congress can be called
into extra session by the Civil Administrator and in such event, it will re-
main in session as long as the Civil Administrator deems it necessary.
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ARTICLE III. FUNCTIONS
The function of the Palau Council is purely advisory to the Civil Ad-
ministrator. It will be the duty of the Palau Congress to submit opinions
and recommendations upon any matter brought before it by the Civil Ad-
ministrator. The members of Congress may submit matters for opinion
and recommendations to the assembled Congress.
The rules of procedure for the Congress will be published separately.
This order effective 1 July 1948.
Given under my hand this 18th day of June 1948.
/S/ C. M. HARDISON
Commander, U.S. Navy
Civil Administrator, Palau District
PALAU DISTRICT ORDER NO. 1–49
1949
To the people of the Western Caroline Islands:
ARTICLE I. RULES FOR THE ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN
1. Election of congressmen will be held by the municipality concerned
within 10 days after the termination of Congress.
2. Elections will be conducted by an electoral assembly.
3. The Chief and the Magistrate (or Clerk, in municipalities where the
Chief is Magistrate,) are charged with the proper conduct of elections.
4. Three days prior to the election day the Magistrate of the Munici-
pality will publish the time and place of the electoral assembly.
5. All persons eligible to vote, except those physically unable, are
urged to leave their daily tasks and be present at the electoral assembly.
6. An electoral assembly is duly and legally constituted if a majority
of the electors are present.
7. The Chairman of the electoral assembly will be furnished by the
Clerk of the Municipality concerned, a roster or registration list of eligi-
ble voters.
8. The Chairman of the electoral assembly will register the electors
participating in the electoral assembly and make a report to the Civil
Administration. This report will contain the following: Number of vot-
ers eligible to vote, number of voters present, names of nominees,
number of votes cast for each nominee, name of person or persons
elected.
9. It is prohibited to hold an election without the permission, in each
case, of the Civil Administration.
10. Members of Congress will be elected from each municipality of
the Palaus in the ratio of:
One member for up to 199 population.
Two members for 200 to 499 population.
Three members for 500 and above.
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11. The Magistrate of a Municipality will automatically become a
member of Congress over and above the ratio as shown in paragraph 10.
12. Each Palauan 26 years of age or older is hereby qualified to vote
for or to be elected as a member of Congress except that:
(a) Persons must vote in the municipality where they maintain their
legal residence.
(b) Persons elected must be legal residents of the municipality con-
cerned.
(c) Persons imprisoned are hereby disqualified for the length of their
term of imprisonment.
(d) Persons under probation are hereby disqualified for the length of
their term of probation.
13. Members of Congress will be elected for a term of office of two
years from the date of election.
14. If there is a session of Congress convened at the expiration of any
Congressman’s term of office the date of the new election will be post-
poned until the Congress has adjourned and the member will retain all
his rights and prerogatives as a member of Congress until the postponed
election can be held.
15. Each municipality is authorized to pay to its Congressmen an
allowance of not more than $1.00 per day each day Congress is in ses-
sion.
ARTICLE II. RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONGRESSMEN
1. Congressmen shall attend all sessions of Congress.
2. Upon receiving notification of the convening of Congress, Con-
gressmen shall be punctual in arriving on the date set.
3. In the case of temporary illness or other circumstances which
would prevent a member from attending Congress, it is directed that the
Civil Administrator be informed as soon as possible.
4. In the case of permanent illness or inability of a member to attend
Congress, Civil Administrator will appoint a member to fill the unexpired
term of office of the Congressman concerned or until an election can be
held.
5. The President of the Congress will be elected at the beginning of
each annual meeting of Congress. If a special session of Congress is
called the President of the last regular session will preside. The Presi-
dent of the last regular session will preside at the opening of the new
Congress and will, as the first matter of business before the Congress,
hold the election of the new President of Congress. The President of the
Congress may be reelected.
6. The President of the Congress is charged with the following:
(a) He will open and close the sessions.
(b) He will moderate the discussions.
(c) He will appoint the Secretary of Congress; said Secretary will not
be a member of Congress.
(d) He will keep order in the Congress. In this duty he is empow-
ered to order the removal of any person who will not keep order; he
may order the spectators cleared from the Congress if they do not
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keep order.
(e) He may, with the consent of the Congress, limit the discussion on
matters brought before the Congress, or, he may declare out of order,
discussion which has no bearing on the matter before the Congress.
(f) He may summon such advisors as he deems necessary for advice
or explanation of matters before the Congress. He may not disregard a
request from the Congressman for summoning of such advisors.
(g) He may not submit any opinions or enter into the discussion of the
matter before the Congress except to introduce said matter for discus-
sion.
(h) He may not vote on any matter before the Congress except to
break a tie vote.
(i) If a motion to introduce new matter for discussion is brought to the
floor while another matter is already under discussion, he will not close
such discussion without the consent of the Congress.
(j) He will present the record of the business of the Congress to the
Civil Administrator.
7. If the President is unable to sit as President a new President will be
elected, for the time being.
8. The Secretary of the Congress is charged with the following:
(a) He will keep the record of the proceedings. In this duty he is al-
lowed to appoint assistants as he deems necessary.
(b) He will call the roll at each session.
(c) He will record the results of all voting of the Congress and enter
them in the proceedings.
(d) He will assign a serial number to all matters introduced into the
Congress. Such serial numbers will show the number of the documents
and the year and session of the Congress. This may be in the form of
the following examples: 1–48, regular session, or; 12–48, 2nd special ses-
sion.
9. All matters to be brought before the attention of Congress,
whether introduced by the Civil Administrator or a member of the Con-
gress, will be submitted to the President of the Congress on the first
day of the Congress or as soon thereafter as may be practicable. The
President of the Congress will then give them to the Secretary of the
Congress to be numbered and placed on the agenda for discussion. All
bills must be placed on the agenda except as otherwise ordered by the
Civil Administrator.
10. All bills submitted to the Congress will be forwarded to the Civil
Administrator with the record of the voting and discussion.
11. Each Congressman will cast his own vote and all votes will be
counted equally.
12. The Civil Administrator may close Congress at any time.
13. Sessions of the Congress are open to the public.
14. Congress is empowered only to render opinions and make recom-
mendations to the Civil Administrator.
15. The Civil Administrator is not required to follow the opinions and
recommendations of the Congress; however, he will, in all cases, take ac-
count of such opinions and recommendations.
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16. Recommendations once approved by the Congress and the Civil
Administrator will then become effective upon publication and posting of
the various municipalities.
17. The Civil Administrator reserves the right to modify, change, or
retract any of the rules in this order at any time.
ARTICLE III
The rules given in Article I, Section 12, shall apply to elections, for
municipal officials or to any issue that requires a vote in the municipal-
ity.
District Order No. 8–48 is hereby cancelled.
Given under my hand at Koror, Palau Islands, this 12th day of January
1949.
/S/ C. M. HARDISON
Commander, U.S. Navy
Civil Administrator, Palau Islands
CHARTER OF THE
OLBIIL ERA KELULAU ERA BELAU
1955
Whereas, the Palau Congress was inaugurated on July 4, 1947, under
the authority of the Military Government of the United States of America
to act as a body of advisors to the Military Government of the Palau Dis-
trict; and
Whereas, the Palau Congress has met annually in regular sessions
since its inauguration; and
Whereas, the people of the Palau District of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands have stated their desire for representation in the govern-
ment of their district; and
Whereas, the Congress of the United States of America has agreed
by ratification on July 18, 1947, of the Trusteeship Agreement between
the United States and the United Nations Security Council to promote
the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands toward self-government;
Now, therefore, I, Delmas H. Nucker, Deputy High Commissioner of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, do hereby charter the people of
the Palau District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to convene
a Congress which shall be known as the Olbiil Era Kelulau Era Belau,
hereinafter referred to in this document as the Olbiil Era Kelulau, to ad-
vise the District Administrator, and otherwise aid in the government of
their District as hereinafter provided.
ARTICLE I. MEMBERSHIP
Section 1. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall be composed of the two High
Chiefs of North and South Palau, and of the magistrate, the recognized
paramount hereditary chief, and the duly elected representative or rep-
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resentatives of each municipality of the Palau District, these elected
representatives to be hereinafter referred to as Chadal Olbiil.
Section 2. The secretary of each municipality shall certify each newly
elected or appointed member of the Olbiil Era Kelulau from his munici-
pality for eligibility and shall so inform the secretary of the Olbiil Era
Kelulau prior to the opening of each session of that body.
Section 3. Members of the Olbiil Era Kelulau may receive compensa-
tions and allowances for travel and subsistence as may be determined by
each municipality.
ARTICLE II. REPRESENTATION IN CHADAL OLBIIL
Section 1. Each municipality shall hold elections for Chadal Olbiil at
least every two years.
Section 2. Each municipality shall elect one but not more than five
Chadal Olbiil provided, that if the population as determined by the last
official census preceding election is less than 200 it shall elect one
Chadal Olbiil; that if the population exceeds 199 but not 499 it shall elect
two Chadal Olbiil; and that if the municipal population exceeds 499 it
shall elect one additional Chadal Olbiil for each additional 500 popula-
tion or fraction thereof.
Section 3. Any citizen of the Trust Territory is eligible for member-
ship in the Chadal Olbiil, regardless of sex, provided that he has attained
the age of twenty-six years prior to the date of election; and that he has
been a resident of the Palau District for more than three years prior to
the date of election; and that he has been a resident of the municipality
which he is to represent for the year immediately preceding his election;
and that he has been elected by vote of the electorate of that munici-
pality; and that he continue to be a permanent resident of the municipal
district from which he was elected for the period of his term in office.
Section 4. An Chadal Olbiil shall serve for a term of two years follow-
ing the date of his election, unless he is removed from office as herein-
after provided, or until such a time as his successor is elected or ap-
pointed.
ARTICLE III. OFFICERS
Section 1. A member of the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall be elected presi-
dent, to be known as Bedul Olbiil, by majority vote of that body at the
beginning of each April session. He shall serve until the qualification of
his successor, unless he is removed from office or dies in office, in which
case a new president shall be elected to complete his term.
Section 2. The Bedul Olbiil shall be assisted by a secretary, whom he
shall appoint with the approval of the Olbiil Era Kelulau.
Section 3. The Bedul Olbiil, shall be assisted by a body of advisors
to be known as Tebechelel Olbiil; he shall appoint the Tebechelel Olbiil
with the approval of the Olbiil Era Kelulau.
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ARTICLE IV. MEMBERSHIP VACANCIES
Section 1. Upon the death or ineligibility of a duly elected Chadal
Olbiil, a substitute shall be appointed by the municipal council to rep-
resent the municipality for the remainder of the term of office so
vacated.
Section 2. In the event that a duly elected Chadal Olbiil or a magis-
trate is unable to attend a session of the Olbiil Era Kelulau, a substitute
may be appointed by the municipal council to represent the municipality
for that session.
Section 3. An Chadal Olbiil may be removed for cause by the District
Administrator or by petition of two-thirds of the electorate of his muni-
cipality and a substitute shall be appointed by his municipal council to
fill the unexpired term in office.
Section 4. After certification by their municipal secretary, appointees
to the Olbiil Era Kelulau under the provisions of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of
this Article shall in all ways be considered members of the Olbiil Era
Kelulau with all of the powers of those whom they are appointed to re-
place.
Section 5. In the event that the paramount hereditary chief of a
municipality or either of the two High Chiefs is unable to attend a session
of Olbiil Era Kelulau, he may designate a substitute who shall have all
the powers that he himself could exercise if present. In cases where a
paramount chief is unable to confer such appointment, his chief’s coun-
cil may act in his stead. The council will certify such appointment and
will so inform the secretary of the Olbiil Era Kelulau prior to the opening
of its next session.
ARTICLE V. POWERS
Section 1. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have the power of resolution
upon any subject, including but not limited to those herein specifically
mentioned.
Section 2. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall determine its own rules and
procedures, provided that they do not contravene any provisions of this
charter, and may choose any officers or employees it deems desirable in
addition to those herein provided.
Section 3. The Olbiil Era Kelulau is hereby empowered to receive and
administer real and personal property, including that which was formerly
acquired or held by the Congress authorized and existing pursuant to
District Order 1–49.
Section 4. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have the power by resolution
to levy and provide for the collection of taxes and fees.
Section 5. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have the power to disburse
funds in accordance with resolutions.
ARTICLE VI. MEETINGS
Section 1. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall meet as a single body, convened
in regular session during April and October at dates to be fixed by that
body prior to the close of the previous session.
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Section 2. The Olbiil Era Kelulau may be convened in special session
by the Bedul Olbiil or by petition of one-third of its membership.
Section 3. Any session of the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall be adjourned by
majority vote.
Section 4. A quorum to do business shall consist of two-thirds of the
Chadal Olbiil and two-thirds of the membership not eligible to vote on
resolutions.
ARTICLE VII. VOTING
Section 1. All members of the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have equal
rights and privileges, except as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. All members of the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have the right
to propose resolutions and to vote on all matters except resolutions.
The Chadal Olbiil alone shall have the right to vote on resolutions, each
Chadal Olbiil having a single vote. Magistrates, paramount hereditary
chiefs, and the two High Chiefs of North and South Palau may vote on
resolutions only if they are also elected Chadal Olbiil.
Section 3. Any matter, in order to be expressed as a resolution of the
Olbiil Era Kelulau, shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the Chadal
Olbiil present and voting.
Section 4. The secretary of the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall maintain
a record of all sessions of that body and forward a copy thereof in
Palauan or in English as the body may determine, to the District Ad-
ministrator.
Section 5. Resolutions adopted by the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall be
signed by the Bedul Olbiil and the secretary and submitted to the District
Administrator.
Section 6. Resolutions will be approved or disapproved by the High
Commissioner within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the
date of acceptance by the District Administrator of an English transla-
tion thereof; if the High Commissioner fails to approve or disapprove any
resolution before the expiration of the one hundred and eighty day pe-
riod, the resolution shall be considered approved, providing it does not
conflict with any provision of the Trust Territory Code or an existing Dis-
trict Order.
Section 7. The District Administrator shall cause to be filed with the
Clerk of Courts of the Palau District a copy of each resolution accorded
the force and effect of law together with copies of all action thereon.
Section 8. Any resolution so approved or considered approved in ac-
cordance with Section 6 above, shall have control over any municipal
enactment.
Section 9. Questions may be submitted to the Bedul Olbiil by the Dis-
trict Administrator for consideration by the Olbiil Era Kelulau.
ARTICLE VIII. AMENDMENTS
Section 1. All provisions of this charter shall continue in force until
amended by resolution of the Olbiil Era Kelulau or by order of the High
Commissioner.
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ARTICLE IX. EFFECTIVE DATE
Section 1. The effective date of this charter shall be the 5th day of
January 1955.
Section 2. Approval is hereby granted for a District Order rescinding
Palau District Order 1–49 effective on the same date as this charter.
Given under My Hand and Seal this 5th Day of January, 1955.
/S/ DELMAS H. NUCKER
Deputy High Commissioner of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
CHARTER OF THE
PALAU DISTRICT LEGISLATURE
1963
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the Olbiil Era Kelulau Era Belau was established under the
provisions of the Charter granted January 5, 1955 by the High Commis-
sioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, in order to provide a
representative legislative body for the people of Palau District; and
Whereas, the elected representatives of Palau District, meeting as the
Olbiil Era Kelulau Era Belau, pursuant to the terms of that Charter, on
April 9, 1963 by unanimous vote requested that the Charter be replaced
by a revised one, provisions of which they recommended;
Now, therefore, I, M. W. GODING, High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, hereby rescind the Charter of January
5, 1955 and grant to the people of Palau District this present Charter,
giving them the right, in accordance with its provisions, to participate,
through the Palau Legislature in the government of Palau District. The
Palau Legislature is the successor in all respects and in every way, and
in accordance with this Charter, to the Olbiil Era Kelulau Era Belau.
ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers of the Palau District herein granted
by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
shall be vested in a single house to be known as the Palau Legislature.
Section 2. The Palau Legislature, hereinafter referred to as the Leg-
islature, shall be composed of twenty-eight (28) legislators elected every
four years by the electors of the Palau District, the Aibedul and the Rek-
lai and the recognized paramount hereditary chief of each municipality.
Only elected members may vote and hold office in this body.
Section 3. The first elections for legislators under the newly amended
charter shall be held within two months after the approval of this amend-
ment.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. There shall be sixteen electoral precincts, as follows:
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Aimeliik, Airai, Angaur, Kayangel, Koror, Melekeiok, Ngaraard, Ngar-
helong, Ngardmau, Ngaremlengui, Ngatpang, Nghesar, Ngiwal, Peleliu,
Sonsorol and Tobi.
Apportionment of legislators shall be as follows:
There shall be five legislators elected at large;
Koror shall have five legislators;
Ngaraard, Ngarhelong, and Peleliu shall each have two legislators;
Aimeliik, Airai, Angaur, Kayangel, Melekeiok, Ngardmau, Ngarem-
lengui, Ngatpang, Nghesar, Ngiwal, Sonsorol and Tobi shall each have
one legislator.
Section 2. Reapportionment on a population basis shall take place
every ten years, beginning in 1970. Regardless of population change,
each municipality shall be guaranteed at least one legislator.
Section 3. To be eligible for election or appointment, a person must
be a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, have resided in
Palau for a three-year period immediately preceding his election, be a
resident of his electoral precinct for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding his election, must be twenty-five (25) years of age
or over; and must never have been convicted of a felony.
Section 4. Where a legislator is unable to perform the duties of his
office due to physical or mental disability or death or who resigns or is
impeached by the Legislature, another shall be appointed to fill the re-
mainder of the term by the Chief Executive of his municipality who shall
select the replacement from a list of three persons nominated by the Mu-
nicipal Council. In the event a legislator-elect, other than an at-large,
is unable to assume office, there shall be a special election in his elec-
toral precinct in order to chcose another in his place. In the case of an
at-large legislator who is unable to assume office or who is unable to
attend a session of the Legislature, a substitute shall be appointed by
the District Administrator from the roster of candidates in the preceding
general election.
ARTICLE III
Section 1. No person may sit in the Legislature who holds an elective
public office in a municipal government.
Section 2. The Legislature alone shall determine the qualifications of
its members. The Legislature may by an affirmative three-fourths vote of
its members impeach any member. A legislator may be recalled by a ma-
jority vote of the registered electors in his precinct.
Section 3. Qualifications of electors shall be as follows: Each shall be
eighteen (18) years of age or over; a citizen of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands; has been a resident of his electoral precinct for a period
of at least six months immediately preceding the election; not be serving
a criminal sentence at the time of the election.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. The Legislature shall convene twice a year in regular ses-
sion on the first Tuesday of April and the first Tuesday in October if
possible. The District Administrator may convene the Legislature into
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special session, whose proceedings shall be confined to the subjects
stated in the District Administrator’s convening call. The Legislature
may also be convened by petition of one-third of its members.
Section 2. Each legislator shall present credentials which shall be in
the form of a statement from the Chief Executive of his municipality
authenticating his election. There shall be an oath of office which the
Speaker shall administer to each elected member individually. The Leg-
islature shall organize annually at the beginning of each April Session
selecting a Speaker and Vice-Speaker.
Section 3. The Legislature, by a majority vote of its members, shall
establish standing rules of procedure.
Section 4. An affirmative vote of a majority of the members present
shall be required to pass a measure. Three-fourths of the members of the
Legislature shall constitute a quorum.
Section 5. Any member may introduce a measure. Measures intro-
duced shall be read before the Legislature two times on different days,
before a vote may be taken.
Section 6. Communications and draft measures may be transmit-
ted to the Legislature by the District Administrator for consideration
by it.
Section 7. Upon passage of a measure by the Legislature it shall be
signed by the Speaker.
Section 8. Each bill shall have an enacting clause as follows: Be it en-
acted by the Palau Legislature, that, etc.
Section 9. Each act shall be submitted to the District Administra-
tor. If he approves the act he shall sign it and transmit it promptly
to the High Commissioner. If the High Commissioner takes no action
within sixty (60) days after receipt, it shall become law. If the
District Administrator takes no action within twenty-one (21) days
after receipt the act shall be considered approved, and the District
Administrator shall immediately send the Act to the High Commis-
sioner. In cases where, in the opinion of the District Administrator,
the approval or veto of an act will require consultation with the
High Commissioner, the District Administrator shall so inform the
Speaker, in writing, in which case the District Administrator shall
have an additional thirty (30) days in which to take action. Acts
vetoed by the District Administrator shall be returned to the Leg-
islature with his objections. By a three-fourths affirmative vote the
Legislature may submit the vetoed act to the High Commissioner
through the District Administrator and the High Commissioner shall
act within sixty (60) days after receiving the act. If he takes no ac-
tion the act shall be considered approved and shall become law. All
approved acts shall be known as Public Laws of Palau.
Section 10. The District Administrator and/or the High Commissioner
shall have authority to exercise item veto on revenue and appropriations
bills.
Section 11. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and
publish the same.
Section 12. Members of the Legislature shall, in all cases except
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felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their at-
tendance at the Legislature and in going to and returning from the same.
No member shall be held to answer before any tribunal other than the
Legislature itself for any speech or debate in the Legislature.
Section 13. As incidents of its legislative authority, the Legislature
may conduct investigations, hold public hearings, subpoena witnesses
and documents and administer oaths.
ARTICLE V
Section 1. There shall be four standing committes: Political, Social,
Economic and Appropriations. Chairman and Members of the commit-
tees shall be appointed by the Speaker. Measures introduced by legis-
lators shall be assigned to the appropriate committee by the Speaker.
Measures reported out by committee shall be in written form either as
bills, resolutions, or memorials. Measures shall be numbered and placed
on a calendar in the order in which they are reported out.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. The Legislature shall have the power to levy taxes and
grant licenses and appropriate funds.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. Compensation of the members of the Legislature and its
employees shall be established by law.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. Amendments to this Charter may be made upon an affirma-
tive vote of three-fourths of the members of the Legislature and ap-
proved by the District Administrator and the High Commissioner, or by
the High Commissioner on his own initiative.
Given under my hand and seal this 25th day of July 1963.
/S/ M. W. GODING
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
CHARTER OF THE
CONGRESS FOR THE ISLAND OF PONAPE
1952
Whereas, the representatives of the people of the Island of Ponape in
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands have stated their desire for a
Congress to express the will of the people in the government of their is-
land; and
Whereas, the United States of America has agreed, by ratification of
the Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese Mandated Islands,
to promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory of
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the Pacific Islands toward self-government;
Now, therefore, I, Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, do hereby charter the people of the Island
of Ponape, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, to convene a Congress
to assist in the government of their islands as hereinafter provided:
Section 1. Establishment. The Ponape Island Congress is established
to express the will of the people in matters of law and government in the
Island of Ponape and to act in an advisory capacity to the District Admin-
istrator, Ponape District.
Section 2. Composition. The Ponape Island Congress shall be com-
posed of two Houses, the Nobles’ House, and the People’s House.
Section 3. The Nobles’ House, Composition. The Nobles’ House shall
be composed of not more than five Nobles from each of the five wehy
of the Island of Ponape: Net, Uh, Jokaj, Metalanim, and Kiti. The Nan-
marki, Wasai, Naniken, and Nalaim of each wehy of Ponape Island shall
be representatives for their wehy in the Nobles’ House. The Nanmarki
and the Naniken of each wehy shall jointly appoint to the Nobles’ House
one high ranking title holder outside the Nanmarki and Naniken lines.
The Nobles’ House shall provide the District Administrator with a record
of all persons eligible for membership in the Nobles’ House.
Section 4. The People’s House, Composition. The People’s House shall
be composed of a representative, or representatives, from each munic-
ipality of the Island of Ponape. Each municipality shall elect by secret
ballot on the basis of universal and equal suffrage of adult citizens, one
representative to the People’s House for each three hundred inhabitants,
or fraction thereof, of the municipality as determined by the last official
census taken by the District Administrator. Persons holding the rank of
Nanmarki, Wasai, Naniken, and Nalaim may not be elected to member-
ship in the People’s House. All other Nobles are eligible for election to
the People’s House, but may not hold concurrent office in both houses.
Section 5. Representation for Out-Island Colonies. Either House may
seat as non-voting delegates one representative from each colony of res-
idents from other islands than Ponape. A majority vote by the members
of the House concerned is required to seat any of these delegates.
Section 6. Regular and Special Meetings. The Ponape Island Congress
shall convene in regular session on the second Tuesday of each May and
November at Kolonia, or in special session at such other times or places
as the Congress or the District Administrator may designate. When duly
convened the Congress shall remain in session until adjourned by con-
sent of both Houses.
Section 7. General Rules of Procedure. Each House shall prescribe its
own rules of procedure.
Section 8. Procedure, Presentation of Proposals, Resolutions. At all
sessions of the Congress matters for the consideration of either House
may be presented as a Proposal by any member of that House or by the
District Administrator. A Proposal, upon approval by a majority of the
House, shall be passed as a Resolution of that House for consideration
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by the other House. A Resolution that has been adopted by a majority
vote of both Houses shall be presented to the District Administrator as a
Resolution of the Congress. A Resolution that fails to gain the approval
of a majority of the second House considering it, upon two-thirds vote of
the originating House, may be presented to the District Administrator as
a Resolution of that House.
Section 9. Resolutions, Presentation. Resolutions presented to the
District Administrator shall be in writing and shall be signed by the
Chairman of the House presenting the Resolution or, in the case of a
Resolution of the Congress, shall be signed by the Chairman of each
House. Copies of all Resolutions will be furnished the High Commis-
sioner.
Section 10. Qualification of Members, Age. No person shall become a
member of the Ponape District Congress who is not at least twenty-five
(25) years of age.
Section 11. Qualification of Members, Residence. No person shall rep-
resent a Municipality or a wehy who has not lived continuously in the
Municipality or wehy for the three (3) years immediately preceding his
election.
Given under my hand this 14th day of May 1952.
/s/ ELBERT D. THOMAS
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
PONAPE DISTRICT CONGRESS CHARTER
1958
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the people of Ponape District of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands have expressed their desire for representation in the gov-
ernment of their district; and
Whereas, they selected and entrusted delegates from their
municipalities to meet together in a Congressional Convention to draft a
charter for the establishment of a district congress; and
Whereas, the Congress of the United States of America has agreed
by ratification on July 18, 1947, of the Trusteeship Agreement between
the United States and the United Nations Security Council to promote
the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands toward self-government;
Now, therefore, I, Delmas H. Nucker, High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, do hereby charter the people of Ponape
District to assemble a Congress of their elected representatives to be
known as the Ponape District Congress to assist in the government of the
district in accordance with the laws of the Trust Territory and the provi-
sions of this charter.
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ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers of Ponape District herein granted by
the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands shall
be vested in a unicameral house to be known as Ponape District Con-
gress.
Section 2. The Ponape District Congress, hereinafter referred to as
Congress, shall be composed of representatives chosen every four years
by the electors of the municipalities of Ponape District. The qualifications
of electors shall be as Congress shall establish by law.
Section 3. Municipalities with less than four hundred population shall
have at least one representative. Other municipalities shall be allotted
one representative for each four hundred people. Those municipalities
having an excess of at least two hundred people over multiples of four
hundred shall be allowed one additional representative. Congress may
by law increase the ratio of one representative for each four hundred
people, but may not deprive any municipality of having at least one rep-
resentative.
Section 4. Apportionment of representatives among the municipalities
shall be in accordance with the official municipal census report as of
June 1958, whereby Kusaie Municipality shall elect six; Madolenihmw
Municipality, six; Kitii Municipality, five; Net Municipality (including
Kolonia Town), five; Sokehs Municipality, five; Uh Municipality, three;
Kapingamarangi Municipality, one; Mokil Municipality, one; Ngatik Mu-
nicipality, one; Nukuoro Municipality, one; and Pingelap Municipality,
one.
Section 5. Reapportionment of representatives shall be made in 1960,
then every five years thereafter.
Section 6. No person shall be elected as a representative who is not a
citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; is not a resident of the
municipality at the time of his election; and has not reached twenty-five
years of age; or has been convicted of a felony.
Section 7. Where a representative is removed from office by death,
resignation, disability, or by action of Congress, another shall be ap-
pointed to fill the remainder of the term by the Chief Magistrate of the
municipality, with the approval of the Municipal Council. In the event a
representative-elect is unable to assume office, then there shall be a spe-
cial election in the municipality in order to choose another in his place.
Any person who assumes office as a representative under this Section
shall not be exempted from the provisions of Section 6.
Section 8. Election of representatives shall be by secret ballot, and
Congress shall set the time of election by law. Municipalities shall enact
ordinances prescribing the manner and places of election, although Con-
gress may change them at any time by law.
Section 9. Congress alone shall determine the qualifications and
judge elections of its members. Congress may by a three-fourths vote ex-
pel any member or refuse to seat any representative-elect.
Section 10. Representatives to the first Congress shall be divided into
two groups, one-half of whom shall hold their office for two years and the
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other half for four years; thereafter all representatives shall be chosen
for four years. Congress shall maintain at all times the division whereby
the term of offices shall expire every two years for one-half of the mem-
bers of Congress. Unless otherwise changed by Congress the division
of offices shall be as provided with the convening of the first Congress,
whereby representatives holding their offices for two years shall be in
accordance with the following schedule: Kapingamarangi, one; Ngatik,
one; Mokil, one; Uh, one; Kusaie, three; Madolenihmw, three; Kiti, two;
Sokehs, two, and Net, three.
Section 11. Election of representatives to the first Congress shall be
held within ninety days of the approval of this Charter by the High Com-
missioner.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. Congress shall convene twice a year in regular session dur-
ing March and September at dates to be fixed by Congress prior to close
of the previous session; provided, however, that the first Congress shall
be convened in September 1958 at a date set by the District Administra-
tor.
Section 2. Congress shall be considered as being continuously in ses-
sion from the date convened, but no session of Congress shall exceed
twenty days. Sundays shall not be counted, otherwise, each day of the
week shall be counted as one.
Section 3. The first Congress shall be called into session upon the
approval of this Charter by the High Commissioner. The District Admin-
istrator shall act as chairman and examine the credentials of each
representative-elect prior to calling the initial Congress together. Cre-
dentials shall be in the form of a statement from the Chief Magistrates of
the municipalities presenting the votes cast for all candidates. Congress
as its first order of business shall elect from its members a chairman who
shall be called President. Congress may elect other officers as it desires.
Hereafter all credentials of representatives-elect shall be presented to
the President and examined by Congress as its first order of business of
each regular session. No person may take the place of or be a substitute
for a duly elected representative to Congress.
Section 4. Congress, by a majority vote of its members, shall establish
its own rules of procedure not otherwise specified in this Charter.
Section 5. Each member of Congress shall have one vote. A majority
of the members of Congress shall be required to pass a bill. Three-
fourths of the members of Congress shall constitute a quorum.
Section 6. Any member may introduce a bill. Each bill introduced
shall be read in its entirety before Congress, and Congress shall deter-
mine by a vote of the majority whether to accept it for deliberation or
reject it. Any bill not rejected shall pass to the Legislative Committee
for drafting and shall be submitted to Congress for consideration at the
next regular session. Congress may by a two-thirds vote of its members
consider any bill during the session at which it was introduced.
Section 7. Upon passage of a bill by Congress it shall be forwarded to
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the District Administrator as a Ponape District Congress Resolution and
shall be signed by the President of Congress.
Section 8. All resolutions shall become law of Ponape District upon ap-
proval by the High Commissioner and shall become effective sixty days
thereafter, unless otherwise specified therein. The District Administrator
shall cause to be posted an English copy and a translation of all resolu-
tions in the municipalities of the district and a copy filed with the Clerk
of Courts along with the translation. Any resolution described herein re-
turned by the High Commissioner as disapproved shall not become law
of Ponape District.
Section 9. Any resolution upon which the High Commissioner has not
taken action within one hundred eighty days from the date of acceptance
by the District Administrator of an English translation thereof, shall be
considered as having his approval and shall become law of Ponape Dis-
trict as provided for in Section 8 of Article II of this Charter.
Section 10. Questions may be submitted to Congress by the District
Administrator for consideration by Congress.
Section 11. Municipal Ordinances shall have the full force and effect
of law insofar as they are not in conflict with any law promulgated under
the provisions of this Charter. District laws shall have the full force and
effect of law insofar as they are not in conflict with the Trust Territory
Code or any laws or regulations promulgated by the High Commissioner
by Executive Orders.
Section 12. The District Administrator may convene Congress into
special session.
ARTICLE III
Section 1. During sessions of Congress each member shall have equal
rights and privileges and no member of Congress shall be honored or re-
spect paid to him in address or manner because of title.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. There shall be a Legislative Committee, and bills of Con-
gress shall be committed to it in accordance with Section 6 of Article
II of this Charter. The Committee shall maintain a permanent or semi-
permanent staff to assist in the drafting or redrafting of bills as may be
necessary. The Committee and its staff shall provide services to the mem-
bers of Congress as may be required by them in the performance of their
office. The Committee shall keep the records of Congress and copies of
all laws which are applicable to Ponape District. It may keep such other
records or documents as it may deem necessary to provide assistance to
the members of Congress, or any other records or documents as Con-
gress shall desire. Congress shall appropriate funds, which shall be a
part of the approved budget, in order that the Committee may function
properly.
ARTICLE V
Section 1. Congress shall have the power by law to levy and provide
for the collection of taxes and fees in conformance with provisions of the
443
Trust Territory Code.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. Compensation of the members of Congress and employees
whose salaries or wages are from district revenues shall be as Congress
establishes by law.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. Expenditures of district revenues shall be in accordance
with the budget of Congress as established by law.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. Congress shall pass no laws which contravene the Trust
Territory Bill of Rights.
ARTICLE IX
Section 1. All laws enacted under the provisions of this Charter shall
be promulgated as Ponape District laws.
ARTICLE X
Section 1. Amendments to this Charter may be made upon the con-
currence of three-fourths of the members of Congress and the District
Administrator, and approval by the High Commissioner. No amendments
shall be made which shall deprive any municipality of representation in
Congress.
ARTICLE XI
Section 1. Any provision of this Charter which is construed to be in
conflict with duly enacted Trust Territory law shall be null and void and
the law of the Trust Territory shall have precedence.
Given under my hand and seal this 16th day of July 1958.
/s/ D. H. NUCKER
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
CHARTER OF THE
PONAPE DISTRICT LEGISLATURE
1963
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the Ponape District Congress was established under the
provision of a Charter granted on July 16, 1958, by the High Commis-
sioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in order to provide a
representative legislative body for the people of the Ponape District; and
Whereas, the elected representatives of the people of the Ponape Dis-
trict, meeting as the Ponape District Congress pursuant to the term of
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that Charter, on April 19, 1963, by unanimous vote, requested that the
existing Charter be replaced by a revised one, the provision of which
they recommended;
Now, therefore, I, M. W. Goding, High Commissioner of the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands, hereby rescind the Charter of July 16, 1958,
and grant to the people of Ponape District this present Charter, giving
them the right, in accordance with its provision, to participate through
the Ponape District Legislature, in the government of Ponape District.
The Ponape District Legislature is the successor in all respects and in
every way, and in accordance with this Charter, to the Ponape District
Congress.
ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers of the Ponape District herein
granted by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands shall be vested in a single house to be known as the Ponape Dis-
trict Legislature.
Section 2. The Ponape District Legislture, hereinafter referred to as
the Legislature, shall be composed of twenty-four (24) legislators elected
every four years by the electors of the Ponape District.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. There shall be eleven (11) electoral precincts, as follows:
Kapingamarangi, Kiti, Kusaie, Metalanim, Mokil, Net, Ngatik, Nukuoro,
Pingelap, Sokehs, Uh. Apportionment of legislators shall be as follows:
Kapingamarangi, Mokil, Ngatik, Nukuoro, and Pingelap shall each have
one member; Net shall have four members of whom two shall be from
and elected by the people of Kolonia Town, and two shall be from and
elected by the people in the remaining area of Net: Uh shall have two
members; Kiti, Metalanim, and Sokehs shall each have three members;
Kusaie shall have four members.
Section 2. Reapportionment on a population basis shall take place
every ten years, beginning in 1970. Regardless of population change,
each precinct shall be guaranteed at least one legislator.
Section 3. To be eligible for election or appointment, a person must
be a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, have resided
in Ponape District for a three-year period immediately preceding his
election, be a resident of his electoral precinct for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding his election; must be twenty-five
(25) years of age or over; and must never have been convicted of a
felony.
Section 4. Where a legislator is unable to perform the duties of his
office due to physical or mental disability or death or who resigns or
is impeached by the Legislature, another shall be appointed to fill the
remainder of the term by the Chief Executive of his municipality. In
the event a legislator-elect is unable to assume office, there shall be a
special election in his electoral precinct in order to choose another in
his place.
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ARTICLE III
Section 1. No person may sit in the Legislature who holds a public of-
fice in the executive branch at the municipal government level or who
holds a judicial office.
Section 2. The Legislature alone shall determine the qualifications of
its members. The Legislature may by an affirmative three-fourths vote of
its members impeach any member. A legislator may be recalled by a ma-
jority vote of the registered electors in his precinct.
Section 3. Qualifications of electors shall be as follows: Each shall be
eighteen (18) years of age or over; a citizen of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands; have been a resident of his electoral precinct for a period
of at least one year immediately preceding the election; not be serving a
criminal sentence at the time of the election.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. The Legislature shall convene twice a year in regular ses-
sion on the third Tuesday of January and the third Tuesday in July if
possible. The District Administrator may convene the Legislature into
special session, whose proceedings shall be confined to the subjects
stated in the District Administrator’s convening call. A special session of
the Legislature may be called upon petition of one-third of the member-
ship.
Section 2. Each Legislator shall present credentials which shall be
in the form of a statement from the Chief Executive of his municipality
authenticating his election. There shall be an oath of office which the
Speaker shall administer to each elected member individually. The Leg-
islature shall organize annually at the beginning of each January Session
selecting a Speaker and Vice-Speaker.
Section 3. The Legislature, by a majority vote of its members, shall
establish standing rules of procedure.
Section 4. An affirmative vote of a majority of the members present,
shall be required to pass a measure. Three-fourths of the members of the
Legislature shall constitute a quorum.
Section 5. Any member may introduce a measure. Measures intro-
duced shall be read before the Legislature two times on different days,
before a vote may be taken.
Section 6. Communications and draft measures may be transmitted to
the Legislature by the District Administrator for consideration by it.
Section 7. Upon passage of a measure by the Legislature it shall be
signed by the Speaker.
Section 8. Each bill shall have an enacting clause as follows: Be it en-
acted by the Ponape District Legislature, that, etc.
Section 9. Each act shall be submitted to the District Administrator.
If he approves he shall sign it and transmit it promptly to the High
Commissioner. If the High Commissioner takes no action within sixty
(60) days after receipt, it shall become law. If the District Adminis-
trator takes no action within twenty-one (21) days after receipt the
act shall be considered approved. In cases where, in the opinion of
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the District Administrator, the approval or veto of an act will require
consultation with the High Commissioner, the District Administrator
shall so inform the Speaker, in writing, in which case the District Ad-
ministrator shall have an additional thirty (30) days in which to take
action. Acts vetoed by the District Administrator shall be returned to
the Legislature with his objections. By a three-fourths affirmative vote
the Legislature may submit the vetoed act to the High Commissioner
through the District Administrator, and the High Commissioner shall
act within sixty (60) days after receiving the act. If he takes no ac-
tion the act shall be considered approved and shall become law. All
approved acts shall be known as Public Laws of Ponape District. The
Legislature by act, may repeal or amend District Orders with the ex-
ception of those designated Emergency District Orders in accordance
with Section 29, Trust Territory Code.
Section 10. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and
publish the same.
Section 11. Members of the Legislature shall, in all cases except
felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their at-
tendance at the Legislature and in going to and returning from the same.
No member shall be held to answer before any tribunal other than the
Legislature itself for any speech or debate in the Legislature.
Section 12. As incidents of its legislative authority, the Legislature
may conduct investigations, hold public hearings, subpoena witnesses
and documents, and administer oaths.
ARTICLE V
Section 1. There shall be four standing committees: Political, Social,
Economic, and Appropriations. Chairmen and members of the commit-
tees shall be appointed by the Speaker. Measures introduced by legis-
lators shall be assigned to the appropriate committee by the Speaker.
Measures reported out by committee shall be in written form either as
bills, or resolutions. Measures shall be numbered and placed on a calen-
dar in the order in which they are reported out.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. The Legislature shall have the power to levy taxes, grant
licenses and appropriate funds.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. Compensation of the members of the Legislature and its
employees shall be established by law.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. Amendments to this Charter may be made upon an affirma-
tive vote of three-fourths of the members of the Legislature and approval
by the District Administrator and the High Commissioner, or by the High
Commissioner on his own initiative.
Given under my hand and seal this 17th day of October 1963.
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/S/ M. W. GODING
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TRUK DISTRICT CONGRESS CHARTER
1957
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the magistrates of the municipalities of the Truk District as-
sembled in Council at Moen on the 23rd day of July 1957 have resolved
that a Congress of the people should be convened to assist in the govern-
ment of the district; and
Whereas, this Council has demonstrated its ability to exercise certain
responsibilities of government under our laws;
Now, therefore, I, Delmas H. Nucker, High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, do hereby charter the people of the Truk
District to assemble a congress of their elected representatives to be
known as the Truk District Congress to assist in the government of the
district in accordance with the laws of the Trust Territory and the provi-
sions of this charter.
ARTICLE I
This charter and all amendments hereto constitute a part of the laws
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
ARTICLE II. POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF POWERS
Section 1. The Congress is empowered to enact laws not in conflict
with the laws of the Trust Territory for the Government of the District,
which shall acquire the force and effect of law in the District when
approved by the District Administrator and the High Commissioner.
The Congress is also empowered to levy taxes and to disburse funds
subject to the approval of the District Administrator and the High
Commissioner.
Section 2. In the event an Act of the Truk District Congress is in
conflict with a municipal ordinance, the Act shall supersede and take
precedence over the ordinance.
ARTICLE III. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Section 1. Each Municipality of less than 500 people shall elect one
representative to sit in the Congress. Each municipality of more than
500 people shall elect one representative for each additional 500 people.
Population shall be determined from the most recently published territo-
rial census.
Section 2. Representatives to Congress shall be citizens of the Trust
Territory, thirty or more years of age and of sound mind and shall have
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maintained official residence in the Truk District for a period of ten years
or longer.
Section 3. Representatives to Congress shall be elected in accor-
dance with the laws of the municipality represented to serve for a term
of three years, except that municipalities entitled to elect more than
one representative may elect, to the first two annual sessions of Con-
gress only, one representative to serve for one year and one to serve
for two years.
Section 4. Each municipality in a reasonable time after election
shall issue a certificate signed by the island council or the island
magistrate and the Secretary of the municipality to each member or
members of Congress elected from the municipality which shall in-
clude: the name of the municipality; the name of the congressman;
the fact that the individual named in the certificate has been elected
to represent the municipality in the Congress; and the period of time
which the congressman shall hold office. This certificate shall be pre-
sented to the Credentials Committee to show that the holder of the
certificate is authorized to sit in Congress as representative of a par-
ticular municipality.
If any municipal officer signs a certificate as required by Article III,
Section 4, of the Truk District Congress Charter, knowing that the per-
son to whom the certificate has been issued has not been duly elected
by the municipality as a member of the Congress, he shall be guilty of
misconduct in public office and upon conviction shall be punished in ac-
cordance with Section 417 of the Trust Territory Code.
Section 5. In the event a representative dies, or becomes incapacitated
to the extent that he cannot perform his duties, or is otherwise disquali-
fied, a substitute may be elected or appointed as provided by law of the
municipality represented to serve the remainder of the unexpired term.
Section 6. A representative may be removed for cause by a two-thirds
majority vote of a quorum of the Congress.
Section 7. Members of Congress may receive pay, or other benefits as
determined by Congress.
ARTICLE IV. OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF CONGRESS
Section 1. At the opening of each session, the Congress shall elect
a Chairman. The Chairman shall preside over that session and shall re-
main in office until a new Chairman is elected by the Congress.
Section 2. The Congress shall elect or appoint a Secretary who shall
maintain a record of all proceedings of the Congress.
Section 3. The Congress shall elect or appoint a Treasurer who shall
be responsible for the collection of taxes and the disbursement of funds.
He shall maintain fund in his custody in a safe place and shall maintain
an account of all funds received, expended, and due.
Section 4. The Congress may appoint such other officers or employees
as may be necessary for the conduct of its business.
Section 5. The Congress may elect as advisors such persons as it may
desire.
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Section 6. Officers and employees of Congress may receive salaries or
other benefits as determined by act of Congress.
Section 7. At each Congress the Chairman shall appoint a credentials
committee of five members. The members of the committee shall serve
until a new committee is appointed by the Chairman of the succeeding
Congress. The committee shall meet and receive the credentials of each
member of Congress before the opening session of the Congress and
shall certify to the Chairman an official list, signed by each member of
the committee, of all members eligible to sit in the Congress and the
municipality they represent. Only those persons whose names appear on
the official list shall be permitted to vote in the Congress. The official list
shall be entered into and become a part of the permanent record of the
proceedings of Congress.
ARTICLE V. MEETINGS OF CONGRESS
Section 1. Congress shall meet annually during the month of August
or at such times as may be determined by act of Congress or the District
Administrator.
Section 2. Except as herein provided the Congress shall determine its
own rules of procedure for the conduct of meetings.
Section 3. A quorum shall consist of two-thirds of the elected mem-
bership.
Section 4. Legislative actions of Congress shall be entitled Acts of
Congress (Nopung or Nomopung).
Section 5. A two-thirds majority vote of the quorum shall be required
to pass an action of Congress.
ARTICLE VI. BUDGETS AND THE COLLECTION, CARE AND DISBURSEMENT
OF FUNDS
Section 1. The Treasurer shall be responsible to the Congress for the
collection, safe-keeping and disbursement of funds.
Section 2. Funds shall be disbursed only as authorized by the budget.
Section 3. Unexpended revenues shall not be accumulated from year
to year except for funds placed and held in a separate account for a
specified purpose. Such accounts shall be authorized by Act of Congress
and their balances reported annually as a part of the budget. Except for
funds held in separate account as authorized by this section, carry-over
funds shall be applied to the budget for the following year.
Section 4. The budget shall be adopted as an Act of Congress. It shall
not be amended except by Act of Congress.
Section 5. Records and accounts of the Treasurer and funds in his cus-
tody shall be made available for audit upon demand of the Congress or
the District Administrator.
ARTICLE VII. AMENDMENTS TO CHARTER
This charter may be amended by Act of Congress and upon the writ-
ten approval of the High Commissioner or by the High Commissioner on
his own initiative.
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Given under my hand and seal this 9th day of August 1957.
/S/ D. H. NUCKER
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
CHARTER OF THE TRUK DISTRICT LEGISLATURE
1963
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the Truk District Congress was established under the pro-
vision of a Charter granted 9 August 1957 by the High Commissioner of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, in order to provide a represen-
tative legislative body for the Truk District; and
Whereas, the elected representative of the people of Truk District,
meeting as the Truk District Congress pursuant to the term of that Char-
ter, on 7 August 1963 by two-thirds majority vote requested that the
existing Charter be replaced by a revised one, provision of which they
recommended;
Now, therefore, I, M. W. Goding, High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, hereby rescind the Charter of 9 August
1957, and grant to the people of Truk District this present Charter,
giving them the right, in accordance with its provision, to participate,
through the Truk District Legislature in the government of Truk Dis-
trict. The Truk District Legislature is the successor in all respects and
in every way, and in accordance with this Charter, to the Truk District
Congress.
ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers of Truk District herein granted
by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
shall be vested in a single house to be known as the Truk District Leg-
islature.
Section 2. The Truk District Legislature, hereinafter referred to as the
Legislature, shall be composed of twenty-seven legislators elected every
two years by the electors of Truk District.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. There shall be fifteen electoral precincts, as follows: Num-
ber 1. Namonouito (Ulul, Magur, Ono, Onari and Pisarach); Number 2.
Ta and Satawan; Number 3. Tol and Fala Beguets; Number 4. Lukunor
and Oneop; Number 5. Namoluk; Number 6. Udot, Ramonum and Eot;
Number 7. Moch, Kuttu and Ettal; Number 8. Uman; Number 9. Man-
wunpattiu (Pulap, Tamatam, Puluwat and Pulusuk); Number 10. Lukeisel
(Nama, Losap and Pis); Number 11. Fefan, Parem and Tsis; Number 12.
Polle, Patta and Wonei; Number 13. Dublon; Number 14. Moen; Number
15. Namwin Pafeng (Ruo, Murilo, Fananu and Nomwin). Apportionment
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of legislators shall be as follows: Precincts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 15
shall elect one member. Precincts 8, 6, 10 and 13 shall each elect two
members. Precincts 3 and 11 shall each elect three members. Precinct
14 shall elect four members.
Section 2. Reapportionment on a population basis shall take place
every ten years, beginning in 1970. Regardless of population change,
each precinct shall be entitled to have at least one legislator.
Section 3. To be eligible for election or appointment, a person must
be a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; have resided in
Truk District for a three-year period immediately preceding his election;
be a resident of his electoral precinct for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding his election; be twenty-three years of age or
over; and never have been convicted of a felony.
Section 4. Where a legislator is unable to perform the duties of the
office due to physical or mental disability or who dies or resigns or is
removed by action of the Legislature, another shall be appointed to fill
the remainder of the term by the District Administrator. In the event a
legislator-elect is unable to assume office, there shall be a special elec-
tion in his electoral precinct to elect another in his place.
ARTICLE III
Section 1. No person may sit in the Legislature who holds an
elected public office in the executive branch in a municipality, who
holds a judicial office, or who holds a staff position in the district
administration.
Section 2. The Legislature alone shall determine the qualifications of
its members. The Legislature may by an affirmative three-fourths vote of
its members expel a member for cause.
Section 3. Qualifications of electors shall be as follows: Each shall be
eighteen years of age or over; be a citizen of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands; have been a resident of Truk District for a period of at
least one year immediately preceding the election; be a registered elec-
tor in his precinct at the time of the election; not be serving a criminal
sentence at the time of the election.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. The Legislature shall convene twice a year in regular ses-
sion. These shall be on the third Tuesday of February and on the third
Tuesday of August, if possible. The District Administrator may convene
the Legislature into special session, whose proceedings shall be confined
to the subject stated in the District Administrator’s convening call. A spe-
cial session of the Legislature shall be called upon petition of one-third
of the membership.
Section 2. Each legislator shall present credentials in the form of a
statement from the chairman of the Truk District Election Board certify-
ing his election. The Legislature shall organize annually at the beginning
of each February session electing a Speaker and ViceSpeaker. There
shall be an oath of office which the Speaker shall administer to each leg-
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islator individually.
Section 3. Members of the Legislature during their attendance at the
Legislature and in going to and returning from the same, shall not be
subject to civil process and shall, in all cases except felony or breach of
the peace, be privileged from arrest. No Legislator shall be held to an-
swer before any tribunal other than the Legislature itself for any speech
or debate in the Legislature.
Section 4. As incidents of its legislative authority, the Legislature may
conduct investigations, hold public hearings and administer oaths.
Section 5. The rate of compensation for the members of the Legisla-
ture and its employees shall be established by law.
ARTICLE V
Section 1. The Legislature shall, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds
of its members, establish rules of procedure.
Section 2. Three-fourths of the members of the Legislature shall con-
stitute a quorum. An affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the
Legislature shall be required to pass a measure.
Section 3. Any member may introduce a measure. Measures intro-
duced shall be read in the Legislature two times on different days before
a vote may be taken. Measures shall be titled as either bills or resolu-
tions.
Section 4. Communications and draft measures may be transmitted to
the Legislature by the District Administrator for consideration by it.
Section 5. Upon passage of a measure by the Legislature it shall be
signed by the Speaker.
Section 6. Each bill shall have an enacting clause as follows: Be it en-
acted by the Truk District Legislature, that, etc. Each bill passed by the
Legislature shall be known as an act of the Truk District Legislature.
Section 7. Every act of the Legislature shall be presented to the Dis-
trict Administrator. If he approves or disapproves he shall so indicate
on the act and transmit it to the High Commissioner. If the District
Administrator does not take action within sixty days the act shall be con-
sidered as having his approval. If the High Commissioner approves he
shall sign the act. If the High Commissioner neither approves nor disap-
proves the act within thirty days, it shall be a law in like manner as if
he had signed it. Both the District Administrator and the High Commis-
sioner shall have item veto power on appropriation acts. Each approved
act shall be known as a Truk District Law. The Legislature may repeal
District Orders with the exception of those designated Emergency Dis-
trict Orders in Section 29, Trust Territory Code.
Section 8. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and
publish the same.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. There shall be four standing committees: Political, Social,
Economic and Appropriation. Chairman and members of the committees
shall be appointed by the Speaker. Measures introduced in the Legis-
lature shall be assigned to the appropriate committee by the Speaker.
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Measures shall be numbered and placed on a calendar in the order in
which they are reported out.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. The Legislature shall have the power to levy and collect
taxes and appropriate money.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. Amendments to this Charter may be made upon an affirm-
ative vote of three-fourths of the Legislature and approval by the District
Administrator and the High Commissioner, or by the High Commissioner
on his own initiative.
Section 2. The Truk District Congress shall be automatically dissolved
upon the convening of the first session of the Legislature. An election to
select members of the Legislature shall be conducted no later than 31
December 1963.
Given under my hand and seal this 25th day of September 1963.
/S/ M. W. GODING
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
YAP ISLANDS CONGRESS CHARTER
1959
PREAMBLE
Whereas, the people of Yap, Western Caroline Islands, through their
duly elected representatives, have expressed their desire for greater
representation in the government of their islands in accordance with the
principles proclaimed in the Trusteeship Council and under the laws of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and
Whereas, their elected and entrusted representatives have met to-
gether to draft a charter for the establishment of an island congress;
and
Whereas, we have confidence in the demonstrated ability of these
people to discharge certain responsibilities of government under our
laws and the provisions of this charter;
Now, therefore, I, Delmas H. Nucker, High Commissioner of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, pursuant to authority vested in
me, do hereby charter the people of Yap, Western Caroline Islands, to
assemble a Congress of their elected representatives to be known as
the Yap Islands Congress to assist in the government of their islands in
accordance with the laws of the Trust Territory and the provisions of
this charter.
ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers within Yap, Caroline Islands, herein
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granted by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands shall be vested in a unicameral assembly to be known as the Yap
Islands Congress.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. The Yap Islands Congress, hereinafter referred to as Con-
gress, shall be composed of two representatives, who shall be known
as Congressmen, from each municipality on Yap, chosen by the electors
within each municipality to serve for a term of four years, except that
in the first election of Congressmen, to be held within sixty days after
granting of this charter, one Congressman from each municipality shall
be elected for a term of two years and one Congressman from each mu-
nicipality shall be elected for a term of four years. Thereafter, elections
will be held at two-year intervals to elect successors to the Congressmen
from the respective municipalities whose terms of office are due to ex-
pire.
Section 2. Any vacancy in the membership of Congress shall be filled
by election held in the municipality concerned to elect a Congressman
to serve the unexpired portion of the term of office vacant provided that,
if less than three months of such term remain unexpired, Congress may
determine that the position shall remain vacant until the next regular
election of Congressmen.
ARTICLE III
Section 1. Any person who is a citizen of the Trust Territory, not less
than twenty-five years of age, resident for not less than three years in
the municipality in which he or she is nominated, has never been con-
victed of a felony, has not been legally adjudged mentally incompetent,
and does not hold office in a municipal government at the time of elec-
tions, may be elected a representative to Congress.
Section 2. Any Congressman who retains the qualifications stated
herein may succeed himself in office if duly reelected by the electorate
of his municipality.
Section 3. Any member of Congress may be impeached and removed
from office by resolution of Congress for cause determined by a hearing
before Congress meeting in closed session at which the impeached and
all parties who are witnesses thereto shall be heard. An affirmative vote
of three-fourths of the total membership of Congress shall be required
for removal from office.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. Qualifications of electors shall be as Congress shall estab-
lish by law, provided that no person otherwise qualified shall be denied
the right of suffrage because of sex, race, or religious creed, and pro-
vided that qualifications of electors which prevail in the municipalities of
Yap at the time of granting this charter shall prevail in the first election
of Congressmen hereunder.
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ARTICLE V
Section 1. As the first order of business at the first session of Con-
gress following regular elections of members, Congress shall elect from
among it members an officer to serve as President of Congress for a term
of two years, provided that, at the first session of Congress after grant-
ing of this charter, the District Administrator shall convene the Congress
and preside until the election of a President as the first order of busi-
ness.
Section 2. Following the election of President of Congress in accord-
ance with Section 1, next above, Congress shall elect from among its
members an officer to serve as Vice-President of Congress for a term of
two years.
Section 3. The President shall appoint, and Congress shall confirm by
majority vote of the members present, an officer to serve as Secretary of
Congress for a term of two years or such shorter period as Congress may
determine.
Section 4. When a vacancy occurs in the Presidency or Vice-Presi-
dency of Congress, Congress shall elect among its members, at the the
next regular or special session, an officer to serve the unexpired portion
of the term of office vacant.
Section 5. Duties of officers shall be as determined by Congress, and
shall include:
(a) that the President shall preside at all regular and special sessions
of Congress, except that in the absence of the President, the Vice-Pres-
ident shall preside, and in the absence of the President and Vice-Presi-
dent, the Secretary shall preside;
(b) that the Secretary shall make and maintain or cause to be made
and maintained records of all sessions of Congress;
(c) that the Officers of Congress shall comprise an Executive Com-
mittee whose function it shall be to prepare and publish before the
convening of each regular session of Congress an agenda of business for
the forthcoming session.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. The President of Congress shall appoint from among the
members a Legislative Committee, among whose functions shall be the
drafting of bills and resolutions of Congress; other functions of the com-
mittee may be specified by Congress in its rules of procedure. The
Legislative Committee may employ under the provisions herein, such
employees as are necessary to perform its proper functions.
Section 2. The Congress may appoint or elect from among its mem-
bers such other committees as are deemed necessary. Advisors and
consultants not members of Congress may be appointed to non-voting
membership on such committees.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. Congress shall convene in regular session twice yearly, con-
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vening on the first Monday in May and the first Monday in November.
Section 2. Special sessions of Congress may be called by the Presi-
dent, the District Administrator, or by petition of a majority of members
of Congress.
Section 3. In any session of Congress, regular or special, Congress
shall be considered continuously in session from the date convened,
but no session of Congress shall exceed ten days duration, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and official holidays established by Congress by
resolution.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. Compensation for services of members of Congress shall
be as Congress may determine and enact as resolution provided that all
Congressmen shall be compensated equally for actual days service in at-
tendance at regular or special sessions of Congress.
ARTICLE IX
Section 1. Congress may employ such persons as are deemed neces-
sary to proper conduct of its functions. Funds for the compensation of
such employees shall be provided in an annual budget enacted by Con-
gress as a resolution.
ARTICLE X
Section 1. At any regular or special session of Congress, each member
shall have one vote on any resolution or representation introduced.
Three-fourths of the membership of Congress shall constitute a quorum
at any regular or special session. An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
members present at any regular or special session shall be required to
pass a resolution of Congress unless otherwise specified herein.
Section 2. Congress shall, by a majority vote of its total members, es-
tablish its rules of procedure not otherwise specified herein.
Section 3. Any member of Congress may introduce a bill. Each bill
introduced shall be read in its entirety before Congress, and Congress
shall determine by a vote of the majority of the members present
whether to accept it for deliberation or reject it. Each bill accepted shall
pass to a Legislative Committee for drafting and shall be submitted to
Congress at its next regular session for consideration. By an affirma-
tive two-thirds vote of the members present, Congress may determine to
consider a bill during the session in which it was introduced or at any
subsequent special session prior to the next regular session.
Section 4. Upon passage of a bill by Congress, it shall be signed by
the President and the Secretary and forwarded to the District Adminis-
trator as a Yap Islands Congress Resolution.
Section 5. Any resolution not approved by the District Administrator
shall be returned to Congress, together with a statement of his reasons
for disapproval and recommendation for reconsideration by the Con-
gress, copies of which shall also be forwarded to the High Commissioner.
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At any regular or special session, Congress may, by an affirmative vote
of three-fourths of its total membership, confirm such resolution and for-
ward it through the District Administrator to the High Commissioner.
Section 6. Resolutions approved by the District Administrator shall
be forwarded to the High Comissioner by the District Administrator and
Congress shall be notified of such action. Resolutions approved by the
High Commissioner shall become law of Yap, Caroline Islands, effective
thirty days thereafter, unless otherwise specified within the resolution or
approval, and shall be promulgated according to law.
Section 7. Any resolution upon which the District Administrator has
not taken action within thirty days after acceptance by him of an English
translation thereof shall be considered as having the District Administra-
tor’s approval, and a copy of the resolution together with a translation
shall be forwarded by Congress through the District Administrator to the
High Commissioner.
Section 8. Any resolution upon which the High Commissioner has not
taken action within one hundred eighty days from the date of accept-
ance by the District Administrator of an English translation thereof shall
be considered as having the High Commissioner’s approval and shall be-
come law of Yap, Caroline Islands, in accordance with Section 6 next
above.
Section 9. No resolution or enactment of Congress shall have the
force and effect of law except as provided herein.
Section 10. No ordinance of any municipality of Yap, Caroline Islands,
which contravenes laws enacted under the provisions of this charter
shall be accorded the force and effect of law.
Section 11. Acts of Congress constituting opinions and not intended
to have the force and effect of law may be presented to the District Ad-
ministrator as Representations of Congress.
ARTICLE XI
Section 1. Congress shall have the power to enact resolutions to
provide for and maintain the welfare of the residents of Yap, Caroline Is-
lands.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power by law to levy and provide
for the collection of taxes and fees in conformance with provisions of the
Code of the Trust Territory, amended.
Section 3. Congress shall establish by law an annual budget to pro-
vide for the use and disbursement of revenues collected under authority
contained herein, under the Code of the Trust Territory, amended.
ARTICLE XII
Section 1. Amendments to this charter may be made by resolution
upon the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the total membership of
Congress or by order of the High Commissioner, provided that no amend-
ment shall be made which shall deprive any municipality of Yap of
Representation in Congress.
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ARTICLE XIII
Section 1. Nothing within this charter shall be construed as contra-
vening the Code of the Trust Territory, as amended, or any other laws,
orders, or directives promulgated by the High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Section 2. No act of Congress which contravenes the laws of the Trust
Territory shall be accorded the force and effect of law.
Given under my hand and seal this 9th day of February 1959.
/S/ D. H. NUCKER
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
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MODEL CHARTER
DISTRICT LEGISLATURE
ARTICLE I
Section 1. The legislative powers of _______ District herein granted by
the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands shall
be vested in a single house to be known as the _______ District Legisla-
ture.
Section 2. The _______ District Legislature, hereinafter referred to as
the Legislature, shall be composed of ______ legislators elected every
_______ years by the electors of _______ District.
ARTICLE II
Section 1. There shall be _______ electoral precincts, as follows:
Apportionment of legislators shall be as follows:
Section 2. Reapportionment on a population basis shall take place
every ten years, beginning in 1970. Regardless of population change,
each precinct shall be entitled to have at least one legislator.
Section 3. To be eligible for election or appointment, a person must
be a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, have resided in
_______ District for a three year period immediately preceding his elec-
tion, be a resident of his electoral precinct for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding his election; must be twenty-three years
of age or over; and must never have been convicted of a felony.
Section 4. Where a legislator is unable to perform the duties of the
office due to physical or mental disability or who dies or resigns or is re-
moved by action of the Legislature, another shall be appointed to fill the
remainder of his term by the chief executive of his municipality. In the
event a legislator-elect is unable to assume office, there shall be a spe-
cial election in his electoral precinct to elect another in his place.
ARTICLE III
Section 1. No person may sit in the Legislature who holds a public
office in the executive branch at the municipal government level, who
holds a judicial office, or who holds a staff position in the district ad-
ministration. (Since conditions vary in the districts, the provisions in this
section are optional.)
Section 2. The Legislature alone shall determine the qualifications of
its members. The Legislature may by an affirmative three-fourths vote of
its members expel a member for cause.
Section 3. Qualifications of electors shall be as follows: Each shall
be eighteen years of age or over; be a citizen of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands; have been a resident of _______ District for a
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period of at least one year immediately preceding the election; be a
registered elector in his precinct at the time of the election; not be
serving a criminal sentence at the time of the election.
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. The Legislature shall convene twice a year in regular ses-
sion. These shall be on the _______ and on the _______, if possible. The
District Administrator may convene the Legislature into special session,
whose proceedings shall be confined to the subjects stated in the District
Administrator’s convening call. A special session of the Legislature shall
be called upon petition of one-third of the membership.
Section 2. Each legislator shall present credentials in the form of a
statement from the chief executive of his municipality certifying his elec-
tion. The Legislature shall organize annually at the beginning of each
________ session electing a Speaker and Vice-Speaker. There shall be an
oath of office which the Speaker shall administer to each legislator indi-
vidually.
Section 3. Members of the Legislature during their attendance at the
Legislature and in going to and returning from the same, shall not be
subject to civil process and shall, in all cases except felony or breach of
the peace, be privileged from arrest. No member shall be held to answer
before any tribunal other than the Legislature itself for any speech or
debate in the Legislature.
Section 4. As incidents of its legislative authority, the Legislature may
conduct investigations, hold public hearings and administer oaths.
Section 5. The rate of compensation for the members of the Legisla-
ture and its employees shall be established by law.
ARTICLE V
Section 1. The Legislature shall, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds
of its members, establish rules of procedure.
Section 2. Three-fourths of the members of the Legislature shall con-
stitute a quorum. An affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the
Legislature shall be required to pass a measure.
Section 3. Any member may introduce a measure. Measures intro-
duced shall be read in the Legislature two times on different days, before
a vote may be taken. Measures shall be titled as either bills or resolu-
tions.
Section 4. Communications and draft measures may be transmitted to
the Legislature by the District Administrator for consideration by it.
Section 5. Upon passage of a measure by the Legislature it shall be
signed by the Speaker.
Section 6. Each bill shall have an enacting clause as follows: Be it en-
acted by the _______ District Legislature, that, etc. Each bill passed by
the Legislature shall be known as an act of the ________ District Legisla-
ture.
Section 7. Every act of the Legislature shall be presented to the Dis-
trict Administrator. If he approves, or disapproves, he shall so indicate
on the act and transmit it to the High Commissioner. If the District
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Administrator does not take action within sixty days the act shall be con-
sidered as having his approval. If the High Commissioner approves he
shall sign the act. If the High Commissioner neither approves nor disap-
proves the act within thirty days, it shall be a law in like manner as if
he had signed it. Both the District Administrator and the High Commis-
sioner shall have item veto power on appropriation acts. Each approved
act shall be known as a _______ District Law. The Legislature may repeal
District Orders with the exception of those designated Emergency Dis-
trict Orders in Section 29, Trust Territory Code.
Section 8. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and
publish the same.
ARTICLE VI
Section 1. There shall be four standing committees: Political, Social,
Economic and Appropriations. Chairmen and members of the commit-
tees shall be apointed by the Speaker. Measures introduced in the Leg-
islature shall be assigned to the appropriate committee by the Speaker.
Measures shall be numbered and placed on a calendar in the order in
which they are reported out.
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. The Legislature shall have the power to levy and collect taxes
and appropriate money.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. Amendments to this Charter may be made upon an affirma-
tive vote of three-fourths of the Legislature and approval by the District
Administrator and the High Commissioner, or by the High Commissioner
on his own initiative.
HIGH COMMISSIONER’S EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 83
August 9, 1962
Subject: An Order Establishing the Office of District Treasurer, and
amending the Charter of the Palau District Congress, the Yap Is-
lands Congress, the Truk District Congress, the Ponape District
Congress, and the Marshall Islands District Congress
I. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 36 of the Code of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands and the authority vested in me as High
Commissioner, it is hereby ordered that:
1. The Office of District Treasurer be and it is hereby established
within the Office of each District Administrator.
2. Appointment and Compensation
(a) The District Treasurer shall be appointed by the District Congress
for a term which shall be specified by the Congress, subject, however, to
removal for cause at any time by the District Administrator.
462 Other Documents
(b) The District Treasurer shall receive a salary for his services, from
the appropriate District funds, in an amount and under such conditions
as the District Congress shall provide.
3. Duties
(a) The District Treasurer shall receive, maintain, and disburse funds
under the authority of the District Congress and under the direction and
supervision of the District Administrator.
(b) The District Treasurer shall keep complete and accurate records
of all funds received, maintained and disbursed by him in such manner
as prescribed by the District Administrator. Such records shall be open
to inspection and audit by the District Congress and the Trust Territory
Government.
(c) The District Treasurer shall analyze the receipts and disburse-
ments under the authority of the District Congress and, under the su-
pervision of the District Administrator, prepare for presentation to the
Congress an annual budget in a manner and at such times as the Con-
gress may by law prescribe.
4. All District Treasurers presently acting as such pursuant to any
law in effect prior to the date of this Order are hereby authorized
to continue to act until the appointment of a District Treasurer at
the next regular or special session of the respective District or Island
Congress, subject, however, to removal at any time by the District Ad-
ministrator.
5. The Charters of the Palau District Congress, the Yap Islands Con-
gress, the Truk District Congress, the Ponape District Congress, and the
Marshall Islands District Congress, respectively, are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing provisions with respect to the office of, ap-
pointment and duties of the District Treasurer.
6. Any District Laws or Resolutions in conflict herewith shall be of no
further force and effect.
II. The above and foregoing order is subject to and is to be construed
in accordance with Presidential Executive Orders numbered 10408 and
10470, dated November 10, 1952 and July 14, 1953, respectively.
/S/ D. H. NUCKER
High Commissioner
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
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374, 376
Education: U.S. approach, 8, 9, 15,
19, 20; provided by Japan, 11,
14, 18; concern of district legis-
latures, 27, 109, 111, 118; of
district legislators, 88, 89; for
political growth, 117, 367, 384,
402; Yap district, 144; Ulithi,
152; of congressional candi-
dates, 276–278; of congressmen,
283, 284, 288, 289, 313, 341.
See also Hawaii; Junior College
of Micronesia; Pacific Islands
Central School; Pacific Islands
Teachers Training School
Elato (Yap district): status, 148
Elections: methods, 180, 186, 188,
355; regulations, 207–209,
246–248, 350; problems,
226–227; boards, 249–251; regis-
tration, 251–253, 271; ballots,
253–255, 270; nominations,
255–261; campaign, 261–267;
conduct, 267–271; results,
271–274. See also Political parties
Embree, John F.: quoted, 383
English language: taught, 19;
problems, 69, 126, 172, 337; in
district legislatures, 88, 89, 92,
104, 105, 163, 170, 175; status,
134; in congress, 219, 284, 293,
294, 296; on ballots, 253; in
campaign, 264, 276, 277, 283,
284; interpreted, 328, 344
Eniwetok (Marshall district): peo-
ple moved, 134
Ethnocentrism: in Micronesia, 3–4;
in politics, 22, 198, 225, 289,
391, 400
Faichuk area (Truk district): dis-
tricting, 228, 229
Fais (Yap district): status, 148,
176
Falmog, Joachim, politician, 160
Falo (Truk district): status, 121
Faraulep (Yap district): status,
148
Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 205
First Trust Territory Conference
on Self Government, 183
Fischer, Ann M. and John L.:
quoted, 117
Fisheries: commercial, 7, 11, 380
Fong, Carlos, politician, 160, 161,
162, 170
Force, Roland: quoted, 131
Fotin, Y. E., 387
Gagil (Yap district): status,
147–149, 151, 164, 167, 168,
176, 240
Galiman (Yap district): status, 147,
151
Garapan, Saipan: population, 11;
destroyed, 30n
Gatelmar, Robert, politician, 160,
170, 174
General Assembly: qualifications,
209, 210; relations with House
of Delegates, 219; representa-
tion, 223–226, 235–243; candi-
dates nominated, 255, 256, 259;
members’ characteristics,
282–287; committees, 298, 308,
311, 316, 323, 327, 329–334,
336, 347, 349, 351, 367, 377;
rules, 304, 306–312, 337, 338;
officers, 308, 310–316, 323,
397; staff, 317, 326, 327; attire,
320; organized, 323; inter-
preters, 328; journal, 329;
procedure, 338; leadership,
341, 342–344, 347; adjourn-
ment, 348–349; name changed,
355, 372; measures, 358, 359,
360, 367, 369, 372; attitude to-
ward tradition, 366, 367
Geology: Micronesia, 2
Germany: rules Micronesia, 2, 9,
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10, 393; rules Ponape, 24; local
government system, 25, 26; sets
district pattern, 30; government
run by trading company, 62; af-
fects chiefs’ role, 120, 121, 124,
133, 141; influences Yap struc-
ture, 146, 147, 150, 166; exiles
Sokehs people, 240; attitude to-
ward ethnic groups, 391
Gilbert Islands: geography, 1n; sta-
tus, 388, 389
Gill, Thomas P., 291n
Gladwin, Thomas: quoted, 48
Goding, M. W., high commissioner,
300
Government service: of Marshal-
lese legislators, 88, 89; of con-
gressional candidates, 279, 280,
281
Great Britain: administers Gil-
berts, 1n, 389
Guam: status, 1, 17, 18, 231, 242,
313, 390, 391, 393, 395, 396,
397; Spanish port of call, 9; terri-
torial Headquarters, 35, 179,
182, 184; Trust Territory liaison
office, 37, 248, 254; early district
council, 46; legislature, 49, 105,
308, 327; territorial leaders’
meetings, 182–184, 195; Trust
Territory absentee voters, 248,
254; politics, 265; medical
school, 289; resident Saipanese,
313; attorneys, 327; access to,
354; Micronesian supplies trans-
shipped, 356, 370, 378; ac-
quired, 382; resident Palauans,
391; strategic value, 394
Hall Islands (Truk district): dis-
tricting, 229, 235; nominations,
258; voting, 268, 272
Hawaii: territorial Headquarters,
35, 179, 182; missionaries to,
46; Micronesians educated in,
47, 266, 289, 293, 341; legisla-
tive practices, 80, 91, 306, 310,
371; language, 105; dog tax,
112; East-West Center, 291,
355; university commended,
325; status, 382, 392–393, 397
Hawaii Architects and Engineers,
Inc.: program, 19
Heine, Dwight, assemblyman, 259,
298n, 315, 316; leadership
style, 342–343
Henry, Bethwel, assemblyman,
261, 298n, 315, 316, 340
Hethy, Belarmino, Ulithian chief,
158, 159, 160, 169, 171, 172,
173, 174
High commissioner: charters mu-
nicipalities, 28; appoints district
administrators, 30, 31; powers,
34, 35, 67, 69, 179–181, 188,
191, 192, 199, 206, 209; veto
power, 54–55, 56, 63, 65, 68, 70,
71, 95, 103, 104, 112–113, 118,
154, 155, 215–218, 369, 371,
373n, 376; incorporates trading
companies, 61; opposition to,
114; election duties, 222,
226–233, 238, 241, 245n, 246,
247, 248, 250, 251, 255, 259,
261, 269; relations with con-
gress, 305, 309, 323, 325, 327,
345–347, 349, 350, 355, 356,
365–366, 375, 376, 377, 379; ti-
tle, 384. See also Administration;
Political Affairs Office
High Court: judges appointed, 38;
jurisdiction, 39, 323
Holdover committees: Marshalls,
10, 80, 81, 82, 119, 137, 140,
249; Marianas, 64, 79, 81; in
districts, 80–82, 93; Truk, 81,
82; Palau, 105; Ponape, 249
House of Delegates: members’
qualifications, 209, 212; rela-
tions with General Assembly,
219; representation, 222, 223,
237, 238, 239; candidates nom-
inated, 255, 256, 259; members’
characteristics, 282–287; com-
mittees, 298, 308, 311, 312, 318,
319, 327, 330–334, 336, 349,
351, 352; rules, 304, 306–312,
337, 338; officers, 312–315,
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317–319, 324; staff, 317, 320,
326, 327; organized, 323, 324,
365; journal, 329; procedure,
338; leadership, 341, 342; ad-
journment, 348–349; name
changed, 355, 372; measures,
358–361, 365, 367, 369, 372; at-
titude toward tradition, 366,
367; concern with Micronesia’s
status, 401
House of Representatives. See
General Assembly
Ibedul, Palauan high chief, 128,
130, 131
Ifalik (Yap district): status, 148
Inter-District Conferences,
182–184, 185, 195
Interest groups: relations with
committees, 100; effect on leg-
islation, 106; safeguards
against, 218; in congress, 365,
367
Iroij: status, 4; in district legisla-
ture, 44, 73, 82, 89; traditional
role, 53, 54, 61, 122, 132–142;
in congress, 140, 278. See also
Marshall Islands district legisla-
ture
Island Trading Co.: activities, 61,
62; funds, 205
Itang: role, 44
Jaluit Co.: administers Marshalls,
62
Japan: rules Micronesia, 2, 9, 10,
11, 14, 18, 282, 380, 385, 387,
394; social system, 6; economic
activity, 7, 380; quits League of
Nations, 14; local government
system, 23, 25, 26, 27; rules
Yap, 24; sets district pattern,
30; territorial government, 34,
35; employs civil servants, 40;
convenes district councils, 46;
government aided by trading
company, 62; affects chiefs’
role, 120, 129, 133, 134; atti-
tude toward land rights, 141,
142; influences Yap structure,
145n, 146, 147, 150, 152; trade
with, 183, 383, 384, 394; inter-
est in Yap, 382; attitude toward
ethnic groups, 391
Japanese language, 88, 253, 264,
276, 277, 283, 284
Johnson, President Lyndon B., 271
Junior College of Micronesia: pro-
posed, 356, 374
Jury system: measure enacted,
355, 369, 370; considered by
districts, 378
Kabua, Amata, delegate, 297n,
315, 318, 340
Kajur: status, 4, 132, 133; in dis-
trict legislature, 73, 136–138
Kaman, Dr. John, disqualified can-
didate, 259
Kanifay (Yap district): school
board, 156
Kapingamarangi (Ponape district),
4; social structure, 5
Keesing, Felix M.: quoted, 16, 281
Kennedy, President John F., 381
Kili (Marshall district): voting,
270
Kiti, Ponape Island division, 24
Klobak, Palau councils, 5, 127,
141
Kolonia, Ponape Island town: char-
tered, 29, 73; constitutional
assembly at, 125
Koreans: influence on Microne-
sians, 11
Koror (Palau district): mandate
headquarters, 35; traditional ju-
dicial system, 41; early district
convention, 51; represented in
district legislature, 74, 105; dis-
trict center, 227, 228, 230, 231;
politics, 241
Koror Confederation, Palau:
chiefs, 5, 128; history, 24,
127; boundaries, 231; politics,
263
Kusaie (Ponape district): social
structure, 4; German rule, 9;
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traditional political system, 27n,
123n; status, 31, 389; king’s
council, 45n; legislators from,
105; districting, 240, 243; lan-
guage, 277; religion, 280n
Kusaieans: separation from Po-
nape, 240; on Ebeye, 254, 269,
270n
Kwajalein (Marshall district):
salaries, 8; as a district, 31;
Trust Territory liaison office,
37; community court, 39; anti-
missile testing, 39; legislative
rump session, 106n; congres-
sional measures for, 355
Lamotrek (Yap district): status,
148
Land rights: Marshalls, 73, 80,
106, 132, 133, 137–140, 142;
Ponape, 124, 141; Palau, 141,
142; Yap, 145, 148, 149, 166;
Micronesia, 182; political issue,
391
Languages: Oceania, 1; Marshall
legislators, 88, 89; in legislative
records, 104–105; Yap problem,
163, 172, 175; interpreting
needed, 184, 219, 276, 328;
abilities of politicians, 219,
276–278, 284; Palau, 253, 264.
See also English language; Jap-
anese language
Leadership: in district legislatures,
116; traditional, 120–142; Yap
district, 143–177 passim; in
congress, 339–345
League of Nations: mandate, 2, 10,
14, 385, 387
Legislative Advisory Committee:
function, 181–182
Legislators: role concepts, 86–87,
285–287, 290, 300–301. See
also Delegate; Politico; Trustee
Legislative counsel: district legis-
latures, 79; congress, 220, 312,
326, 327, 331, 337, 343, 346,
347, 355, 371; Marianas, 378
Legislature: institution defined,
v–viii. See also District legisla-
tures: various bodies
Leroij: in district legislature, 86,
276
Liberal party: Palau district, 241,
257, 263, 264
Liquor control, 32, 111, 268
Lockwood, George, missionary, 45
Luktun, Francis, 160
Madrich: Yap visitors’ shelter, 151,
163, 167
Magic: Ulithi, 149; Woleai, 175.
See also Religion
Magistrates: Marshalls, 46, 53, 54,
72, 134; Truk, 48, 50, 56, 81,
99, 115, 122; Palau, 52, 53, 73,
115, 225; relation to district
legislatures, 82, 89, 116; con-
sulted on apportionment, 227.
See also Municipalities
Mailo, Petrus: Truk chief, 121,
122; assemblyman, 314, 315,
316, 319, 340; leadership style,
343–344; concern for Microne-
sia’s status, 400
Majuro (Marshall district): district
center, 31; magistrates confer-
ence, 53, 54; anthem, 61;
legislators from, 80, 81; politi-
cal leaders, 135; land dispute,
139; congressional election,
250, 252, 258n, 268, 270, 271;
radio, 376
Maoris: in Cook Islands, 392
Mariana district: cleavage, 17, 55;
established, 31; chiefs, 120; rep-
resentation, 223, 224, 226; map,
231; districting, 231–242 passim;
political parties, 241, 377; con-
gressional elections, 248–273
passim, 278, 324; religion,
280–281; congressmen from, 288,
297n, 298n, 308, 313, 315, 318,
319, 327, 328, 340, 341; court,
323; police aid congress, 326;
congressional measures for, 355;
congressional delegation’s spon-
sorship, 357–365 passim
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Mariana district administration:
relations with legislature, 63,
66; congressional apportion-
ment plan, 227
Mariana Islands: geography, 1, 2;
social structure, 4; status, 10,
17, 390, 393; economy, 11; peo-
ple characterized, 292. See also
Northern Marianas
Mariana Islands district legisla-
ture: antecedents, 49, 50, 63;
holdover committee, 64, 79, 81;
powers, 70, 71; structure, 74,
75, 78, 79; charter, 76–77,
417–420; membership, 82, 84,
85; procedure, 94; legislative
measures, 94, 95, 97, 98; floor
action, 103, 106, 107; output,
107; relationships, 108, 115,
247; budget, 109; measures ve-
toed, 113, 369; legislative
counsel, 378; visited by Guama-
nians, 390; concern for
Micronesia’s status, 400
Marianas Legislative Conference:
Guam, 391
Marshall district: religion, 5,
280–281; established, 31; tradi-
tional government, 53, 54, 61,
132–142; congressmen from,
141, 297, 298n, 313, 315, 316,
318, 340, 376; represented on
Council of Micronesia, 186;
congressional elections, 208,
245n, 250–252, 258–260, 262,
266–272 passim, 279; map, 232;
representation, 223, 224, 226;
districting, 234, 236–238; cul-
ture, 292; congressional delega-
tion’s sponsorship, 357, 358,
362, 363; flag committee, 374,
398; attitude toward Guamani-
ans, 396
Marshall district administration:
district headquarters, 30n; rela-
tion with legislature, 81; con-
gressional apportionment plan,
227
Marshall Islands: geography, 1, 2;
climate, 3; social structure, 4;
status, 9, 389; missionaries in,
10; people resettled, 17;
Protestant church, 45; strate-
gic value, 394. See also Atomic
testing
Marshall Islands district legisla-
ture: holdover committee, 10,
80, 81, 82, 119, 137, 140, 249;
membership, 44, 82, 86–90, 96,
107, 116; antecedents, 46, 47,
51, 53, 54; name, 57; powers,
59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 68, 69, 70;
structure, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78;
charter, 76–77, 421–425; trans-
portation problem, 84; leroij in,
86, 276; organized, 93; proce-
dure, 95, 103, 104, 107, 310;
rump session, 106n; output,
108; budget, 109; measures ve-
toed, 112, 114; organizes
MIECO, 117; role of iroij, 122,
135–142, 169; role in congres-
sional election, 249, 250; nom-
inates candidates for council of
Micronesia, 256
Marshall Islands Importing and
Exporting Co., 61, 62, 117
Marshallese Magistrates Confer-
ence, 1949, 72
Meeting Place of Whispers. See
Palau district legislature
Melekeok Confederation, Palau:
chiefs, 5, 128; history, 24, 127;
boundaries, 231; politics, 263
Merau, Palauan class, 5
Merir (Palau district): voters, 270
Metalanim (Ponape district): mu-
nicipal elections, 377
Meteet, Palauan class, 5
Meyungs, Koror village, Palau,
230
Micronesia: name, 1; population,
8–9; strategic value, 382, 385,
386, 389, 392, 394. See also
Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands
Micronesia Day: proclaimed, 354,
356, 374; significance, 380
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Micronesian Hotel Corporation,
337n, 365, 369, 376
Micronesian Times: criticizes con-
gressional staff, 335
Micronesian Title and Pay Plan,
40, 336, 365, 370, 378
Micronesians: origin, 3; social
structure, 4–6; role in adminis-
tration, 32, 181–184; charac-
terized, 345, 400; power trans-
ferred to, 345, 353, 367, 368;
preferences, 354, 356, 370,
378. See also Nationalism
Midkiff, Frank E., high commis-
sioner, 184
MIECO. See Marshall Islands Im-
porting and Exporting Co.
Mindszenty School, Palau district,
284
Missionaries: to Micronesia, 10;
teach parliamentary procedure,
45, 46, 47; to Hawaii, 46
Modekgnei, Palau cult, 5, 264
Moen (Truk district): district head-
quarters, 75; chief, 121;
districting, 228, 229; voting,
268; municipality chartered,
343. See also Mailo, Petrus
Mogmog, Ulithi (Yap district):
status, 148, 159, 160, 173,
175
Mokil (Ponape district): traditional
government, 123n; districting,
240; congressional nomina-
tions, 256
Mortlocks (Truk district): legisla-
tive session planned, 75; dis-
tricting, 228, 229; people in
Sokehs area, 240; congressional
election, 272
Mount Tagpochau, Saipan, 325
Moving pictures: used at congress-
men’s workshop, 302–303
Municipalities: self-government,
22–30 passim; relation to dis-
trict legislatures, 59, 60, 63, 82,
84; represented in district legis-
latures, 73, 76, 173; power,
115, 116; Yap district, 151–155,
167, 169; Truk district, 154;
districting problem, 228, 229;
election procedures, 247; Mari-
anas, 256; officers elected to
congress, 283, 284. See also
Magistrates
Nakayama, Tosiwo, delegate,
298n, 314, 317, 318, 319;
leadership style, 342
Namoneas area (Truk district): dis-
tricting, 228, 229
Namonuito (Truk district): status
in Yap empire, 148; districting,
229, 235
Naniken, Ponapean chiefs,
123–127
Nanmarki, Ponapean chiefs, 110,
123–127, 141
Nanpei, Henry, politician, 47
Nanpei, Oliver, politician, 60
Nanyo Boeki Kaisha, 62
Nanyo Cho: civilian rule, 11; struc-
ture, 34, 35
Nathan, Robert R., Associates,
Inc.: resource survey, 19
Nationalism: Micronesian, 355,
356, 374, 375
Nationalist Chinese: guerillas
trained, 17–18; attitude toward
dependent peoples, 386
Natural resources: Micronesia, 2,
380. See also Economic condi-
tions
Nauru: geography, 1n; status, 389
Net, Ponape Island division, 24
New Guinea: legislature, 339n; Mi-
cronesia governed from, 393;
status, 395
New Zealand: suggests territorial
conferences, 194; administers
Western Samoa, 390; adminis-
ters Cook Islands, 392
Ngek. See Outer Islands (Yap dis-
trict)
Ngerbeched, Koror village, Palau,
230
Ngiraked, John O., delegate, 298n,
312, 315, 317, 318, 319
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Ngulu (Yap district): status, 147
Northern Marianas: status, 9, 18,
31, 242, 265, 390, 400; district
councils, 46; district charter ve-
toed, 54–55; represented in
district legislature, 74; politics,
265, 266; ethnic groups, 391;
strategic value, 394. Also see
Mariana Islands; Saipan (Mari-
ana district)
Nucker, Delmas H., high commis-
sioner, 184, 193, 195
Nukuoro (Ponape district), 4; so-
cial structure, 5
Nuuan, Francis, delegate, 297, 340
Oberdofer, Don: quoted, 383
Oceania: culture, 1
Okinawans: influence on Microne-
sians, 11
Olbedabel, John. See Ngiraked,
John O.
Olbiil era Kelulau. See Palau dis-
trict legislature
Olter, Bailey, delegate, 297, 317,
318, 319, 340, 401
Outer Islands (Yap district): be-
liefs, 5; status, 31; traditional
government, 144–152 passim;
magic, 149, 175; participation
in district politics, 154, 156–176
passim, 377; districting, 235,
240; congressional elections,
249, 256, 269, 270, 272, 278n;
culture, 292
Pacific Islands Central School,
289, 313, 341, 356
Pacific Islands Teachers Training
School, 289
Pacific State: suggested by Hawaii,
393
Palau Association: functions, 63
Palau Board of Education: power,
64
Palau Council: role, 52, 53, 61, 79,
80, 81, 82; charter, 425–426
Palau district: traditional govern-
ment, 5, 111, 127–131, 141;
municipal government, 23, 24,
28; entomologist, 37; age quali-
fications, 210, 245; representa-
tion, 223, 224, 225, 226; dis-
tricting, 227, 228, 229–231,
235, 236–238, 241, 242; map,
230; congressional election,
249, 252–272 passim, 276, 278;
political parties, 249, 263–265,
273, 377; religion, 281; con-
gressmen from, 297n, 298n,
312–318 passim, 337, 340; dele-
gation sponsors measures, 357,
358, 359, 362, 363, 364; Mi-
cronesian anthem sung, 375
Palau district administration: es-
tablished, 30; relations with
legislature, 66, 79, 80, 103; re-
lations with magistrates, 116
Palau district legislature: name, 6;
antecedents, 41–43, 47, 50–53;
relationships, 52, 53, 61, 79, 80,
81, 82, 105, 113, 116, 119, 337,
375; powers, 59, 61–64 passim,
67, 70, 71n; structure, 73, 74,
77, 78; role of chiefs, 73, 102,
122, 129, 130, 131, 137, 142,
169; charter, 76–77, 426–437;
membership, 82, 84, 85, 86,
116; procedures, 93, 95, 98,
100, 103, 106, 107; holdover
committee, 105; output, 108;
budget, 109; attitude toward
tradition, 110, 111; congres-
sional apportionment plan, 227,
241; nominates Council of Mi-
cronesia candidates, 256
Palau Islands: social structure, 5,
141, 142; commercial fishing, 7;
economy, 11; Sokehs exiles on,
240; people characterized, 292;
status, 389, 398n; strategic
value, 394
Palau Magistrates Conference,
115, 116
Palauans: culture, 3; on Yap, 156;
reputation, 318; on Guam, 391
Papua-New Guinea: House of As-
sembly, 339n; status, 395
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Parliamentary procedure: taught,
29, 45, 46, 47; in district
legislatures, 78–79, 91–92, 101;
Ulithi, 158; Council of Microne-
sia, 185; familiarity with, 293,
334, 335, 344. See also General
Assembly; House of Delegates
Paul, Dr. Olter, assemblyman, 316,
358n
Peace Corps Volunteers: influence,
19, 401; as legislative counsel,
79
Pearl Harbor. See Hawaii
Peleliu (Palau district): districting,
230
Petrus. See Mailo, Petrus
Philippine Islands: migrations
from, 3; Micronesia governed
from, 393
Pingelap (Ponape district): district-
ing, 240; language, 277
Pingelapese: in Sokehs area, 240
Political Affairs Office: district leg-
islature activities, 158, 172;
relations with congress, 199,
246, 247, 248, 253, 326
Political parties: functions, 93, 97,
115; Palau, 106, 262, 263–265,
273, 278, 377; Marianas, 106,
262, 265, 273, 278, 377, 391;
Saipan, 187; affected by appor-
tionment, 235, 241, 242; role in
congressional elections, 249,
250, 253, 255–257, 262, 267,
278; Guam, 265; influence on
congress, 319, 364, 365, 367
Politico: representational role
type, 87, 285–287
Polynesians: culture, 4, 5
Ponape district: economy, 6; popula-
tion growth, 9; airport, 20;
municipal government, 24, 28;
plant pathologist, 37; represen-
tation, 201, 223, 224, 226; dis-
tricting, 227, 235–238, 240, 242;
map, 234; congressional elec-
tion, 250–254 passim, 256, 260,
261, 266, 268, 269, 270n, 272,
273; languages, 277; congress-
men from, 278, 297n, 298n, 313,
316–319 passim, 340, 401; reli-
gion, 281; delegation sponsors
measures, 357, 358, 362, 363
Ponape district administration: es-
tablished, 30, 31; congressional
apportionment plan, 227
Ponape district legislature: an-
tecedents, 45–56 passim, 125;
powers, 59, 60, 62, 66, 70;
structure, 72, 73, 75, 79; char-
ter, 76–77, 437–447; members,
82, 83, 84; procedures, 93, 95,
102, 105; languages, 104; rela-
tionships, 105, 116, 301n;
output, 108, 112; budget, 109;
upholds tradition, 110; evalu-
ated, 117; role of chiefs, 122,
126, 127, 142; holdover com-
mittee, 249; role in
congressional election, 249;
chooses Council of Micronesia
delegates, 256
Ponape Island (Ponape district):
geography, 2; culture, 3; tradi-
tional government, 4, 123–125;
status, 9, 389; divisions, 24,
240; politics, 55, 56, 105; reli-
gion, 280n; bauxite, 380
Popular party: Marianas, 242, 257,
265, 283, 323, 364, 365, 391
Population: Micronesia, 8–9; base
for apportionment, 74, 164,
166, 201, 222–243 passim
Pressure groups. See Interest
groups
Progressive party: Palau district,
241, 257, 263
Progressive party (Northern Mari-
anas). See Territorial party
Protestant church: Micronesia, 5;
concepts, 45; Marshalls, 88, 89;
Ponape mission, 124; member-
ship of congressional candi-
dates, 280–281
Public health: under Japanese, 11,
14; under U.S., 15, 19, 20; con-
gressional concern, 370, 377, 379
Puerto Rico: status, 391, 392
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Pulap (Truk district): status in Yap
empire, 148
Puhisuk (Truk district): status in
Yap empire, 148
Puluwat (Truk district): status in
Yap empire, 148
Radak chain of islands (Marshall
district): magistrates, 46; legis-
lators from, 105; social struc-
ture, 132, 133n; districting, 234
Radio: serves district legislatures,
60; Yap, 171, 173, 176; operators
licensed, 205; role in congres-
sional elections, 248, 258, 262,
264, 266, 267, 270; Palau, 264;
serves congress, 326, 331, 334,
376; Marshalls, 376
Ralik chain of islands (Marshall
district): magistrates, 46; legis-
lators from, 105, 106n; social
structure, 133n; districting, 234
Regionalism: fostered, 51, 61, 86;
inter-legislature visits, 118. See
also Ethnocentrism
Reklai, Palauan high chief, 128,
130, 131
Religion: of Marshall legislators,
88, 89; influence on legislation,
106; institutions aided, 205,
206; of congressional candi-
dates, 280–281. See also Catho-
lic church; Magic; Protestant
church
Representational role: types, 87,
284–287, 300–301
Rifai, Najmuddine: quoted, 83, 84
Riggs, Fred W.: quoted, 288
Robbins, Robert R., legislative
counsel, 327
Robert’s Rules of Order: used by
Marshalls church conferences,
45; used by district legislatures,
92; taught to Ulithians, 158;
used by Council of Micronesia,
185
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.,
385
Rota (Mariana district): status, 17,
31; represented in district legis-
lature, 74; districting, 232, 235,
242; votes for district council,
256; congressional election,
257, 266, 270, 271; petitions U.
N., 374n, 397
Rugulmar, John, assemblyman,
161, 162, 174
Sablan, Juan A., assemblyman,
298n, 315, 316
Sady, Emil J., 179, 391
Saipan (Mariana district): settled,
10; C.I.A. program, 17, 18, 55;
municipality, 27, 49, 50, 73; dis-
trict headquarters, 30n; ter-
ritorial Headquarters, 32, 34,
35, 37, 322, 325; early district
councils, 46, 54–55; repre-
sented in district legislature,
74, 75; delegates to Council of
Micronesia, 185; politics, 187,
241, 249, 365, 373; congress
meets on, 197, 325, 328; rela-
tions with Guam, 231, 390;
districting, 232, 235, 242; con-
gressional elections, 257, 265,
266, 270, 271; climate, 320; at-
torneys, 327; radio, 331;
congressmen from, 371
Saipan Municipal Council: func-
tions, 47, 308; relation to dis-
trict legislature, 115, 247, 390
Saipanese: on Guam, 313
Salii, Lazarus, assemblyman, 284,
298n, 315, 316, 375
Samoa. See American Samoa;
Western Samoa
Samuel, Dr. Henry, assemblyman,
316
Santos, Gonzalo: designs flag, 371
Sarigan (Mariana district): voters,
270
Satawal (Yap district): status, 148
Sawaichi, Jacob, assemblyman,
316
Security Council: party to Trustee-
ship Agreement, 187, 192n,
193, 386
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Senate. See House of Delegates
Shakov, P. F.: quoted, 6
Shipping: to Trust Territory ports,
356, 370, 378
Sokehs, Ponape Island division, 24,
240; people exiled, 240
Solomon Commission: report, 109,
180, 401
Sonserol (Palau district), 24n
Sorol (Yap district): status, 148
South Pacific Commission, 396
South Seas Government, 11, 34,
35
Spain: rules Micronesia, 2, 9, 12,
120, 127, 128; rules Marianas,
4, 393; rules Ponape Island,
24; convenes district councils,
46
Spanish-American War: disposal of
Spain’s possessions, 9, 10; ef-
fects, 382
Special session: congressional,
309, 349–352, 355, 371
Spoehr, Alexander: quoted, 134
Strategic Trusteeship, 192, 385,
386
Sturges, Albert A., missionary, 45
Tapioca (manioc): cash crop, 11
Taxation: municipal, 29, 116, 305;
jurisdiction, 32, 63, 109, 118,
169, 205, 206, 305, 346, 350;
Yap district, 154, 157, 161, 163,
165, 166, 169, 174, 175
Tebechelel Olbiil. See Palau coun-
cil
Territorial Advisory Council: role,
182, 190–191, 194
Territorial party: Marianas, 242,
257, 265, 273, 319, 364, 365,
391
Thomas, Elbert D., high commis-
sioner, 182
Tinian (Mariana district): repre-
sented in legislature, 74; district-
ing, 232, 235, 242; congressional
election, 257, 266, 270
Tman, Luke M., assemblyman,
298n, 316, 366, 373
Tmetuchl, Roman, delegate, 297
Tobi (Palau district), 24n; district-
ing, 230
Toppa-Tappi Club, Saipan, 325
Tourist industry: hotels, 7, 19,
337n, 365, 369, 376; Palau, 11;
Pacific, 393
Trading companies: chartered, 61,
62, 117
Tradition: in social structure, 4–6;
respected by U.S., 18; political
systems, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30,
41, 42, 43, 44, 53, 58, 59, 68, 72,
101, 122, 131, 230, 231, 233,
234, 261, 262, 263, 267, 269,
322, 366, 367, 369; subjects in
district legislatures, 109–111,
112; legislative protection, 170,
198, 202; congressmen’s con-
cern, 289, 366, 367
Transportation: by air, 7, 19, 20,
375, 378n; difficulties, 84, 268,
270; improvements urged, 370;
cost, 381. See also Shipping
Travel: of congressional candi-
dates, 278; of congressmen,
283, 284, 288
Truk district: population growth,
9; established, 31, 148; munici-
palities chartered, 154; repre-
sentation, 202, 222, 223, 224,
226; districting, 227–229,
235–239 passim; map, 229;
congressional elections, 246,
252, 253, 254, 260, 262, 266,
268, 269, 272, 273; congress-
men from, 278, 297n, 298n,
313, 314, 315, 318, 319, 337,
340, 365; religion, 280n, 281;
delegation sponsors measures,
357, 358, 361, 362, 363
Truk district administration: dis-
trict headquarters, 30n; func-
tions, 33; relations with
legislature, 48, 65; congres-
sional apportionment plan,
227–228
Truk district legislature: antece-
dents, 44, 47, 48, 50, 56, 57,
477
122; powers, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70,
305n, 369; structure, 74, 75,
78; charter, 76–77, 447–453;
holdover committee, 81, 82;
members, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87,
211n; procedure, 95; Low Is-
lands members, 102; output,
107; budget, 109; relationships,
113, 115, 118, 119, 337, 343;
nominates Council of Microne-
sia candidates, 256; concern for
Micronesia’s status, 399
Truk [District] Magistrates Confer-
ence, 48, 56, 122
Truk Islands: social structure, 3, 4;
status, 9, 389; magistrates
meetings, 50, 81, 99, 115;
precincts, 73; chiefs, 120–122;
territorial conferences, 183,
184; congressional election,
268; protest war, 380n
Truk Trading Co., 62
Truman, President Harry S.: sets
up Trust Territory administra-
tion, 14, 35; approves Trustee-
ship Agreement, 187
Trust Territory Code, 69, 71, 72,
96, 178–182 passim, 190, 191,
205, 372
Trust Territory Conference on Self-
Government, 1953, 60
Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands: geography, 1, 2; map,
12–13; administrative districts,
30–34; Headquarters organiza-
tion, 32, 34, 35–39, 325; staff
entomologist and plant patholo-
gist, 37; flag, 180, 326, 354, 355,
356, 371, 372, 374; strategic
trusteeship, 192, 385, 386; na-
tional anthem, 375; status,
381–403. See also Administra-
tion; High commissioner; Saipan,
territorial Headquarters
Trustee: representational role
type, 87, 285–287, 290, 301
Trusteeship Agreement: terms,
14–17 passim, 21, 179, 187,
190; relation to Security Coun-
cil, 187, 192n, 193, 386; rele-
vance to bill of rights, 205
Trusteeship Council: urges political
development, 22, 28, 192–196
passim, 401, 403; favors unicam-
eral district legislatures, 73;
Marshallese charter reported to,
138; session reports, 184, 185;
attitude toward congressional
charter, 198, 204, 206, 207, 210,
212, 214, 215, 217; attitude to-
ward voting age, 245;
attendance of congressmen
urged, 355, 356; American am-
bassador visits Yap, 399
U, Ponape Island division, 24
Udui, Kaleb, legislative counsel,
327
Ujelang (Marshall district): iroij,
134
Ulithi (Yap district): culture, 3; sta-
tus, 144, 147–152 passim;
politics, 157, 159, 161, 162, 168;
language problem, 158; Woleai
students, 175; districting, 240
Unicameralism: considered for dis-
trict legislatures, 72, 73, lxxvi,
125, 130, 137; Marshalls, 89,
138, 140; considered for con-
gress, 192, 198, 201–204, 209,
223
United Micronesia Development
Association, 7
United Nations: aims, 51, 138,
242, 384, 390, 396, 403; visit-
ing missions, 61, 195, 198, 200,
202, 203, 207, 212, 213, 214,
220; petitions to, 66, 374, 397,
398, 399, 400; reports to, 67,
345; relations with, 178, 311,
395. See also Security Council;
Trusteeship Agreement;
Trusteeship Council
United States: administers Micro-
nesia, 14–21, 22, 23, 192, 194,
195, 196, 200, 380–384, 385,
394; attitude toward traditional
leaders, 25, 26, 120–122, 126,
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129, 133, 134, 141, 166; as a
model, 33, 144, 282; civil ser-
vice, 40; principles of repre-
sentation, 226, 236; opposes
Micronesia split, 242; state leg-
islators, 284–287, 301; Micro-
nesian attitudes toward, 356,
397–400, 401–403. Also see
United States Congress
United States Commercial Co., 61,
62
United States Congress: enacts
laws for territory, 34; considers
Organic Act, 51, 178, 179, 188,
189–192, 193; attitude toward
trading companies, 61, 205; as
a model, 98, 302, 306, 309; au-
thorizes Trusteeship Agree-
ment, 187; committee visits,
189, 398, 399; measures relat-
ing to Micronesia, 204, 350,
355, 381; relations with high
commissioner, 345; policy to-
ward Micronesia, 384, 392,
397, 402, 403
United States Department of the
Interior: administers Microne-
sia, 17, 18, 20, 54, 179–181,
182, 183, 187, 188, 190, 381,
385, 390; jurisdiction over
American Samoa, 189; role in
Congress of Micronesia, 197,
199, 200, 204, 205, 217; Office
of Territories, 382
United States Department of
State: drafts Organic Act, 188;
concern with Micronesia’s sta-
tus, 402
United States Navy: administers Mi-
cronesia, 14, 17, 51, 179–181,
182, 183, 374, 380; administers
Marianas, 31, 185, 390; colonial
training, 40n; jurisdiction over
American Samoa, 189; veto on
foreign visitors, 383
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics: criticizes U.S., 6, 192, 194,
195; attitude toward Microne-
sia, 385, 386, 387
Utagai, Woleai (Yap district): meet-
ings, 174, 175
Weloy, Yap municipality, 160
Western Caroline Trading Co., 61,
63
Western Carolines: social struc-
ture, 6; districts, 31. See also
Caroline Islands
Western Islands (Truk district):
districting, 229, 235; voting,
268, 272
Western Samoa: traditional gov-
ernment, 123; nationhood, 389,
390
Woleai atoll (Yap district): status,
148; Outer Islands conference,
157; politics, 160, 162, 174,
176, 177; students on Ulithi,
175; districting, 240
Woleai region (Yap district): status,
148, 149, 151, 152
Woloi clan (Gagil, Yap), 149
Women: as district legislators, 86;
in politics, 276
Workshop for Congress of Micro-
nesia. See Congressmen, pre-
session workshop
World War I: effect on Micronesia,
10; effect on Yap, 382
World War II: influence on mining,
2; effect on Micronesia, 9, 14,
17, 21, 380, 382, 385; effect on
Yap, 150
Yalmai, Woleai chief, 160, 174,
175, 176
Yanaihara, Tadao: quoted, 25
Yap district: municipal government,
24; traditional government, 120,
143–156, 170, 240; congressmen
from, 159, 160, 163, 165, 168,
170, 171, 297n, 298n, 313, 316,
318, 340; anthropologist, 160;
representation in congress, 202,
222, 223, 224, 226; map, 233; dis-
tricting, 235, 236–238, 240;
congressional election, 245, 256,
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260, 269, 270, 272, 278; religion,
280–281; delegation sponsors
measures, 357, 358, 362, 363
Yap district administration: estab-
lished, 30, 31; cooperates with
Council, 155; insists on single
government for district, 159; al-
locates tax money, 169; relation
to legislature, 172; congres-
sional apportionment plan, 227
Yap Islands (Yap district): social
structure, 3, 4, 5; German rule,
9; status, 10, 389, 398; in Palau
district, 52; relation with Outer
Islands, 144–145, 149, 150–152,
157, 159, 161, 163–167; negoti-
ating committee members, 160;
representation in legislature,
162, 173; tax source, 163, 166;
Sokehs exiles on, 240. See also
Outer Islands (Yap district)
Yap Islands Council: functions,
155–160 passim, 163–168
passim; role in congressional
election, 249, 256; petitions
U.N., 399
Yap legislature: antecedents, 47;
powers, 70; structure, 75, 78,
79; charter, 76–77, 453–458;
membership, 82, 86; procedure,
95, 96, 97; role of chiefs, 102,
169; budget, 109; relationships,
119, 249, 256; planning district
legislature, 156–160, 377; dis-
trict negotiations, 160–177; pe-
titions U.N., 399
Yap Magistrates Council, 151–155
passim
Yapese Empire. See Outer Islands
(Yap district)
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